The fate of Yeltsin's retinue: oblivion and criminality. Rutskoi said: “Go with the white flag

At the end of September - beginning of October 2013. Russia recalls one of the most dramatic episodes of its formation as a state - the dispersal of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, also known as the shelling of the White House or the October putsch.

These events, which were caused by the constitutional crisis facing the young country, made Russia a presidential republic. Moscow again turned into a field for revolutionary experiments, which already happened in 1991, but this time everything ended much more tragically, although the current government managed not only to maintain, but also to consolidate its position.

RBC recalls the main characters of this drama, which took place in the Russian capital 20 years ago.

Boris Yeltsin- first president of the Russian Federation. He became a key player in the October putsch. Together with the head of government Viktor Chernomyrdin and the mayor of Moscow, he opposed the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutsky, who were supported by most of the people's deputies.

On December 10, 1992, the day after the Congress of People's Deputies accused Yegor Gaidar of failing economic reforms and did not approve his candidacy for the post of Prime Minister, Boris Yeltsin tried to disrupt the work of the Congress and actually provoked the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993.

It was B. Yeltsin on March 20, 1993. made a televised address to the people, in which he announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a “special procedure for governing the country,” but a few days later it turned out that the president had signed a completely different decree. This saved Boris Yeltsin from impeachment, since the actual text of the decree did not contain gross violations of the Constitution.

April 25, 1993 An All-Russian referendum took place, remembered by the residents of the country for the advertising slogan “Yes - yes - no - yes.” Based on its results, it turned out that the majority of Russians support Boris Yeltsin, approve of his socio-economic policies, do not want early presidential elections and do not want early elections of people's deputies.

September 21, 1993 B. Yeltsin's conflict with the legislative authorities has entered the final stage. The President signed Decree No. 1400 “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” which terminated the work of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, introduced a temporary system of government bodies and scheduled elections to the State Duma for December 11-12.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Boris Yeltsin's actions were unconstitutional, on the basis of which the Supreme Council decided to terminate his presidential powers and transfer them to Vice President A. Rutsky.

The confrontation between Boris Yeltsin and people's deputies reached its climax on October 3-4, 1993. After supporters of the Supreme Council seized the Moscow City Hall building on Novy Arbat and attempted to seize the television center in Ostankino, Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in the capital. It was the first president of Russia who decided to storm the White House using tanks.

After the seizure of the White House, R. Khasbulatov, A. Rutskoy and a number of other leaders of the Supreme Council were detained and placed in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center, but in February 1994. they were amnestied (although their trial never took place) by the newly elected State Duma.

After his victory, Boris Yeltsin began a large-scale reform of the Russian political system, signing a decree “On legal regulation during the period of phased constitutional reform” and actually giving himself the functions of a legislator. On December 12, a popular vote took place on the new Constitution of Russia, as well as elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council.

The subsequent activities of B. Yeltsin are associated, first of all, with the Chechen conflict and the 1996 presidential elections. and the election campaign under the slogan “Vote or lose”, the denomination of the ruble, the crisis of 1998, the concepts of “family” and “seven bankers” and the expression “dashing 90s” so beloved by the current government.

In May 1999 The State Duma unsuccessfully tried to raise the issue of removing Boris Yeltsin from office, but on December 31, 1999. the first president himself left office, uttering the famous “I’m tired, I’m leaving” and appointing him as his successor. On the same day, the former prime minister signed a decree guaranteeing Boris Yeltsin protection from prosecution.

June 12, 2001 B. Yeltsin was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 1st degree. According to Boris Nemtsov, while in retirement, B. Yeltsin was extremely irritated that under V. Putin freedom of speech began to be curtailed and the institution of elections was destroyed, although he did not speak out about this publicly.

B. Yeltsin died on April 23, 2007. at the age of 76, and on April 25 he was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery with military honors.

Alexander Rutskoy- first and last vice president of the Russian Federation. Initially, together with R. Khasbulatov, he supported the policies pursued by B. Yeltsin and even on March 11, 1991. signed a letter directed against a group of members of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, who formed the opposition to B. Yeltsin and invited him to resign as Chairman of the Council.

June 12, 1991 he was elected vice president together with Russian President B. Yeltsin. A. Rutsky had a conflict with the head of state after he openly criticized E. Gaidar’s “shock therapy,” calling his office “boys in pink pants.” In addition, A. Rutskoy opposed the abolition of the USSR and criticized the Belovezhskaya Agreement, comparing it with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918. At the same time, he met with Mikhail Gorbachev and convinced him to arrest B. Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich. As a result, an irritated Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the transfer of a number of structures subordinate to the vice president to the government.

During the constitutional crisis of 1993, on September 1, B. Yeltsin, by his decree, removed A. Rutsky from all duties, but the Supreme Council sent a petition to the Constitutional Court with a request to verify the compliance of this decree with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. According to the deputies, B. Yeltsin invaded the sphere of powers of the judicial authorities. The decree was suspended until the case was considered by the Constitutional Court.

After B. Yeltsin signed decree No. 1400 on September 21, and the Constitutional Court issued a conclusion on the unconstitutionality of the actions of the head of state, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on the termination of B. Yeltsin’s presidential powers and their transfer to A. Rutsky. He took office on the night of September 22 and canceled B. Yeltsin’s anti-constitutional decree.

One of the first decrees of A. Rutsky was the appointment of security ministers. Vladislav Achalov became Minister of Defense, Viktor Barannikov became Minister of Security, acting. Minister of Internal Affairs - Andrey Dunaev. On October 3, A. Rutskoy from the balcony of the White House called for an assault on the Moscow City Hall and Ostankino. Subsequently, he admitted that the decision to send people to storm the television center was wrong: “Of course, it was a mistake. I didn’t want blood, but my nerves are in a ball.” On the same day, B. Yeltsin signed a decree releasing A. Rutsky from the post of Vice President of Russia.

On October 4, A. Rutskoy led the defense of the White House. Early in the morning he drove around the House of Soviets in a Mercedes to inspect the forces entrusted to him. When tanks opened fire on the White House, one of the shells hit A. Rutsky’s office. “The first shell hit the meeting room, the second - into R. Khasbulatov’s office, the third - into mine. Moreover, they hit with high-explosive shells, and not blanks, as they claim today. The building will not burn from blanks. I was sitting in my office when the shell "I went through the window and exploded in the right corner. Fortunately, my table was on the left. I jumped out of there, crazy. I don’t know what saved me," said the former vice president.

In the evening of the same day, A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov and Albert Makashov were arrested and taken to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. The former head of B. Yeltsin's security service, Alexander Korzhakov, said that he had the task of “chopping” A. Rutsky and R. Khasbulatov, but it was impossible to do this, since they hid in the crowd of deputies. Together with other participants in the October putsch, A. Rutskoy was amnestied in February 1993.

Later, he explained his behavior during the “Yeltsin coup”: “I hope that by the end of his life he still understood what really happened then, in 1993. I didn’t rebel against him, but against the team, against the people who then B. Yeltsin was surrounded. I want to believe that he knew this. Some time after those events, he nevertheless fired those who were around him at that time: E. Gaidar, G. Burbulis, M. Poltoranin ... Then A. Korzhakova."

After his release, A. Rutskoy no longer participated in the struggle for senior government positions, but in 1996. was elected governor of the Kursk region and held this post for four years. He currently lives in Odintsovo and is the chairman of the board of directors of a cement plant located in the Voronezh region.

Ruslan Khasbulatov since October 29, 1991 - Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. Even before the constitutional crisis arose, B. Yeltsin proposed to dismiss the government of E. Gaidar, but at that moment the majority of people's deputies did not support him. After the president on September 21, 1993. signed a decree on constitutional reform and dissolved the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, R. Khasbulatov convened a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council and stated the termination of Boris Yeltsin's powers and their transfer to Vice President A. Rutsky.

Later, the president's actions were qualified by R. Khasbulatov and his supporters-deputies as an attempt at a coup. The Congress of People's Deputies scheduled September 23 for March 1994. early presidential elections contrary to the results of the referendum.

During the putsch, R. Khasbulatov, together with A. Rutsky and other leaders of the Supreme Council, led the defense of the White House. On October 1, an attempt was made at peace negotiations between supporters of Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Council through the mediation of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Rus'. As a result, an agreement was signed to record and deposit all weapons held by those who defended the House of Soviets. After the signing of “Protocol No. 1,” electricity was supplied to the building and journalists were allowed in, and the access regime was relaxed, however, due to the intervention of R. Khasbulatov, the Congress of People’s Deputies denounced this agreement and the negotiations were stopped.

On October 3, R. Khasbulatov called on Russian soldiers to “storm the Kremlin with the usurper - former criminal Yeltsin,” saying that B. Yeltsin should be imprisoned in “Sailor’s Silence.” After the October events, he, along with A. Rutsky, was accused of organizing the seizure of the Moscow City Hall, but a State Duma commission later came to the conclusion that the seizure was carried out before their calls were made and occurred spontaneously. In addition, R. Khasbulatov disowned the accusations of organizing the storming of the television center. According to him, he called for “to position all the people as in August 1991, around the perimeter of the Supreme Council,” but “provocateurs” led them to take Ostankino.

When the shelling of the White House began on October 4, one of the shells hit R. Khasbulatov’s office, but the head of the Supreme Council was not injured. After B. Yeltsin’s supporters took the House of Soviets, General Mikhail Barsukov brought R. Khasbulatov’s personal smoking pipe to the president as a trophy, which B. Yeltsin smashed against the wall. A. Rutskoy speaks about the role of R. Khasbulatov in the October events as follows: “If there had been another person in R. Khasbulatov’s place, perhaps everything would have gone differently. He was sitting then, huddled in a corner - neither visible nor heard. He's puffing out his cheeks now."

After the victory of B. Yeltsin's supporters, R. Khasbulatov was arrested and placed in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. He was charged with organizing mass riots, but in February 1994. he was released under an amnesty from the State Duma. In October 2010 R. Khasbulatov reported that a group of Russian deputies is preparing an appeal to the International Court regarding the events of October 2010.

After his release, R. Khasbulatov became head of the department of world economics at the Plekhanov Russian Academy. In the same year, he tried to fulfill the “peacekeeping mission of Professor Khasbulatov”, setting himself the task of organizing peace negotiations between the leader of the Chechen separatists Dzhokhar Dudayev and the anti-Dudaev coalition, as well as the Russian authorities. However, this initiative turned out to be a failure. After hostilities began in Chechnya, R. Khasbulatov returned to Moscow, where he continued to work at the institute. In 2003 he stated that he intended to take part in the presidential elections in Chechnya and was able to win in the first round, but did not keep his promise.

Valery Zorkin- Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 1991-1993. and since 2003 During the period of the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993, which preceded the dispersal of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, he actively participated in negotiations between representatives of the branches of government. In particular, on his initiative in December 1992. Negotiations between Russian President B. Yeltsin and Chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov took place.

When on March 20, 1993 B. Yeltsin made a televised address to the people, in which he announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a “special order of governing the country.” The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation declared his actions unconstitutional and found grounds for removal from office. September 21-22, 1993 The Constitutional Court, chaired by V. Zorkin, issued a conclusion on the unconstitutionality of the president’s actions. This allowed the Supreme Council to adopt a resolution to terminate the powers of President Boris Yeltsin from the moment of issuing the famous Decree No. 1400.

After the shelling of the White House, on October 7, 1993, V. Zorkin, under threat of criminal prosecution on charges of “legal support for a constitutional coup,” resigned from the post of chairman of the Constitutional Court, retaining his powers as a judge. Only on March 21, 2003. he was again elected chairman of the Constitutional Court. To this day, he continues to perform his duties.

V. Zorkin reacted negatively to demonstrations in defense of fair elections that took place in Moscow and other large Russian cities after massive fraud in the State Duma elections in December 2011. The Chairman of the Constitutional Court is confident that “the passions of the rally were fueled from abroad,” as in 1993, and the Russian Federation is more suited to people who will not “castigate vices,” but “work patiently.” At the same time, he compared the Russian opposition with Chatsky from Griboyedov’s “Woe from Wit.”

Yegor Gaidar- one of the most controversial figures in Russian politics, the first Minister of Finance of Russia, the ideologist of large-scale reforms that allowed the country to make the transition to a market economy.

Refusal of the Congress of People's Deputies to approve E. Gaidar as head of the Council of Ministers in December 1992. became one of the reasons for the political crisis in the Russian Federation. Later, he described the current situation as follows: “Everything suggests that constitutional resources have been exhausted. The people were asked at the referendum, they received an unequivocal answer, and now, contrary to their opinion, the coalition of communists, nationalists and simple crooks demands the removal of the president, whom they convincingly supported just recently Russia".

After the publication of Decree No. 1400 and the refusal of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies to dissolve, E. Gaidar became one of the initiators of establishing a blockade of the White House, turning off electricity and sewerage in it, as well as banning the appearance of A. Rutsky, R. Khasbulatov and their supporters on television .

When supporters of the putsch organized an assault on the Moscow City Hall and the television center, E. Gaidar decided to turn to Muscovites for support. On the evening of October 3, he appeared on television, declaring that “at this hour it is not enough to rely only on the police and security services,” and calling on “all Russians who value democracy and freedom” to gather at the Moscow City Council building.

After this appeal, thousands of supporters of B. Yeltsin came to the building of the Moscow City Council, which was under the control of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Barricades were built on Tverskaya and adjacent streets. Self-defense units were formed from volunteers, which were used, in particular, to protect a number of objects, including the Ekho Moskvy radio station. At the same time, E. Gaidar received a guarantee from the chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations that, if necessary, weapons would be distributed to demonstrators supporting the president. Later, E. Gaidar noted that only after these measures, around 02:00 Moscow time on October 4, the military began to carry out Boris Yeltsin’s orders, and the troops moved to Moscow to storm the White House.

After President B. Yeltsin’s victory in the confrontation with the Supreme Council, E. Gaidar, who was the chairman of the “Russia’s Choice” electoral bloc, which united supporters of continuing market reforms, headed the list of candidates in the State Duma elections. Election posters with his portrait were accompanied by the slogan: “They say it all... He does it.” However, the bloc received only 15% of the votes in the elections, losing to the Liberal Democratic Party.

As first deputy head of government and acting. Minister of Economy of the Russian Federation E. Gaidar continued his course towards reducing inflation, as well as tightening budget and monetary policies. However, in the new government, he said, the ability to pursue such a policy was “very limited.” In January 1994 V. Chernomyrdin announced economic decisions related to another increase in budget spending and the risk of inflation. E. Gaidar was not even informed about this. January 13, 1994 he wrote a letter to B. Yeltsin, noting that he could not be in the government and in opposition to it at the same time, and seven days later he resigned.

In 1996-1999. E. Gaidar was a member of the board of directors of OJSC from 1994 to 2001. was the chairman of the Democratic Choice of Russia party. To participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The democratic bloc “Union of Right Forces” was formed, which included E. Gaidar’s party. Later, SPS was transformed into a party, and E. Gaidar became its co-chairman along with Irina Khakamada.

He insisted that SPS support him in the 2000 presidential elections. In the State Duma (1999-2003) he was a member of the Committee on Budget and Taxes. According to him, the most successful reforms in which he took part were tax reform, reform of fiscal federalism, and the creation of the Stabilization Fund. E. Gaidar openly opposed the “YUKOS case”. In his opinion, “a stronger move aimed at stopping economic growth in Russia has not happened for a long time.”

November 24, 2006 During an international conference in Dublin, at which E. Gaidar presented his book “The Death of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia,” he was hospitalized in one of the city hospitals with symptoms of severe poisoning. expressed the opinion that this is connected with the murder of A. Politkovskaya and A. Litvinenko: “The miraculously not completed deadly construction of Politkovskaya - Litvinenko - Gaidar would be extremely attractive to supporters of unconstitutional forceful options for changing power in Russia.” E. Gaidar himself spoke in a similar way: “Some of the obvious or hidden opponents of the Russian authorities are behind what happened.”

In recent years, E. Gaidar has written a lot about the need to build a functioning democracy in Russia. “What do you think you feel when it seems to you that you have already pulled your country out of the quagmire, and then you see how it is being pulled back into it?” he noted in an interview.

Former Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, President and Chairman of the Board of VTB24 Bank Mikhail Zadornov noted that “people little knew how serious E. Gaidar’s influence was on economic decision-making in Russia - even in recent years, when he did not hold any positions.”

E. Gaidar died on December 16, 2009. at the age of 53 years. In Moscow, in the building of the Higher School of Economics (SU-HSE) on Pokrovsky Boulevard, a monument to the former Minister of Finance was unveiled.

... and others

Pillars of the Yeltsin camp in 1993 There were Chairman of the Council of Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, his deputy Konstantin Kobets, Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin, Mayor of Moscow, Head of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation Alexander Korzhakov, Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Sergei Filatov, as well as General Valery Evnevich, whose troops directly led shelling of the White House and dispersed the Supreme Council.

The key figures in the camp of the putschists, in addition to A. Rutsky and R. Khasbulatov, were generals Vladislav Achalov, Albert Makashov and Viktor Barannikov, the leader of Labor Russia Viktor Anpilov, the founder and leader of the nationalist movement "Russian National Unity" Alexander Barkashov, the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Yuri Voronin, member of the Supreme Council and co-chairman of the National Salvation Front Ilya Konstantinov, his colleague Sergei Baburin, deputy chairman of the nationalist party Russian People's Union Viktor Alksnis, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation Ramazan Abdulatipov, V. Achalov's assistant Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov and others .

According to the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, as a result of mass riots in Moscow from September 21 to October 4, 1993. More than 6 thousand people were detained. On the evening of October 4, after the victory of B. Yeltsin's coalition, Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy, leader of the Union of Officers Albert Makashov and Chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov were arrested. Later, several more known participants in the confrontation were detained.

A criminal case was initiated against them and other participants in the events. The investigative team included more than two hundred people; several episodes were investigated, including the storming of the television center in Ostankino, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to create a real picture of what was happening. The main defendants in the case were R. Khasbulatov, A. Rutskoy, V. Achalov, V. Barannikov, as well as A. Makashov and several of his subordinates. All of them were taken to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center on the day of B. Yeltsin’s victory. They spent several months there, until the prison amnesty, which was announced in February 1994. The accused were released and the proceedings in the case were discontinued.

According to the conclusion of the Russian State Duma commission investigating the events of September-October 1993, the fact that the participants in the October putsch avoided criminal prosecution made it impossible for those injured during the riots to receive any compensation for damage to health or property.

After the announcement of the amnesty, in March 1994. Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Filatov, wanting to punish B. Yeltsin’s opponents, compiled, in fact, a black list of deputies who did not resign from the Supreme Council until October 3, 1993. There were 151 people in it. No social benefits were any longer valid for these persons. This measure, however, did not work for long - in April of the same year, the black list was canceled by presidential decree. Almost all the main characters of the political arena in the fall of 1993. found their place in politics or business.

First Deputy Head of the Armed Forces Yuri Voronin, who was a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was elected to the State Duma several times. He worked as an auditor of the Accounts Chamber, but was removed from office upon reaching 65 years of age - the maximum age for civil service. Now Yu. Voronin heads the organization for maintaining connections between Russians and compatriots who remain abroad, “Russian Fatherland”. He is a member of the Russian Academy of Technological Sciences.

Sergei Baburin, who previously headed the Supreme Council Committee on Economic Reform, was until last year the rector of the Russian State Trade and Economic University (RGTEU). In 2012 he was fired by the Minister of Education Dmitry Livanov, according to one version, because students strongly opposed the merger of their university with the Plekhanov Russian Academy of Economics, according to another, because of the weak results and high corruption of the university. After the events of the autumn of 1993. S. Baburin was repeatedly elected to the State Duma. Currently heads the political party "Russian All-People's Union".

People's Deputy and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Salvation Front of the Armed Forces Ilya Konstantinov after 1993. became involved in social activities in 2008. joined A Just Russia, but soon left it due to ideological differences with the party’s policies. Later he joined the Russian All-People's Union party of S. Baburin. In 2012 I. Konstantinov took part in the “Russian March” in Moscow.

Another bright representative of the political arena of October 1993. - Colonel General Albert Makashov. Then he was the head of defense of the White House. After his release from Lefortovo, he was repeatedly elected to the State Duma and developed legislation in the field of military reform. He became known among parliamentarians for his anti-Semitic statements. In 2005 joined the signatories of the resonant “Letter 5000”.

After his release from Lefortovo, Viktor Barannikov died of a stroke. Vladislav Achalov ran for the State Duma and for a long time headed the Union of Russian Paratroopers. In 2011 the general died.

Appointed during the October events of 1993. As an assistant to the Russian Minister of Defense, the leader of the Union of Officers, Stanislav Terekhov, twice ran for the State Duma, but was not elected. He took the post of co-chairman of the far-right National Power Party of Russia (NDPR). In 2012 participated in the "Russian March".

Leader of Russian National Unity Alexander Barkashov, who in 1993 came out in support of the Supreme Council, after the shelling of the White House he ran for the State Duma, but his organization was banned. In 2005 Information appeared in the media that A. Barkashov took monastic vows in the “True Orthodox Church”. His religious followers organized their own movement, which they named after the politician - “Alexander Barkashov”.

Active participant in the October 1993 riots. Viktor Anpilov, as a result of the dispersal of the Supreme Council, was also arrested, but not on October 4, but a few days later at his dacha. He also faced imprisonment in the Lefortovo detention center, where he remained until his release under an amnesty in February of the following year. V. Anpilov ran for the State Duma, although unsuccessfully. In 1999 joined the unregistered National Bolshevik party of Eduard Limonov, “The Other Russia”. In 2006 took part in one of the “Dissent Marches”. Currently heads the executive committee of the Other Russia movement.

Viktor Alksnis, who was the deputy chairman of the nationalist party "All-Russian People's Union", was a deputy of the State Duma of the 3rd and 4th convocations. Currently he is the mayor of the village of Tuchkovo, Moscow region.

Ramazan Abdulatipov, who in September-October 1993. represented the Supreme Council in negotiations between the president and parliament, to date he has achieved the greatest success among those who were part of the putschist camp - he is the head of Dagestan.

As stated in the conclusion of the State Duma commission to investigate the events of September-October 1993, the severity of the consequences of what happened and to this day all domestic legal means in relation to persons whose actions led to these consequences do not allow us to relate to the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993. like a turned page of Russian history.

“A final and fair resolution of issues related to the consequences of the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993 is possible only if persons whose actions related to abuse of power became the original cause of these events are held accountable under the law,” the document notes. .

Today marks the 20th anniversary of the storming of the Ostankino television center on October 3, 1993 and the subsequent shelling of the White House.

The key participants in those events on the part of opponents of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speaking about them today, place different emphasis. Alexander Rutskoy regrets the victims and believes that this should not happen again; Ruslan Khasbulatov is sure that it was necessary to act more harshly and “take power into our own hands.”

On the eve of the memorable date, ex-chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov and former vice-president of the Russian Federation A. Rutskoy attended the pre-premiere screening of the documentary film by NTV columnist Vladimir Chernyshev “White House, Black Smoke,” dedicated to the tragic events of October 1993.

A. Rutskoy, in a conversation with journalists, expressed words of regret in connection with the deaths of civilians at that time, but rejected accusations that members of the Supreme Council were involved in this.

“We are accused of creating all the conditions for a civil war, but we, on the contrary, did everything possible and impossible to prevent it,” said A. Rutskoy.

He added that the investigation, which continued for a year after the October events, found that “not a single person was killed from the weapons seized from members of the Supreme Council.” A. Rutskoy placed responsibility for the murders of citizens on his opponents.

“As for the events at the Ostankino television center. If you look at archival videos and take still pictures, you can see where they are shooting from. From the building they shoot at people on the square in front of Ostankino and from infantry fighting vehicles and KPVT heavy machine guns. "Who was in the building? Internal troops, police. Who gave them the command to shoot at people?" - said A. Rutskoy.

He remembered the snipers, whose participation in those events was officially established during the investigation, but who led them was never clarified.

“As for snipers, the Supreme Council did not have sniper rifles. Journalist Mark Deitch in the magazine “Capital” published an interview with an FSB general on the question of whose snipers they were. This general tells Deitch: Korzhakov met 25 sports guys in Vnukovo physique, they went to Fryazino - there was a special forces brigade of internal troops there, where they received sniper rifles. And whose snipers were they then? " - said A. Rutskoy.

He explained his threats to “take aviation into the air” as an “emotional outburst” and said that he had no serious intentions of involving aviation in this conflict. "When you're indoors and there's artillery being fired at the building around you, how do you feel?" - noted A. Rutskoy.

He complained that for many years these events have been surrounded by “sweeping lies,” but expressed confidence that “history and time will put everything in its place.”

“The public will know what really happened in 1993. For what reasons should they know the truth? So that this never happens again,” said A. Rutskoy.

R. Khasbulatov, in turn, said that B. Yeltsin’s opponents had to act more harshly. “Now I would turn them all into a ram’s horn. And I would put them on trial. I would not rely on either the acting president or his useless ministers. It was necessary to act tougher, very tough, given the actions that were taken by that side,” - he said.

According to him, “on the other side there were bankrupt rebels who were unable to lead the country.”

“The country was on the verge of an uprising. They couldn’t cope and plunged people into poverty, but they wanted to blame it on parliamentarians. In fact, there was no power, and they just had to take it,” said R. Khasbulatov.

He noted that he still considers “parliamentary democracy the most adequate political system for Russia.” In his opinion, at the moment there is no opposition as such.

“There have been attempts to do something since 2011, but you see what kind of reprisals are taking place. And, by the way, Yeltsin led demonstrations of 100 thousand people, did not ask anyone, walked through stadiums, along the streets of Moscow, no one threw him into jail. And now people are being apprehended because they were allegedly beating up policemen, it’s funny and ugly,” said R. Khasbulatov.

Both A. Rutskoy and R. Khasbulatov do not see themselves in Russian politics today. A. Rutskoy admitted that he had several attempts to return to the political field, but they all ended in nothing. R. Khasbulatov even exclaims: “How will I return to politics? I was kicked out, what are you saying? I was thrown out of big politics!”

The political crisis of 1993 between the two branches of Russian power - the executive represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislative represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, on October 3-4 in Moscow turned into an armed clash and ended with a tank shelling of the parliament - House of Soviets (White House). According to various sources, about 200 people became victims of these events, at least 1 thousand were injured. The confrontation was motivated by differences in the ideas of the parties to the conflict about reforming the constitutional structure, about the new Constitution, as well as about the ways of socio-economic development of Russia.

The most vivid memories of Russians in the autumn of 1993

Twenty years later, Russians still find it difficult to give a definite assessment of the events of the autumn of 1993, reports the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) based on the results of its research.

Every third (36%) of 1,500 Russians admitted that they took the events of October 3-4, 1993 to heart. What was happening did not evoke any emotions in a fifth (21%) of respondents, and 31% of participants in the September survey, which was conducted in 100 settlements of 43 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, reported that they were still very young, or had not yet been born at the time of the crisis.

Describing, at the request of sociologists, their most vivid memories of those days, 9% of respondents pointed to tanks on the streets of the capital and the storming of the White House, 7% most remembered the moments of armed clashes, the feeling of approaching war. 6% associate the October events with feelings of fear and panic. 4% of respondents recall the political background, or, more precisely, the confrontation between the President of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Council.

Every fifth (19%) Russian said that during the events of 1993 he did not support either side of the conflict. A sixth of those surveyed (16%) admitted that they adhered to the position of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation; slightly less (14%) sympathized with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 13% of respondents could not remember their point of view, 7% were unable to definitely answer the question about their preferences.

Looking back, more than half (57%) could not determine whose side was right in those events. A fifth (20%) of respondents assume that the position of the Supreme Council was correct, in particular because B. Yeltsin subsequently pursued an anti-people policy (“everything is destroyed, but nothing has been created”), the Supreme Council tried to preserve the Soviet Union (according to 4%), defended the interests of the people (2%). Only 9% now support the position of the then-current president, since the country needed changes (2%), and B. Yeltsin advocated democratic changes, under him life began to improve (1% each). At the same time, 15% believe that there were no rightists among the participants in the conflict.

According to the relative majority (43%) of Russians, if the Supreme Council, and not the president’s supporters, had won, Russia would have developed differently. At the same time, 42% could not imagine a hypothetical situation. Every sixth (15%) noted that the country would still have followed the same path.

There is no need to introduce Alexander Rutsky to our readers. Until now, many people have heard his name. And it still causes mixed reactions - primarily in connection with the events of the autumn of 1993. Then, 10 years ago, his name was a kind of banner. Many sincerely believed in this banner, but many cleverly hid in its shadow. That is why today, on the tenth anniversary of those tragic events, we cannot do without Rutskoi.

“Alexander Vladimirovich, how did your disagreements with Boris Yeltsin begin?

Our relations generally developed along a sine wave, and soon after the elections, when I became vice president, this sine wave somehow went down sharply.

What did this depend on?

From the whisperers. Burbulis constantly sang to him that I was filing the chair under the president. And the main whisperer was Korzhakov.

Did you have a tense relationship with him?

Externally - normal. But, apparently, this is the psychology of this person: it is imperative to throw mud at someone. You read his book about Yeltsin, everything will be clear.

Somewhat later, Korzhakov and I had an interesting story. Of course, I don’t have direct evidence, but no one else does. Once they invited me to ZIL, the workers there rebelled. The salary was about 340 rubles a month, then with this money you could buy a couple of kilos of meat and a kilo of butter. In short, you can’t feed your family. Well, I went. Calm down. Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov was also present there. I got excited and told the workers: when Boris Nikolayevich returns from vacation, I’ll ask him to allow me to assign my security to Nechaev (then Minister of Economy), and let’s see how this scoundrel will live on 340 rubles.

Yeltsin returned and called me to the dacha to celebrate his birthday. Let's go. He has Burbulis, Barannikov, Korzhakov, and someone else there. Before we had time to say hello, Yeltsin said to me: “Well, give me 340 rubles.” And turns on the recording. Everyone is listening. And that means it’s like that there. My words were “edited”, Nechaev was removed, and it turned out: they say, Boris Nikolaevich will return, I will assign my guards to him, give him 340 rubles and see how this scoundrel will live on them.

I see Korzhakov smiling so disgustingly.

And then Barannikov intervened. He asks: “Boris Nikolaevich, who gave you this recording?” And he, Barannikov, had a habit: to record what happened at such rallies. He took out his cassette, inserted it into the recorder and turned it on. Yeltsin listened, grabbed the recorder and slammed it against the wall. And then he says to me: “Okay, let's get to work. I entrust agriculture to you.”

This is after his decree on the dissolution of collective farms and the creation on their basis - in one year! - 200 thousand farms?

Well, yes. Pure scam. He and I had many clashes about this. In the end, he appointed me chairman of the interdepartmental commission to combat corruption. After a while I bring him a very sharp report. He leafed through the report and said with a grin: “Well, well.” That's all. And then I found out that Yeltsin was retelling everything to those about whom I wrote in the report. It was then that I decided to speak at the Supreme Council.

After this memorable meeting you were removed?

That’s where we parted ways with Yeltsin. The next day I come to work, and the guard says to me: “Sorry, but the president has forbidden you to enter the Kremlin territory.”

Were you and Khasbulatov like-minded people?

Never. We are completely different people. But then, in August 1993, we united. They decided to hold a congress and sent telegrams to the deputies. Telegrams also poured in from the Kremlin with all sorts of promises - only that no one would come.

How did the communists behave?

What kind of communists they are! They are changelings. They are like a flag in a bathhouse: whichever direction the wind goes, the flag goes there. Remember 1993: where did their leader go after the meeting of the Supreme Council? He said that he was going to raise the masses. And on September 23rd he disappeared. And no one saw him again. Later, however, we saw Mr. Zyuganov on television. He called on the people “not to support the rebels,” “not to participate in the confrontation.”

And then, at the end of the same year, the same “communists” came to the Duma, they were the majority there. And all these laws on privatization - in other words, a signal for the total plunder of the country - were adopted with their active participation.

But was there still a quorum?

Even with excess. So everything was completely legal. We also invited Boris Nikolaevich. In response to our invitation, we were surrounded by barbed wire, dogs, communications, electricity, water, sewerage were cut off... You know what happened next.

Much is known, but some questions still remain. What was the impetus for the confrontation to escalate into an armed conflict?

Terekhov's provocation. Well, the same one who runs some kind of “union of officers.” With several of his people, he tried to capture the headquarters of the CIS troops, although no one instructed him to do this. In addition - and this is very important - his people had weapons with the numbers filed off. The guards of the Supreme Council had their own weapons park. There was a machine gun, machine guns, and sniper rifles. Then, when the investigation began, it established: all the weapons of the Supreme Council remained in grease and were not fired. The cartridges remained in galvanized boxes.

Where did Terekhov’s people get the weapons, and even with the numbers cut off?

As they say, good question. But I don't have an answer to that. But I know that before appearing here in the White House, Terekhov met with the head of the FSK department for Moscow and the region, Evgeny Savostyanov. Draw conclusions.

I myself have some interesting questions. How were Terekhov and his men able to get through three or four chains of cordons surrounding the White House? And even with weapons? And how did the Barkashovites get to us, and also with their weapons?

Do you want to say that the coming of Terekhov with his people and the Barkashovites to you was a provocation of the special services?

I am one hundred percent sure of this. Their slogans that they hung out were “Beat the Jews, save Russia!” - part of the same provocation. I have repeatedly sent security to tear off these slogans. And several times fights broke out between the guards and Barkashov’s men.

Why didn't you kick them out of there?

Try putting them out in this mess. By the way, they left the White House through underground passages, which no one except the secret service workers could know about.

Let us suppose. But there is an episode for which you are personally responsible. I mean your call to your fellow pilots: take planes into the air and bomb the Kremlin. Would you still sign it today?

Now, ten years later, no. But try to imagine that situation. A two-week blockade, a complete lack of opportunity to express one’s position through the media, brutal beatings of people on the outskirts of the White House, the shooting of a demonstration near the city hall, the massacre at Ostankino, shooting from tanks at the building. The meeting room was hit with direct fire, with shells that pierced the wall and exploded inside the room. There were rivers of blood, guts on the walls, severed heads. I saw it all. I was probably wrong to make such an appeal. But it was almost unconscious. I don't know what another person would do in this situation. Later, in Lefortovo, I told the investigator the same thing: the fault is mine, I am responsible for everything.

How did the other defendants behave?

I had a chance to read some interrogation reports. I was ashamed of Khasbulatov. From the testimony of the “leader of the communists” Anpilov, I felt as if I was rolling around in shit. It was a shame to read the interrogation protocols of Yanaev and Makashov... Come on, God be with them all...

Snipers in October. How many were there? Who are they? Where?

This is one of the most mysterious pages of the October events of ten years ago. And it still remains a mystery. Of course, not the only one. For example, there are many answers to the question about the number of dead and wounded. This means that most likely none of them are reliable. However, some questions have no answers at all, and it is almost impossible to approach them. First of all, I mean snipers, whose role in those October days was discussed so much later in almost all the media. Who are these snipers? How many were there? Where did they come from? And where did they go later, when it was all over? And why weren't any of them caught?

In the book “Notes of the President,” Boris Yeltsin writes that on October 4, the special forces “Alpha” and “Vympel” refused to obey the order and storm the White House. Mikhail Barsukov, Lieutenant General, Head of the Main Directorate of Presidential Security, had to persuade them:

“Barsukov had difficulty convincing them to even just approach the White House,” Yeltsin recalls. - The fact that they are somewhere nearby will put psychological pressure on those holed up in the building, they will surrender sooner... Barsukov’s tactics were simple: try to pull them as close as possible to the building, to the fighting. Having felt the gunpowder, the fumes, having plunged into the whirlpool of shots and machine gun fire, they will go further forward.”

However, even approaching the White House, the special forces were in no hurry to storm. Right here - just in time! - Junior Lieutenant Sergeev was killed by a sniper's shot.

“After the Alpha fighters learned that their comrade had died,” Yeltsin continues, “many did not need to be persuaded. Almost the entire team went to liberate the “white house”. “Alpha” was led by Barsukov and the head of the presidential guard, Alexander Korzhakov.”

Yeltsin did not specify what kind of sniper he was. From the context it was necessary to understand that we were talking about a sniper shooting from the White House.

A year after these events, in 1994, I experienced a rare stroke of luck. A person agreed to answer my questions, whose last name and even first name I promised not to reveal under any circumstances. All I was allowed to say about him was that he was a high-ranking intelligence officer, and that part of the information (as far as I understood, very insignificant) that he shared with me was received by him from his subordinates and colleagues - professionals just like him myself. According to the terms of our agreement, even his voice on the tape was changed by me - an interview with him was broadcast in October 1994 on the waves of Radio Liberty, where I worked at that time.

Much of what you read about now may seem incredible even 10 years later. I can neither confirm nor deny this information. And my interlocutor did not need to confirm anything. He simply told me what he thought was possible. By the way, he continues to work in the same special service today - professionals of his level are always needed.

* * *

According to official and unofficial estimates, 100-110 professional snipers operated in Moscow in those days. There is a version that these are militants who arrived from Abkhazia and Transnistria. Indeed, there are professionals there, but they are few. According to the data I have, there were 8-10 of them in Moscow.

Not more?

Not more. There are actually few of them, professionals. In addition, it is very difficult to carry a sniper rifle even on a train. This is not a shortened assault rifle, this is not an AKS.

Maybe these were snipers from the former “Afghans” whom Kotenev brought to the White House? (Reserve Lieutenant Colonel A. Kotenev, Chairman of the Union of Afghan Veterans. His “Afghans” then sided with Boris Yeltsin. - M.D.)

In my opinion, no. I myself am a good shooter and I know that in order to prepare and train, a sniper needs to practice at least once a week. Former “Afghans” did not have such an opportunity. In addition, when they arrived at the White House, they were armed with pump-action shotguns and AKS. They didn't have sniper rifles.

True, there was another group that theoretically could have been able to introduce snipers into the combat area...

There were also snipers from the White House side, weren't there?

This is exactly what I want to talk about. It was there that the snipers from Abkhazia and Transnistria were located. But in the White House, according to the documents known to me, there were no more than 10 SVD rifles. If we keep in mind the other, opposing side, then the Kremlin guards include a platoon of “tracer-attics.” These people cover the president's route or equip their sectors during his public appearances. They were involved in the October events: even in the media there were reports that when the sniper was detained, he showed the ID of the special services, in particular the Ministry of Security. Employees of the Main Security Directorate have similar certificates - as cover documents. However, there are also very few such people with professional sniper skills. According to my information, some other forces were involved here.

What do you have in mind? According to a simple calculation, there were 20-25, well, 30 “October snipers” in total. But not 100-110! Where did the rest come from?

Let me start by saying that these were real professionals. The lieutenant of group “A”, which journalists dubbed “Alpha”, Sergeev, was killed by a bullet that hit between the upper border of the bulletproof vest and the lower border of the sphere. For civilians, I’ll explain: the sphere is a special protective helmet for special forces. According to information from investigators, the shot was fired from the technical room of the Kapranov factory, which is located next to the White House. This room was used for a long time by the KGB of the USSR to monitor the American embassy. The room in this room was equipped on September 27th.

What is it equipped with?

Everything necessary for sniper shift duty.

What is the boundary between the top of the body armor and the sphere? Is it accessible to the average shooter?

According to the data I received, for Sergeev this gap was about two centimeters. Only a professional of the highest class can get into it.

Are you ruling out an accidental shot?

I don't rule it out. But its probability is so insignificant that it can be neglected.

Another fact. The 119th Naro-Fominsk regiment, withdrawn from the Baltic states even before the October events (few people know about this - this regiment was also called “Achalovsky”, since before that it was commanded by Achalov, who was later appointed Minister of Defense of the White House by Rutsky. The regiment went to the aid of Rutsky This is what gave Achalov the basis to report to the deputies in the White House and Rutskoi that “loyal” troops were rushing towards them) - so, when this regiment approached the White House, senior lieutenant Krasnikov, private Korovushkin and corporal were killed by sniper shots ... (the corporal's name on the film turned out to be illegible; later I found out that it was Corporal Khikhin. - M.D.) Who shot at them?

After this, as I understand it, the mood in the 119th regiment changed dramatically?

Right.

In that technical room of the Kapranov factory - what else was discovered there? Besides what you've already talked about?

You still haven't said where all these snipers came from.

As an answer, I will offer you a few scattered facts.

In August, one of the people close to Korzhakov, General Prosvirin (Major General Boris Prosvirin, Deputy Chief of Security of the President of the Russian Federation - M.D.), through the Swiss station, established informal contacts with the intelligence services of several European states. On September 17, several groups of tourists flew from Cyprus to Sheremetyevo, among which there were only men. For some reason, documents about the arrival of these groups have not been preserved.

How do you know that they have not been preserved?

This is how my people informed me. As well as the fact that documents for the arrival of a certain rugby team have not been preserved, which, if I am not mistaken, was met by Korzhakov himself on September 27 at Sheremetyevo airport. There were no rugby competitions at that time either through the sports committee or through any sports clubs. Before this group met, first Korzhakov and then Prosvirin received SVD sniper rifles at the special purpose police armory in Reutov.

In what quantity?

According to the information I received, there are 50 and 52 rifles, respectively.

Here's another fact. In the Mir Hotel, from where - after the murder of Sergeev - there was shooting at the Alpha group, four corpses were subsequently found in one of the rooms. One of them is in the uniform of a police lieutenant colonel. According to my informants, this man was an employee of the Main Security Directorate. The other three are in civilian clothes, without documents.

With weapon?

Two SVD sniper rifles were found not far from them. It is impossible to say who they belonged to, since, as far as I know, no investigative actions were carried out regarding the deaths of these people.

I remember the Romanian events well. There, snipers, also not caught and not seen by anyone, shot both opposing sides - in order to thus free the hands of the stronger side. Among ourselves, we conventionally call this technique “picadilla.” During bullfights, there are people who deliberately anger the bull with small darts so that he appears more furious against the bullfighter. It seems to the audience that because of this the bull becomes scarier, but in fact it is safer.

Another interesting fact. Immediately after the October events, groups of men left Moscow, among whom one could recognize those who had flown in as rugby players or tourists from Cyprus. They left by train to Warsaw, Berlin and Bucharest. Moreover, they were traveling in those compartments for which, according to the practice established many years ago, tickets were sold using KGB armor...

Versions in this case are a thankless and even dangerous task. However, let's say - I emphasize: let's say - these people who flew to Moscow on the eve of the October events and left wearing KGB armor were those snipers unknown to us. Such use of foreign professionals - how widespread is this practice in relations between intelligence services?

I know of cases where the corporatism of the intelligence services turned out to be much stronger than the political ties of the heads of state. I also know of cases when specialists from the Russian special services, through their physical participation, helped in the fight against organized crime in European countries, where our compatriots were involved against the so-called “Russian mafia.”

Regarding the story with the snipers, I’ll tell you this. Unlike many military men, I am not a subscriber to the newspaper “Den” (now called “Zavtra.” - M.D.), which more than once built a delusional version about the arrival of Jewish militants in Moscow, from which combat detachments were formed here... Let's leave this version to the “patriots”. I just told you about some scattered facts that I received through my official channels.

More on this topic:

Alexander Rutskoi: “I don’t hold any grudge against Yeltsin”

"Newspaper", 03.10.2003, Svetlana Smetanina

Ten years ago, Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi announced that he was taking over the powers of the president and barricaded himself in the White House. The two-week confrontation between the Kremlin and parliament ended with the execution of the latter. Since then, Russia has never had vice presidents again. Alexander Rutskoy recalls the events of October 1993.

How has your attitude towards those events changed over the years?

It’s bad that the modern history of Russia began with a tragedy. As a result, all these sacrifices turned out to be unjustified: basic industries have collapsed, the country's natural resources have been seized, and the population is impoverished.

If you had won then, would Russia have taken a different path?

We did not fight for the division of portfolios, not for power. We were against this approach to reforms. From the very beginning it was clear to me what the experiments of amateurs would lead to. In 1993, the Congress of People's Deputies asked Yeltsin to give clarification: what were the goals of the reforms, to give a program. But only amendments to the Constitution were made, giving the president unlimited powers.

What did you count on when starting the confrontation with the Kremlin - the support of the people? Khasbulatov then called for blocking railways, oil pipelines, communications...

The people supported us - remember these demonstrations of many thousands. But you cannot resist force with your bare hands. We were surrounded by barbed wire and troops in three rows. How was it possible to get through this? We are accused of having criminals among our defenders. And I say - name the names. And when they say that people from RNU ended up in the White House, the question arises: how could they get through these three cordons, who let them through? This was done on purpose so that later they could point the finger - that’s who defended them. In general, there were a lot of provocations. The same Terekhov, for example, who organized all sorts of provocative military attacks. Where is this “defender of the people” now? Can't be seen or heard. All this talk about snipers from the White House is also nonsense. The investigation found that the bullets used to shoot the sniper victims were of a caliber that neither the army nor the police had in service. Where would they come from? In addition, all the weapons belonging to the Supreme Council, including sniper rifles, were in their places in a special room, where the Prosecutor General then described them.

Have you tried to find a compromise? Did you call Yeltsin?

It was impossible to contact Yeltsin. We negotiated with his representatives. Our demands were to announce new elections for both parliament and president, and to convene a constitutional assembly for the period of anarchy.

Khasbulatov in one of his interviews says that disagreements began between you very soon: he told you, “you are the president, well, go take your Kremlin.”

If there had been another person in Khasbulatov’s place, perhaps everything would have gone differently. He then sat huddled in a corner - neither visible nor heard. He's the one puffing out his cheeks now. And what did they say later during the investigation... When I left prison, I published all my interrogation reports - I had copies. I suggested to Khasbulatov, Makashov, other “great revolutionaries” - to Anpilov as well: publish your protocols, ten years have already passed. No, they are afraid.

So you don't communicate with any of them now?

No, I don't communicate. Zyuganov generally privatized these events. But I remember how in May 1993 Zyuganov escaped through Neskuchny Garden and abandoned the workers’ demonstration. And on September 24, they, together with another figure, Tuleyev, declared: we went to raise the proletariat, and no one saw them again. When Zyuganov begins to lash out at journalists, saying that they are discrediting the Communist Party, I think, look at yourself. Privatized something that doesn't belong to you. And people shed blood.

Do you think today that the trip to Ostankino was justified?

I stood at the window of the White House, and a demonstration was going on along Arbat. And I saw how a machine gun began firing from the city hall building, people began to fall. In a fit of anger, evil, despair and because we had no outlet in the media, people were directed to Ostankino. Of course it was a mistake. I didn't want blood. But my nerves are in a ball. We are sitting without electricity, without water, no communication...

Who exactly made these or those decisions?

I couldn't take it alone. Everything was decided collectively - Khasbulatov, Dunaev, Barannikov, Achalov, Rutskoi. We didn’t want confrontation, we compromised - lift the blockades, we’ll take away all the weapons, seal them in the gun park and start a dialogue.

Were you scared when the shelling started?

The first shell hit the meeting room, the second - Khasbulatov's office, the third - mine. Moreover, they were hit with high-explosive shells, and not with blanks, as they claim today. The building will not burn from the blanks. I was sitting in my office when a shell went through the window and exploded in the right corner. Luckily, my desk was on the left. He jumped out of there, crazy. I don’t know what saved me.

Do you still have a personal grudge against Yeltsin?

Some modern researchers of those events are trying to prove that all these were personal squabbles between Yeltsin, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. Yes, there were personal issues: they prepared a forgery against me - a trust agreement, accounts in Switzerland. And then two years later, Prosecutor General Skuratov notified me in writing that the investigation was completed, my signatures had been forged, and the perpetrators had not been found. But I don’t hold any grudge against Yeltsin. God will judge us, because the law cannot.

Will you celebrate those events somehow?

What to celebrate? This is a wake. Moreover, I can’t even drink. Well, maybe I'll drink some lemonade..."

The dispersal of the Supreme Council in October 1993 can be seen as the culmination of the struggle between different power groups for access to the proceeds of corruption. The elements of this struggle were “special operations”, “pilots”, propaganda, and the Muscovites who took to the streets turned out to be extras. This version of the dramatic events of October 3-4 would explain a lot.

SUPPRESSION OF THE "RED MUTINY"

The official version of events, which President Boris Yeltsin spoke on television on October 5, 1993, was the postulate of successful suppression

Citizens and security forces of the "fascist-communist rebellion." The very fact of the president’s speech caused a sigh of relief among many: during the tragic historical events on the night of October 3-4, Yeltsin was not visible either on television or at the rally near the Kremlin, to which First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor, who had recently returned to the government, called on Muscovites to gather Gaidar. Yegor Gaidar also coordinated security measures that night. In particular, a military expert recalls this Victor Baranets, who then worked as press secretary of the Russian Minister of Defense.

As for the meaning of Yeltsin’s statement, the shooting of parliament was actively supported by part of the intelligentsia, who put forward the same arguments as the president in open letters published in newspapers: “You can’t go back to the USSR.” The forceful dispersal of parliament was supported by the United States.

The deputies of the Supreme Council and the representative of the executive branch, the vice president, who was deposed by Yeltsin, do not agree with the definition of “red-browns.” Alexander Rutskoy. In this regard, Rutskoi makes irony about Gennady Zyuganov, who left the Supreme Council, which was in a state of siege, on September 24 with the intention of “raising the masses”: “ He left and never returned. And two weeks after the shooting of the Supreme Council, parties that did not participate in these tragic events signed an agreement on mutual understanding and cooperation with Yeltsin: LDPR, Communist Party of the Russian Federation. So, what kind of reds are we?"

Deputy of the Supreme Council Ilya Konstantinov I am sure that in December 1993 the reactionary communists really opposed the liberals. Only the communists were not those whom Yeltsin pointed out: “Both Yeltsin, and Gennady Burbulis, and Sergei Shakhrai were communists. And who was Gaidar, who worked in the magazine “Communist”? He was also a propagandist of communist ideology... These people would not recognize either Academician Sakharov, or Sergei Kovalev, or Marina Salye... And Yeltsin only needed a submissive parliament. The Moscow intelligentsia personally called me a red-brown monster. And I actually started in “Democratic Russia”. What can you do, liberal sentiments prevailed among journalists then, and that’s how they understood it ". Ilya Konstantinov, according to him, is still a champion of democracy and parliamentarism today, being one of the active members of the Opposition Coordination Council.

The actions of the defenders of parliament were relatively recently again called a “red-brown rebellion”, rightly suppressed Anatoly Chubais.

Economist Andrey Illarionov suggests turning to the facts: The “Red-Brown Parliament” elected Boris Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Council in 1990, supported Yeltsin as President of Russia in his confrontation with the State Emergency Committee during the August putsch, and with an absolute majority of votes supported Yeltsin’s program for economic and government reform of Russia, for opening the country, for inclusion her into the world community, a large number of laws and regulations to support former political prisoners, to rehabilitate innocently convicted Gulag prisoners, to return historical names to the map of Russia...”

However, not all former political prisoners of the USSR were grateful to parliament for the rehabilitation law. So, Vladimir Bukovsky called the Supreme Council a “mastodon” that must be ended (his interview with these words was published after the April 1993 referendum and before the October events).

The real reason for such assessments is hope. Hope for rapid democratic change under the leadership of President Yeltsin. " Russia needs a strong presidency, at least for now."- said Bukovsky. In 2013, one can shrug: democracy without separation of powers has turned out to be “sovereign.” Some RS interlocutors admitted that years later they changed their assessments of the events of the early 1990s. Ilya Konstantinov today is proud that his well-known political ally, Marina Salye, with whom he created democratic parties in Leningrad-Petersburg, who supported Yeltsin, said “I was wrong” five years after the shooting of parliament.

At the same time, hardly the speaker of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov, who appears to be playing Cassandra today ("I told you so"), was just that

From the very beginning it was clear that an oligarchic version of privatization was being prepared

A visionary from the very beginning. After all, the Supreme Council placed high hopes on President Yeltsin, granting him emergency powers for economic reform on November 1, 1991. Andrei Illarionov believes that this ultimately led to the civil war: in 1992-1993, the parliament believed that Yeltsin was still obliged to consult with it, and Yeltsin, or rather his entourage, sought to do without parliament on the most important issues. Sociologist Alexander Tarasov, analyzing the October 1993 events in hot pursuit, noted then that " the parliament itself gave Yeltsin such a degree of power that the president quite logically wanted ALL the power.”

Ruslan Khasbulatov today denounces Boris Yeltsin, calling him a criminal who shot parliament. However, the question of the responsibility of the parliament, which transferred power to Yeltsin already in 1991, puzzles him: " Well, yes, it’s their own fault, they gave all the power to Yeltsin. But we trusted him."- says Khasbulatov.

Alexander Rutskoy complains: " up to a certain point, all the legislative initiatives that Yeltsin came up with were all included, including the position of the President of Russia, in the Constitution by decision of the Congress of People's Deputies. And no one bothered him. And then – well, who could agree with this crazy privatization?”

Privatization really finally quarreled parliament and Yeltsin, recalls Ilya Konstantinov. According to him, " from the very beginning it was clear that an oligarchic version of privatization was being prepared; The Supreme Council insisted on personal and gradual privatization, but Gaidar and Chubais wanted anonymous vouchers and privatized everything at once."

The arguments of Yeltsin’s supporters are presented in detail, for example, in the voluminous work “So who shot the parliament after all” by the journalist Oleg Moroz, who personally spoke with Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar and other participants in the events: Alexander Rutskoy insulted Gaidar’s government, calling the reformers “boys in pink pants.” This did not help the working relationship between Gaidar and parliament. From the author’s point of view, the failure of the “oligarchic” privatization that was ultimately carried out (without interference from the Supreme Council) was impossible to foresee in advance. Moreover, Gaidar was simply not given time to finish what he started, and the threat of communist revenge hung over the reforms, so they had to be carried out quickly.

BARKASHOV'S PEOPLE LOAN AT THE SUPREME COUNCIL

Among the defenders of the Supreme Council from September 21 to October 4, 1993, about five thousand people were seen: ordinary Muscovites, retired military personnel, Transnistrian volunteers, Anpilovites, “Makashovtsy”, “Barkashovtsy” (“Russian National Unity - RNE”) in unknown numbers.

The founder of RNE himself Alexander Barkashov in recent interview-monologue, answering the question of whether his actions were a provocation (for example, RNE members were in the vanguard of the group that set out to storm Ostankino on October 2), he answers: “ In terms of intentions, no, but in terms of results, yes, it turns out it was a provocation.". In an interview two years ago, Barkashov said that there were 130 of his fighters in the White House, and in 2013, in an interview with NTV, he already spoke about 200. But outside, according to Alexander Barkashov, there were at least a thousand of his supporters. Formally, Barkashov was allegedly called to defend the Supreme Council by Vladislav Achalov, who was appointed Minister of Defense by the Supreme Council. This version seems plausible to the former Minister of the Interior Andrey Dunaev ("Barkashov was friends with Achalov", - says Dunaev), but Alexander Rutsky laughs.

Ilya Konstantinov states: " If General Makashov, being Rutskoi’s assistant and a deputy of the Supreme Council, “called himself,” then no one called the Barkashovites at all. But it was impossible to separate some White House defenders from others. The Barkash people gathered and threw their provocative zigs. And there were only 15 armed Makashovites". Ilya Konstantinov also claims that the Barkashovites who were in the building of the Supreme Council left just before the assault on the night of October 3-4.

“Vodka and the swastika” - with such a special report shortly after the October
events in Russia were addressed, in particular, by the German magazine Der Spiegel. Photos of zigging RNE people are accompanied by captions stating that there are a total of one and a half thousand armed neo-Nazis in Moscow, and they do not hesitate to hand out their newspapers on Red Square. " And just a few weeks ago, an alliance of neo-Nazis and old-school communists tried to take power from President Yeltsin.", recalls Der Spiegel.

Researcher of right-wing radical organizations sociologist Alexander Tarasov I am sure that posing extremists for the press against the backdrop of the Supreme Council was their main task:

– The Supreme Council does not have exact figures on the number of RNU. But all witnesses agree that there were “about 150” Barkashovites. That is, there could be 130 of them, and

200, but not 1000-1200. I believe that the Barkashovites had the following task: to compromise the Supreme Council in world public opinion. The main thing they were needed for (and what they successfully did) was to take pictures in their Nazi-like uniforms with their arms raised in a Nazi salute against the backdrop of the White House. These images circulated in newspapers and television channels all over the world and created the desired impression that the Supreme Council was supposedly being defended exclusively by fascists. There are at least three facts that force us to perceive the RNE people as provocateurs not only along this line: unhindered (unlike all others) passage through the posts surrounding the White House, back and forth (even after a total blockade with barbed wire); the forced removal from the White House of Sergei Kurginyan, who was paranoidly looking for a provocation in Yeltsin’s every step; that it was the RNE militants who were in the vanguard of the group that stormed the city hall.

– RNE was formed three months before the storming of the White House?

– RNE was formed back in 1990. In July 1993, the movement was officially registered. RNU's support for the Supreme Council in September-October 1993 surprised everyone, since starting in the spring of 1993, RNU consistently moved in the opposite direction, accusing the forces opposing Yeltsin of "falling under the commies and partycrats." I am convinced that RNE was created by the Ministry of Internal Affairs - and it was the Ministry of Internal Affairs that gave Barkashov the order to bring his own people to the Supreme Council. Discipline in the RNU was then very strict, military: the “leader” said it, so we carry it out. The “leader” knows why.

The Barkashovites (those of them who did not die) turned out to be the only group that left the White House unhindered (through secret underground communications) - and “disappeared.” I am sure that they were brought out by curators from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (b There were also those who left the White House in the same way, but individually. Ilya Konstantinov, according to him, was helped by an Alpha officer. – RS). RNU, despite its fascist reputation and participation in the conflict in 1993, received the right to create a network of private security companies and access to weapons, which was absolutely impossible without permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the mid and second half of the 1990s, RNE was haunted by scandals related to the illegal sale of weapons and explosives, robberies and murders. Any other organization would have been banned for this long ago, but RNU provided cover for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And when, at the turn of the decade, the FSB began to subjugate the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then at the same time, through its agents (in particular, through Oleg Kassin), the FSB was able to split the RNU. But even after the split, the Ministry of Internal Affairs almost openly patronized one of the three main organizations of the ex-RNU - the Volga region structures led by the Lalochkin brothers. The fact that RNE was then for Yeltsin and against the “commies” is no secret, he argues Alexander Tarasov about the oddities of the nationalist movement RNE.

Alexander Barkashov himself denies his connection with the special services: he states that the support of the Supreme Council was natural, since it was this body of power that spoke out in defense of the Russian nation.

WHO SHOOT?

In general, according to sociologist Tarasov, the executive branch did everything to force supporters of the Supreme Council to be the first to use force and thus legitimize return fire. In a broader sense, the beginning of the violent, but not yet armed, confrontation and civil war can be considered May 1, 1993, when a rally of the opposition to President Yeltsin (mostly “communist”) was brutally dispersed. From September 28 to October 2, 1993, rallies were also brutally dispersed, and Viktor Alksnis was broken several ribs by riot police.

Armed clashes near the CMEA building (Moscow City Hall) and Ostankino became the prelude to the shooting of the White House. Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky confirmed the fact that the fire was directed on October 3 from the CMEA building towards the gathered crowd. However, the massacre at Ostankino “untied Yeltsin’s hands.” The assault on Ostankino, as stated Alexander Rutskoy, was necessary because he was not provided with airtime. " Why trucks? - And then it went on! Well, lying for 14 days - how do you think you can tolerate all this?”

At the same time, Alexander Barkashov admits some of the “stupidity” of using trucks by his “fighters”, who were at the forefront of events, to storm Ostankino...

As was initially reported, two people died near Ostankino at the hands of the rebels - private Yuri Sitnikov and video engineer Sergei Krasilnikov. The production editor who was in the building at that moment Elena Savina stated to an RS correspondent that, apart from the defenders of the Supreme Council, “no one could do this”: “I didn’t see a shot from a grenade launcher, but I felt a wave.”

Later in a "Top Secret" interview given by a senior investigator Leonid Proshkin, it was reported that Sitnikov died from a shrapnel wound received inside the building, and Krasilnikov was killed in the corridor, which was also not clear from the street.

It was after Sitnikov’s death that Spenaz opened heavy fire on the crowd in front of Ostankino. According to Elena Savina, she saw at least 10 corpses near herself alone.

Much has been written in previous years about the subsequent assault on the Supreme Council, Alexy II’s attempts at negotiations that lasted several days before, or Alpha’s attempts to resolve the confrontation peacefully (“Alpha did not want blood”).

The official number of deaths is still unknown, but the figure was 154 people - service personnel and defenders of the White House. 4 people from the military. The version that the Supreme Council was protected by snipers was not confirmed, at least not documented. Statements about the snipers of the Supreme Council were made at a high level - by the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and the head of the KGB (ICB) department for Moscow and the Moscow region, Yevgeny Savostyanov.

Former Radio Liberty correspondent Mark Deitch recorded an interview with an FSB general who claimed that the snipers were sent by the special services. However, the interview was published on condition of anonymity and with voice modulation.

But whether Alexander Rutskoy could (and wanted) to overcome political corruption, being himself “under criminal charges” in 1993, is an interesting question.

President of the Information and Research Center "Panorama" Vladimir Pribylovsky provided RS with a certificate of the biography of Alexander Rutsky: “As a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, in 1990 he took part in the organization of the charitable Fund for Social Development of Russia “Revival” and became the chairman of its board. The founder of the fund was the Presidium of the Supreme Council, and the post of president of the Revival Foundation was first taken by the Chairman of the Supreme Council Boris Yeltsin, but , after his election as President of Russia, Rutskoy himself was the president of the foundation for some time. Later, he formally resigned as president of the foundation, but in fact left its management for himself (since the charter of the Revival foundation remained a clause according to which the fund’s managers are appointed vice -President of Russia)".

A journalist became interested in Rutsky’s business back in 1992 Vladimir Ivanidze:

– By the time the 1993 putsch began and Yeltsin threw the general out of the post of vice president, Rutskoi was quite active, let’s call it that, within the framework of the notorious Revival Foundation. The Revival Fund is, at first glance, a jingoistic, statist organization, but in fact they had a commercial center of the Revival Fund with a branch in Brighton Beach, in which the money of defrauded investors of the Chara financial pyramid was deposited. This fund is a kind of roof for former representatives of the special services and for bandits too. The fund developed wild activity in 1991-1992.

There are protocols of interrogation of Rutskoy in a criminal case, the peak of which was in 1993. $20 million was stolen using false advice notes. Even Vladimir Zhirinovsky was interrogated, because, according to the investigation, he received money from front companies that were associated with the “Pushkin” group. Akop Yuzbashev (the head of the group) was Rutsky’s man. Rutskoi was steaming in his bathhouse. In 1993, RUBOP tried to take Yuzbashev (they found an entire arsenal of weapons on him), but he fled to Israel. When everything calmed down, he returned from Israel and became an adviser to Rutskoi, by that time the governor of the Kursk region, on foreign economic relations.

– What did they explain during interrogations about the false advice notes in 1993?

“They give us money, we take it, I don’t care where it comes from,” Zhirinovsky said. Rutskoi spoke about the gifts he received from Akop Yuzbashev. Rutskoy was the honorary president of the Renaissance Foundation. He lobbied for all sorts of regulations related to this fund: relaxations, additional allocations (Yuri Boldyrev has no complaints against Rutskoi in connection with corruption; but in general, according to him, corrupt decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council - to allocate such and such or to exempt such and such structures from tax benefits - were not uncommon . – RS).

A scandal broke out in Moscow related to Rutskoi’s connections with the Revival Foundation and with Boris Birshtein. There was an oligarch who headed the Siabeko Group structure. There were several criminal cases, but everything rested on Vladimir Belkin, who was Rutskoi’s assistant. Belkin fled Russia without waiting for the outcome. He is on the international wanted list. But in the mid-90s a miracle happened, as it often happened with us. Criminal cases in the Prosecutor General's Office were frozen. And Belkin returns as an Israeli. However, he subsequently goes missing.

Birshtein's partner was the wife of the current senator Alexander Korovnikov ( Now, in 2013, he is also being investigated in a criminal case for transferring a bribe to the Accounts Chamber. – RS). According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Belkin was involved in jewelry smuggling. They also allegedly found lists of weapons that he sold to criminal groups. All this is through the Revival Foundation. I will add that two of Rutskoi’s assistants died under strange circumstances.

Korovnikov once said that all this was a lie and falsification. However, all telephone numbers of the fund and the commercial center of the Renaissance fund were registered to the Siabeko-Group company. That is, they were paid for by Boris Birshtein.

Boris Birshtein, from my point of view, provoked the mess with the “suitcases of compromising evidence.” Rutskoi himself would not have shouted about the suitcases, since he did not really know their contents. He didn’t even know exactly how many there were: sometimes ten, sometimes

Rutskoi, from my point of view, became the leader who was needed to lead the herd to the slaughter in order to get rid of parliament

Eleven, then thirteen. These were apparently assessments of inspectors, inspections, financial documents. Rutskoi would not have been able to digest all this, but they explained to him that this was compromising evidence. In all FBI reports, Birshtein appeared as an active member of the Solntsevo criminal organization. What is this data based on? In any case, in Belgium Birshtein opened companies for Sergei Mikhailov (Mikhas) - one of the leaders of the Solntsevo organization.

Another of the people close to Rutsky was singer Joseph Kobzon. They traveled to Israel together to lobby for the release from prison of a man associated with both the mafia and the KGB - Shabtai Kolmanovich. He was also killed, and also in Moscow. Rutskoi maintained serious connections in the army. Transport aviation was very important. These were fantastic opportunities to send goods anywhere on military cargo planes.

– Through Tiraspol?

- For example. Or through Abkhazia. There are reports from the German, Belgian police, and French counterintelligence, which include people from Rutskoi’s immediate circle. And this is not after he was amnestied and became governor; but they started much earlier. They are called quite unequivocally the mafia and an organized criminal group. Rutskoi’s connection with these people did not stop. They sat down.

Thus, the struggle over corruption flows began in 1991-1992. By 1993, when the White House began to be destroyed, Rutskoi, from my point of view, was the leader who was needed to lead the herd to the slaughter in order to get rid of parliament. It is not clear how consciously he played this role (there is a conspiracy theory here), but in fact it was a dirty role. The leader is trained - he is fed, never killed. Otherwise, panic begins, the sheep feel blood, but the leader walks ahead, and they are not afraid , – told Vladimir Ivanidze about the results of his previously unpublished journalistic investigation.

The Renaissance Foundation became the topic of the “Moment of Truth” program on ORT on July 15, 1993. Presenter Andrei Karaulov told guest Alexander Rutsky that President Yeltsin established a special commission to check the fund, which worked with the forms of the Supreme Council. True, the commission cannot really work: the speaker of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov refuses to provide the necessary documents. Rutskoy said : “Rutskoy has exactly the same relationship to this fund as Russian President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. He was the president of this fund. The fund worked according to a program approved by the Chairman of the Supreme Council Yeltsin and the Prime Minister of Russia Ivan Stepanovich Silaev...”

Little is known about Rutsky’s current business (he himself defines his type of activity as follows: “I do what I like”).

“Rutskoi’s role in 1993 can be assessed in different ways. I do not assess his role too positively, but not because I consider him a provocateur. Rutskoi was not a provocateur. He is a man who plays a game, the result of which could be death or the presidency "Exchanging this game for some kind of governorship is naive, ridiculous and stupid. But the fact that he did not have enough political and intellectual potential to ensure the most important tasks that faced the acting president is a fact.", - speaks Ilya Konstantinov.

Former allies Ruslan Khasbulatov and Alexander Rutskoy cannot stand each other today. For some reason, Rutskoi despises Khasbulatov - in his words, for cowardice. But Khasbulatov did not agree with the line of defense of the Supreme Council chosen by Rutsky. Thus, in the NTV film by Vladimir Chernyshev Khasbulatov said that he “realized that it was all over” when Rutskoi called for taking Ostankino.

In a conversation with RS, Khasbulatov, however, advised paying attention to Yeltsin’s blatant lawlessness, and not to some provocations from the White House: “ Well, I said that, yes, but that’s not the main thing.” Khasbulatov also does not want to talk about his tactical alliance with General Rutsky. "We both must be rehabilitated. Not amnestied, but rehabilitated!"

REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT

What is the real reason for the defeat of the “red-brown” parliament, which the vice-president joined, and its consequences? He insists on the version that Yeltsin and his team needed to eliminate any control over the executive branch when carrying out reforms Yuri Boldyrev, using the phrase “group of reformers.”

"The current Russian authoritarian political regime was born from the ruins of parliament in October 1993", - speaks Andrey Illarionov. He argues that in Russia there was no proper political culture, no understanding of the need for separation of powers, a system of checks and balances, and as a result, the defeat of parliament was accepted by some Russians calmly, and by others with applause.

And if anyone had doubts, then many of those who hesitated were convinced by the “Makashovites and Barkashovites”, the versions about the snipers of the Supreme Council, the events in Ostankino and CMEA.

Opponents of the “Yeltsin” version of the legacy of the “Putin” regime insist on the absence of predetermination: Yeltsin’s political regime had a long evolution ahead of it, the Chechen wars before it became Putin’s, and 1993 was not decisive. (Ilya Konstantinov objects: an independent parliament would not approve of the war in Chechnya.)

It is curious that an indirect consequence of the dispersal of the Supreme Council in Moscow was an attempt to destroy the materials of the parliamentary investigation into the politician who personified the current political regime - then vice-mayor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Putin. Len-Petrosovet (1990-1993), whose commission led by deputy Marina Salye conducted a parliamentary investigation into Putin and even recommended Putin’s removal from office in 1992 for official inconsistency, was dissolved by Yeltsin’s decree on December 21, 1993 - and this without any the presence of Barkashovites, Pridnestrovians, etc., simply “following the example and likeness.” " Everything happened suddenly. Deputies, including Salye, were simply not allowed into the building, the report on Putin had to be taken away to me, I managed to get in under some pretext,” remembers a relative of Marina Salye Natalya Mikhailova.

The fiasco of that parliamentary investigation (the general public did not listen to the deputies - the press sometimes laughed at them, and the mayor of the city Anatoly Sobchak spoke about the “machinations of communists” inspiring parliamentary investigations against the executive branch) former presidential representative in St. Petersburg Sergey Tsyplyaev explains this way: “Russians did not understand the essence of collegial governing bodies at all.”

A reassessment of events occurred many years later.

“My first reaction was that the two sides, eager for the feeding trough, were locked in a fight in this division. However, the historical view paints a different picture. Firstly, the majority of the deputies behaved, by and large, with dignity. Secondly, they are to blame the fact that they could not limit the arbitrariness of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, which tried to distribute benefits and benefits, just like the executive branch,” says Yuri Boldyrev.