When the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Khasavyurt agreements
On August 31, 1996, in Khasavyurt, a Dagestan regional center on the border with Chechnya, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov signed documents that put an end to the first Chechen war - the Khasavyurt agreements. Hostilities were stopped, federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the issue of the status of the territory was postponed until December 31, 2001.
The signatures under the Khasavyurt peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the signing ceremony was attended by the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman.
The documents indicated the principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. The parties pledged not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force, and also to proceed from the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The key points of the settlement were contained in a special protocol. Chief among them is the provision on "deferred status": the question of the status of Chechnya was to be resolved by December 31, 2001. A joint commission of representatives of the state authorities of Russia and Chechnya was supposed to deal with operational problems. The tasks of the commission, in particular, included monitoring the implementation of Boris Yeltsin's decree on the withdrawal of troops, preparing proposals for restoring monetary, financial and budgetary relations between Moscow and Grozny, as well as programs for restoring the republic's economy.
After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, Chechnya became de facto an independent state, but de jure - a state not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
In October 1996, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Chechen Republic", according to which the documents signed on August 31, 1996 in the city of Khasavyurt were considered "evidence of the parties' readiness to resolve the conflict peacefully, having no state legal significance."
93 State Duma deputies submitted a request to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the Khasavyurt agreements. In December 1996, the Constitutional Court refused to accept for consideration the request of a group of deputies due to the lack of jurisdiction of the issues raised in it to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
The Khasavyurt Accords and the signing of the Treaty “On Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”, which was signed by Boris Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, in May 1997, did not lead to stabilization of the situation in the region. After the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces in Chechnya, an interwar crisis began: the destroyed houses and villages were not restored, due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya or was physically destroyed.
The agreements did not affect the practice of taking hostages and extorting money by armed Chechen groups. For example, journalists Viktor Petrov, Bris Fletjo and Svetlana Kuzmina were kidnapped at the time of the Khasavyurt agreements. The theft of state property, drug trafficking and the slave trade developed.
More aboutWas the first Chechen war finished on time?
Kommersant asked Alexander Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Franz Klintsevich and other readers / Russia after the 90s
August 31 marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Khasavyurt truce and the end of the First Chechen War. Related: |
Kommersant asked its readers if the hostilities in Chechnya were stopped in time in August 1996.
2. Photo: Alexander Miridonov
It's hard to answer. By the standards of that time, the signing of the military block of the agreement on August 31, 1996, although a small one, was a victory ... But almost immediately it became clear from the intercepted negotiations of the heads of the militants what was on their minds. They accumulated strength and did not give up hope to strike. It was necessary to admit that every time our good will, shown in relation to the militants, backfired on us.
3. Photo: Gennady Gulyaev
It was better not to start. And there was such an opportunity, but Pavel Grachev (in 1994, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. - Kommersant) convinced Boris Yeltsin that it should be started ... But the agreements signed in Khasavyurt, although they stopped the war, were a betrayal in relation to those who laid down there their heads. And if these agreements had included clauses on the complete surrender of weapons by the Chechens and the complete withdrawal of troops from the territory, then there would not have been a second war.
4. Photo: Dmitry Dukhanin
The pause, which was sustained as a result of protracted negotiations with Maskhadov, gave our power structures an opportunity to recover and prepare for further actions. In the Chechen Republic, the situation among the population has also changed. People are tired of war. The population of the republic began to understand that the war must be stopped, because it does not gain anything from it.
5. Photo: Vyacheslav Reutov
During. I am against any bloodshed. The army that was on the territory of Chechnya consisted of conscripts. They were not at all ready for full-fledged combat operations. Therefore, saving their lives by the Khasavyurt agreement seems to me the right decision. In addition, from a political point of view, it also looked quite successful.
6. Photo: Stanislav Tikhomirov
Then the war was not over. The first Chechen war was betrayed. Two weeks before the assault on Grozny, the militants warned about this, asked to leave from there in order to avoid casualties. Exactly on the appointed day, they really took the city. And our valiant commanders have already withdrawn the special services, OMON, and practically surrendered the city. The resentment of the military involved in this campaign was great, because they were simply betrayed. No one wanted to understand later how it happened.
7. Photo: Dmitry Lebedev
It was impossible to end the war, and the Khasavyurt agreement was an ordinary betrayal. The bandits in Chechnya took a break, regrouped, and then active hostilities continued for another seven years. This led to the loss of the image of the country, the death of a large number of our soldiers. The war could have ended already then.
8. Photo: Dmitry Lekay
It was necessary to stop the war, the bloodshed, but it was impossible to sign the Khasavyurt agreement. I was almost the only one who criticized it, said that it was shameful and would not lead to peace. I was then criticized even by the allies, but subsequent events and the second war became a logical consequence of this particular agreement.
9. Photo: Gleb Shchelkunov
I don't have a definitive answer to this question. It's good that we managed to finish it, because its completion allowed us to avoid more losses. But there are no internal wars that, after their end, would have a clear, clear ending. This war ended when the opportunity arose to end it.
10. Photo: Maxim Kimerling
That war could have been avoided and the conflict stopped in the bud. Yeltsin lacked more respect for Dzhokhar Dudayev (the leader of the separatists. - Kommersant). Yeltsin answered condescendingly to Dudayev's proposals... Yes, Yeltsin unleashed that war, it was a mistake on the verge of a crime. But he repented of it.
Don't think about the finest hour down
Gleb Cherkasov - about Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov
By the time the Khasavyurt Accords were signed, Alexander Lebed, at that time Secretary of the Security Council, already had experience in cessation of hostilities. Moreover, his political career really began in 1992 in Transnistria. His appointment to the post of commander of the 14th Army led, as was then believed, to the cessation of hostilities. And an incredible bass and a penchant for chopped aphorisms only added to the beauty of the image.
11. Gleb Cherkasov / Photo: Sergey Mikheev
The Khasavyurt agreements were to become the same stepping stone on General Lebed's road to the very heights, like the scandalous dismissal from the army or third place in the 1996 presidential election. That summer, it was hard to find anyone who doubted that Alexander Lebed would become one of the main actors in the next presidential election. And when they pass, the sight of Boris Yeltsin suggested that everything could happen a little earlier than expected.
Aslan Maskhadov, who signed the Khasavyurt agreements on the part of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria, also negotiated a truce not for the first time. But in August 1996, everything indicated that it was he who would become the leader of post-war Ichkeria, and it was with him that the Russian leaders would have to negotiate, who, according to the Kremlin staffing table, were higher than the Secretary of the Security Council (SB). And so it happened: in January 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the republic, and in the fall of 1996 and in the spring of 1997 he signed agreements with Viktor Chernomyrdin and Boris Yeltsin - simple human memory did not retain from them either names, or content, or circumstances.
Only Alexander Lebed, Aslan Maskhadov and Khasavyurt remained in my memory. The agreements that were signed there were then a symbol of peace, the end of one of the most difficult conflicts in the post-Soviet space, then they began to be called a symbol of weakness and surrender. The assessment of the cessation of hostilities is often different: after they stop shooting and some time later.
In any case, the Khasavyurt agreements were not implemented. By 2001, when the parties were going to return to the question of the status of Chechnya, the second Chechen war was going on, and there was nobody and nothing to discuss.
Aslan Maskhadov remained the president of Ichkeria and could only remember how it was not possible to ensure long-term peace. The second campaign of the Russian troops turned out to be more successful than the first, and by 2001 the star of the Kadyrov clan, who had gone over to Moscow, was already rising. Ahead were wanderings around the not quite already native republic and death, as it is believed, in battle.
Alexander Lebed survived a scandalous resignation from the post of secretary of the Security Council, a retreat to the post of governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, which at first was perceived as an attack on the Kremlin from the flank, and by 2001 he was an ordinary leader of the region with no career prospects. Ahead was an unsuccessful helicopter ride - this type of transport killed more than one governor.
The Khasavyurt agreements became a high point for Lebed and Maskhadov, but at that moment they probably did not understand this. Maybe because for two former Soviet officers who had experience of conflicts in the late 80s, any truce agreement was perceived as nothing more than a respite. Or maybe because of the hope that further career will only be more beautiful.
There is no politician who would not dream of his "finest hour", and not everyone is able to realize when it actually happens. And not everyone has time to live to write a truly detailed memoir.
"The generals didn't want to admit they couldn't win"
Participant of the Khasavyurt talks Vladimir Lukin told Kommersant how the first Chechen war ended
On August 30, 1996, at about seven in the evening, a combat Mi-24 landed on the outskirts of the village of Zondak in the Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya. A short, middle-aged man dressed in camouflage came on board. It was the chief of the main headquarters of the armed forces of Ichkeria, former colonel of the Soviet army Aslan Maskhadov. The helicopter flew towards Dagestan. Half an hour later, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen delegations began in the building of the Khasavyurt city administration. Late at night, Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, signed peace agreements.
12. Former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov and General Alexander Lebed / Photo: Alexi Fyodorov
Khasavyurt was preceded by fierce battles in Grozny. In the early morning of August 6, several thousand militants, many of whom made their way to the city in advance, attacked military and administrative facilities. For several days they paralyzed the actions of the federal forces, but the superiority in numbers and weapons eventually allowed the army and internal troops to block the forces of the separatists.
Thus, a small detachment of Shamil Basayev took up a combat position in the basement of an old multi-storey building in the center of Grozny, a few blocks from the complex of government buildings. The Basayevites fired at the feds, and they fired back at direct fire. In addition to the militants, civilians also hid in the house. The women asked the militants: “What will happen to us?” The militants answered: "Get ready to die in the ghazawat, we will not leave here alive."
Later, when the republic finally passed into the hands of the separatists, the field commanders themselves admitted: after the ultimatum of the commander of the Russian military group, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who threatened to bomb Grozny, only a few hundred militants remained in the city, who decided to fight to the end. “It was not we who won, but Allah came to our aid and removed the Russians from here,” said Aslan Maskhadov.
In 1996, he was part of the Russian delegation at the talks with the separatists Vladimir Lukin explained to the correspondent "Kommersant" Musa Muradov, which forced Moscow to negotiate and conclude a peace, which both then and now many call "treacherous".
13. Photo: Dmitry Korotaev
"Lebed hoped to replace the ailing Yeltsin"
- Who came up with the idea of negotiations?
Many began to talk about the fact that this war was terrible and tragically dragged on. However, if we talk about personalities, then, of course, the decisive role in the fact that truly intensive peace negotiations began belongs to Alexander Ivanovich Lebed. It was he who initiated this process. As you know, then the presidential elections were held in Russia. The swan took third place and became such a regulating factor. And Alexander Ivanovich very clearly imagined that he could play a historical role. And, of course, he hoped that he would become the main figure, that it was he who would replace, in one way or another, the seriously ill Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin as president. Alexander Lebed believed that the glory of a peacemaker would ease his path to the presidency. And then, without being distracted by the war, he will successfully solve the political and economic problems of the country. That is why he set out to remove this thorn from the body of our country, to stop hostilities, in fact, a civil war.
- Do you think that Alexander Lebed forced Boris Yeltsin to negotiate with the Chechens?
I don't think he forced it. Boris Nikolayevich himself was, of course, in a difficult position, and by that time he had already begun to understand that this war, in which he was drawn into, was politically counterproductive for him. Because of her, he lost a significant part of his political capital. But he had an impasse: in his circle they could not agree on how to end this war, and in the army everything was not easy. The generals did not want to admit that they could not win, although they really could not win at that time. And as a result of all this, a situation arose that had to be resolutely corrected by someone. This person turned out to be Alexander Lebed
- Were there signals from the Chechen side?
I think that there were signals from the Chechen side as well. They probably even were.
- How did you get into the delegation?
At that time I was the chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma, a representative of the Yabloko party, which took an anti-war position. Many people in the then government trusted me and treated with understanding what I said. I raised the question that we must immediately end the war, we must conclude peace. I also spoke about this with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. I talked about this with General Anatoly Kulikov, who was then the Minister of Internal Affairs.
- And what did you put into the words "it is necessary to end the war"?
This means, first of all, the cessation of hostilities. There is such a children's game "Freeze". When everyone freezes and so on. It was necessary not to haggle over who, where, what borders. It was necessary to simply stop hostilities and continue to negotiate a further political system, and so on and so forth.
Then in August I was vacationing with my family in the Pskov region. And there, on vacation, I was caught by a call from General Kulikov, who, on behalf of Chernomyrdin, said that negotiations of this kind were beginning, that Alexander Ivanovich Lebed was going to the Caucasus. And they ask me to join them as an experienced negotiator, as someone who knows what diplomacy is. Well, I immediately interrupted my vacation and came to Moscow. Came to Lebed. We didn't really know him before. He told me that he also willingly agreed with my candidacy. So we began to actively work on who will go, how they will go. And it was all compressed in a very short time. On August 30 we flew to Makhachkala. At midnight we boarded a helicopter and flew from Makhachkala to Khasavyurt. This flight was the most difficult test for me. The fact is that shortly after takeoff, Alexander Ivanovich, having removed the pilot, began to pilot the helicopter himself.
“Chechens felt that the wind blew into their sails”
- How did you meet the Chechens?
When we arrived, I asked: “Where is Maskhadov?” No one knows anything, no one has contacted anyone. In general - a mess. Then I told my assistant, he is now working as an ambassador in one of the Asian countries, I say: “Listen, you need to get through to the Swiss embassy in Moscow.” The fact is that Tim Guldimann, a Swiss citizen and OSCE representative in the conflict zone, knew about our mission. I decided that they should find Guldimann at the embassy and put him in touch with us. And the ambassador: "We don't know anything, we don't participate." I had to call several times and insist. Then, for the second or third time, the ambassador says, “Well, okay, I’ll try.” After a while, the same Guldimann appears. We ask him: “Where is the Chechen company? Where are our negotiators? He says he doesn't know exactly what he's trying to find out. We told him: let them know about us, let them know that Alexander Lebed is here, our delegation is here, and we have come with the intention to seriously engage in the conclusion of peace agreements. After some time, Mr. Guldimann reports that he managed to get in touch with the Chechens, that soon Aslan Maskhadov and his people will arrive. And so they began to arrive. In turn: first ordinary members of the delegation, and the last - Aslan Maskhadov.
- Why did they choose the Dagestan Khasavyurt, and not Grozny, as the meeting place?
I do not know this. Apparently, because Khasavyurt is such a border town. near Chechnya. It seems that the Chechens insisted on this. It was convenient for them to get there from the places where they took refuge. Again, many Chechens lived here, among whom, by the way, there were many supporters of independence. In general, the place was agreed on in preliminary negotiations. This is how we sat down at the table. Alexander Ivanovich in general, especially at first, sat aside and watched. For him, diplomacy is new and something incomprehensible. And we were negotiating - me and some of my colleagues. But for the most part, I did this.
- How did the Chechens behave?
At first, the Chechens behaved very emotionally. They felt like people who feel like they have an advantage, that the wind is blowing into their sails. Because indeed, before that, they actually took possession of Grozny, so to speak. Moscow at least did not win. So they felt like people who have the right to insist. Insist and demand. And at the same time, they, as people not very experienced in such matters, tried very emotionally to challenge minor cases.
- Why did Aslan Maskhadov represent the Chechens? He was only a field commander ...
It was quite obvious that Lebed and Maskhadov were the leaders of these negotiations. And this was not in doubt.
- What did the Chechen side argue with you about?
The Chechens, for example, strongly insisted that Mr. Guldimann participate in the negotiations. I ask: “And in what status will he participate? As a representative of the OSCE? They consulted and began to say that the OSCE should not be included - this is, they say, bilateral negotiations. Because the OSCE recognizes Russia within the borders that include Chechnya. Chechens: "No, Chechnya should not be included anywhere." I say: "If Chechnya does not need to be included, then let Guldimann leave." No, let him not leave, the Chechens ask. They argued like that for an hour. Finally, they agreed: if Guldimann does not leave, then let him remain as an observer, let him sit at a separate table and be silent. As an observer, he may be present, but no more. These are subtle things, of a professional nature, the Chechens did not really catch, of course, but this is not surprising.
“In order to negotiate already from a position of strength, it was necessary to pause”
- Which version of the agreement was eventually adopted - Russian or Chechen?
Oddly enough, but even before the start of the discussion, the Chechens were familiar with our version of the agreement and therefore immediately began to reject some points. For example, references to the Russian Constitution, other points that imply the preservation of the integrity of the country, indicating that Chechnya, although with a special status, is a subject of the federation.
- How did the Chechens manage to get your version of the agreement in advance?
Even before our departure, someone from Moscow sent them a document. Who and how did it, and most importantly, why did it - I do not know. Most likely, in Moscow they had their own people among the officials. Given the chaos that reigned at the time, this is not surprising.
- So you had to make concessions to the Chechens?
I did not like some things in the final document, I would like it to be different. The Chechens, for example, insisted that the document should not contain references to the Russian Constitution, so that the agreement looked like an interstate one. I objected, but Alexander Lebed was in a hurry. He understood: either we will sign the agreement now, or then braking will begin and everything else. And he insisted. Well, then Yeltsin also agreed with this agreement and accepted it. But the decisive thing in this agreement was, undoubtedly, that hostilities ceased, that the republic was provided with material assistance, any other kind, that illegal armed groups were gradually liquidated.
But these fundamental things were not fulfilled, they remained on paper. But the Russian side needed a breather. A respite was needed both politically and militarily.
- In other words, did Moscow fail to cope with the situation in Chechnya?
It was obvious that our army was bogged down there. Very serious measures were needed in order to strengthen the army. Strengthen her. To create a situation in which it would be possible to solve the problem with the help of, among other things, military force. So, I think, for this purpose the federal authorities started negotiations with the Chechens. This became clear judging by the events that took place in Chechnya later.
- What impression did Aslan Maskhadov make on you?
He impressed me as a man with the psychology of a professional Soviet officer. A man like a soldier so straightforward, but a man not stupid.
Shamil Basayev's brother always stood behind Maskhadov's back. And so, silently, he watched our conversation. I had the impression that there were big internal conflicts, big disagreements. And military actions and a common enemy somehow smoothed out these differences. To some extent. But then they showed up in full force. Therefore, it is difficult to say what their intentions were.
How was Aslan Maskhadov going to guarantee the fulfillment of the agreements, if he was so dependent on Basayev and other field commanders?
I think Maskhadov counted on strengthening his power among this insurgent conglomerate on the basis of victory, on the basis of the peak of his authority. It will strengthen and somehow push back extremist groups. But it turned out differently. He was incapable of this job, of such a scenario. Or he did not want such a scenario.
- Why was the Russian military Khasavyurt agreements regarded as a betrayal?
I think that those soldiers who were directly involved in unsuccessful battles tried to save face. After all, the military always lacks five minutes to win a complete victory. Do you understand? That's why I think it was such a fist-waving after the fight. When they were pointed out their miscalculations and the fact that they had plenty of time to suppress the resistance of the militants, they fell silent.
On the other hand, there were great difficulties in terms of state discipline, in terms of state mobilization. Therefore, now it is easy to talk about how badly someone fought there, how badly someone acted. There was general laxity. Undocking. Well, that was the situation then. Therefore, a respite was needed to streamline things. This respite has been received.
Another thing is how it was used. In general, they used it normally, because the second war ended differently than the first. No matter what anyone says, I still believe that ending the war then was the right decision, because otherwise the bloodshed would have continued, there would have been incomparably more victims.
“I think that it was possible to agree with Dudayev”
- Do you think it was possible to avoid the first Chechen war?
I think that the federal center acted too harshly. I would say so, inflexibly negotiated with Dzhokhar Dudayev (the first president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, was killed during a special operation in April 1996. - Kommersant). And I think that it was still possible to agree with Dudayev. Especially in the early stages. I would say this: had the Kremlin officials shown more tact and personal respect in dealing with the Chechen leaders, I think there would have been no bloodshed.
- Do you think there is any historical explanation for what happened in the early 1990s in Chechnya?
Your question reminds me of the phrase of a very intelligent person: "The problem of the gods is too complicated, and human life is too short." Why are such revolutionary epochs born? It is part of the human being. In each of us there is a person who can intelligently resolve issues, analyze. But suddenly something happens - as they say, he got up on the wrong foot - and the flight from reality begins in the direction of some heroic and unambiguous solution to the issue. This is how all revolutions begin. But we must also take into account the fact that the Chechens have a reputation for being very courageous and very quick-tempered, who often strike with their fists first, and then think about what is happening. Then there are relatively many Chechens in the Caucasus in comparison with other peoples who were deported by the Stalinist regime. And the memory of the deportation, in my opinion, played an important role.
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (represented by the chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (represented by Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in Khasavyurt (Dagestan) (known as the Khasavyurt agreements, which put an end to the first Chechen war). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Thus ended the First Chechen War.
After the collapse of the USSR, against the backdrop of nationalist sentiments aggravated in the republic, the former general of the Soviet air force Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured with a microphone), who headed the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OKChN), created in 1990, announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic, as a result of which Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of Chechnya. On November 2, 1991, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR declared these elections illegal.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic", which caused a sharp aggravation of the situation in the republic: separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. Three days after the introduction of the state of emergency, the state of emergency was broken, and the decree had to be canceled on November 11 - after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. At the same time, the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992.
In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (pictured in the center) ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition in Chechnya be handed over to the Dudayevs. According to the minister, this was a forced step, because a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been seized, and it was not possible to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons. In turn, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov, at a meeting of the State Duma, explained the appearance of a large number of weapons from the inhabitants of the Chechen Republic as follows: “You know that in 1991 a huge amount of weapons were partially transferred, and partially - and mostly - seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The number of these weapons is estimated at tens of thousands of units, and they are dispersed throughout the Chechen Republic, buried in residential buildings, forests and caves.
Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dzhokhar Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council, unofficially supported by Russia. The troops under the command of Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by the opposition troops. These hostilities were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
Even before the announcement of the decision of the Russian authorities to send troops to Chechnya, on December 1, 1994, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and thus disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure lawfulness, law and order and public security on the territory of the Chechen Republic" (which was later recognized by the Constitutional Court as consistent with the Constitution - like most of the actions of the federal government in Chechnya)
On December 11, 1994, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia) and from the east (from the territory of Dagestan)
The command of "measures to maintain constitutional order" in Chechnya was entrusted to the first deputy commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused to lead the operation "because of its complete unpreparedness" and filed a report on his dismissal from the Russian armed forces
The eastern grouping of the OGV was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully: already on December 12, it approached the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny
A new offensive by units of the joint group of troops began on December 19, 1994. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne regiment blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. Thus, in the first days of hostilities, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
In mid-December 1994, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bombing of the city center was carried out. Many civilians (including ethnic Russians) died and were injured during artillery shelling and bombing
On December 31, 1994, the combined group of troops began the assault on Grozny. About 250 units of armored vehicles entered the city, which was extremely vulnerable in street battles. The Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared: interaction and coordination were not established between the various units, many soldiers did not lack combat experience, in addition, the Russian armed forces did not have closed communication channels, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications
In January 1995, the Russian troops changed tactics: instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they mainly involved mobile air assault groups supported by artillery and aircraft. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By the end of January, despite the successful offensive, the combined group of troops controlled only a third of the capital of the republic. By the beginning of February, the number of OGVs was increased to 70 thousand people
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce. The parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and under the terms of the truce, both sides were given the opportunity to take the dead and wounded from the streets of Grozny. In fact, the truce was violated by both sides
In February 1995, the "South" grouping was formed in the OGV, and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By the end of the month, street fighting was still going on in the city, but the Chechen detachments were gradually retreating. In the end, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of field commander Shamil Basayev (pictured) retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by separatists, and the city came under the control of Russian troops
Then, in March 1995, after the capture of the city by Russian troops in Grozny, a pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov. As a result of the assault, the capital of Chechnya was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the united group of troops was to establish control over the flat regions of Chechnya. The Russian side began intensive negotiations with the local population of the republic, persuading the residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian combat units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thus, at the end of March 1995, Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight. A characteristic feature of these victories was that the militants were not destroyed and freely left the settlements
Major battles in the first Chechen war were the battle for the village of Bamut and the operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the village of Samashki. On April 7-8, 1995, the combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrino brigade of internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martanovsky district of Chechnya). It is believed that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called Abkhaz battalion of Shamil Basayev). Street fighting began in the village. According to a number of international organizations (including the UN Commission on Human Rights), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.
On March 10, 1995, protracted and fierce battles began for the village of Bamut. The core of the Chechen defense of the village consisted of 100 fighters under the command of Khizir Khachukaev. Approaches to Bamut, its main streets were heavily mined with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. On April 15-16, Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on its outskirts. But soon the OGV fighters were forced to leave Bamut, since the militants managed to occupy the dominant heights, they also used the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. The fighting for Bamut continued until June 1995 and was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part. The offensive resumed only on May 12. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were stuck in the enemy's defense. Just like in the plains, the militants were not defeated: they were able to leave the abandoned settlements and transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions
On June 14-19, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, attacked Budyonnovsk, followed by the seizure of a hospital and hostages - 1,600 residents of the city. The terrorists demanded the end of hostilities in Chechnya and the start of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Thanks to the storming of the hospital by special forces on June 17, 61 hostages were released. After negotiations on June 19, the militants released the remaining hostages, the Russian authorities agreed to stop the military operation in Chechnya, and the terrorists were allowed to return to Chechnya. The attack killed 129 people, 415 people were injured
After the terrorist act in Budennovsk, from June 19 to June 22, 1995, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen parties took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place in the capital of Chechnya, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the detachments of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections. At the same time, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides, and local battles were going on throughout the republic.
On December 14-17, 1995, elections were held in Chechnya - with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. The protege of the Russian authorities, the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev, won the election, receiving over 90% of the vote. All military personnel of the joint group of forces participated in the elections
Since the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured), but three attempts ended in failure. However, it was possible to find out that Dudayev often uses the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system. On April 21, 1996, the special services located the signal of the CRI president's satellite phone, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the Russian warplanes reached their target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, which destroyed Dzhokhar Dudayev.
In 1996, despite some successes of the Russian armed forces (such as the liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the first Chechen war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of the imminent presidential elections, the Russian authorities decided once again to negotiate with the separatists. On June 10, in Nazran (Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen fighters numbering, according to various estimates, from 850 to 2 thousand people attacked Grozny. The Russian garrison under the command of General Konstantin Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city. According to a number of historians, it was the defeat of the Russian armed forces in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
On August 31, 1996, in Khasavyurt, representatives of the Russian Federation and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) signed a document on the cessation of hostilities.
What started the war
The conflict between the Russian authorities and Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev began after the collapse of the USSR and escalated in the summer of 1994, when the Russian special services began to actively support the local opposition. The peak of this activity was the unsuccessful assault on Grozny on November 26, 1994. On December 11 of the same year, by decision of President Boris Yeltsin, troops began to enter Chechnya in order to "ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the republic."
What preceded the settlement
Despite some successes of the federal forces in early 1996 (liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev, capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. On the eve of the presidential elections, Moscow entered into negotiations with the militants. On June 10, an agreement was reached in Nazran on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), and the disarmament of separatist detachments. However, fighting resumed after the elections.
From August 6 to 22, the militant detachments carried out Operation Jihad, as a result of which they managed to occupy Grozny, Gudermes and Argun.
Who signed the agreements
On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt agreements were signed in Dagestan. In the presence of the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, Tim Guldiman, Secretary of the RF Security Council Alexander Lebed and Head of the CRI Armed Forces Headquarters Aslan Maskhadov put their signatures. The signing was also attended by Alexander Lebed's deputy Sergey Kharlamov and CRI vice-president Said-Khasan Abumuslimov.
What was agreed
The parties agreed to renounce the use of force and withdraw Russian troops. Until October, they planned to create a commission to prepare joint measures to combat terrorism and crime, proposals for restoring financial and budgetary relations, and a program to restore the socio-economic complex of Chechnya. The main issue - the status of Ichkeria - was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Views on agreements divided
The signing of the Khasavyurt Accords divided Russian society. Among those who supported the end of hostilities were the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn and General Lev Rokhlin. However, many, including the Russian military leadership, believed that this step was not necessary.
Alexander Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation:
If this massacre is not stopped, we will come not only to a new Caucasian war... As for the status of the republic, I consider it reasonable to postpone this issue.
Konstantin Pulikovsky, Commander of the United Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya:
As you know, the Kremlin suddenly blew the all-clear, Lebed arrived and signed a peace agreement. I am convinced that if we had been allowed to close the ring then, there would not have been a second Chechen campaign and thousands of Russian guys would have remained alive.
How the Khasavyurt agreements were respected
On October 3, 1996, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, head of the CRI, visited Moscow. As a result of the visit, decisions were made to resume funding for the republic and complete the withdrawal of troops. On November 23, Aslan Maskhadov and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed an agreement on the principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic. However, in the same year, the Criminal Code was introduced in Chechnya, based on the principles of Sharia.
In 1997, a group of Chechen fighters attacked the Dagestan city of Buynaksk. And in August 1999, militants led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded Dagestan, which marked the beginning of the second Chechen war.
According to the Russian Ministry of Nationalities Affairs, more than 21,000 Russians were killed in Chechnya between 1991 and 1999, not counting those who died in the course of hostilities.
The fate of the signatories
Alexander Lebed. On October 17, 1996, he was relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Assistant to the President for National Security. In May 1998 he was elected governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. He died on April 28, 2002 in the crash of a Mi-8 helicopter in the Krasnoyarsk Territory.
Aslan Maskhadov. October 17, 1996 headed the coalition government of Chechnya. In January 1997 he was elected president of Chechnya. In the spring of 1999, he introduced Sharia rule in Chechnya. In August 1999, he first condemned the actions of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, who attacked Dagestan, but then led the armed resistance to the Russian authorities. In March 2000, he was put on the federal wanted list, and in 2002 - on the international wanted list. Destroyed during a special operation in Chechnya on March 8, 2005.
At the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, they are inclined to believe that the adoption of a decision on this truce was erroneous for the Russian side - the Khasavyurt agreements gave the Chechen separatists an opportunity to rest and accumulate forces and means for further military operations.
An unquenchable hotbed of conflict
In the first Chechen campaign, the federal troops were placed in obviously unfavorable conditions for themselves - the militants were supported by a significant part of the population of the rebellious republic, they were well versed in the mountainous terrain familiar to them and waged a largely successful guerrilla war. The liquidation of the first president of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, did not change the situation - the clashes continued, and the federal authorities realized that this bloody conflict could turn out to be protracted. The Kremlin made attempts to negotiate with the leadership of the militants, but these truces each time turned out to be short-lived. The situation was complicated by the fact that "illegal armed gangs" regularly received assistance from abroad - with weapons, money, mercenaries. At the end of the summer of 1996, the separatists recaptured Grozny from the federals, and such strategically important settlements of Chechnya as Argun and Gudermes also came under the control of the militants.
Chechnya was in fact recognized as independent
It was these strategic losses of the federal troops, according to some experts, that served as the reason for the conclusion of the Khasavyurt peace agreement, signed at the end of August of the same year. The treaty was signed by the then Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, the future unrecognized president of rebellious Chechnya. The agreement included clauses on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the republic, on the resumption of economic relations with Russia (in fact, financing of Chechnya from the center). The main thing in this agreement was what was spelled out between the lines: Russia's de facto recognition of Chechnya's independence. Although the consideration of this issue from a legal point of view was formally postponed until the full restoration of Chechnya after the war.
Useless treaty
In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never respected by the Chechen side during the period of the agreement - it was drawn up in such a way that the main obligations were imposed on Russia. The main one is the full provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was being created, on the basis of which the rest of the North Caucasian republics could also present their rights to autonomy. Some deputies of the State Duma tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists rapidly expanded their territory of influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic, cases of hostage-taking became more frequent, and facts of cruel oppression of the Russian-speaking population. No one was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. Such "sluggish schizophrenia" continued until the attack of gangs on Dagestan in 1999. The second Chechen campaign began, this North Caucasian region this time stayed in the counter-terrorist operation regime for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that the only way to fight the militants was by force, not agreeing to their terms.
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