Divisional howitzer m 30. Military Observer
The M-30 howitzer is probably known to everyone. The famous and legendary weapon of the workers' and peasants', Soviet, Russian and many other armies. Any documentary about the Great Patriotic War almost necessarily includes footage of an M-30 battery firing. And even today, despite its age, this weapon is in service in many armies of the world.
By the way, it’s like 80 years...
So, today we will talk about the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model M-30. About the howitzer, which many artillery specialists call an era. And foreign experts say that it is the most widespread weapon in the history of artillery (about 20 thousand units). A system where old solutions, tested by many years of operation of other tools, and new, previously unknown solutions were combined in the most organic way.
In the article preceding this publication, we talked about the most numerous howitzer of the Red Army of the pre-war period - 122 mm howitzer model 1910/30. It was this howitzer that was already replaced in number by the M-30 in the second year of the war. According to data from various sources, in 1942 the number of M-30s was already greater than its predecessor.
There is a lot of material on creating the system. Literally all the nuances of competition between different design bureaus, the tactical and technical characteristics of guns, design features, etc. are discussed. The points of view of the authors of such articles are sometimes diametrically opposed.
I would not like to go into all the details of such disputes. Therefore, we will “denote the historical part of the story with a dotted line,” leaving readers the right to their own opinion on this issue. The authors' opinion is just one of many and cannot serve as the only correct and final one.
So, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was outdated by the mid-30s. That “small modernization” that was carried out in 1930 only extended the life of this system, but did not return its youth and functionality. That is, the weapon could still serve, the whole question is how. The niche of divisional howitzers would soon be empty. And everyone understood this. The command of the Red Army, state leaders and the designers of artillery systems themselves.
In 1928, there was even quite a heated discussion on this issue after the publication of an article in the Journal of the Artillery Committee. Disputes took place in all directions. From combat use and gun design, to the necessary and sufficient caliber of howitzers. Based on the experience of the First World War, several calibers were quite reasonably considered at once, from 107 to 122 mm.
The designers received the task of developing an artillery system to replace the outdated divisional howitzer on August 11, 1929. In studies on the issue of howitzer caliber, there is no clear answer regarding the choice of 122 mm. The authors are inclined to the simplest and most logical explanation.
The Red Army had enough ammunition of this caliber. Moreover, the country had the opportunity to produce these ammunition in the required quantities at existing factories. And third, the logistics of delivering ammunition was simplified as much as possible. The most numerous howitzer (model 1910/30) and the new howitzer could be supplied “from one box.”
There is no point in describing the problems during the “birth” and preparation for serial production of the M-30 howitzer. This is beautifully described in the “Encyclopedia of Russian Artillery”, probably the most authoritative artillery historian A. B. Shirokorad.
The Red Army Artillery Directorate announced the tactical and technical requirements for the new divisional howitzer in September 1937. The requirements are quite strict. Especially in the shutter part. The AU required a wedge valve (promising and having great potential for modernization). Engineers and designers understood that this system was not reliable enough.
The development of the howitzer was carried out by three design bureaus at once: the Ural Machine-Building Plant (Uralmash), Plant No. 172 named after Molotov (Motovilikha, Perm) and Gorky Plant No. 92 (Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant).
The howitzer samples presented by these factories were quite interesting. But the Ural development (U-2) was significantly inferior to the Gorky (F-25) and Perm (M-30) in ballistics. Therefore, it was not considered promising.
Howitzer U-2
Howitzer F-25 (highly likely)
We will look at some performance characteristics of the F-25 / M-30:
Barrel length, mm: 2800 / 2800
Rate of fire, rpm: 5-6 / 5-6
Initial projectile speed, m/sec: 510 / 515
HV angle, degrees: -5…+65 / -3…+63
Firing range, m: 11780 / 11800
Ammunition, index, weight: OF-461, 21, 76
Weight in firing position, kg: 1830 / 2450
Calculation, persons: 8 / 8
Issued, pcs: 17 / 19 266
It is no coincidence that we have listed part of the performance characteristics in one table. It is in this version that one can clearly see the main advantage of the F-25 - the weight of the gun. Agree, the difference of more than half a ton is impressive. And, probably, it was this fact that became the main one in Shirokorad’s definition of this design as the best. The mobility of such a system is undeniably higher. It is a fact.
True, there is a “buried dog” here too, in our opinion. The M-30s provided for testing were somewhat lighter than the serial ones. Therefore, the gap in mass was not so noticeable.
The question arises about the decision taken. Why M-30? Why not the lighter F-25.
The first and main version was voiced back on March 23, 1939 in the same “Journal of the Artillery Committee” No. 086: “The 122-mm F-25 howitzer, developed by Plant No. 92 on its own initiative, is currently of no interest to the AU, since it is already Field and military tests of the M-30 howitzer, more powerful than the F-25, have been completed.”
Agree, such a statement at that time puts a lot into place. There is a howitzer. The howitzer has been tested and there is no point in wasting people’s money on developing a weapon that no one needs. Continuing further work in this direction was fraught for the designers with “moving to some kind of sharashka” with the help of the NKVD.
By the way, the authors in this regard agree with some researchers on the issue of installing not a wedge valve on the M-30, but the good old piston valve. Most likely, the designers committed a direct violation of the AU requirements precisely because of the reliability of the piston valve.
At that time, problems with the semi-automatic wedge bolt were also observed in smaller caliber guns. For example, the F-22, a universal divisional 76-mm gun.
The winners are not judged. Although, this is how you look at it. Of course they took risks. In November 1936, the head of the Motovilikha plant design bureau, B.A. Berger, was arrested and sentenced to 5 years in prison; a similar fate befell the leading designer of the 152-mm ML-15 howitzer-gun, A.A. Ploskirev, in January of the following year.
After this, it is understandable that the developers want to use a piston valve that has already been tested and debugged in production in order to avoid possible accusations of sabotage if problems arise with its wedge-type design.
And there is one more nuance. The lighter weight of the F-25 howitzer compared to its competitors was ensured by the machine and the carriage of the 76-mm cannon. The gun was more mobile, but had a shorter service life due to a more “flimsy” carriage. It is quite natural that the 122 mm projectile gave a completely different recoil impulse than the 76 mm one. The muzzle brake, apparently, at that time did not provide adequate reduction in impulse.
It is obvious that the lighter and more mobile F-25 was preferred to the more durable and longer-lasting M-30.
By the way, we found further confirmation of this hypothesis in the fate of the M-30. We often write that structurally successful field guns were soon “transplanted” onto already used or captured chassis and continued to fight as self-propelled guns. The same fate awaited the M-30.
Parts of the M-30 were used to create the SU-122 (on the captured StuG III chassis and on the T-34 chassis). However, the cars turned out to be unsuccessful. The M-30, for all its power, turned out to be quite heavy. The cabinet installation of weapons on the SU-122 took up a lot of space in the fighting compartment of the self-propelled gun, creating significant inconvenience for the crew. The large forward reach of the anti-recoil devices with their armor made it difficult for the driver to see from the driver's seat and did not allow a full-fledged manhole for him to be placed on the front plate.
But the main thing is that the base of the medium tank was too fragile for such a powerful weapon.
The use of this system was abandoned. But the attempts did not end there. In particular, in one of the variants of the now famous airborne self-propelled gun “Violet” the M-30 was used. But they preferred the universal 120 mm gun.
The second disadvantage for the F-25 could just be its lower mass in combination with the already mentioned muzzle brake.
The lighter the weapon, the greater its chances of being used to directly support friendly forces with fire.
By the way, it was in this role that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the M-30, poorly suited for such purposes, played more than once or twice. Not from a good life, of course.
Naturally, powder gases deflected by the muzzle brake, raising dust, sand, soil particles or snow, will more easily give away the position of the F-25 compared to the M-30. And even when firing from closed positions at a short distance from the front line at a low elevation angle, the possibility of such unmasking had to be taken into account. Someone in the AU may well have taken all this into account.
Now directly about the design of the howitzer. Structurally, it consists of the following elements:
A barrel with a free pipe, a casing covering the pipe approximately to the middle, and a screw-on breech; 
A piston valve that opened to the right. Closing and opening the shutter was done by turning the handle. A striking mechanism with a linearly moving firing pin, a screw mainspring and a rotating hammer was mounted in the bolt; to cock and lower the firing pin, the hammer was pulled back with a trigger cord. The spent cartridge case was ejected from the chamber when the bolt was opened using an ejector in the form of a crank lever. There was a safety mechanism that prevented premature unlocking of the bolt during prolonged shots; 
The carriage included a cradle, recoil devices, an upper machine, aiming mechanisms, a balancing mechanism, a lower machine with sliding box frames, combat travel and suspension, sighting devices and shield cover. 
The cage-type cradle was placed with pins in the sockets of the upper machine.
Recoil devices included a hydraulic recoil brake (under the barrel) and a hydropneumatic knurler (above the barrel). 
The upper machine was inserted with a pin into the socket of the lower machine. The shock absorber of the pin with springs ensured the suspended position of the upper machine relative to the lower one and facilitated its rotation. A screw rotary mechanism was mounted on the left side of the upper machine, and a sector lifting mechanism was mounted on the right side.
Combat drive - with two wheels, shoe brakes, switchable transverse leaf spring. The suspension was switched off and on automatically when the frames were moved apart and moved.
M-30 in the museum on Sapun Mountain
TTX M-30 Weight in firing position Longest firing range Maximum elevation angle Greatest declination angle Horizontal firing angle Number of alternating charges Rate of fire is practical 5-6 rounds per minute Highway transport speed
In order to speed up the design, it was decided to borrow advanced foreign experience. KB-2, led by German specialists, began design work. In 1932, testing began on the first experimental model of the new howitzer, and in 1934 this weapon was put into service as the “122-mm howitzer mod. 1934." It was also known as "Lubok", from the name of the theme combining two projects to create a 122 mm divisional howitzer and a 107 mm light howitzer. Barrel of a 122 mm howitzer mod. 1934 had a length of 23 calibers, the maximum elevation angle was +50°, the horizontal aiming angle was 7°, the mass in the traveling and combat position was 2800 and 2250 kg, respectively. Like the guns of the First World War, the new howitzer was mounted on a single-beam carriage (although carriages of a more modern design with sliding frames had already appeared at that time). Another significant drawback of the gun was its wheel travel - metal wheels without tires, but with suspension - which limited the towing speed to twelve kilometers per hour. The gun was produced in 1934–1935 in a small series of 11 units, of which 8 entered trial operation (two four-gun batteries), and the remaining three were sent to a training platoon for Red commanders.
However, in 1936, the GAU experienced a serious change in views on the divisional howitzer - the Lubok project in its original form was no longer considered promising. In particular, the gunners were no longer satisfied with the single-beam carriage, and they demanded sliding frames. In addition, there was talk of a transition from 122 mm to 107 mm caliber on the grounds that everyone abroad had switched from 120 mm to 105 mm guns. Due to all this, the Lubok was never accepted into service, and the 122-mm howitzer model remained in production. 1910/30
By 1937, it became clear that in the event of a transition to the 107-mm caliber, the artillery would begin to experience a starvation of shells - the production capacity for the production of 107-mm ammunition was too small. For the same reason, the project to replace divisional three-inch guns with 95-mm guns was rejected.
In March 1937, at a Moscow meeting of representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA), it was decided to accept Marshal Egorov's proposal to develop a more powerful 122-mm howitzer. In September 1937, a separate design group of the Motovilikha plant under the leadership of F. F. Petrov received the task of developing such a weapon.
The M-30 howitzer project was received by the GAU on December 20, 1937. The gun borrowed a lot from other types of artillery weapons; in particular, the design of the barrel bore was close to a similar unit of the Lubok howitzer, and the recoil brake and limber were taken from it. Despite the GAU requirement to equip the new howitzer with a wedge breech, the M-30 was equipped with a piston breech, borrowed unchanged from the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 The wheels were taken from the F-22 cannon. The M-30 prototype was completed on March 31, 1938, but factory testing was delayed due to the need to modify the howitzer. Field tests of the howitzer took place from September 11 to November 1, 1938. Although, according to the commission's conclusion, the gun did not withstand field tests (during the tests the frames broke twice), it was nevertheless recommended to send the gun for military trials.
On September 29, 1939, the M-30 was put into service under the official name “122-mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938"
Production of M-30 howitzers began in 1940. Initially, it was carried out by two plants - No. 92 (Gorky) and No. 9 (UZTM). Plant No. 92 produced the M-30 only in 1940; in total, this enterprise produced 500 howitzers.
In addition to the production of towed guns, M-30S barrels were produced for installation on SU-122 self-propelled artillery mounts (SAU).
Mass production guns continued until 1955. The successor to the M-30 was the 122-mm howitzer D-30, which was put into service in 1960.
The M-30 had a fairly modern design for its time, with a carriage with sliding frames and sprung wheel travel. The barrel was a prefabricated structure consisting of a pipe, a casing and a screw-on breech with a bolt. The M-30 was equipped with a single-stroke piston bolt, a hydraulic recoil brake, a hydropneumatic knurler, and had separate cartridge loading. The bolt has a mechanism for forced extraction of the spent cartridge case when it is opened after a shot. The descent is made by pressing the trigger on the trigger cord. The gun was equipped with a Hertz artillery panorama for firing from closed positions; the same sight was also used for direct fire. The carriage with sliding frames is equipped with a balancing mechanism and a shield cover. Metal wheels with rubber tires, leaf springs. The transportation of a weapon by mechanical traction was usually carried out without a limber directly behind the tractor; the maximum permissible transportation speed was 50 km/h on the highway and 35 km/h on cobblestone roads and country roads. The horse-drawn howitzer was transported behind the front by six horses. When the frames are retracted, the suspension is switched off automatically; if there is no space or time to retract the frames, shooting is allowed with the frames retracted in the stowed position. The horizontal firing angle is reduced to 1°30′.
The M-30 fired a full range of 122mm howitzer shells, including a variety of old Russian and imported grenades. After the Great Patriotic War, new types of ammunition were added to the range of projectiles listed below, for example, the 3BP1 cumulative projectile. The 53-OF-462 steel high-explosive fragmentation grenade, when the fuse was set to fragmentation action, when it exploded, created about 1000 lethal fragments, the effective radius of destruction of manpower was about 30 meters.
The M-30 was a divisional weapon. According to the 1939 staff, the rifle division had two artillery regiments - a light one (a division of 76-mm cannons and two mixed divisions of two batteries of 122-mm howitzers and one battery of 76-mm cannons in each) and a howitzer (a division of 122-mm howitzers and a division 152 mm howitzers), a total of 28 122 mm howitzers. In June 1940, another division of 122-mm howitzers was added to the howitzer regiment, making a total of 32 of them in the division. In July 1941, the howitzer regiment was expelled, the number of howitzers was reduced to 16. Soviet rifle divisions spent the entire war in this state. Since December 1942, the Guards Rifle Divisions had 3 divisions with 2 batteries of 76 mm cannons and one battery of 122 mm howitzers each, for a total of 12 howitzers. Since December 1944, these divisions had a howitzer artillery regiment (5 batteries), 20 122-mm howitzers. Since June 1945, rifle divisions were also transferred to this state. In the mountain rifle divisions in 1939–1940 there was one division of 122 mm howitzers (3 batteries of 3 guns each), a total of 9 howitzers. Since 1941, a howitzer artillery regiment (2 divisions of 3 four-gun batteries each) was introduced instead, and the number of howitzers became 24. Since the beginning of 1942, only one two-battery division remained, a total of eight howitzers. Since 1944, howitzers have been excluded from the staff of mountain rifle divisions. The motorized division had 2 mixed divisions (a battery of 76 mm cannons and 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers each), with a total of 12 howitzers. IN tank division there was one division of 122 mm howitzers, 12 in total. Until August 1941, cavalry divisions had 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers, a total of 8 guns. Since August 1941, divisional artillery was excluded from the cavalry divisions. Until the end of 1941, 122 mm howitzers were in rifle brigades - one battery, 4 guns. 122-mm howitzers were also part of the howitzer artillery brigades of the reserve of the Supreme High Command.
The M-30 was used for firing from closed positions at entrenched and openly located enemy personnel. It was also successfully used to destroy enemy field fortifications (trenches, dugouts, bunkers) and to make passages in wire fences when it was impossible to use mortars. The defensive fire of the M-30 battery with high-explosive fragmentation shells posed a certain threat to enemy armored vehicles. The fragments formed during the explosion were capable of penetrating armor up to 20 mm thick, which was quite enough to destroy armored personnel carriers and the sides of light tanks. For vehicles with thicker armor, shrapnel could damage chassis components, guns, and sights. To destroy enemy tanks and self-propelled guns in self-defense, a cumulative projectile, introduced in 1943, was used. In his absence, the artillerymen were ordered to fire high-explosive fragmentation shells at the tanks with the fuse set to high-explosive action. For light and medium tanks, a direct hit from a 122-mm high-explosive shell was fatal in many cases, even leading to the turret being torn off its shoulder strap.
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a significant number (several hundred) of M-30s were captured by the Wehrmacht. The weapon was adopted by the Wehrmacht as a heavy howitzer 12.2 cm s.F.H.396(r) and was actively used in battles against the Red Army. Since 1943, the Germans even launched mass production of shells for this gun (as well as a number of earlier captured Soviet howitzers of the same caliber). In 1943, 424 thousand shots were fired, in 1944 and 1945. – 696.7 thousand and 133 thousand shots, respectively. Captured M-30s were used not only on the Eastern Front, but also in the defenses of the Atlantic Wall on the northwestern coast of France.
122-mm howitzer model 1938 M-30
According to some artillery experts, the M-30 is one of the best Soviet barrel artillery designs of the mid-20th century. Equipping the Red Army artillery with M-30 howitzers played a big role in the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War.
Division-level field howitzers, which were in service with the Red Army in the 1920s, were inherited from the Tsarist army. These were the 122-mm howitzer model 1909 and the 122-mm howitzer model 1910, designed respectively by the German concern Krupp and the French company Schneider for the Russian Empire. They were actively used in the First World War and Civil wars. By the 1930s, these guns were clearly outdated. Therefore, already in 1928, the Journal of the Artillery Committee raised the question of creating a new divisional howitzer of 107-122 mm caliber, adapted for towing by mechanical traction. On August 11, 1929, an order was issued to develop such a weapon.
In 1932, testing began on the first experimental model of the new howitzer, and in 1934 this weapon was put into service as the “122-mm howitzer mod. 1934." Like the guns of the First World War, the new howitzer was mounted on a single-beam carriage (although carriages of a more modern design with sliding frames had already appeared at that time). Another significant drawback of the gun was its wheel travel (metal wheels without tires, but with suspension), which limited the towing speed to 10 km/h. The gun was produced in 1934-1935 in a small series of 11 units. Serial production of 122-mm howitzer mod. 1934 was quickly terminated. It was too complex in design for the conditions of serial production at defense industry enterprises.
Since the mid-1930s, the GAU has been at the center of discussions about the future of Soviet divisional artillery. In particular, a light 107 mm field howitzer, a “traditional” 122 mm howitzer, as well as a 107 mm gun howitzer as a duplex addition to a divisional howitzer were considered as alternatives or complementary solutions. The decisive argument in the dispute could well be the experience of using Russian artillery in the First World War and the Civil War. Based on it, the 122 mm caliber was considered the minimum sufficient for the destruction of field fortifications, and in addition, it was the smallest allowing the creation of a specialized concrete-piercing projectile for it. As a result, the divisional 107-mm light howitzer and 107-mm howitzer-gun projects never received support, and the GAU focused all its attention on the new 122-mm howitzer.
Already in September 1937, a separate design group of the Motovilikha plant under the leadership of F.F. Petrova received the task of developing such a weapon. Their project had the factory index M-30. Almost simultaneously, in October 1937, on its own initiative, but with the permission of the GAU, the design bureau of plant No. 92 (chief designer - V.G. Grabin, howitzer index F-25) took up the same work. A year later, a third design team joined them - the same task was also given to the design bureau of the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (UZTM) on September 25, 1938, on his initiative. The howitzer, designed by the UZTM Design Bureau, received the U-2 index. All designed howitzers had a modern design with sliding frames and sprung wheels.
The U-2 howitzer entered field testing on February 5, 1939. The howitzer did not withstand the tests due to the deformation of the frames that occurred during firing. Refinement of the gun was considered inappropriate, since it was inferior in ballistics to the alternative M-30 project, although it was superior to its competitor in fire accuracy.
The F-25 howitzer project was received by the GAU on February 25, 1938. The F-25 successfully passed factory tests, but did not enter field tests, since on March 23, 1939, the GAU decided:
“The 122-mm F-25 howitzer, developed by Plant No. 92 on its own initiative, is currently of no interest to the GAU, since field and military tests of the M-30 howitzer, more powerful than the F-25, have already been completed.”
The M-30 howitzer project was received by the GAU on December 20, 1937. Despite the GAU requirement to equip the new howitzer with a wedge breech, the M-30 was equipped with a piston breech, borrowed unchanged from the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 The wheels were taken from the F-22 cannon. The M-30 prototype was completed on March 31, 1938, but factory testing was delayed due to the need to modify the howitzer. Field tests of the howitzer took place from September 11 to November 1, 1938. Although, according to the commission's conclusion, the gun did not withstand field tests (during the tests the frames broke twice), it was nevertheless recommended to send the gun for military trials.
Refinement of the gun was difficult. On December 22, 1938, three modified samples were submitted for military testing, which again revealed a number of shortcomings. It was recommended to modify the gun and conduct repeated field tests, and not to conduct new military tests. However, in the summer of 1939, military tests had to be repeated. Only on September 29, 1939, the M-30 was put into service under the official name “122-mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938."
Although there is no official document detailing the advantages of the M-30 over the F-25, the following arguments can be assumed that influenced the final decision of the GAU:
- There is no muzzle brake, since spent powder gases deflected by the muzzle brake raise clouds of dust from the surface of the earth, which unmask the firing position. In addition to the unmasking effect, the presence of a muzzle brake leads to a higher intensity of the sound of a shot from behind the gun compared to the case when there is no muzzle brake. This to some extent worsens the operating conditions of the calculation.
- Use in construction large quantity spent nodes. In particular, the choice of a piston valve improved reliability (at that time there were great difficulties in producing wedge valves for guns of sufficiently large caliber). In anticipation of the upcoming large-scale war, the possibility of producing new howitzers using already debugged components from old guns became very important, especially taking into account the fact that almost all new types of weapons with complex mechanics created in the USSR from scratch had low reliability.
- Possibility of creating more powerful samples on the M-30 carriage artillery pieces. The F-25 carriage, borrowed from the divisional 76-mm F-22 cannon, was already at the limit of its strength properties - the 122-mm barrel group had to be equipped with a muzzle brake. This potential of the M-30 carriage was later used - it was used in the construction of the 152-mm howitzer mod. 1943 (D-1).
The characteristic features of the howitzer are a carriage with sliding frames, large elevation and horizontal firing angles, and high mobility with mechanical traction.
The howitzer barrel consists of a pipe, a casing and a screw-on breech. The bolt placed in the breech is a piston one, with an eccentrically located hole for the firing pin to exit. The shutter is closed and opened by turning the handle in one step. The firing pin is also cocked and released in one step by pulling the hammer back with the trigger cord; in the event of a misfire, the firing pin can be repeated, since the firing pin is always ready to be released. After firing, the cartridge case is removed by the ejection mechanism when the bolt is opened. This bolt design ensured a rate of fire of 5-6 rounds per minute.
As a rule, firing from a howitzer is carried out with the frames apart. In some cases - in the event of a surprise attack by tanks, infantry or cavalry on the march, or if the terrain does not allow for the deployment of the frames - shooting is allowed with the frames closed. When opening and closing the frames, the leaf springs of the chassis are automatically switched off and on. In the extended position, the frames are locked automatically. Thanks to these features, the transition from traveling to combat position takes only 1-1.5 minutes.
The sighting devices of the howitzer consist of a sight, independent of the gun, and a Hertz system panorama. During the war, two types of sights were used: with a semi-independent line of sight and with an independent line of sight.
The howitzer can be transported either mechanically or horse-drawn (six horses). The speed of transportation by mechanical traction on good roads is up to 50 km/h, on cobblestone roads and country roads up to 35 km/h. When drawn by horse, the howitzer is carried behind the limber; with mechanical traction, it can be transported directly behind the tractor.
The weight of the howitzer in a combat position is 2450 kg, in a stowed position without a limber - about 2500 kg, in a stowed position with a limber - about 3100 kg.
Factory production of M-30 howitzers began in 1940. Initially, it was carried out by two plants - No. 92 (Gorky) and No. 9 (UZTM). Plant No. 92 produced the M-30 only in 1940; in total, this enterprise produced 500 howitzers.
In addition to the production of towed guns, M-30S barrels were produced for installation on SU-122 self-propelled artillery mounts (SAU).
Serial production of the gun continued until 1955. The successor to the M-30 was the 122-mm howitzer D-30, which was put into service in 1960.
The howitzer was a divisional weapon. According to the 1941 staff, the rifle division had 16 122-mm howitzers. Soviet rifle divisions spent the entire war in this state. Since December 1942, the Guards Rifle Divisions had 3 divisions with 2 batteries of 76 mm cannons and one battery of 122 mm howitzers each, for a total of 12 howitzers. Since December 1944, these divisions had a howitzer artillery regiment (5 batteries), 20 122-mm howitzers. Since June 1945, rifle divisions were also transferred to this state.
The motorized division had 2 mixed divisions (a battery of 76 mm cannons and 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers each), with a total of 12 howitzers. The tank division had one division of 122 mm howitzers, 12 in total. Until August 1941, cavalry divisions had 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers, a total of 8 guns. Since August 1941, divisional artillery was excluded from the cavalry divisions.
Until the end of 1941, 122 mm howitzers were in rifle brigades - one battery, 4 guns.
122-mm howitzers were also part of the howitzer artillery brigades of the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) (72-84 howitzers).
This weapon was mass-produced from 1939 to 1955, was or is still in service with the armies of many countries around the world, and was used in almost all significant wars and armed conflicts of the mid- and late 20th century. The first Soviet large-scale self-propelled artillery units of the Great Patriotic War, SU-122, were armed with this weapon.
During the Second World War, the howitzer was used to solve the following main tasks:
destruction of manpower, both open and in field-type shelters;
destruction and suppression of infantry fire weapons;
destruction of bunkers and other field-type structures;
fighting artillery and motorized vehicles;
punching passages in wire barriers (if it is impossible to use mortars);
punching passages in minefields.
The defensive fire of the M-30 battery with high-explosive fragmentation shells posed a certain threat to enemy armored vehicles. The fragments formed during the explosion were capable of penetrating armor up to 20 mm thick, which was quite enough to destroy armored personnel carriers and the sides of light tanks. For vehicles with thicker armor, shrapnel could damage chassis components, guns, and sights.
To destroy enemy tanks and self-propelled guns in self-defense, a cumulative projectile, introduced in 1943, was used. In his absence, the artillerymen were ordered to fire high-explosive fragmentation shells at the tanks with the fuse set to high-explosive action. For light and medium tanks, a direct hit from a 122-mm high-explosive shell was fatal in many cases, even leading to the turret being torn off its shoulder strap. Heavy "Tigers" were a much more stable target, but in 1943 the Germans recorded a case of causing heavy damage to tanks of the PzKpfw VI Ausf H "Tiger" type during a combat clash with Soviet SU-122 self-propelled guns armed with M-30 howitzers.
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a significant number (several hundred) of M-30s were captured by the Wehrmacht. The weapon was adopted by the Wehrmacht as a heavy howitzer 12.2 cm s.F.H.396(r) and was actively used in battles against the Red Army. Since 1943, the Germans even launched mass production of shells for this weapon. In 1943, 424 thousand shots were fired, in 1944 and 1945. - 696.7 thousand and 133 thousand shots, respectively. Captured M-30s were used not only on the Eastern Front, but also in the defenses of the Atlantic Wall on the northwestern coast of France. Some sources also mention the use by the Germans of M-30 howitzers to arm self-propelled guns, created on the basis of various captured French armored vehicles.
IN post-war years The M-30 was exported to a number of countries in Asia and Africa, where it is still in service. It is known that such weapons exist in Syria and Egypt (accordingly, this weapon took an active part in the Arab-Israeli wars). In turn, some of the Egyptian M-30s were captured by the Israelis. The M-30 was also supplied to countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, for example, to Poland. Chinese People's Republic unwrapped her own production M-30 howitzers called Type 54.
Finnish army in 1941-1944. captured 41 guns of this type. The captured M-30s, designated 122 H/38, were used by Finnish artillerymen in light and heavy field artillery. They really liked the gun; they did not find any flaws in its design. The Finnish M-30s remaining after the war were used as training howitzers or were in the mobilization reserve in the warehouses of the Finnish army until the mid-1980s.
Regarding its fighting qualities, the statement of Marshal G.F. is known. Odintsova: “Nothing can be better than her.”
The 122mm M-30 howitzer, known in the West as the M1938, is a staunch veteran. The howitzer was developed back in 1938, and a year later its serial industrial production began. Produced in large quantities and widely used during the Great Patriotic War, the M-30 howitzer, virtually unchanged, is still widely used in the CIS and other countries to this day, although today in many armies it is used only for training purposes or has been transferred to reserve. Although production of the M-30 ceased in the CIS countries several years ago, the howitzer is still produced in China under the designation 122-mm howitzer Type 54 and Type 54-1. The Type 54-1 modification has a number of design differences that are due to the peculiarities of local technologies.
The 122-mm M-30 as a whole has a classic design: a reliable, durable two-frame carriage, a shield with a liftable central plate that is rigidly fixed, and a 23-caliber barrel without a muzzle brake. The gun was equipped with the same carriage as the 152-mm howitzer D-1 (M1943). Wheels with a large diameter are equipped with solid slopes, filled with sponge rubber, however, the Bulgarian modification M-30 has wheels of an excellent design. Each implement has two types of openers - for hard and soft soil.
Crew of the Soviet 122-mm howitzer M-30 in battle against German tanks. In the foreground is a dead artilleryman. 3rd Belorussian Front
122-mm howitzer M-30 of senior sergeant G.E. Makeeva on Gutenberg Strasse in Breslau, Silesia. 1st Ukrainian Front
A Soviet artillery guardsman rests by his 122 mm M-30 howitzer after a battle with German tanks near Kaunas. 3rd Belorussian Front. The author's title of the work is “After a Fierce Battle”
Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 are walking through Leningrad to the front, returning from repairs
The M-30 howitzer was at one time the main weapon of the SU-122 self-propelled gun, which was created on the basis of the T-34 chassis, but at present these installations no longer exist in any army. The following self-propelled guns are currently being produced in China: the Type 54-1 howitzer is mounted on a Type 531 armored personnel carrier chassis.
The main type of ammunition M-30 is a highly effective fragmentation projectile, weighing 21.76 kilograms, with a range of up to 11.8 thousand meters. To combat armored targets, the BP-463 cumulative armor-piercing projectile can theoretically be used, which at the maximum direct shot distance (630 m ) to penetrate 200 mm armor, but such ammunition is practically not used at present.
It is still in service with the armies of many countries around the world and was used in almost all significant wars and armed conflicts of the mid and late 20th century.
Tactical and technical data of the 122-mm howitzer M-30:
The first prototype - 1938;
Start of serial production - 1939;
Countries in which it is currently in service are former member countries of the Warsaw Pact, countries to which Soviet Union provided military assistance, China;
Calculation – 8 people;
Length in stowed position – 5900 mm;
Width in stowed position – 1975 mm;
Caliber - 121.92 mm;
Initial projectile speed – 515 meters per second;
Projectile weight - 21.76 kg;
Full charge weight – 2.1 kg;
Maximum pressure of powder gases – 2350 kgf/cm;
Maximum firing range – 11800 m;
Barrel length (excluding bolt) - 2800 mm (22.7 caliber);
Number of grooves – 36;
The length of the rifled part of the barrel is 2278 mm (18.3 calibers);
Rifling width – 7.6 mm;
Cutting depth – 1.01 mm;
The width of the rifling fields is 3.04 mm;
The volume of the chamber when using a long-range projectile is 3.77 dm3;
Chamber length – 392 mm (3.2 caliber);
Declination angle - -3°;
Maximum elevation angle - 63°;
Horizontal firing angle - 49°;
Vertical guidance speed (one revolution of the flywheel) – approximately 1.1°;
Horizontal guidance speed (one revolution of the flywheel) – approximately 1.5°;
The height of the firing line is 1200 mm;
Maximum rollback length – 1100 mm;
The recoil length when firing with a full charge is from 960 to 1005 mm;
Normal pressure in the knurl is 38 kgf/cm2;
The volume of liquid in the knurl is from 7.1 to 7.2 l;
The volume of fluid in the rollback brake is 10 l;
Gun height (elevation angle 0°) – 1820 mm;
Stroke width - 1600 mm;
Ground clearance – 330-357 mm;
Wheel diameter – 1205 mm;
Barrel weight with bolt – 725 kg;
Pipe weight – 322 kg;
Casing weight – 203 kg;
Breech weight – 161 kg;
Shutter weight – 33 kg;
Weight of sliding parts – 800 kg;
Cradle weight – 135 kg;
Weight of the swinging part – 1000 kg;
Carriage weight – 1675 kg;
The weight of the upper machine is 132 kg;
Wheel weight with hub – 179 kg;
Weight of the lower machine – 147 kg;
Weight of frames (two) – 395 kg;
Weight in combat position - 2450 kg;
Weight without front end in stowed position – 2500 kg;
Weight of ski rig LO-4 – 237 kg;
Transfer time between traveling and combat positions is 1-1.5 minutes;
Rate of fire – up to 6 rounds per minute;
The maximum carriage speed on good roads is 50 km/h;
The pressure of the trunk on the coupling hook is 240 kgf.
A battery of Soviet 122-mm howitzers model 1938 (M-30) fires at Berlin
122-mm howitzer M-30 in historical retrospect
Anatoly Sorokin
Service and combat use
Before a detailed consideration of the aspects of the service and combat use of the M-30 in the Red Army, we present an excerpt from the “Divisional Artillery Battery Commander’s Handbook,” released in 1942. In this publication, the main tasks facing 122-mm howitzers are summarized in the following list:
"1. destruction of enemy personnel both in open areas and behind cover;
2. suppression and destruction of infantry fire weapons;
3. destruction of field-type structures;
4. fight against enemy artillery and motorized vehicles.”
The main projectile of howitzers is a high-explosive fragmentation grenade. This grenade can also be used to shoot at tanks. Therefore, in addition to the tasks listed above, 122-mm howitzers are also tasked with combating enemy tanks and armored vehicles. For shooting at enemy personnel, the most effective means is shrapnel. In addition, the howitzers’ ammunition includes glow and smoke grenades.”
In general, this was consistent with previous views on the use of divisional howitzers (the mention of smoke and lighting shells indicated the preservation of “special tasks”), but the experience of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was also taken into account.
We have already provided assessments of the success of using the 122-mm M-30 howitzer in the Red and Soviet Army. Yes, and in the Armed Forces Russian Federation it is still used for training purposes, not to mention in a number of countries where guns of this type are still in service. We can only briefly summarize the four most important aspects of the service system in the Red Army. These include ammunition, means of propulsion, the necessary measuring and reconnaissance equipment, tactically and technically competent personnel in operating units. History shows that, at least for the first three positions, the situation was not so bad from the very beginning, and for the last position, the situation was corrected during the Great Patriotic War and after it.
122-mm long-range howitzer ammunition has been produced by industry in large quantities since the modernization of howitzers of this caliber of the old design. They could also be used by the 122 mm A-19 gun. In addition, there were significant stocks of old high-explosive grenades and shrapnel. Although the latter has largely lost its significance, in a number of cases it could still be effective, acting on openly located enemy manpower, and also be used when installing a tube “on buckshot” in self-defense of guns from massive attacks by his infantry and cavalry. Naturally, with the adoption of the M-30, another reason appeared to continue their production and improvement. In 1941, steel cast iron fragmentation grenades 0-462 were introduced into its ammunition (it was from this year that they were mentioned in firing tables), and the following year they began to develop a 122-mm cumulative projectile. On the development of ammunition for the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 has already been mentioned, but here we will focus only on the quantitative indicators of their release.
The ZIS-Zb all-terrain vehicle tows a 122-mm M-ZO howitzer with an artillery limber. February 1941
The 122-mm M-30 howitzer with an artillery limber is prepared for towing by car.
As of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 6,561 thousand howitzer rounds of all types, of which 2,482 thousand were lost after the start of the war until January 1, 1942. However, the industry managed to compensate for the losses by firing 3,423 thousand howitzer rounds during this period. But this was not enough to compensate not only for losses, but also for the consumption of ammunition in battles (1,782 thousand pieces). As a result, the number of 122-mm howitzer rounds of all types decreased to 2,402 thousand pieces. as of January 1, 1942. During 1942, consumption increased significantly (4,306 thousand units), but losses decreased by an order of magnitude (166 thousand units) and 4,571 thousand howitzer rounds were received from factories. This was a positive development, since the industry was already able to provide the army with the necessary amount of ammunition for 122 mm howitzers. Subsequently, the production of the latter only increased and in 1944 amounted to 8538 thousand rounds, which was almost a million more than the number of shells spent in battle (7610 thousand units) during the reporting period. The main thing is that 122-mm howitzers did not experience “ammunition starvation,” unlike a number of other artillery systems. However, according to A.V. Isaev, the enemy’s consumption of 105-mm howitzer shells was several times (4–5 times, depending on the year) greater than that of domestic 122-mm howitzers. Moreover, it even slightly exceeded the total fire of the divisional 122-mm howitzers and 76-mm cannons.
The lack of specialized means of traction for artillery at all levels of subordination was a headache for the GAU leadership throughout the war years. The artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), where M-30s were also used, was relatively tolerably provided in this regard, but even there it was necessary to use national economic tractors and trucks due to the lack of suitable tractors.
As for the primary “recipient” of the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 - divisional artillery, then for it the GAU initially considered horse-drawn artillery to be the main means of traction. The guns were equipped with limbers and charging boxes, which, although allowed for mechanical traction, was generally redundant. Horse traction had its own advantages, and in some cases it could even be more advantageous than mechanical traction. But it was not at all suitable for mechanized units and formations intended for maneuverable combat operations. In addition, horses suffered from high vulnerability to any type of enemy weapon and, most importantly, were a difficult-to-replenish resource. The truck in this regard also did not look the best, but not all hits from rifle bullets and small fragments led to the loss of traction functionality, and supplies from the domestic industry and Lend-Lease, together with the use of captured automotive equipment, made it possible to compensate for the losses.
The optimal solution could be a light and fast tracked tractor (especially with bulletproof armor for the most critical parts), but for divisional artillery it remained largely a dream until the end of the war. The Yaroslavl I-12 machine was somewhat close to it, but its production volumes were small.
Therefore, it was widely practiced to use trucks as artillery tractors. various types. The mass-produced domestic ZIS-5, in terms of its characteristics, was suitable for transporting divisional guns on roads - the weight of the trailer allowed in such conditions was 3.5 tons. In off-road conditions it was worse, but Lend-Lease supplies played a big role here: three-axle all-wheel drive General Motors The CCKW-353 and Studebaker US6 could tow division artillery howitzers (carrying crews and ammunition at the same time), although with some restrictions. Naturally, tractors such as Komintern, S-2 or national economic tractors could be used with the M-30 different types, however, in this case one of the main advantages of the gun was lost - the ability to transport it at high speed (up to 50 km/h) along a hard-surface road.
Damaged STZ-5-NATI tractor with a 122 mm M-30 howitzer with an artillery limber. Summer 1941
M-30 howitzer, abandoned during the retreat of Soviet troops in the summer of 1941.
Artillery limber for the M-30 howitzer. Right: Rear view with door open.
The LO-5 ski mount was intended to provide the ability to tow the M-30 howitzer behind a tracked tractor in deep snow or in marshy areas.
Artillery limber for the M-30 howitzer for horse traction.
Placing a pick-hoe, bucket and ax on the front end of the M-30 howitzer.
With supplies from domestic industry and Lend-Lease, the problem of equipping all artillery of the Red Army with means of observation, measurement, technical reconnaissance and communications was generally solved. Firing techniques were improved and the data in the shooting tables was clarified. Suffice it to say that in 1943 their fifth edition was published! Since the author is in his own way military specialty artillery calculator, the nomenclature and content of the firing tables published at that time are of considerable interest to him in terms of what fire control was like in units armed with the M-30.
To begin with, the shooting tables were printed in two versions - full and short. The first of them provided, in principle, all the same information as in modern publications of the same type for artillery systems currently in service. But the brief shooting tables lacked a lot of information that required a high degree of preparation - there were no corrections for elevation angle, auxiliary tables such as the decomposition of ballistic wind into components, information about ammunition, and the main part was given in a very compressed form. Instead of fairly detailed charge selection tables for various conditions shooting, in a brief version, only a general nomogram was given for solving this problem.
It can be assumed that the complete firing tables were intended for the artillery of the RVGK and the most “advanced” division officers, who could boast of having reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, as well as competent personnel. Brief firing tables were apparently required for hastily trained wartime artillerymen at the division level of the Army hierarchy, who found it difficult or impossible to use the full fire data preparation method. And, guided by the phrase “personnel decide everything,” you can smoothly move from the “supply, technical and management” aspects of the service to the personal ones.
In the second and third periods of the war, 122-mm M-30 howitzers remained the most powerful weapon of divisional artillery and proved themselves to be excellent both in the “classical” application (mounted shooting in field battles) and in direct fire in street battles.
For towing the M-30 howitzer, American all-wheel drive vehicles supplied under Lend-Lease turned out to be indispensable.
122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 entered the army at a very alarming time for the USSR. The Second World War has already begun in Europe World War, the threat of our country being drawn into it has become more than likely. Accordingly, there was a need to sharply increase the number of the Red Army and train the required number of specialists for various branches of the military. All responsibility for organizing the competent tactical use of artillery then fell on the officers - commanders of batteries, divisions and regiments. They were required, in addition to the excellent physical training and discipline traditional for the army, to have a good knowledge of mathematics, including higher mathematics, topography, and preferably also a number of applied branches of physics and chemistry. It is clear that future commanders from non-cadre mass mobilization personnel could only obtain this knowledge in secondary and higher civilian schools. An 18-year-old conscript or volunteer in 1940 entered school around 1929, when the situation in domestic education was still characterized by one word - “ruin.” And even then it was good if a potential artilleryman completed ten classes, because many teenagers then limited themselves to seven years and then went to work in industry or Agriculture. Few working-class families, especially outside Moscow or Leningrad, could afford a student. The seven classes of that time for the correct use of such weapons as the M-30 (with full disclosure of all capabilities) were clearly not enough: at best, with such a knowledge base, it was possible to passably master only direct fire shooting*.
Therefore, oddly enough, at first the M-30s were better suited for the artillery of the RVGK, since they had the opportunity to massively use these howitzers with fewer trained personnel and technical means of observation and reconnaissance per gun. It is possible that more powerful systems would be desirable there instead of the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938, but there were also problems with the volume of production of heavy guns. Nevertheless, the ability to concentrate the fire of numerous 122-mm RVGK artillery guns, including M-30 howitzers, in narrow breakthrough areas was very important in the success of the offensive operations of 1944–1945. According to the recollections of a number of enemy military leaders, for example F. von Mellenthin, such a concentration of artillery, together with its low mobility (according to the German general), sometimes led to the complete collapse of German flank counterattacks at the base of the “wedge” of Soviet advancing forces. But you have to pay for everything, and in the work of G. F. Krivosheev and his colleagues, the fact is mentioned that the concentration and active use of artillery in two recent years wars led to an inevitable increase in its losses. For 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 is perhaps of particular significance. With almost the same power of a high-explosive fragmentation grenade in comparison with another 122-mm system in the ranks of the RVGK artillery - the A-19 gun - the M-30 needed to be located much closer to the front line due to its almost half the firing range. This made it much easier for the enemy to counter-battery fire; he also had a chance to “catch” 122-mm howitzers on the march while changing firing positions caused by the need to move forward to provide fire support for his troops. The much longer-range A-19 guns could accomplish this task while remaining in their original position.
[* In combat conditions, direct fire shooting from 122 mm howitzers was practiced more widely than expected - not only for shooting at tanks and armored vehicles, but also for destroying and suppressing bunkers and bunkers. This made it possible to solve the problem faster and with less ammunition consumption, but sharply increased the vulnerability of the crews. It is no coincidence that it was noted that “for firing at bunkers, a 122 mm caliber is not necessary, since this task is successfully accomplished by 76 mm guns” (Colonel D.S. Zrazhevsky, “Artillery Journal”, No. 4, 1943). Direct fire from 122-mm howitzers was practiced especially extensively in street battles.]
Captured Soviet M-30 howitzers were readily used by Wehrmacht artillerymen under the designation 12.2 cm s.FH. 396(r).
British soldiers inspect guns captured from the Germans in France. Among them are M-30 howitzers.
The crew of the howitzer prepares it for battle in position. From the post-war service of the M-30.
After the war, M-30 howitzers were in service with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries for a long time. This implement is equipped with truck tires.
As for the divisional level, not only before the war, but also in its first phase, things were not in the best way, and this is a rather diplomatic expression. During personal correspondence with M.N. Svirin, whose father served in the divisional artillery during the Great Patriotic War, the author of this article was very surprised to learn that in his battery only four people (besides the commander) had knowledge of mathematics corresponding to today’s 9th grade and the then ten-year-old. And this battery was considered the best in the regiment. The use of logarithms in calculations was considered “aerobatics.” And M-30 or 122-mm howitzers of old types were fired at direct fire in approximately a third of cases. In addition to the objective reasons for such use (the small depth of the division’s combat formations, difficulties with organizing communications and ammunition supply, frequent access to the firing positions of enemy tanks and infantry, battles in dense buildings, etc.), the lack of competent personnel also played a certain role in this. Accordingly, the losses of divisional 122-mm howitzers, both in absolute and relative terms, turned out to be significantly higher compared to guns at higher levels of the army hierarchy.
The first volume of the work “Artillery in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War,” published in 1964, provides the following features of artillery and rifle training of divisional artillery on the eve of the war: based on the results of firing training conducted in 1939–1941, an eye-based method of preparing initial installations used in 51–67% of cases; in 85–90 cases out of a hundred, shooting was carried out based on the observation of signs of explosions; “lower training” of commanders of secondary formations was noted.
A very useful source of information is the book "Artillery", published in 1953. It gives an example of typical combat operation of the 122 mm M-30 howitzer from indirect firing positions. Here the main method is sighting, and the observation device is binoculars or a stereo scope. Sound meters, processing of aerial photography results, accurate calculations for the method of complete preparation of fire data and other things usual for today's artilleryman are mentioned only for heavy systems at the army level of subordination or units of the RVGK, and even then in connection with the need to save expensive shells. For comparison: in the staff of an artillery regiment of a German tank or infantry division, all this was provided for, and in the Third Reich, among conscripts or reservists there were enough people with the necessary level of education to train artillery specialists.
But towards the end of the war, the situation began to improve, as the understanding came that it was people who fought, and successes or defeats on the battlefield were determined by their level of professionalism. A graduate of an artillery school in 1944, aged 18–23, with a good knowledge of mathematics and topography, was no longer a rarity: before conscription or voluntary enlistment in the army, he was a junior student or schoolboy with good or excellent grades in subjects relevant to artillery. IN post-war period The situation in this regard has already completely returned to normal. Also, in order to disseminate the experience gained in battles, front-line printing houses printed information sheets and manuals describing technical, computing and tactical innovations that were successfully applied by artillerymen in practice.
Thus, the potential of the M-30 howitzer in 1940–1945. was not fully disclosed. Towards the end of the war, significant progress was made in this matter, but its partial implementation turned out to be so successful that it became the basis for the phrases of Marshal G.F. quoted in the introduction to the article. Odintsov and the opinions of historian Ian Hogg. The M-30 was exceptionally suitable for service in the post-war Soviet Army, and it also became a step in the training of artillerymen for later and more advanced systems, which, due to their high cost and complexity, are difficult to entrust to inexperienced military personnel. All this characterizes the work done by F.F. Petrov and his employees work only with the most the best side. Former enemies and allies who used the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938, often under other names (for example, the German designation - 12.2 cm schwere Feldhaubitze 396 (g) or the Finnish - 122 N/38), this weapon was also highly rated.
A battery of M-30 howitzers with tracked tractors on the march. Howitzers are on a trailer on the AT-L light tractor and semi-armored AT-P. The use of tractor-transporters made it possible to eliminate the front end. Howitzers are on tires with spongy rubber.
American freight car GMC CCKW 352 towing an M2A1 howitzer.
Foreign analogues
Comparison technical characteristics- a thankless thing, since the effectiveness of the use of artillery systems rarely depends only on them. First of all, it is determined by the training of artillerymen; when assessing it, one should not neglect issues of quality and supply of ammunition, as well as external conditions like the state of the atmosphere in a particular combat episode. But the comparison tactical and technical characteristics may be useful in the sense that it still gives an idea of what type of weapon turned out to be optimal in the armed forces or for the industry of a particular country.
By and large, the 122-mm M-30 howitzer, according to its data, finds itself in a separate category of field howitzer artillery of the World War II era, which the author would call “medium.” Into a light group of these similar design features systems on carriages with sliding frames include numerous 105-mm guns from other countries, and the heavy ones include samples in the 149–155 mm caliber range. It just so happened that from the very beginning the military Russian Empire preferred a heavier and more powerful version of the 122 mm caliber field howitzer, and the successful experience of combat use of such guns led to continuity in their development already in Soviet time. A light domestic howitzer of 107 mm caliber, which would be fully consistent with its foreign counterparts, was considered before the war only in the guise of a specialized mountain weapon. Therefore, on the battlefields of 1939–1953. in divisional artillery, the “medium” M-30 took the place of 105-mm systems in the armies of other countries (with the exception of Great Britain, where a 25-pound howitzer gun of 87.6 mm caliber was preferred for this purpose).
The tactical and technical characteristics of the 105-mm “rivals” M-30 are given in the table. It does not include the small-scale French howitzer model 1935B produced by the Bourges Arsenal of this caliber, since its production was completed before the surrender of the Third Republic to the Third Reich. The M-30 was used with the other guns mentioned in the table in battles of World War II and the Korean War. Obviously, with a much more powerful projectile, the M-30 was practically not inferior to its peers in firing range. Only the German modernized versions of le.FH.18 managed to surpass it in this indicator, and even then not by much. Moreover, with a barrel length of 28 calibers, in Soviet terminology they were closer to cannon howitzers than to classic howitzers. Only the American M2A1 howitzer had the ability to fire mortars. In terms of mobility, the brainchild of F.F. Petrova also looks decent, despite the large mass in the combat position. Naturally, with lighter ammunition and wedge bolts, the 105-mm systems are somewhat superior to the M-30 in maximum rate of fire. In terms of service life and geographic coverage, the M-30 paired with the Chinese Type 54 clone far surpassed its closest rival - the American 105-mm howitzer M2A1 (later redesignated M101), which also earned great respect from its users.
122-mm M-30 howitzer with the wheel drive replaced during repairs in the post-war period.
An original demonstration by the Chinese People's Liberation Army - tanks and ground artillery guns fire from the deck of a ship. In the foreground is a 122 mm Type 54 (or Type 54-1) howitzer.
Japanese 105 mm howitzer "Type 91" for mechanical traction.
Abandoned 105 mm light field howitzer le.FH.18. Winter 1941–1942
Tactical and technical characteristics of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer and foreign analogues
| Feature/System | M-30 | 10.5 cm le.FH.18 | 10.5 cm le.FH. 18M | 10.5 cm le.FH. 18/40 | 105mm M2A1 | Type 91 |
| State | USSR | Germany | Germany | Germany | USA | Japan |
| Years of development | 1937–1938 | 1928–1929 | 1941 | 1942 | 1920–1940 | 1927–1931 |
| Years of production | 1940–1955 | 1935–1945 | 1942–1945 | 1943–1945 | 1941–1953 | 1931–1945 |
| Built, units | 19266 | 11831 | 10265 | 10200 | 1100 | |
| Weight in firing position, kg | 2450 | 1985 | 2040 | 1900 | 2260 | 1500 |
| Weight in stowed position, kg | 3100 | 3490 | 3540 | ? | ? | 1979 |
| Caliber, mm | 121,92 | 105 | ||||
| Barrel length, club | 22,7 | 28 | 22 | 24 | ||
| Model of HE grenade (projectile) | OF-462 | 10.5-cm-SprGr | M1 | ? | ||
| Weight of HE grenade (projectile), kg | 21,78 | 14,81 | 14,97 | 15,7 | ||
| Max. initial speed, m/s | 515 | 470 | 540 | 472 | 546 | |
| Muzzle energy, MJ | 2,9 | 1,6 | 2,2 | 1,7 | 2,3 | |
| Max. range, m | 11800 | 10675 | 12325 | 11160* | 10770 | |
| Max. fire rate, rds/min | 5-6 | 6-8 | ||||
| Vertical aiming angles, degrees. | - 3…+63.5 | - 5…+42 | - 5.. | +45 | - 1…+65 | - 5…+45 |
| Sector horizon, interference, hail. | 49 | 56 | 46 | 40 |
* Firing range in the USA was determined under different normal conditions (temperature, Atmosphere pressure etc.) than in the USSR, Germany or Great Britain, therefore, other things being equal, this indicator for American guns is overestimated relative to analogues from the mentioned countries.
122-mm howitzer M-30 manufacturer. No. 4861, produced in 1942, in Nizhny Novgorod’s Victory Park.
Installation of lighting equipment on the gun shield (side light and brake light) during post-war repairs.
Comparative characteristics of high-explosive fragmentation shells of field howitzers
| Projectile | OF-462 | 10.5-cm-SprGr | M1 | Mk 16 | Schneider's "Normal" |
| A country | USSR | Germany | USA | Great Britain | France |
| Caliber, mm | 122 | 105 | 105 | 114 | 105 |
| Projectile weight, kg | 21,78 | 14,81 | 14,97 | 15,87 | 15,5 |
| Weight of explosive charge, kg | 3.67 (TNT) | 1.4 (TNT) | 2.18 (TNT) | 1.95 (TNT or ammotol) | 2.61 (TNT) |
| Filling factor | 0,17 | 0,09 | 0,15 | 0,12 | 0,17 |
Afterword
To summarize, it can be noted that there are still many questions left in the history of the M-30 howitzer. It is too early to put an end to its last page, and the author hopes that a detailed monograph about this weapon will appear, where it will be possible to find answers to questions that arose during the work on this article. To accurately formulate the problem along the search path is to take the first step in solving it. If this article turned out to be useful in this regard, then the author will consider his task completed.
Photo from the archive of M. Grif.
Applications
1. Nomenclature of ammunition for 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)
The nomenclature of shells is given according to the status set out in the service manual published in 1948 and in the fifth updated edition of firing tables No. 146 and 146/140D 1943 with the addition of the BP-463 cumulative shell, which was adopted for service after 1948. For reasons of secrecy, information about chemical shells of the OX-462, X-462 and X-460 types was not provided in these books. The gun could also fire old high-explosive grenades and shrapnel of the 460 family. However, in the above-mentioned firing tables, information about firing with old ammunition was no longer available, although the official designation of high-explosive fragmentation and fragmentation grenades of the 462nd family as “long-range” remained a kind of reminder of them. The 1948 and later editions of the service manual omit this adjective. In addition, some types of shells from the 122 mm caliber ammunition directory for howitzer artillery are listed in the firing tables, but are not in the service manual and vice versa.
| Type | Designation | Projectile weight, kg | Explosive mass, kg | Initial speed, m/s | Table range, m |
| HEAT projectile | BP-460A | 13,4 | ? | 335 (charge No. 4) | 2000 |
| HEAT projectile 1 2 | BP-463 | ? | ? | 570(full charge) | ? |
| High explosive steel howitzer grenade | OF-462 | 21,71–21,79 | 3,675 | 515 (full charge) | 11800 |
| Steel cast iron fragmentation howitzer grenade with screw head | 0-462A | 21,71–21,79 | 3,000 | 458 (charge No. 1) | 10700 |
| Solid-body fragmentation howitzer grenade made of steel cast iron. | 0-460A | ? | ? | 515 (full charge) | 11 800 |
| Smoke steel howitzer shell | D-462 | 22,32–22,37 | 0,155/3,600 | 515 (full charge) | 11 800 |
| Steel cast iron smoke howitzer shell 1 | D-462A | ? | ? | 458 (charge No. 1) | 10 700 |
| Lighting projectile 2 | S-462 | 22,30 | 0,100 | 479 (full charge) | 8 500 |
| Propaganda shell 2 | A-462 | 21,50 | 0,100 | 431(first charge) | 8 000 |
1 The 1943 edition is not mentioned in the Shooting Tables.
2 The Service Manual does not mention the 1948 edition.
2. Armor penetration tables for the 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)
The armor penetration of 122-mm howitzer cumulative shells is not indicated in the service manual and firing tables published during the war or a short time after it. Other sources provide values with a fairly large scatter. Therefore, the author provides estimated calculated data based on the general breakdown properties of this type Soviet ammunition different generations. The first Soviet cumulative shells, developed in 1942, penetrated armor thicknesses of about their caliber, and adopted into service in the 1950s. - about one and a half of its calibers.
Armor penetration table for 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-30)
The given data were calculated taking into account the conditions of the Soviet methodology for determining penetration ability. It should be remembered that penetration rates can vary noticeably when using different batches of shells and different armor manufacturing technologies.
Availability of 122 mm howitzers in the troops
| Number of guns Date | 22.VI.1941 | 1.1.1942 | 1.1.1943 | 1.1.1944 | 1.1.1945 | 10.V.1945 |
| All types, thousand pcs. | 8,1 | 4,0 | 7,0 | 10,2 | 12,1 | 11,7 |
| M-30, thousand units | 1,7 | 2,3 | 5,6 | 8,9 | 11,4 | 11,0 |
| M-30, share of the total, % | 21 | 58 | 80 | 87 | 94 | 94 |
Ammunition consumption of 122 mm howitzers
1 According to the book “Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.”
2 Ammunition consumption Soviet artillery in 1942 - TsAMO, F. 81, on. 12075, no. 28. Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/1718/1718985.htm).
3 Consumption of ammunition for Soviet artillery in 1943 Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/2/archive/1706/1706490.htm).
4 Consumption of ammunition for Soviet artillery in 1944–1945. Published by A.V. Isaev on the website vif2ne.ru (http:// vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/arhprint/1733134).
5 Proportional to the share of M-30s from the total number of 122 mm howitzers.
3. Availability in the troops, ammunition consumption and losses of 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30)
In the available statistics, data on all types of 122-mm howitzers are combined into one group, so their isolation for the M-30 is calculated based on the losses of guns of all types and the receipt of only new M-30s from industrial plants. It should be borne in mind that due to the rounded values of losses, availability and supply of guns in the initial data and addition and subtraction operations in the calculations, the initial absolute error of 0.05 thousand pieces. triples. The resulting number of M-30s in the troops has an absolute error of 0.15 thousand units; the corresponding relative error determines the possible spread in the number of lost guns and ammunition consumption.
It should be borne in mind that information about the presence of 122-mm howitzers in the Red Army is not the same in different sources of information. The tables on the left are compiled according to those given in the work of G.F. Krivosheev data. However, in the book “Artillery in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War” similar figures are noticeably lower (see the corresponding table).
During 1945, Plant No. 9 delivered 2,630 howitzers, of which by May 10, 1945, only about 300 guns had reached the troops. By the end of the year, the Red Army should have had about 14.0 thousand units at its disposal. 122-mm howitzers, 13.3 thousand of which (95%) were M-30, if you do not take into account the decommissioning of old types of guns and the transfer of some M-30 to other states.
Losses of 122 mm howitzers
1 5952, according to the book “Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.”
2 1522, according to the same source.
3 Proportional to the share of M-30s from the total number of 122 mm howitzers.
4. Ammunition for 122 mm divisional howitzers 1
| Main projectile mass, kg | Shot weight, kg | Number of shots, ammunition | The amount of ammunition that fits in a 16.5-ton wagon | |
| 122 mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 | 21,8 | 24,9 | 80 | 500 |
| 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 | 21,8 | 27,1 | 80 | 480 |
Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. In 2 vols.-M.: Voenizdat, 1964.
5. The work “Artillery in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War” (1964–1965) provides figures for the receipt of 122-mm howitzers and howitzer ammunition from industry during the Great Patriotic War by month:
| Year | 1941 | ||||||
| Month | Available on 06/22/41 | July | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
| 122 mm howitzers, pcs. | 7923 | 240 | 314 | 320 | 325 | 308 | 349 |
| 6561 | 288 | 497 | 479 | 350 | 135 | 873 |
| Year | 1942 | |||||||||||
| Month | Jan. | Feb. | March | Apr. | May | June | July | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
| 122 mm howitzers, pcs. | 77 | 299 | 604 | 321 | 380 | 381 | 408 | 430 | 420 | 420 | 420 | 345 |
| 122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs. | 379 | 216 | 238 | 131 | 121 | 132 | 120 | 328 | 285 | 339 | 383 | 351 |
| Year | 1943 | |||||||||||
| Month | Jan. | Feb. | March | Apr. | May | June | July | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
| 122 mm howitzers, pcs. | 130 | 308 | 282 | 330 | 350 | 350 | 370 | 330 | 330 | 330 | 330 | 330 |
| 122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs. | 253 | 345 | 354 | 274 | 369 | 386 | 403 | 547 | 647 | 693 | 685 | 700 |
| Year | 1944 | |||||||||||
| Month | Jan. | Feb. | March | Apr. | May | June | July | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
| 122 mm howitzers, pcs. | 305 | 310 | 310 | 300 | 305 | 310 | 285 | 285 | 265 | 265 | 265 | 280 |
| 122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs. | 707 | 656 | 695 | 710 | 685 | 720 | 690 | 690 | 765 | 755 | 655 | 805 |
| Year | 1945 | ||||
| Month | Jan. | Feb. | March | Apr. | Available on 05/01/45 |
| 122 mm howitzers, pcs. | 300 | 320 | 350 | 360 | 9940 1 |
| 122-mm howitzer shells, thousand pcs. | 840 | 870 | 913 | 1000 |
1 - Of these: as part of the artillery of divisions and brigades - 6544, corps artillery - 73, artillery of the RVGK - 3323 pieces.
Literature
1. 122 mm howitzer mod. 1938 Service Manual. - M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of the Armed Forces USSR, 1948.
2. Directory of the commander of a battery of divisional artillery. Material and ammunition. - M.: Military publishing house. People's Commissariat of Defense, 1942.
3. Firing tables for 122 mm howitzers mod. 1938 TS/GAUKA No. 146i 146/140D. Ed. 5, additional-M.: Military edition. People's Commissariat of Defense, 1943.
4. 152 mm howitzer mod. 1943 Service Manual. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1958.
5. Firing tables for 152 mm howitzers mod. 1943 TS/GRAU No. 155. Ed. 6. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1968.
6. 122 mm howitzer D-30 (2A18). Technical description and operating instructions. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1972.
7. Firing tables for the 122-mm howitzer D-30. TS No. 145. Ed. 4. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1981.
8. Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. In 2 volumes - M.: Voenizdat, 1964.
9. Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. - Moscow-Tula, ed. GAU, 1977.
10. Ivanov A. Artillery of the USSR in the Second World War. - St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003. - 64 p.
11. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Statistical research / Ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - 608 p.
12. Kolomiets M.V. KV. "Klim Voroshilov" - breakthrough tank. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2006. - 136 p.
13. Kolomiets M.V. Captured tanks of the Red Army. - M.: Eksmo, 2010.
14. Nikiforov N.N., Turkin P.I., Zherebtsov A.A., Galienko S.G. Artillery / Under the general. ed. Chistyakova M.N. - M.: Military publishing house. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1953.
15. Svirin M. N. Tank power of the USSR. - M.: Eksmo, Yauza, 2008.
16. Svirin M.N. Self-propelled guns of Stalin. History of the Soviet self-propelled guns 1919–1945. - M.: Eksmo, 2008.
17. Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. Soviet medium self-propelled artillery installations 1941–1945. - M.: LLC Publishing Center "Exprint", 2005. - 48 p.
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