D.V. Vedeneev. The role of the Soviet special services in the defeat of Nazism (based on the intelligence and sabotage activities of the NKVD-NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR)

The national composition of the personnel of the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB of the USSR in 1g.

(Brief historical background)

Leningrad
October 1998

1.2 Introductory remarks
2. The leading personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR in the years
2.1 Personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD in the years
2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and the NKVD when he was deputy chairman of the OGPU and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was the People's Commissar
3. Key Findings
Used materials

1.1 The political significance of the issue

After the forthcoming inevitable restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia, the question will arise of carefully correcting the mistakes of the Soviet government in the period when the RSDLP-VKP(b)-CPSU were the only ruling Party in the USSR, in the years, i.e., until the moment of the treacherous surrender political positions of the CPSU Yov and his like-minded people.

Among the errors in the area national question it should be noted the weak, condescending and ineffective control of the Central Committee of the Party over the proportional representation of the peoples of the USSR. In the governing bodies of the country, the well-known exclusion of representatives of the indigenous nation - the Russian people - from active participation in the work of the governing bodies and the filling of these bodies, especially in their higher echelons, with national minorities in a share many times greater than their actual weight in the composition of the population of Russia and the USSR . This is a violation of a clear provision: Russia should be ruled by Russians, who make up the majority of its population. The remaining allied nations must have legal representation in the governing bodies of Russia, approximately proportional to their share in the numerical composition of the population of Russia.

A different approach is when some national clan is concentrated in the leadership of Russia, which, by the method of mutual support, gradually expands its influence and takes root in some important government body, pushing aside the indigenous nationality. This leads to:

Harmful to the cause of socialism, alienation of the broad masses of the people from the Party is being created, which allegedly introduces an alien government (which actually took place in the history of the country in connection with claims to the role of the “second leader of the October Revolution”);

There is a danger that, having concentrated in power, such a national wedge will gradually move away from defending the interests of Russia and will begin to use the authority of the Russian people to defend their own national interests;

A breeding ground is being created for hostile agitation inside and outside the country (at the international level) with the main thesis: “Russia is ruled by a non-Russian Government”, as it actually was in the years. and later;

The unity of the country's leadership is broken, since the presence of "disproportionate national strata" in the governing bodies does not contribute to their unity and focus on solving the most difficult problems of building a socialist society, and introduces elements of national competition into the atmosphere of management.

Thus, on the whole, such a practice of disproportionate representation of nations in the leadership of a multinational socialist power does not contribute to the creation of sincere confidence of the broad masses of the people in Soviet power, and violates the monolithic unity of the Party and the people.

Of course, the principle of internationalism fully allows any worthy communist of a non-indigenous nationality to apply for any post and hold it in the Party and the State.

Being from a Russified Polish noble family, in particular, he did not contribute to the concentration of people of Polish nationality in the Cheka. In addition to the revolutionary underground known from time to time, who was the first deputy and became the successor after his death, only a few Chekists of Polish origin are known, for example, the Chekist Redens authorized by the OGPU in Transcaucasia, married to his wife's sister. Under the leadership of this Chekist, a young man began his work in the OGPU, who managed to survive his less insidious boss from the Caucasus and nestled himself in his position.

The fact that the founder of the Cheka-OGPU did not tend to concentrate his fellow tribesmen in the apparatus of his department is another positive characteristic of his political activity.

At that time, the cadres of the Cheka were formed from revolutionary sailors, Red Guards, Bolsheviks with underground experience, most of them Great Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, with a noticeable layer of Latvians. The question of the concentration in the Cheka-OGPU of persons of any one non-indigenous nationality was not raised, and the national composition of the bodies approximately corresponded to the composition of the population of Russia and the USSR.

However, it was not without errors. In 1919, under historically obscure circumstances, he authorized the admission, and immediately to the leadership position of one of his deputies, a distant relative, the husband of his niece Yakov (Yankel) Mikhailovich Sverdlov. Most likely, he personally insisted on getting his relative to a prominent post in the Cheka-OGPU.

Since in the future he played a negative role in the work of the OGPU of the USSR and, in particular, in every possible way contributed to filling the apparatus of the OGPU with his fellow tribesmen (by nationality he was a “Polish Jew” - as he wrote in his own handwriting in his questionnaires), it is necessary to dwell on this person in more detail, which cannot be done without simultaneously covering the history of the Sverdlov family.

Nizhny Novgorod engraver-private Jew Mikhail Sverdlov (father of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov) from the end of the 19th century served the needs of revolutionary organizations in his workshop (engraving seals, clichés, etc.). In connection with this, he was under the supervision of the Nizhny Novgorod gendarme department. In the first years of the 20th century, he was accepted as an engraver's student by the young son of the Nizhny Novgorod pharmacist Genrikh Genrikhovich Yagoda. In some sources, the true name and surname of Yagoda is defined as Gerschel Gershelevich Yehuda (translated from Hebrew - Judas).

The history of the relationship between the student and the master is dramatic: before the revolution, the student robbed his master twice, hid from him in other cities, where he tried to open “his own business”. In both cases, the Sverdlov family did not turn to the police, given their connections with revolutionary circles and fearing exposure and repression.

In both cases, he returned to the master in disgrace, asked for forgiveness and again worked in the engraving workshop of the Sverdlovs. After the second theft and the second reconciliation with Sverdlov, the eldest, the young engraver married the granddaughter of Mikhail Sverdlov (she is Yakov Sverdlov's niece) Ida Averbakh to strengthen the family union. After this, friction in the family ended, and in 1918 Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov got his relative into the bodies of the Cheka, although at that time the engraver had no revolutionary merits of his own, nor did he have experience in operational Chekist work. He considered himself a member of the Sverdlov family. Moreover, he considered himself a member of the family on the very flimsy basis that another son of Mikhail Sverdlov, Zavel (who, when he adopted Orthodoxy, was given the name Zinovy) was (after breaking with his father, Mikhail Sverdlov, on religious grounds) adopted (by Gorky) and since then has been known in the family as Zinovy ​​​​Peshkov (he was his godparent at Orthodox baptism).

This artificial “kinship” made him a part of the family in the 30s, where he, as a relative, spent a lot of time. From this followed the accusation of poisoning his son Maxim Peshkov.

The rather confusing circumstances presented here are set forth in a source (3), the author of which B. Bazhanov was closely acquainted with the younger generation of the Sverdlov family in the 1920s. It can be seen from this that, wanting to “please a loved one,” he slipped a frame that was very dubious in its moral qualities, and for some reason Dzerzhinsky himself contributed to this typically “criminal” employment operation, which did not and could not have any special merits before the RCP (b ) and could hardly qualify for the post of second deputy chairman of the Cheka for his business and political qualities.

As you know, those who were repressed under the “Bukharin process” have now been rehabilitated - all of them, with the exception of those on whose conscience there are many crimes. The moral character of this “chekist” is well characterized by his actions. Entering in the early 30s in strength and power, he anticipated the well-known "Beria Syndrome" - the hunt for women. In 1932/33, already as the head of the NKVD, he became interested in the wife of the diplomatic courier Selivanov, Nina Selivanova. The diplomatic courier himself was immediately captured, accused of spying for Germany and shot. Somewhat later, he “laid his eye” on an employee - the wife of his son Maxim. And then Maxim Peshkov - this healthy young man, athlete - suddenly dies to the great grief of his father -.

Before that, in 1933, the chief died, clearing the way for him to the top.

Considering that at that time he set up a special laboratory for the development of poisonous drugs as part of the OGPU-NKVD, it can be assumed that these particular deaths, which he personally needed, were not accidental. The rest of the accusations of “poisoning” Kuibyshev, Gorky and others were most likely attributed by the initiators of the “Bukharin process”, because there is no personal interest in the death of Gorky, Kuibyshev and others.

As follows from this, at the request and surprising oversight, a man who had no political merit before the Party before the Revolution, a principled cynic, a thief, a murderer and an adulterer, made his way to the responsible work of the head of all the special services of the USSR.

The principle “The Chekist must always have a cool head and a warm heart devoted to the cause of the Party” was violated in this case.

2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and the NKVD during his tenure
Deputy Chairman of the OGPU and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Already in the first period of his activity in the field of the special services of the USSR, as their deputy head, he contributed in every possible way to filling these services with people of the same nationality as him. He encouraged clans and fraternities, arranged for the bodies and members of his family (for example, his son - Nadezhda Peshkova, mentioned above).

The first assistant to the Secret Operational Directorate of the OGPU, which he personally oversaw, he appointed an Odessa Chekist.

The most important foreign department in the OGPU (foreign intelligence) was successively headed (at the suggestion) by Jewish Chekists Trilisser, Artuzov, Slutsky and Shpigelglass (the organizer of the murder of (Bronstein) in Mexico), Passov and Dekanozov.

A Jewish specialist (and, concurrently, a poisoner), Colonel Mairanovsky, was appointed to the post of head of the specially established “chemical laboratory of the OGPU” (compilation of deadly poisons and toxic long-acting compounds), who at the criminal court in his case (1954) directly testified: “ What kind of court sentences, they pointed the finger at me who should be seized, and I seized, that is, poisoned with the means developed by the laboratory. Gesselberg was appointed head of the photo laboratory of the OGPU, and Berenzon was appointed chief accountant of the department. After the “transfer of cases” - the last to be arrested was the Chekist Colonel Shvartsman from the NKVD investigation unit. This officer was accused of creating a terrorist Zionist organization directly in the general apparatus of the NKVD (Moscow). It was in the distant 30s, when the state of Israel did not yet exist, but the Zionist movement was already developing and was well organized.

Being “interrogated”, Colonel Shvartsman immediately named thirty (!) names of Chekists-Jews, who allegedly were in his organization.

Thus, the question of whether the organization was part of the NKVD remains open (this organization could have been invented by the investigator), but the fact that 30 Jewish Chekists “worked” in the central apparatus of the NKVD is beyond doubt.

Personally supervising the work of the Main Directorate of State Security of the OGPU-NKVD, he appointed the well-known (Sorenzon) as his first deputy in this important area. - this is the same investigator who, with one stroke of the pen, single-handedly “sentenced” the Russian poet to execution (1921) and who stubbornly imposed his “friendship” on another great poet -. In general, knowing with whom he was dealing, he respectfully called this “friend of Russian poetry” “Agranych”. By the way, Yagodovsky’s employee of the Cheka-OGPU was also the notorious “patron” - Osip Brik, who, using his connections in the OGPU, prevented Mayakovsky from issuing a passport for his next trip to Paris, which upset the poet’s plans to marry a Russian emigrant - Tatyana Yakovleva, daughter of the royal engineer-colonel Yakovlev, who left for France back in 1908. According to some writers, this tragedy (Tatyana, without waiting for Mayakovsky, married Prince Radziwill) caused the poet's suicide.

Back in 1924, he became a member of the Special Meeting of the OGPU, which had the rights of the highest judicial instance, passing sentences without the right to appeal.

How stubbornly the People's Commissar was committed to the idea of ​​saturating the personnel of the USSR special services with his fellow tribesmen is well shown by the historical episode of the second admission to the cadres of the OGPU for a responsible position of the famous Socialist-Revolutionary Ya. Blumkin.

Y. Blyumkin until 1918 worked in the Cheka from the allied at that time with the RCP (b) party of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. By position, he was entrusted with the supervision of the activities of the German embassy. Fulfilling the illegal order of the leader of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Maria Spiridonova, Blumkin, using his official access to the Embassy, ​​organized a terrorist act - the assassination of the German ambassador to the RSFSR, Count Mirbach, in order to provoke Germany into military action against a still weakened Russia, contrary to the Brest Peace. On the same signal, the Left SRs raised an armed rebellion in Moscow and Yaroslavl, in particular, managed to arrest. Thus, Ya. Blyumkin was the instigator and executor of the largest political provocation against the Soviet government, which put the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee in a critical situation. Thanks to political art, the rebellion of the Left SRs was suppressed, but during its suppression (especially in Yaroslavl) a lot of blood was shed, which modern Israeli ideologists “really regret for reasons of humanity”, apparently forgetting who exactly started the case and shed blood in Moscow foreign diplomat.

For this counter-revolutionary outing Ya. Blyumkin was outlawed by the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR (at the suggestion).

For a couple of years, this SR terrorist was hiding from justice in the SR underground. Then, seeing no other way out, he “turned himself in confession to the OGPU” (the Cheka had already been reorganized), handed over to the OGPU all the materials known to him about the activities of the underground party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries already at that time (that is, in other words, he sold his accomplices) and .... asked to return to work in the OGPU of the RSFSR. His petition was warmly supported. As a result, Y. Blumkin was “forgiven” and again began to “serve” the Soviet government, first in Georgia, where, according to the conclusion of the OGPU itself, “showed excessive cruelty”, then in Mongolia, where again due to “abuse of executions” he was recalled to Moscow, a little later the Collegium of the OGPU sent Blumkin as a resident to the Middle East.

However, betrayal eats into the character of a person, Blumkin had to betray and in 1929 he betrayed the leadership of the OGPU, establishing an illegal connection with the exiled to Trotsky. Only after that was he forced to give sanction for the punishment of the traitor - Y. Blyumkin was shot.

The secondary admission of the Left Social Revolutionary Y. Blyumkin to a responsible job in the OGPU and his entire subsequent career lies entirely on his conscience. This episode illustrates how clan loyalty to people of their nationality, regardless of their moral, political and business qualities, is detrimental to the cause.

The admission of Blumkin to the cadres of the OGPU for the second time had other consequences: Blumkin, like Yagoda, dragged his fellow tribesmen into the OGPU to smaller positions. In 1924, in Odessa, the supply manager of a cavalry regiment, a cousin of Y. Blumkin, a certain Arkady Romanovich Maksimov (actually Isaac Birger) stole and was expelled from the party. Having taken root in the OGPU for the second time, Ya. Blyumkin turned to the head of the administrative department of the OGPU Flexner with a request to arrange A. Birger for a “good job”. There was a resolution "Accept". The scoundrel was accepted for "Chekist work", like Ya. Blyumkin, was reinstated in the CPSU (b), and began to demand "responsible assignments." The order was immediately issued - tacit observation of the work and life of the responsible technical secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks B. Bazhanov. In other words, instead of fighting the counter-revolution, the OGPU officer was charged with indirect “observation” of the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And who was responsible for this observation? To the former thief expelled from the Party, recommended to the OGPU apparatus by the former Socialist-Revolutionary, provocateur and terrorist Y. Blyumkin, his relative! The whole story of Y. Blumkin and his henchman is detailed in the source (3).

This kind of semi-criminal admission of new "chekists" to responsible positions is typical of the times of the OGPU and NKVD.

This is a very dangerous recruiting system. One more concrete example has to be given. In the early 1920s, he recommended to the personnel service of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the position of personal secretary-assistant to "one of the members of the Politburo" two of his "countrymen": a certain G. Kanner and widely known in the future. Both were issued directly to the secretariat.

Further, the case developed according to the principle of a “chain reaction”: he immediately accepted a certain Makhover and a certain Yuzhak as “assistant secretaries”. The latter turned out to be a Trotskyite: he regularly removed from the table data on the progress of voting against the opinion of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the primary party organizations (on the question of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc) and transmitted them directly.

The second "secretary" G. Kanner takes in his "assistant" Chekist, a certain Bombin (Shmul Zomberg), who, presumably, also "observed" the work of the Politburo.

So, clinging to each other and carefully maintaining their monopoly, the organs of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD and other “leading heights” were filled with more and more tribesmen of the omnipotent. The trouble would have been less if it had been about ideologically convinced Jews, communists, tested by the underground. However, the “personnel policy” was aimed at staffing the OGPU with people like Blumkin, Flexner, Mekhlis, Birger, etc., if there was a Jew, the rest would follow.

The staff of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (foreign international intelligence) was recruited in approximately the same way.

"This service was considered a bread service." Permanent residence abroad, the right to organize trade and industrial enterprises there with the money of the OGPU (masking and material support for basic intelligence work), accelerating career advancement, awards and, finally, high salaries of maintenance (for example, a resident in Trepper received $350 a month in the years, and when he sent his wife and children to the USSR he began to receive $275. At that time it was a lot of money (6). this area of ​​the tribesmen is like flies to honey.

As one of our military observers writes; The defeat of foreign intelligence led to the fact that foreign intelligence for operational work was taken almost from the street. “Recruits” were illegally sent abroad, who did not know the specifics of their business, the country of their illegal activity and its language.

The well-deserved authority of the external operations carried out by the Cheka and the OGPU during (for example, the operation “Trust” and the arrest of the “leader” of the Socialist-Revolutionary movement Savinkov), faded, things went from failure to failure, the first officers of the NKVD appeared - traitors (Ya. Blyumkin, A. Orlov (i.e. L. Feldbin) and others).

On the other hand, his Collegium of the NKVD sharply increased the purely repressive functions of the OGPU. “Extrajudicial bodies” appeared to pass sentences without the right to appeal. The network of “political isolation wards” and concentration camps expanded, “unauthorized methods” of investigation, in other words, the use of physical measures of influence against prisoners, became widespread.

It is surprising to note that the most acute structure of mass repressions - the Gulag - was also (in terms of leadership) staffed by Yagoda on a national basis.

At that time he was the head of the Main Directorate of Camps and Settlements. His deputy - .
He was the head of the White Sea camps.
He was the head of the White Sea - Baltic camp (canal construction).
The head of the Main Directorate of Prisons of the NKVD of the USSR was H. Apert.
The head of the camps on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR were, then Balitsky.
Finkelstein was the head of the camps in the northern regions.
The head of the camps in the Sverdlovsk region was Shklyar.
Polin was the head of the camps on the territory of the Kazakh SSR.
The head of the camps in Western Siberia was first Shabo, then Gogel.
Friedberg was the head of the camps in the Azov-Chernomorsky region.
Pilyar was the head of the camps in the Saratov region.
Raisky was in charge of the camps in the Stalingrad region, Abrampolsky in the Gorky region, Faivilovich in the North Caucasus, Zaligman in Bashkiria, Deribas in the Far East region, and Leplevsky in Belarus.

In general, fellow tribesmen commanded and practically carried out repressions in 95% of the Gulag camps. The main contingent of prisoners in these camps were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Caucasians. Among them and among their relatives, thoughts and conversations involuntarily arose that the Jews, the heads of repressive institutions, were raging over the rest of the inhabitants of the USSR. This, of course, fueled anti-Semitism and was therefore harmful to the national policy of the Party. However, everything was for nothing - he continued to stubbornly pump up the leading cadres of the NKVD with "his" people.

This is a clear historical example of how a biased unfair personnel policy can really quarrel the peoples of our multinational state.

An analysis of the deplorable results of the leading “Chekist” activities clearly showed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the need for its urgent replacement by another comrade who, in particular, would be less susceptible to inflating the Jewish diaspora directly in the structures of the special services and, especially, in their leadership.

As part of the OGPU, he also kept “women's units”. When residents and emissaries of the OGPU and the GRU were sent abroad with assignments, it was supposed “for technical needs” to send with them a secretary (or radio operator) of an OGPU employee - a woman, and a situation was encouraged in which “informal relations” arose between both sent. Upon returning from a business trip, the woman “assigned” to the resident in this way made a separate and secret report from her partner about his words, deeds and lifestyle abroad.

So, for example, the former Socialist-Revolutionary already mentioned above, an employee of the OGPU (resident in the Middle East) Ya. Blyumkin, returning to 1929. in the USSR from Baghdad, secretly drove to the Princes' Islands (Turkey), where L. Trotsky was at that time, Blumkin took from Trotsky a secret letter to the Trotskyite Sobelson (i.e., Karl Radek) and propaganda materials for illegal distribution in the USSR. His assistant (she is also his wife) Lisa Blyumkina (in her second marriage, Liza Zarubina, captain of state security), having learned about this in accordance with the charter of the OGPU, reported her husband's behavior to the command. Blumkin, upon arrival in the USSR, was arrested, tried and shot as a traitor.

Upon surrendering the post of head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (05/21/1935), he appointed him to this most important position, and made him his first deputy, and only the second deputy - - was Russian.

On November 26, 1935, he reached the highest point of his career: by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he was awarded the title “General Commissar of State Security of the USSR”. At that time, he was already the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and his adventures with Nina Selivanova and Nadezhda Peshkova, which ended in the deaths of the husbands of these women, also belong to the same time of “dizziness from success”. To characterize him as a person, it can be noted that when Yezhov, who replaced him in office, turned to him with a “kind” question: was he interested in the future fate of Nina Selivanova (she was in prison at that time as “the wife of a German spy”), answered : "Not at all interested." The new (last in his career) rank: "General Commissar of State Security of the USSR" corresponded to the title of "Marshal of the Soviet Union", and the corresponding uniform included a marshal's star on the buttonhole of a tunic (tunic, overcoat).

One step below the General Commissar of the State Security Council of the USSR was the title of “Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank”, which then corresponded to the then rank of “Commander of the 1st rank” or the current one - “General of the Army”. Interestingly, out of the 5 persons who were awarded this title, according to the presentation, three were Jews:, and, the remaining two were Poles: and not a single (!) Russian. (4)

By order of 01.01.2001, he organized in N.K.V. D. special ”Central Department of Trade, Industrial and Consumer Enterprises and Public Catering of the NKVD Contingents”. The NKVD was appointed the head of this sweet and completely uncontrolled feeding trough.

On January 4, 1936, he organized the “Engineering and Construction Department of the NKVD of the USSR” for the construction of buildings, housing, prisons and camps for his department. He was appointed head of the new department.

Finally, on January 28, 1936, a long-standing wish came true: Order No. 000 of the NKVD of the USSR announced the transfer of the most important body from the NPO of the USSR to the NKVD - the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. By the same order, upon nomination, a certain commander was appointed to the post of commandant of the Kremlin (4).

Now he could let any terrorist team into the Kremlin.

Some of the old Chekists who served at the time believe that he had far-reaching plans to "enter power" in the country and that for this purpose he even created some kind of "elite unit" of 2000 fighters who underwent special military sports training, however, the unlucky omnipotent the minister forgot that here he is playing against a much larger political grandmaster - .

In the midst of the troubles described above, the all-powerful People's Commissar and General Commissar of State Security of the USSR on September 26, 1936, was unexpectedly relieved of his posts and rank with the appointment of the People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR. Sunset has begun.

Further fate corresponded to the spirit of the times. On April 3, 1937, by the Decree of the USSR, he was removed from the post of the People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR, on the same days he was arrested. On March 13, 1938 (this year was needed to participate as a defendant in the Bukharin trial), he was sentenced by the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR to be shot, but immediately filed a request for pardon to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

In his request, the former General Commissar of State Security of the USSR sensibly wrote: “My guilt before the Motherland is great. Don't redeem it in any way. It's hard to die. Before all the People and the Party, I kneel and ask for mercy on me, saving my life. The petition was rejected and G. G. Yagoda was shot on March 15, 1938 (4).

The time has come for a new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and a new General Commissar of State Security of the USSR - Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, this time a representative of the indigenous people.

2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was the People's Commissar

Remembering this time, the well-known Soviet intelligence officer (later a KGB general) Pavel Sudoplatov writes (5): “I remember the oral (!) instruction of Obruchnikov, Deputy Minister for Personnel, not to accept Jews for officer positions. I could not imagine that such an openly anti-Semitic order came directly from Stalin.” Of course, the husband of the Lieutenant Colonel of the State Security Service Emma Koganova took this order with resentment, but let us ask ourselves, how else could the Government of the USSR clear away the huge diaspora of Jews in the special services, which the “Polish Jew” cherished for many years? Apparently, common sense suggested: we should at least limit the influx of new Jewish replenishment into the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR already sufficiently filled with Jewish Chekists.

Implementing this new personnel policy, the USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs began to gradually replace cadres with Chekists from among the overwhelming majority of the People of the USSR.

The case, apparently, went with great creaking and noticeable resistance from the “already recruited” personnel.

Nevertheless, things moved forward: on March 17, 1937, he was expelled from the Central Office of the NKVD to the Saratov Region, but on the other hand, deputies were appointed (10/16/36) and (09/29/36). At the same time, 4 more Chekists of Russian nationality (,) and a Pole were immediately appointed as deputies.

These first steps gave rise to the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD of the USSR on December 20, 1937, to declare: “... Yezhov created in the NKVD a wonderful backbone of Chekists, Soviet intelligence officers, expelling alien people who penetrated the NKVD and hindered his work. Yezhov achieved these successes thanks to the fact that he worked under the leadership of Stalin, learned and was able to apply the Stalinist style of work in the field of intelligence. ”(4)

The purge in the apparatus of the NKVD was cardinal. From the central apparatus of the NKVD, which consisted (in the last year of work) of 22,283 operational workers, were dismissed (from 01.10.36 to 01.01. operational workers, that is, 1/4 of the personnel (about 25%). Of this number, they were arrested “for counter-revolutionary activities in the organs” about 1,700 officers, “for the collapse of work” - 373 officers and “for criminal offenses” - 35 officers.

Among the arrested leaders of the NKVD of the USSR were: former People's Commissar, head of the Engineering and Construction Directorate, head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, head of the Security Department (Government) of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

However, no matter how hard he tried to get rid of the “Jewish bias” in the staff of his department, the process of equalizing the national composition of the central bodies of the NKVD proceeded slowly, with great resistance from external and internal (in relation to the NKVD) influential intercessors.

When in the Central Office of the NKVD continued their activities:
- the head of the Gulag (that is, the officer who directly led the repressions);
- Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR (his affairs are mentioned above);
- Specially authorized under the Collegium of the NKVD;
- commandant of the Moscow Kremlin;
- Head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the NKVD Secretariat;
- Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- head of the 3rd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD;
- head of the 7th department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Central Trade Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- head of the 5th department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 1st Department of the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
head of the 9th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Resettlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- (obviously, the brother of the previous one) - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

- Head of the 2nd Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
responsible officer of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR;
Nikolaev - - head of the operational department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR;
- executive secretary of the Special Conference under the NKVD of the USSR (a body for sentencing in political cases, consisting of 3 members of the OSO);
- Head of the personnel department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Operational Secretary of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

This list refers only to the top leaders of the apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, it includes only 23 Chekists of Jewish nationality. In total, this top nomenclature of leaders included 50 posts, including the people's commissar and his deputies.

Consequently, in the top leadership of the NKVD of the USSR until 1936-38. the Jewish stratum was about 45%, the rest of the chiefs were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc. This shows that the task of correcting the “national bias” in the top leadership of the NKVD did not completely cope.

One of the reasons for the weakening of his activity is moral degradation: the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs drank heavily. Women in the apparatus of the NKVD were afraid to stay for evening work in the building on Lubyanka, because the drunk People's Commissar walked along the corridors and molested employees. The personal circumstances of life are confused. He seduced the wife of a famous diplomat Evgenia Solomonovna Gladun (Khayutina), whom he had known since 1929 in Odessa (where he worked). The diplomat was immediately captured and, in the best tradition, shot as a "Trotskyist terrorist." Finally married. However, to establish normal family life he could not, he drank and was jealous of his second wife for the writer Isaac Babel, with whom she had a relationship in Odessa. As a result, Isaac Babel also ended up in the Gulag and died there. To “strengthen the family”, a child (girl) was taken from a children's boarding school, however, the family was clearly going to collapse, and the People's Commissar appeared daily at the workplace in an inoperable state.

This continued until the end of his career. At the time of his political collapse (Yezhova) shot herself, and the child ended up again in a boarding school.

It should be noted that even according to official statistics, as of 01.01.32, only in the Central Office of the NKVD, Russians accounted for 65%, Jews - 7.4%, while among the top leadership (see above) the ratio was different: Russians and other nationalities -55%, Jews - Chekists - 45%.

Hence the conclusion follows: 1937 was the year of the “great terror” in the USSR after the assassination, therefore, the Jewish Chekists also made a very significant contribution to this wave of repressions.

Therefore, the cries of the “democratic” press of our time about the “special suffering” of the Jews at this time are political demagogy. A significant stratum of Jewish Chekists carried out the repressions of the 1920s and 1930s “fully” without any hesitation. The victims of the repressions were mostly Russians, but Jews, Slavs, Caucasians and Muslims also got it. To put the question in such a way that the Jews were not at all involved in the repressions of the 1920s and 1930s is historically wrong.(4)

Further career developed in a descending line. On April 8, 1938, being the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he was appointed, concurrently, the People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR. On November 23, 1938, he addressed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally with a statement in which he asked the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to release him from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

In a statement he wrote: “The most neglected section in the NKVD turned out to be personnel. ... Over the decades, foreign intelligence services have managed to recruit not only the top of the Cheka, but also the middle level, and often even ordinary workers. I calmed down on the fact that I defeated the top and some of the most compromised middle managers. Many of the newly nominated, as it now appears, are also spies and conspirators.”

By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 01.01.01, the request of N. And Yezhov was satisfied "in view of the motives set forth by Yezhov, and also, taking into account the painful condition." On November 25, 1938, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

By another decree, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia was appointed to this position on the same day.

In April 1939 he was arrested and in February 1940, by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was shot along with a large group of his former subordinates.

From these times, a decisive change began in the personnel policy of the NKVD (later the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR), in particular, in the direction of correcting the bias in the national composition of the leaders of the Special Services.

The general direction of policy in this area has been to bring quantitative composition national personnel in the leadership of the Special Services in accordance with the proportions of the national composition of the population of the USSR.

Around the person following Yezhov, the People's Commissar (then Minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, our propagandists of "true democracy" and their corrupt newspapers raised whole fountains of mud. Meanwhile, this was a complex and contradictory personality, unfortunately, stained by the further development of the “Yagoda-Yezhov-Clinton syndrome”, that is, by the constant hunt for women.

As for his political activity, if you approach it objectively, he did a lot of useful things for the country.

Suffice it to note his great role in organizing work on the rapid creation of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which allowed the USSR to quickly achieve parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.

Now the son - - has filed a petition for the rehabilitation of his father from charges in the Khrushchev trial of 1953. The chairman of the commission for the rehabilitation of Mr. Yeltsin is now a well-known renegade Communist Party Yakovlev. And even this "violent democrat" and fighter against Soviet power was forced to admit in the press that the accusations against him (except for the above-mentioned moral and domestic ones) were not supported by any evidence and evidence.

Without attempting to give an analysis of all activities, we note here what is directly related to the topic under consideration.

The fact is that in 1953 he clearly understood the importance of observing the principle of proportional representation of the nations of the USSR in the governing bodies of the Union republics. On June 8, 1953, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR addressed a letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the national composition of the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR, pointing out the weak promotion of local workers of Belarusian nationality to senior positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. Of the 22 heads of departments of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, he wrote, only 7 are ethnic Belarusians; out of 148 senior officials of the regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 37 are Belarusians, out of 173 heads of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 33 are Belarusians. Therefore, with the permission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Beria by his order released the Minister of Internal Affairs of Belarus and appointed the Minister of Belarus, obliging him "... to take measures to staff the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus with proven local personnel." A similar order was issued for the Lithuanian SSR. Major General was dismissed from the post of the Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, and Lithuanian Lieutenant Colonel Viljunas was appointed the Minister of the Interior instead. Beria issued the same orders to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Estonian SSR and the Latvian SSR. In Estonia, the Russian Minister of the Interior, a Ukrainian colonel, gave way to an Estonian lieutenant colonel; in Latvia, the Minister of the Interior, a Russian lieutenant general, gave way to a Latvian lieutenant colonel as Minister of the Interior. (7) The same orders were prepared for the rest of the Union Republics of the USSR. No matter how you evaluate the personality, however, one cannot fail to note the usefulness of the mentioned measures of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR for correcting distortions in personnel policy on the ground, which increased the real level of management of the affairs of the national republics by the forces of their indigenous nations and emphasized the equality of all peoples within the USSR.

3. Key Findings

From the facts and circumstances discussed above, the following conclusions should be drawn: The Jewish people were widely (disproportionate to their numbers in the country's population) represented in the bodies of the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD of the USSR.

"Great Terror" was implemented in the USSR with the active participation of Chekists-Jews. There were frequent cases when a Chekist-Jew applied "unauthorized methods of investigation" to a Jewish prisoner. A classic example: the practical implementation of the murder of Leiba Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky) by security officers Spiegelglass and Eitingon and their team. The national and even more family concentration of “compatriots” and “friends” in the highest echelons of power is a hidden form of violation of socialist democracy, since such national or family distortions in personnel policy violate the natural rights of the broad masses of the people to equal representation in the organs of people's power.

A person's nationality objectively exists in society and therefore should be reflected in accounting documents (passports, questionnaires, personnel statistics). Elimination of the “nationality” column in current passports Russian Federation objectively leads to the concealment of the concentration of persons of one or another nationality in the highest echelons of power in the country. And the concealment of distortions in the national composition of government bodies is a violation of the democratic right of an indigenous nation to govern its state directly.

It should be self-critically admitted that the strict daily control over the activities of the governing bodies of the Cheka, the OGPU-NKVD by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) in the historical period under consideration. failed to implement. Conclusions on correcting mistakes were made after the mistakes were made. Outside the strict control of the Party was the selection of new personnel for the USSR Special Services. The mistakes of the VChK, OGPU, and NKVD bodies were of a massive nature, concerned a large number of Party members and non-Party people, and therefore really influenced the attitude of the broad masses towards the work of the security agencies in a negative direction. In addition, the leaders of the Special Services (,) were “forgiven” for the lawlessness and even crimes committed against the personality of Soviet citizens (the Selivanov case, the Gladun case, the cases of the victims).

The foregoing should be taken into account after the restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia and the USSR.

Used materials

What do Jews believe...

(2) - Pravda-5, 12.08.97, p.3, V. Prussakov “Dangerous guarantor”

(3) - B. Bazhanov “Kremlin, 1920s”, Ogonyok magazine, October 1989.

(4) - Y. Kozhurin, N. Petrov “From Yagoda to Beria”, Pravda-5, No. 17

(5) - P. Sudoplatov "Intelligence and the Kremlin", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1993.

(6) - “Red Chapel”, magazine “Foreign Literature”, February 1990, Moscow.

VChK-OGPU-KVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB

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INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION "DEMOCRACY"

RUSSIA. XX CENTURY DOCUMENTS

UNDER THE GENERAL EDITION OF ACADEMICIAN A.N.YAKOVLEV

EDITORIAL COUNCIL:

A.N. Yakovlev (chairman), E.T. Gaidar, A.A. Dmitriev, V.P. Kozlov, V.A. Martynov, S.V. Mironenko, V.P. Naumov, Ch. Palm, R.G. Pikhoya (deputy chairman), E.M. Primakov, A.N. Sakharov, G.N. Sevostyanov, S.A. Filatov, Chubaryan A.O.

VChK-OGPU-KVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB

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COMPILERS: A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov

SCIENTIFIC EDITOR R.G. Pihoya

MOSCOW 1997

UDC 351.746(47х97)(09)

BBK 67.401.212(2)Ya2 L82

The State Archives of the Russian Federation, Scientific Information and Educational Center "Memorial" took part in the preparation of the reference book.

L82 LUBYANKA.

VChK - OGPU - NKVD - NKGB - MGB - MVD - KGB

Directory.

Compilation, introduction and notes by A.I. Kokurina, N.V. Petrov. Scientific editor R.G. Pikhoya.

M.: MFD Edition, 1997 - 352 p. ("Russia. XX century. Documents.").

15YOU 5-89511-004-5

The reference book is devoted to the history of the Central Office of the Internal Affairs and State Security of the USSR in 1917–1960. For the first time, information is provided on the structure of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD - NKGB - MGB - MVD - KGB, the most important orders that determined the activities of these departments, as well as biographical data on the people's commissars (ministers) of internal affairs of the USSR and their deputies.

BBK 67.401.212(2)Ya2

5YOU 5-89511-004-5

© A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov © International Foundation"Democracy", 1997

INTRODUCTION

Until now, the structure of the Central Office of the Soviet organs of internal affairs and state security has not been described in detail. The information about her was top secret.

However, without these data, it is impossible to explore many aspects of Russian history in the 20th century. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 23, 1992 "On the removal of restrictive vultures from legislative and other acts that served as the basis for mass repressions and infringements on human rights", ordered to declassify laws, by-laws and departmental directives, including "... organizations and activities of the repressive apparatus", which were the NKVD - KGB. This is how this handbook came about.

Of course, fragmentary data on the structures of state security can be gleaned from numerous publications of recent years devoted to the history of punitive organs and repressions. But the fragmentation of the sources used and a considerable proportion of subjectivist interpretations have formed many contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the structure and functions of certain units of the NKVD; to confusion about what the numbering departments of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) were doing; to references to subdivisions that do not exist for a particular period of time; to errors in the names of the heads of these units.

The compilers of the handbook did not set themselves the task of providing detailed coverage of the activities of various departments of state security agencies. Only the names of the relevant departments are indicated. In those cases when this name is too conditional and does not contain an indication of the scope of the unit, brief explanations are given of what this or that department or department was engaged in. At the same time, one significant remark should be made: the conditional names given in the reference book should not be taken literally, as indications that the state security agencies were responsible for the state of affairs in certain economic areas. Thus, the Department of Water Transport of the GUGB did not organize water transportation, but coordinated the activities of all operatives at water transport facilities: on ships, in ports, at piers, in shipping companies. The tasks of the Chekists in water transport included conducting "undercover developments", arrests and investigations into the cases of employees of this industry. In the language of the Chekists, this meant "operational service" in this area.

The same can be said about the departments of heavy and defense industry and the like in the GUGB and GEM. In 1938–1941 the work of these units was to monitor the state of affairs in the respective industries National economy with the help of covert methods (undercover apparatus), identifying "anti-Soviet" and "counter-revolutionary" elements, their further "development", arrest and investigation. The work of state security in these areas was built on a sectoral basis.

In 1917, Vladimir Lenin created the Cheka from the remnants of the tsarist secret police. This new organization, which eventually became the KGB, dealt with a wide range of tasks, including intelligence, counterintelligence, and isolating the Soviet Union from Western goods, news, and ideas. In 1991, the USSR collapsed, which led to the fragmentation of the Committee into many organizations, the largest of which is the FSB.

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was established on December 7, 1917 as an organ of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The main task of the commission was the fight against counter-revolution and sabotage. The body also performed the functions of intelligence, counterintelligence and political search. Since 1921, the tasks of the Cheka included the elimination of homelessness and neglect among children.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Vladimir Lenin called the Cheka "a striking weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power by people who were infinitely stronger than us."
The people called the commission "extraordinary", and its employees - "chekists". Felix Dzerzhinsky headed the first Soviet state security agency. The building of the former mayor of Petrograd, located at Gorokhovaya, 2, was assigned to the new structure.

In February 1918, employees of the Cheka received the right to shoot criminals on the spot without trial or investigation in accordance with the decree "The Fatherland is in danger!".

The death penalty was allowed to apply to "enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies", and later "all persons involved in White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions."

The end of the civil war and the decline of the wave of peasant uprisings made the continued existence of the expanded repressive apparatus, whose activities had practically no legal restrictions, meaningless. Therefore, by 1921, the party faced the question of reforming the organization.

On February 6, 1922, the Cheka was finally abolished, and its powers were transferred to the State Political Administration, which later became known as the United (OGPU). As Lenin emphasized: "... the abolition of the Cheka and the creation of the GPU does not simply mean a change in the name of the bodies, but consists in changing the nature of all the activities of the body during the period of peaceful state building in a new situation ...".

Until July 20, 1926, Felix Dzerzhinsky was the chairman of the department, after his death this post was taken by the former People's Commissar for Finance Vyacheslav Menzhinsky.
The main task of the new body was still the same fight against counter-revolution in all its manifestations. Subordinate to the OGPU were special units of the troops necessary to suppress public unrest and combat banditry.

In addition, the following functions were assigned to the department:

Protection of railway and waterways;
- the fight against smuggling and border crossing by Soviet citizens);
- fulfillment of special instructions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

On May 9, 1924, the powers of the OGPU were significantly expanded. The department began to obey the police and the criminal investigation department. Thus began the process of merging the state security agencies with the internal affairs agencies.

On July 10, 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was formed. The People's Commissariat was all-Union, and the OGPU was included in it as a structural unit called the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB). The fundamental innovation was that the judicial board of the OGPU was abolished: the new department was not supposed to have judicial functions. The new people's commissariat was headed by Genrikh Yagoda.

The NKVD was responsible for political investigation and the right to extrajudicial sentencing, the penal system, foreign intelligence, border troops, and counterintelligence in the army. In 1935, traffic control (GAI) was assigned to the functions of the NKVD, and in 1937 NKVD departments for transport were created, including sea and river ports.

On March 28, 1937, Yagoda was arrested by the NKVD, during a search of his house, according to the protocol, pornographic photographs, Trotskyist literature and a rubber dildo were found. In view of the "anti-state" activities, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks expelled Yagoda from the party. Nikolai Yezhov was appointed the new head of the NKVD.

In 1937, the "troikas" of the NKVD appeared. A commission of three people delivered thousands of sentences in absentia to "enemies of the people", based on the materials of the authorities, and sometimes simply according to the lists. A feature of this process was the absence of protocols and the minimum number of documents on the basis of which a decision was made on the guilt of the defendant. The verdict of the Troika was not subject to appeal.

During the year of work, the “troikas” convicted 767,397 people, of which 386,798 people were sentenced to death. The victims most often became kulaks - wealthy peasants who did not want to voluntarily give their property to the collective farm.

April 10, 1939 Yezhov was arrested in the office of Georgy Malenkov. Subsequently, the former head of the NKVD confessed to being homosexual and preparing a coup d'état. Lavrenty Beria became the third people's commissar of internal affairs.

On February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

This was done in order to improve the intelligence and operational work of the state security agencies and the distribution of the increased workload of the NKVD of the USSR.

The tasks assigned to the NKGB were:

Conducting intelligence work abroad;
- the fight against subversive, espionage, terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR;
- operational development and liquidation of the remnants of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary -
- formations among various strata of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture;
- protection of party and government leaders.

The tasks of ensuring state security were assigned to the NKVD. The military and prison units, the police, and the fire brigade remained under the jurisdiction of this department.

On July 4, 1941, in connection with the outbreak of war, it was decided to merge the NKGB and the NKVD into one department in order to reduce the bureaucracy.

The re-creation of the NKGB of the USSR took place in April 1943. The main task of the committee was reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the rear of the German troops. As we moved west, the importance of working in countries increased. of Eastern Europe, where the NKGB was engaged in the "liquidation of anti-Soviet elements."

In 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed into ministries, respectively, the NKGB became the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. At the same time, Viktor Abakumov became the Minister of State Security. With his arrival, the transition of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the MGB began. In 1947-1952, internal troops, police, border troops and other units were transferred to the department (the camp and construction departments, fire protection, escort troops, courier communications remained in the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

After Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev removed Beria and organized a campaign against the illegal repressions of the NKVD. Subsequently, several thousand unjustly convicted were rehabilitated.

On March 13, 1954, the State Security Committee (KGB) was created by separating from the MGB departments, services and departments that were related to issues of ensuring state security. Compared to its predecessors, the new body had a lower status: it was not a ministry within the government, but a committee under the government. The chairman of the KGB was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but he was not a member of the highest authority - the Politburo. This was explained by the fact that the party elite wanted to protect themselves from the emergence of a new Beria - a man who could remove her from power for the sake of implementing their own political projects.

The area of ​​responsibility of the new body included: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, operational-search activities, protection of the state border of the USSR, protection of the leaders of the CPSU and the government, organization and provision of government communications, as well as the fight against nationalism, dissent, crime and anti-Soviet activities.

Almost immediately after its formation, the KGB carried out a large-scale staff reduction in connection with the beginning of the process of de-Stalinization of society and the state. From 1953 to 1955, the state security agencies were reduced by 52%.

In the 1970s, the KGB intensified its fight against dissent and the dissident movement. However, the department's actions have become more subtle and disguised. Such means of psychological pressure as surveillance, public condemnation, undermining a professional career, preventive talks, coercion to travel abroad, forced confinement to psychiatric clinics, political trials, slander, lies and compromising evidence, various provocations and intimidation were actively used. At the same time, there were also lists of "not allowed to travel abroad" - those who were denied permission to travel abroad.

A new "invention" of the special services was the so-called "exile beyond the 101st kilometer": politically unreliable citizens were evicted outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Under the close attention of the KGB during this period were, first of all, representatives of the creative intelligentsia - figures of literature, art and science - who, due to their social status and international authority, could cause the most extensive harm to the reputation of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

On December 3, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the law "On the reorganization of state security agencies." On the basis of the document, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and, for the transitional period, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created on its basis.

After the abolition of the KGB, the process of creating new state security agencies took about three years. During this time, departments of the disbanded committee were transferred from one department to another.

On December 21, 1993, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK). From December 1993 to March 1994, Nikolai Golushko was the director of the new body, and from March 1994 to June 1995 this post was held by Sergei Stepashin.

Currently, the FSB cooperates with 142 special services, law enforcement agencies and border structures of 86 states. Offices of official representatives of the bodies of the Service are functioning in 45 countries.

In general, the activities of the FSB bodies are carried out in the following main areas:

counterintelligence activities;
- fight against terrorism;
- protection of the constitutional system;
- fight against especially dangerous forms of crime;
- intelligence activities;
- border activities;
- ensuring information security; fight against corruption.

The FSB was headed by:
in 1995-1996 M. I. Barsukov;
in 1996–1998 N. D. Kovalev;
in 1998-1999 V. V. Putin;
in 1999–2008 N. P. Patrushev;
since May 2008 - A. V. Bortnikov.

The structure of the FSB of Russia:
- Office of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee;
- Counterintelligence Service;
- Service for the protection of the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism;
- Economic Security Service;
- Operational Information and International Relations Service;
- Service of organizational and personnel work;
- Activity support service;
- Border Service;
- Scientific and technical service;
- Control service;
- Investigation department;
- Centers, departments;
- directorates (departments) of the FSB of Russia for individual regions and constituent entities of the Russian Federation (territorial security agencies);
- border departments (departments, detachments) of the FSB of Russia (border agencies);
- other directorates (departments) of the FSB of Russia exercising certain powers of this body or ensuring the activities of the FSB bodies (other security bodies);
- aviation, railway, motor transport units, special training centers, units special purpose, enterprises, educational institutions, research, expert, forensic, military medical and military construction units, sanatoriums and other institutions and units designed to ensure the activities of the federal security service.

VChK - ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION for the fight against counter-revolution (1918-1922) was created by the Bolsheviks on December 20, 1917 to fight dissidents. The task of the Cheka was the systematic organization of large-scale political terror in Russia to follow the October Revolution. The reason for the creation of the Cheka was partly because the ideas of the Bolsheviks did not enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the population, and they could only stay in power through brutal violence and cynical lawlessness. At first, the Cheka had little investigative powers, only from February 1918, on the basis of the decree “The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger,” the Chekists received emergency powers and the right to apply capital punishment without trial or investigation (near the execution for the place), which was confirmed by the decree “On the Red Terror” ". The methods of struggle of the Cheka were very diverse: terror, hostage-taking, provocations, confiscation of property, trial in concentration camps, the introduction of agents into anti-Soviet organizations, foreign missions and institutions. The scope of the Cheka was unusually wide: from the suppression of anti-Bolshevik armed uprisings and the disclosure of conspiracies by foreign intelligence services, in advance of ensuring the operation of transport, the fight against homelessness and typhus epidemics. The organs of the Cheka, especially for the localities, got a lot of morally decomposed people with a criminal past and even with mental disabilities, who enjoyed unlimited power, disregarding any legal norms, without going into ideological reasoning, violating moral principles. The mass terror and arbitrariness that accompanied the activities of the Cheka caused outbreaks of anti-Soviet speeches, open discontent among the general population, even that part of the Russian intelligentsia, which at first was loyal to Soviet power. The Cheka existed on the eve of 1922, if this punitive body was transformed into the GPU. Throughout the entire period of its existence, the Cheka gang was headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky.
CHON - PARTS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE OF THE VCHEKA OF THE USSR (1919-1925) - military party detachments created near factory party cells, district committees, city committees, ukoms and provincial committees of the party on the basis of a decree of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated April 17, 1919 to assist the bodies of Soviet power in the fight against counter-revolution, guard duty at important sites, etc. For general leadership, responsible organizers were allocated near the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and organizers close to the provincial committees, ukomas, etc. Initially, CHONs were formed from members and candidates of the party, and later from the best members of the Komsomol. The first CHONs arose in Petrograd and Moscow, except in the central provinces of the RSFSR (by September 1919, they were created in 33 provinces). CHONs of the frontline of the Southern, Western and Southwestern fronts took part in front-line operations. In November 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a verdict on the introduction of CHON into the Vsevobuch system, only with the preservation of their independence of formation and readiness for use in accordance with the order of the local party organization. On March 24, 1921, the Central Committee of the party adopted a regulation on the basis of the decision of the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) on the inclusion of CHON in the figure of the police units of the Red Army. The personnel of the CHON was divided into personnel and militia (variable). In September 1921, the command and headquarters of the CHON of the country were established (commander A. K. Aleksandrov, chief of staff V. A. Kangelari), for the sake of political leadership - the Council of the CHON under the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (secretary of the Central Committee V. V. Kuibyshev, deputy chairman VChK I. S. Unshlikht, commissar of the headquarters of the Red Army and commander of the CHON), in the provinces and districts - the command and headquarters of the CHON, the Councils of the CHON near the provincial committees and party committees. and variable - 323,372 people. The ChON included infantry, cavalry, artillery and armored units. Due to the improvement of internal and international position The USSR and the strengthening of the Red Army in 1924-25 in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) CHON were disbanded.
OGPU - 1922-1934 - On November 15, 1923, by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the GPU of the NKVD of the RSFSR was transformed into the United State Political Domination (OGPU) approximately SNK of the USSR, which is an independent body through the NKVD. In turn, the NKVD retained the functions of ensuring public security and suppressing banditry and other offenses, the OGPU retained its specialization in combating counter-revolution, espionage, ensuring state security and combating elements alien to Soviet power. The chairman of the GPU, and later the OGPU until July 20, 1926, was F. E. Dzerzhinsky, then, preliminarily in 1934, the OGPU was headed by V. R. Menzhinsky.
SPECIAL PURPOSE DIVISION - ODON OGPU (NKVD) of the USSR (1922-1955) - June 17, 1924 on the basis of OSNAZ was reorganized into a Special Purpose Division near the OGPU of the USSR. In addition to the existing units, the newly formed division included the 6th regiment and the 61st division of the OGPU troops. The division staff consisted of 4 rifle regiments and an armored division (former armored detachment), which later, in 1931, was reorganized into an armored regiment. In May 1926, the Special Solovetsky Regiment of the OGPU entered the measure of the division. In July 1926, F. E. Dzerzhinsky died suddenly. At a meeting of the personnel of the division, it was decided to petition for the division to be named after him. By order of the OGPU of the USSR No. 173, on August 19, 1926, the unit was named the Special Purpose Division under the OGPU of the USSR named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky. In November 1926 age. the measure of the division included the 1st Tula, 4th Voronezh, 5th Nizhny Novgorod, 8th Yaroslavl, 15th Vyatka divisions of the OGPU troops. The number of the division was 4436 people. In February 1929, the division was still being reorganized, its composition was built according to the type of the Red Army. The division consisted of 2 rifle regiments, a scooter regiment, a cavalry regiment, an armored division, a communications division, each Suzdal division, and a regimental class. In the 20-30s, the division carried out the tasks of protecting the Kremlin, the administrative buildings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and other separately important objects. In addition, parts of the division were involved in operations in accordance with the suppression of rebellions for the Don and in the Tambov region, the fight against Basmachi in Central Asia. SINCE 1937 SEPARATE MOMTORIFUL DIVISION OF SPECIAL PURPOSE - OMDON NKVD USSR - 1937-1943 - Parts of the division participated in the battles during the era of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, separate parts of the division participated in the defense of Moscow. the remaining units guarded important objects of the capital, carried out patrol service on the streets of the city, were involved in activities to eliminate reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the front line and for the city. In battles with the German troops, the snipers of the 4th cavalry regiment (later the 4th motorized rifle regiment) distinguished themselves unmistakably. Only during the first trip of two sniper teams of the regiment in 1942, they destroyed 853 German soldiers and officers. Since 1943, the 1st BRIDGE DIVISION of the NKVD of the USSR - (1943-1955). In 1944, the 2nd regiment of OMSDON was entrusted with the protection of government delegations of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain near the Yalta Conference of the countries - allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. From August 1943 to 1990, on public holidays, the artillery division of the division fired artillery salute from the territory of the Moscow Kremlin. During 1944-1947. parts of the division participated in the liquidation of the nationalist movement in Western Ukraine, repeatedly clashed with units of the OUN-UPA. At the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945, the soldiers of the 2nd regiment of the division were entrusted with the honor of carrying enemy banners and standards along Red Square and throwing them to the foot of the Mausoleum. This passage was captured by Soviet and foreign filmmakers.
SEPARATE MOTOR RIFLE BRIGADE OF SPECIAL PURPOSE (1941-1943) - Since the beginning of the 1930s, operations were actively developed in the USSR on enemy communications, in his deep rear. The main tasks of the sabotage groups intended for the sake of such raids, of course, were to disrupt the management and supply of enemy troops. Preparation for the actions of sabotage groups on the adventure of the outbreak of hostilities was carried out by two main departments - the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, on the one hand, and the organs of the NKVD - the NKGB - on the second. On June 27, 1941, by order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, a Training Center was established for the training of special reconnaissance and sabotage detachments to operate behind enemy lines. In the organizational sense, the whole matter, in accordance with the coordination of these activities, was entrusted to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD - the NKGB of the USSR around the leadership of the Commissar of State Security P. A. Sudoplatov. By the autumn of 1941, the center included two brigades and a few separate companies: sapper-subversive, communications and automobile. In October, he was reorganized into a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes of the NKVD of the USSR (OMSBON). Sudoplatov himself unreasonably describes these events: “On the leading date of the war, I was instructed to lead all reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army in accordance with the line of the Soviet state security agencies. For this, a special unit was formed in the NKVD - a Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. By order in accordance with the People's Commissariat, my task as the head of the group was issued on July 5, 1941. My deputies were Eitingon, Melnikov, Kakuchaya. Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Gudimovich, Orlov, Kiselev, Massya, Lebedev, Timashkov, Mordvinov became the heads of the leading directions in the fight against the German armed forces that invaded the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. The chiefs of all services and divisions of the NKVD, by order, in accordance with the people's commissariat, were obliged to assist the Special Group with people, equipment, weapons in order to deploy reconnaissance and sabotage work in the near and far rear of the German troops. The main tasks of the Special Group were: conducting reconnaissance operations against Germany and its satellites, folding guerrilla war, the creation of an agent network in the territories located near the German occupation, the management of special radio games with German intelligence in order to misinform the enemy. We immediately created a military unit of the Special Group - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes (OMSBON NKVD of the USSR), which was commanded at different times by Gridnev and Orlov. By decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Comintern, all political emigrants who were in the Soviet Union were invited to join this combination of the Special Group of the NKVD. The brigade was formed in the early days for the Dynamo stadium. Under our leadership, we had more than twenty-five thousand soldiers and commanders, of which two thousand were foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians. We had at our disposal the best Soviet athletes, including champions in boxing and athletics - they became the basis of sabotage formations sent to the front and thrown behind enemy lines. After the completion of the formation, the contingent of the motorized rifle brigade included up to 25,000 people, of which two thousand foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians, who were political immigrants and lived in the USSR. The number of compounds included the best Soviet athletes, including champions in boxing and athletics, they subsequently became the basis of sabotage formations sent to the front and thrown behind enemy lines. The compound was directly subordinate to Lavrenty Beria. The brigade was given the following tasks: bringing intelligence operations against Germany and its satellites, building a guerrilla war, creating an undercover network in the territories under German occupation, directing special radio games with German intelligence in order to misinform the enemy. In October 1941, the Special Society, due to the expanded scope of work, was reorganized into the causeless 2nd heading of the NKVD, still directly subordinate to Beria. The personnel of the brigade were staffed by employees of the NKVD - NKGB apparatus, including from the Main Directorate of Border Troops, cadets of the Higher School of the NKVD, personnel of the police and fire departments, volunteer athletes of the Central state institution physical culture, CDKA and the Dynamo society, as well as Komsomol members mobilized in accordance with the call of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. A small, only very important package, the brigade was staffed by foreign communists who were members of the Comintern. Colonel M.F. became the first commander of OMSBON. Orlov, who previously held the post of head of the Sebezh military school of the NKVD troops. For the personnel of the brigade, a special combat training program was developed. The tasks of the OMSBON included the installation of mine-engineering obstacles, mining and demining of vitally important military facilities, paratrooper operations, and conducting sabotage and reconnaissance raids. In addition to the general program, the brigade trained specialists to perform special tasks for capital and behind the front line. According to its regular organization, the brigade was an ordinary motorized rifle formation, of which there were many in the ranks of the NKVD troops at the beginning of the war. On the date of the battle because of Moscow, OMSBON as part of the 2nd motorized rifle division troops of the NKVD for special purposes was used on a bump, but even now it formed combat groups intended to be thrown into the enemy rear. The typical number of the group included a commander, a radio operator, a demoman, a demolition assistant, a sniper and two submachine gunners. Depending on the tasks performed, battle groups could be combined or split up. During the critical period of the battles for Moscow, in the winter of 1941/1942, the OMSBON mobile detachments carried out a bunch of daring raids and raids behind German lines. Some groups were used to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the interests of the headquarters of the combined arms armies. Most of the raids ended successfully, but the saboteurs suffered heavy losses. Since 1942, the primary task of the brigade has been the preparation of detachments for operations behind enemy lines. By the beginning of autumn, 58 such detachments were thrown behind enemy lines. Like life, the reconnaissance group withdrawn to the German rear became the core for the formation of a partisan detachment. The growth in the number of the latter was due to the influx of soldiers of the Red Army who lagged behind their units in 1941-1942, escaped prisoners of war, simple local residents, dissatisfied with the German occupation regime. In the end, many detachments turned into large partisan formations that fairly confidently controlled vast areas deep in the German rear. During the era of the war, 212 detachments and groups with a total number of 7316 people were formed. In total, over 11,000 commanders and Red Army soldiers trained OMSBON personnel in accordance with various specialties. The main part of this number were demolition workers (5255 people) and paratroopers-paratroopers (more than 3000 people). Other military specialties included radio operators, demolition instructors, snipers, mortarmen, drivers, medical instructors, and chemists. In addition, the instructors of special task forces operating behind enemy lines for two or three years from civilians and partisans prepared an additional 3,500 demolition men. At the OMSBON bases, 580 trainees from the personnel of the guards units of the RGC (mainly paratroopers) underwent sabotage and reconnaissance training. The parachute service of the brigade was engaged in logistical, educational and methodological support for operations behind enemy lines, as well as supplying groups located behind the front line. During the entire war, Li-2 and S-47 aircraft carried out 400 sorties, 1372 people were delivered to the occupied territories (with landing for partisan airfields or by parachute), about 400 tons of special cargo were transported. The result of the combat activities of OMSBON for the sake of four years of war is the destruction of 145 tanks and the following armored vehicles, 51 aircraft, 335 bridges, 1232 locomotives and 13,181 wagons. The fighters of the brigade carried out 1415 crashes of enemy military echelons, disabled 148 kilometers of railway lines, and carried out a number of 400 other sabotage. In addition, 135 OMSBON operational groups transmitted 4418 intelligence reports, including 1358 to the General Staff, 619 to the commander of long-range aviation and 420 to front commanders and Military Councils.
Special Purpose Detachment OSNAZ NKVD 1943 - 1945 - At the beginning of 1943, OMSBON was reorganized into the Special Purpose Detachment close to the NKVD - NKGB USSR (OSNAZ). This Military Unit was more clearly focused on solving reconnaissance and sabotage tasks. At the end of 1945 OSNAZ was disbanded. Some of its functions were transferred to the special detachments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB, which waged a difficult "forest war" with detachments of the Baltic and Ukrainian nationalists. These forces concentrated in their ranks a notorious first personal number: in addition to at the height of the war, next to an analysis of the heavy losses suffered by SD reconnaissance groups, Walter Schellenberg noted “the difficulty of countering the special forces of the NKVD, whose units are finally 100% manned by snipers.”
EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORM OF THE OSNAZ NKVD TROOPS OF THE USSR
In the troops of the NKVD, the supply of weapons, ammunition and uniforms was much better than in the Red Army. In front-line conditions, captured weapons were widely used, mainly MP 38/40 assault rifles and mg 34/42 machine guns. The OMSBON units were saturated with PPSh submachine guns (then PPS-43) for almost 100%, with the exception of machine gunners, armor-piercers and some other specialists. All servicemen wore, turning off machine guns, holstered weapons: TT pistols or revolvers, as well as all kinds of captured samples. The saboteurs from the brigade, along with the fighters of other deep reconnaissance units, were without fail armed with the so-called reconnaissance knives (hp). The fighters and commanders of the OMSBON wore the uniform of the NKVD troops: border or internal (with colored caps, piping and instrument cloth, laid down by these branches of the military). Employees of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, who served in the operational groups of the brigade, also wore their own uniform with special insignia. It should be noted that for the purposes of conspiracy, the uniform of the Red Army was often worn instead of departmental uniforms. The personnel of the militia, included in the OMSBON, received a protective uniform with police insignia. Enamel insignia similar to the army ones were pinned to the blue buttonholes with red piping, but filled with blue enamel with a red metal border. On the elbow of the left sleeve, the commanders wore a colored shade of the coat of arms of the USSR, and political workers wore a blue cloth star with a golden edging and an image of a hammer and sickle in the center. A blue edging was sewn on for the side seams of blue command breeches. As a headgear, militia officers mobilized for service wore protective caps with a blue band and the same piping for the crown. Cockade - a scarlet enamel star with a color image of the coat of arms in the middle (the metal parts of the star and coat of arms were brass for commanders and nickel-plated for privates). This uniform was canceled after the introduction of shoulder straps in February 1943, in addition, most of the personnel recruited from the police by that time had already been transferred to the NKVD troops, except for state security. Soviet paratroopers and special forces had a significant range of summer and winter camouflage uniforms: coats and suits. Since the end of the 30s, the so-called bast camouflage suits made from bundles of bast and dry grass have been widely used in the army and the NKVD troops exactly in factories, for no reason and in artisanal conditions. During the era of fighting in the steppes, this device camouflaged the owner well in the thickets of grass, which was widely used in the age of fighting on Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River. All other samples of costumes, like white, for no reason and spotted, like a pose, were made of calico - a very fragile, but cheap material. In the 30s - early 40s, there were two variants of the fabric pattern. They were officially called autumn and summer, indeed, for practice in the warm season, they wore uniforms with both color options. Summer camouflage had a grassy-green base with large black amoeba-like spots applied to it. The autumn version was distinguished by a sandy-olive color with spots of the same shape, but brown. Before the start of the war, camouflage suits were widely used in the Airborne Forces and the border troops. Since June 1941, the wearing of camouflage uniforms has been extended to military intelligence units (including OMSBON), groups of snipers, demolition workers and other special forces. In addition, the operational units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, following the war, were engaged in the liquidation of nationalist formations in the Baltic states and in the west of Ukraine, without fail were supplied with camouflage suits. The color scheme of the 1943 uniform was developed around the strong influence of the small-spotted SS camouflage: for the basic herbaceous base the contours of branches and leaves were applied with yellow or light olive paint. In some cases, amoeba-like black or brown spots were depicted on top of this composition, that is, for old mask suits. The summer camouflage suit consisted of a loose blouse and trousers. The fastener of the blouse reached the middle of the chest; on the sides there were capacious welt pockets. The floors and sleeves were supplied with lingering ribbon backstage. The low legs were tucked into tarpaulin boots. Summer camouflage suits were often equipped with baggy hoods: the dimensions of the latter made it possible to pull them over a steel helmet. Hoods were sewn according to the circumference to the shoulders of the blouse. The neckline of the hood, which at once was a blouse strap, was fastened with three or four plastic buttons, and a small front bag was closed with a thick gauze mesh in camouflage color. In the stowed position, the hood was previously unbuttoned at the very bottom and discarded after the back. In the airborne units, especially before the war, they often wore blouses without a hood: the neckline was pulled into a drawstring. Often, in special forces units, instead of suits, they wore dressing gowns: a cape with sleeves and a hood, which was fastened in front for a button on the eve of the bottom.
GUK "SMERSH" of the NPO of the USSR (1943-1945) - Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by a secret Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 19, 1943. The same Decree created the Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the NKVMF of the USSR and the counterintelligence department "SMERSH" of the NKVD of the USSR . On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created with its transfer to the skill of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. On April 21, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed the Decree of the GKO No. 3222 ss / s regarding the approval of the regulation on the Smersh NPO of the USSR. The main opponent of SMERSH in its counterintelligence activities was the Abwehr, the German intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, the field gendarmerie and the Main dominion of the imperial security of the RSHA, the Finnish military intelligence . The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was very dangerous - on average, the operative served 3 months, for which he dropped out in accordance with death or injury. Only in the age of fighting because of the liberation of Belarus, 236 were killed and 136 military counterintelligence officers went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Senior Lieutenant Zhidkov P.A. - detective of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. The activities of the GUKR SMERSH are characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of performance, SMERSH was the most effective special service during the Second World War. From 1943 until the end of the war, only 186 radio games were conducted by the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front-line departments. During these games, over 400 cadre employees and Nazi agents were brought to our territory, and tens of tons of cargo were captured. Since April 1943, the size of the Smersh GUKR included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. GB, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich) 2nd fragment - a case between prisoners of war, checking the Red Army soldiers who were captured (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich) 3rd fragment - the fight against agents thrown into the rear of the Red Army (Head - Colonel GB Utekhin Georgy Valentinovich) 4th part - action for the enemy side to identify agents thrown into the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Timofeev Petr Petrovich) 5th ration - management of the work of Smersh bodies in military districts (Head - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich) 6th Department - Investigation (Head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Leonov Alexander Georgievich) 7th Vereshok - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, cipher workers, admission to top secret and secret work, checking employees sent to follow the border (head - Colonel Sidorov A.E. (appointed later, there is no reason in the order)) 8th fraction - operational equipment (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich) 9- th section - searches, arrests, surveillance (head - lieutenant colonel of the State Security Committee Alexander Evstafyevich Kochetkov) 10th fragment - Department "C" - special assignments (head - Major of the State Security Service Alexander Mikhailovich Zbrailov) 11th issue - cipher (head - Colonel of the State Security Service Chertov Ivan Alexandrovich)
OPERATIONAL-RAIDING GROUPS (OVG) OF THE NKVD-MGB INTERNAL TROOPS (1945-1955) - The main task of these raiding operational-troop (otherwise Chekist-military) groups was the rapid implementation of operational data through the territorial internal affairs and state security agencies through the search and neutralization of nationalist participants gangs. In more detail, the activities of the OVG were regulated in the directive of the head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian District, Lieutenant General Marchenko, to the commanders of formations and units of the district on July 21, 1945:
“For each raiding detachment to snatch out and liquidate a certain gang registered with the NKVD bodies and the headquarters of a formation or unit, ... Equip the raiding detachment with a radio station, give the personnel the necessary format of ammunition and food. Do not burden the detachments with convoys. ... When a gang is discovered, the raiding detachment pursues it before complete elimination, and only then the problem is considered completed .... The raiding detachment operates day and night, in any weather and in any terrain conditions, being not connected with the administrative boundaries of the district or region. ... In each battalion, regiment and formation, include a mobile reserve (in vehicles, on carts, groups of horsemen) to assist the raiding detachment near the outset of the battle with the gang .... The commander of the formation, unit, having received a report from the head of the raiding detachment about the outset fighting with a gang, takes decisive measures to assist the detachment by sending out a mobile reserve with the task of blocking the probable escape routes and completely destroying the bandits .... Raiding detachments, endlessly torn off through supply bases, and especially during the pursuit, are like a rarity to decide to amuse food from the local of the population from the chairmen of the village councils, formalizing this with the relevant documents.
A SEPARATE SPECIAL TEAM OF THE FIRST MAIN DEPARTMENT OF THE KGB OF THE USSR (OBON PGU KGB USSR) (1955 - 1969) - In 1955, a special department was created close to the PGU KGB. In the war era, the Directorate of Subversive Intelligence was deployed for the base of the department. In turn, a separate special-purpose brigade was created near this department. But the brigade wore a cropped figure. One of the main tasks of the department was the preparation of the special reserve of the KGB for the good fortune of wartime, which was reduced to a brigade with a total number of 4,500 people. Organizationally, the brigade consisted of 6 regiments and, alone, an operational battalion. The formation of these regiments by reservists and their deployment in peacetime was carried out by the territorial bodies of the KGB of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as the Khabarovsk and Krasnodar Territories, Moscow and Leningrad Regions. In this they were supervised by a special department. In addition, he was engaged in the selection and training of the special reserve of foreign intelligence, organized courses and training camps. The most famous actions are the holding of special events in accordance with the preparations for the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. COURSES OF IMPROVEMENT OF THE OFFICERS - By the decision of the leaders of the KGB in 1969, as part of the Higher School of the KGB, however, under the operational subordination of intelligence, the Courses for the Improvement of Officers (KUOS) were created. Their main task was to prepare KGB "operatives" for operations as part of operational combat groups on enemy territory in the retail (threatened) era or in its deep rear with the outbreak of hostilities. The training program included a set of disciplines aimed at training the commander of an operational combat group, a well-developed and professionally competent officer in charge of a reconnaissance and sabotage unit. For seven months, students underwent special physical, fire, airborne and mountain training. They mastered special tactics, mine-blasting creation, topography, improved the skills of reconnaissance activities, studied the experience of guerrilla warfare, and much more. As a result, a separate special-purpose brigade, which had training grounds for all geographic latitudes of the Soviet Union, also received a private training center, where groups were put together during training, and commanding skills were actually tested. The most trained personnel, both the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, were involved in teaching. Undoubtedly moral and physical exercise special reservists, property released for their training and logistical guarantee were not wasted.
"ZENIT" - One of the groups, called "Zenith", was formed from the "Kuosovites", which received the name "Zenith", which took part in the coup d'état in Afghanistan. The most famous action associated with the capture of the Taj Beck Palace in Kabul in December 1979. As they now indiscriminately know, the problem was carried out with honor, at the highest professional level.
"CASCADE" - In May 1980, in the Committee State Security At the level of the Chairman, the task of relative mobilization of the Separate Special Purpose Brigade was worked out in order to send it in full force to Afghanistan. Lazarenko proposed, and on the basis of his proposals, an order was developed and signed regarding the mobilization of the Krasnodar and Alma-Ata regiments, as well as part of the Tashkent battalion. From other units of the brigade, only those who knew the Persian language were taken. In total, thousands of people entered the number of the consolidated detachment. Colonel A.I. Lazarenko was ordered to command the detachment, who coined the word "Cascade" for him. Additional training of the detachment was carried out in Fergana, for the base of the 105th airborne division.

The following tasks were assigned to the "Cascade":
Helping Afghans build local security agencies
Organization of intelligence and operational work in spite of the existing bandit formations
Organization and holding of special events against the most aggressive opponents of the existing Afghan regime and the USSR.
The second task was the most difficult due to the local national, ethnic and religious characteristics that had land in Afghanistan.
"Cascade" was designed to resist the opponents of the new government and teach its defenders to harp themselves. From time to time, "Cascade" began to supply reliable intelligence to the army in accordance with gangs, often joint operations were carried out. The stunt epic ended in the spring of 1983.
"OMEGA" - "Cascade" replaced the "Omega" detachment, whose tasks included, mainly, advisory activities in the special forces of the Ministry of Security of Afghanistan. It also lasted for a number of years. In April 1984, Mikhail Tsybenko, on the territory of the KGB office in Kabul, in the presence of two officers, chopped the official flight and the corner stamp of Omega with an ax. Witnesses signed the act and the Omega detachment ceased to exist.
"VIMPEL" - The actions of non-staff units of the KGB special forces in Afghanistan clearly showed the need to create a full-time structure that would be capable of solving special tasks deep behind enemy lines. This idea was expressed by Major General Yu.I. Drozdov. during the meeting with Andropov Yu.V. at the end of 1979. During the 1980s, this idea was often discussed in the Government and the Politburo, and, in the end, the KGB leadership agreed with the idea of ​​its creation. On August 19, 1981, a closed meeting of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, at which a verdict was passed on the creation of a literally secret special forces detachment in the KGB of the USSR to conduct operations from outside the USSR in a "partial period". Captain 1st rank Evald Grigorievich Kozlov became the first commander. The detachment was named "Vympel" in association with the admiral's bred pennant for the mast. The official name of the structure is the Separate Training Center of the KGB of the USSR.
Orders to carry out operations by the forces of this detachment could only be paid by the chairman of the KGB, and only in writing. However, there were no cases of its use from abroad, though some Vympel employees illegally underwent “training” in NATO special forces units.
The unique division required the development special program training of its employees, so that they could carry out special measures at the right time in accordance with the disorganization of the rear of the enemy. It was necessary to train highly qualified, thinking fighters, ready to make independent decisions and even self-sacrifice in the name of the interests of the Motherland. The training program was developed almost from scratch. The experience of preparing airborne units, border guards, KGB operatives and a truly personal test. The recommendations and methodologies developed for the KUOS were of great help. Intense combat training of Vympel employees began immediately due to the recruitment of the unit. IN combat units anciently recruited all officers. Basically, these were people who had passed the "Cascade" and KUOS. But since the day of the unit was originally about a thousand people, they recruited officers from the border troops and from the airborne forces and from other branches of the military. In the brutal selection, only ten candidates remained. Great attention was paid to physical training, hand-to-hand combat. Mountain training was at a high level. They learned to shoot from everything that shoots, to drive cars and armored personnel carriers. Serious training was given to mine-explosive business. The soldiers knew how to make explosives from household chemicals. When working at radio stations, they were trained to work, on an equal footing in telephone and telegraph mode. And many many others. The Vympel fighters were ready to appear in the country opposite which they were preparing with partial legalization. This allowed them to speak one or two foreign languages ​​and excellent knowledge of the enemy country, the national characteristics of its population.
It took about five years to train a fighter from scratch. Rarely, the height of training in the detachment became high and did not concede, and in many ways surpassed the height of training of the most elite units in the world, let's take, such as the British SAS.