History of airborne troops. Background 37 separate air assault brigade
Hello dears!
Please do not judge me for the text, I am not a writer - I am a reader.
At one time, under the USSR, and then Ukraine..., I had the honor of serving as an officer in military unit A0224 (40th separate airborne assault brigade). The brigade was directly subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the servicemen will understand what this means. Under the USSR, the brigade was fully provided for, in every sense. Starting from 1992-93, the provision, to put it mildly, began to limp..., I will not describe all the moments. It got to the point that a sign saying “kuren commander” (platoon commander) was hung on the doors of the officer’s room. The brigade commander walked by..., looked at it and at the next morning parade on the parade ground announced:
Return the old signs to their place, we do not raise chickens, we defend the Motherland!
In 1995, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry decided to create an elite unit - the National Guard of Ukraine and station one of these units on the basis of our unit. By the way: on the territory there was absolutely everything that was necessary for airborne training (airborne training), including repair shops for servicing the domes.
And the entire composition of the airborne unit was transferred to Solyanye (Nikolaev) to the base of the military communications unit...., i.e. I mean, of course, there was neither the VDP nor the VDK (airborne complex) on the territory of the signalmen, and no one was going to build it...
After the 40th separate airborne assault brigade was assigned to the 79th airborne regiment (Khmelnitsky) and as such, my unit ceased to exist.
Let's return to the national Guard of Ukraine, which, starting in 1995, began to be formed at the base of paratroopers in B. Korenikha. This elite did not last long, if I’m not mistaken, a year and a half, and then.........
By chance, yesterday, December 28, 2017, I was on the territory of my airborne unit, or rather in the place that was left of it.....
I'll start in the order of my walkthrough:
there was a fleet of equipment (shishariki, urals, BMD-shki, D-30, etc., etc.), a fuel and lubricants warehouse. Of course, all the boxes were overhauled.
Checkpoint parts (central entrance/entrance)
to the right of the checkpoint there was a 2-story building, on the 1st floor there was an officer’s canteen (in which we, among other things, held festive events), on the second floor there was an officer’s dorm, where I lived.
at this place there were capital barracks, which housed a parachute battalion, attached - a division of artillerymen on the D-30 and mortars.
This is what the barracks looked like from the parade ground.
the parade ground itself......
as it was (in the background there is a soldiers' canteen), preparations for formation on the parade ground, morning divorce.
This is what the left side entrance to the soldiers' canteen looks like now (for loading food)
and here is its own shooting range for shooting from automatic weapons and pistols, which was equipped with two long steel turrets and an automatic target control point. On last photo- Probably even God doesn’t know how much lead is buried in this hill.
what remains at the site of the VDK.....
as it was... (in the background there are repair shops for servicing the domes, the sports complex begins on the right and then behind it, to the right, was the same Airborne Sports Complex)
tactical training areas, which were equipped with concrete trenches and trenches for throwing live grenades.
Central checkpoint (taken an angle to capture the road sign)
Opposite the checkpoint is the field where Kherson helicopters (6s and 8s) came to us for parachute jumps.
Domestic airborne vehicles had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault forces was the provision of their aviation component, in other words, helicopters.The “second wave” airborne units formed en masse in 1979 consisted only of a ground component – i.e. Unlike their older brothers - the “first wave” brigades - they did not have helicopter regiments. This situation can be explained by several theses.
Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine for the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they must be part of them for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts to use them in the chosen direction. Theoretically, the apparently correct desire to give each formation helicopter forces, in reality led to the dispersion of helicopters among very numerous formations in view of the overall enormity of the SA. Here it was necessary to either liquidate unnecessary (or not unnecessary?) formations, or deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or speed up the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.
Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapons, depends on the prevailing this moment doctrines. As mentioned above, the “volumeists” who advocated for the creation of the lifting of part of the ground forces into the air, and therefore for a sharp increase in the number of air transport vehicles necessary for this, were defeated in the fight against supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was rather a consequence of objective preconditions, the objective course of development of the country’s armed forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.
Third, The very fact of combining air and ground components in a tactical formation apparently raised objections among many military leaders - and not only subjective, but also well-founded. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, being “tied” exclusively to supporting the operations of the airborne units. As it seems to the author of the article, the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military aviation aircraft, without paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and obligatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the first decreases. Moreover, according to operational calculations and exercise experience, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the ADS/DSD?
Finally, fourthly, As is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient to, like, for example, the Americans, equip all the formations with which they could be useful, and even have a reserve. However, it seems to me that there is a lot that is unclear here. Namely. Let's look at the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official data, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the author’s calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 vehicles with exhausted service life be disabled, but where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.
So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with the focal (non-linear) nature of combat operations, due to the lack of an aviation component in their composition that imparts maneuverability, sharply reduced their potential capabilities, becoming, in fact, units of light infantry. A fundamental way out of this situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinate to war time front-line departments. This formation would include a ground component (a ground combat unit from the ground forces or airborne forces) and an airborne helicopter component (from the airborne forces). Such a construction scheme would allow achieving high combat effectiveness and at the same time all interested departments “staying with their sheep.”
Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for the airborne helicopters. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The group consists of one transport combat helicopter regiment (tbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one department. air assault brigade (3 battalion) and three departments. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to operate as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks typical for airborne assaults during it show that within the framework of the airborne assault forces, in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne assault brigade as a tactical airborne assault force and eight to ten airborne assault forces as part of an airborne infantry assault battalion and reinforced small and medium infantry fighting forces. The average standards for the allocation of transport and landing helicopters are: airborne assault helicopters - up to four regimental sorties (regimental sorties) airborne assault helicopters *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p/v otbvp; reinforced SME - one p/v otbvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a squad of combat escort helicopters is required. Crew composition: air defense - 40 Mi-8T/MT, 20 Mi-6A; air defense - 40 Mi-24V/P and 20 Mi-8T/MT.
* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions with armored vehicles in the airborne brigade sharply increased the required number of helicopters for transportation, especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport approx. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share of the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties, and in reality the Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of carrying 2 units. The BMD/BTRD class BTT (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation in better side. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire armored personnel carrier of the DShB by Mi-6A helicopters.
There is no need to prove that disembarking OTTV on three flights, let alone four, is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer of no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without removing transport and combat helicopters from the air defense forces for the period of its operations (in total by 1-2 military units), i.e. they will have to be left without the Mi-8T/MT aircraft.
The duration of an OTTV disembarkation in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of the helicopters, only after a day can we count on their repeated actions (in Afghanistan, for example, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense forces remain without Mi-8 aircraft and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is necessary to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then almost all airborne assault forces are left without transport and landing helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the time it takes to restore the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault brigade, a repeated landing of the airborne assault forces is practically impossible. In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the odshb/us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight life of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landing forces. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TAC. Although not entirely. Nevertheless, it was also necessary to attract transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force - mainly An-12 - to land the DShV. This created additional inconvenience. Thus, the infantry fighting vehicle on the BTT had to independently follow to the initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality
A certain problem was the adaptability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 families to airborne assault operations and, more broadly, to airborne landings in general. This problem has already been discussed on the pages of the VIF-Almanac in the article "What kind of helicopter does special forces need". In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of airborne units to the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); At the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th Airborne Training Center. It was decided to disband all of the individual air assault battalions. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations had already been completed. The brigades were reorganized, and most of the battalions were disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former ones. The general picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.
Brigades and regiments in the period 1988-91:
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The individual battalions were dealt with as follows: in 1989 (maximum, early 1990) all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded, simultaneously redeploying those in groups of troops in Europe to the USSR. Then, before the beginning. 1991 they were disbanded too. Only the 901st battalion survived.
Individual battalions in the period 1988-91:
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Notes:
* By this time it was already called a separate parachute battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units within the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the Army and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thereby neutralizing the formation of army aviation, which was positive for the DShV. Coordination between air assault formations and the command of combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act was disrupted. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarities in recruitment and training do not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military issues. The inattention of the Airborne Forces command to the development of the doctrine of using helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of “envy” of the “competitor”; Moreover, the successes of the “helicopter landing” doctrine were evident both for us and for the NATO members. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne forces on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military air transport aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of landing forces with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing force drops sharply. Dnepropetrovsk December 2003 – July 2004, additions and changes – as of February 2005.
Private-K
Airborne troops (Airborne Forces) are a branch of troops intended for combat operations behind enemy lines. Usually they are part of the ground forces, less often - part of air force(fleet), but can also be an independent branch of the armed forces.
Designed for air landing behind enemy lines or for rapid deployment in geographically remote areas. The main method of delivering airborne forces is parachute landing; they can also be delivered by helicopter; During the Second World War, delivery by gliders was practiced.
At the end of 1930, near Leningrad, a Soviet airborne unit was created - an airborne detachment. In December 1932, he was deployed to the 3rd Special Purpose Aviation Brigade, which in 1938 became known as the 201st Airborne Brigade.
The first use of airborne assault in the history of military affairs occurred in the spring of 1929. In the city of Garm, besieged by the Basmachi, a group of armed Red Army soldiers was landed from the air, which, with the support of local residents, defeated a gang that had invaded the territory of Tajikistan from abroad. However, Airborne Forces Day in Russia and a number of other countries is August 2, in honor of the parachute landing at a military exercise of the Moscow Military District near Voronezh on August 2, 1930.
In 1931, on the basis of a directive dated March 18, a non-standard, experienced aviation motorized landing detachment (airborne landing detachment) was formed in the 1st aviation brigade of the Leningrad Military District. It was intended to study issues of operational-tactical use and the most advantageous organizational forms of airborne (airborne) units, units and formations. The detachment consisted of 164 personnel and consisted of:
- one rifle company;
- separate platoons: engineer, communications and light vehicles;
- heavy bomber aviation squadron (air squadron) (12 aircraft - TB-1);
- one corps aviation detachment (air squadron) (10 aircraft - R-5).
The detachment was armed with:
- two 76-mm Kurchevsky dynamo-reactive guns (DRP);
- two wedges - T-27;
- 4 grenade launchers;
- 3 light armored vehicles (armored vehicles);
- 14 light and 4 heavy machine guns;
- 10 trucks and 16 cars;
- 4 motorcycles and one scooter (apparently, they meant a bicycle).
E.D. Lukin was appointed commander of the detachment. Then, in the same air brigade, a non-standard parachute detachment was formed.
In 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted a resolution on the deployment of detachments into special purpose aviation battalions (BOSNAZ). By the end of 1933, there were already 29 airborne battalions and brigades that became part of the Air Force. The Leningrad Military District was entrusted with the task of training instructors in airborne operations and developing operational-tactical standards. By the standards of that time, airborne units were an effective means of disrupting enemy command and control and rear areas. They were to be used where other types of troops (infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored forces) could not currently solve this problem, and were intended to be used by the high command in cooperation with troops advancing from the front; airborne assaults were to assist in the encirclement and defeat the enemy in this direction.
Staff No. 015/890 1936 of the “airborne brigade” (ADBR) in wartime and peacetime. Name of units, number of wartime personnel (number of peacetime personnel in brackets):
- management, 49 (50)
- communications company, 56 (46)
- musician platoon, 11 (11)
- 3 airborne battalions, each 521 (381)
- Junior Command School, 0 (115)
- services, 144 (135)
Personnel:
- Total: 1823 (1500)
- Command staff, 107 (118)
- Commanding staff, 69 (60)
- Junior command and management personnel, 330 (264)
- Enlisted personnel, 1317 (1058)
Material part:
- 45 mm anti-tank gun, 18 (19)
- Light machine guns, 90 (69)
- Radio stations, 20 (20)
- Automatic carbines, 1286 (1005)
- Light mortars, 27 (20)
- Passenger cars, 6 (6)
- Trucks, 63 (51)
- Special vehicles, 14 (14)
- Cars "Pickup", 9 (8)
- Motorcycles, 31 (31)
- Tractors ChTZ, 2 (2)
- Tractor trailers, 4 (4)
IN pre-war years a lot of effort and money was allocated to the development of airborne troops, the development of the theory of their combat use and practical training. In 1934, 600 paratroopers were involved in Red Army exercises. In 1935, during the maneuvers of the Kyiv Military District, 1,188 paratroopers were parachuted and a landing force of 2,500 people with military equipment landed. In 1936, 3,000 paratroopers were landed in the Belarusian Military District, and 8,200 people with artillery and other military equipment were landed. The invited foreign military delegations who attended these exercises were amazed by the size of the landings and the skill of the landing.
31. Parachute units, as a new type of air infantry, are a means of disrupting the enemy’s control and rear. They are used by high command.
In cooperation with troops advancing from the front, air infantry helps to encircle and defeat the enemy in a given direction.
The use of air infantry must be strictly consistent with the conditions of the situation and requires reliable support and compliance with measures of secrecy and surprise.
Chapter two "Organization of the Red Army troops" 1. Branches of troops and their combat use, Field Manual of the Red Army (PU-39)
The paratroopers also gained experience in real battles. In 1939, the 212th Airborne Brigade took part in the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. For their courage and heroism, 352 paratroopers were awarded orders and medals. In 1939-1940, during the Soviet-Finnish War, the 201st, 202nd and 214th airborne brigades fought together with rifle units.
Based on the experience gained, in 1940 new brigade staffs were approved, consisting of three combat groups: parachute, glider and landing.
In preparation for the operation to annex Bessarabia to the USSR, occupied by Romania, as well as Northern Bukovina, the command of the Red Army included the 201st, 204th and 214th airborne brigades in the Southern Front. During the operation, the 204th and 201st ADBR received combat missions and troops were sent to the area of Bolgrad and Izmail, and after the closure of the state border to organize Soviet control bodies in populated areas.
By the beginning of 1941, on the basis of the existing airborne brigades, airborne corps of over 10 thousand people each were deployed. On September 4, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar, the Directorate of the Airborne Forces was transformed into the Directorate of the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, and formations and units of the Airborne Forces were removed from the subordination of the commanders of the active fronts and transferred to the direct subordination of the commander of the Airborne Forces. In accordance with the same order, the formation of ten airborne corps, five maneuverable airborne brigades, five reserve airborne regiments and an airborne school (Kuibyshev) was carried out. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War airborne wars constituted an independent branch of the forces (troops) of the Red Army Air Force.
In the counteroffensive near Moscow, conditions were created for the widespread use of airborne forces. In the winter of 1942, the Vyazma airborne operation was carried out with the participation of the 4th Airborne Corps. In September 1943, an airborne assault consisting of two brigades was used to assist the troops of the Voronezh Front in crossing the Dnieper River. In the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945, more than 4 thousand personnel of rifle units were landed for landing operations, who successfully completed the assigned tasks.
In October 1944, the Airborne Forces were transformed into a separate Guards Airborne Army, which became part of long-range aviation. In December 1944, this army was disbanded, and the Airborne Forces Directorate was created, reporting to the commander of the Air Force. The Airborne Forces retained three airborne brigades, an airborne training regiment, advanced training courses for officers and an aeronautical division.
Since 1946 transferred to the ground forces Armed Forces USSR, were directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, being the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
In 1956, two airborne divisions took part in the Hungarian events. In 1968, after the capture of two airfields near Prague and Bratislava, the 7th and 103rd Guards Airborne Divisions were landed, which ensured the successful completion of the task by formations and units of the United Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact during the Czechoslovak events.
Paratroopers in the cargo compartment of the An-12.
In the post-war period, the Airborne Forces carried out a lot of work to strengthen the firepower and mobility of personnel. Numerous samples of airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D), automotive vehicles (TPK, GAZ-66), and artillery systems (ASU-57, ASU-85, 2S9 Nona, 107-mm recoilless rifle B-11) were created. Complex parachute systems were developed for landing all types of weapons - “Centaur”, “Reaktaur” and others. The fleet of military transport aircraft was also increased, designed for the massive transfer of landing forces in the event of large-scale hostilities. Large-body transport aircraft were created capable of parachute landing of military equipment (An-12, An-22, Il-76).
In the USSR, for the first time in the world, airborne troops were created, which had their own armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. At large army exercises (for example, "Shield-82" or "Friendship-82"), the landing of personnel with standard equipment of no more than two parachute regiments was practiced. The state of the military transport aviation of the USSR Armed Forces at the end of the 80s made it possible to parachute 75% of the personnel and standard military equipment of one airborne division in one general sortie.
Organizational and personnel structure of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, as of July 1979.
By the fall of 1979, the 105th Guards Vienna Red Banner was disbanded airborne division, specialized for combat operations in mountainous desert areas. Units of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces were stationed in the cities of Fergana, Namangan and Chirchik of the Uzbek SSR and in the city of Osh of the Kyrgyz SSR. As a result of the disbandment of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces formed three separate air assault brigades (35th, 38th and 56th) and the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment.
Following the disbandment of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces in 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan showed the deep error of the decision taken by the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces - the airborne formation, specially adapted for combat operations in mountainous desert areas, was thoughtlessly and hastily disbanded, and was ultimately sent to Afghanistan 103 Guards VDD, personnel which had no training for conducting combat operations in such a theater of operations:
“...in 1986, the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Army General D.F. Sukhorukov, came and said then what fools we were, disbanding the 105th Airborne Division, because it was intended to conduct combat operations in mountainous desert areas. And we were forced to spend huge amounts of money to transport the 103rd Airborne Division to Kabul by air..."
By the mid-80s. The airborne troops of the USSR Armed Forces included 7 airborne divisions and three separate regiments with the following names and locations:
Organizational and staffing structure of the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment, 105th Guards Airborne Division as of July 1979.
- 7th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. Stationed in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR, Baltic Military District.
- 76th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov, II degree, Chernigov Airborne Division. Stationed in Pskov, RSFSR, Leningrad Military District.
- 98th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree Svir Airborne Division. It was stationed in the city of Bolgrad, Ukrainian SSR, Kodvo, and in the city of Chisinau, Moldavian SSR, KodVO.
- 103rd Guards Red Banner Order of Lenin Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR. She was stationed in Kabul (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979 and after February 1989, it was stationed in the city of Vitebsk, Belarusian SSR, Belorussian Military District.
- 104th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division, specialized for combat operations in mountainous areas. Stationed in the city of Kirovabad, Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
- 106th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. Stationed in Tula and Ryazan, RSFSR, Moscow Military District.
- 44th training Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree and Bogdan Khmelnitsky II degree Ovruch airborne division. Stationed in the village. Gaizhunai, Lithuanian SSR, Baltic Military District.
- 345th Guards Vienna Red Banner Order of Suvorov III degree parachute regiment named after the 70th anniversary Lenin Komsomol. Stationed in Bagram (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979, he was stationed in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR, after February 1989 - in the city of Kirovabad, Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
- 387th separate training parachute regiment. Until 1982 it was part of the 104th Guards. VDD. In the 80s, the 387th training ODDP trained young recruits to be sent to airborne and air assault units as part of OKSVA. In the cinema, in the film “9th Company”, the training unit means exactly 387 OUPDP. Stationed in Fergana, Uzbek SSR, Turkestan Military District.
- 196th separate communications regiment of the Airborne Forces. Stationed in the village. Bear Lakes, Moscow Region, RSFSR.
Each of these divisions included: a directorate (headquarters), three parachute regiments, one self-propelled artillery regiment, and combat support and logistics support units.
In addition to parachute units and formations, the airborne troops also had air assault units and formations, but they were subordinate to the commanders of military districts (groups of forces), armies or corps. They were no different in anything except their tasks, subordination and general education system. Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms of military personnel were the same as those of parachute units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ADSB), separate air assault regiments (ADAS) and separate air assault battalions (ADSB).
The reason for the creation of air assault formations in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The emphasis was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the enemy's near rear, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical capability for such a landing was provided by the significantly increased fleet of transport helicopters in the army aviation by this time.
By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were stationed on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per one military district, which has land access to the State Border of the USSR, one brigade in the internal Kiev Military District (23 ADSB in the city of Kremenchug, subordinate to the Main Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ADShBR in the GSVG in Cottbus and 83 ADShBR in the SGV in Bialogard). 56th Guards The ODSBR in OKSVA, stationed in the city of Gardez of the Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District in which it was formed.
Separate air assault regiments subordinated to the commanders of individual army corps.
The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:
- Standard airborne armored vehicles are available (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns “Nona”, etc.). In the air assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of the airborne units.
- Subordinate to the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of forces), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters were in Moscow.
- In the assigned tasks. It was assumed that the airborne assault units, in the event of the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land near the enemy's rear, mainly by landing from helicopters. The parachute units were supposed to be used deeper behind enemy lines with parachute landing from military air transport aircraft. At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne formations.
- Unlike the guards parachute units of the Airborne Forces deployed at full strength, some air assault brigades were squadroned (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the name Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division, disbanded in 1979 - the 35th, 38th and 56th.
In the mid-80s, the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces included the following brigades and regiments:
Organizational and staffing structure of the 56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade, as of December 1986.
- 11th airborne assault brigade in the Transbaikal Military District ( Transbaikal region Mogocha and Amazar)
- 13 Special Airborne Brigade in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur Region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk)
- 21 Special Airborne Brigade in the Transcaucasian Military District ( Georgian SSR, Kutaisi)
- 23 ADSB of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug)
- 35th Guards ODSBR in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus)
- 36 airborne assault brigade in the Leningrad Military District ( Leningrad region, town Garbolovo)
- 37 airborne assault brigade in the Baltic Military District ( Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk)
- 38th Guards ODShBR in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest)
- 39 ODSBR in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyrov)
- 40 ODShBR in Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev)
- 56th Guards ODSBR in the Turkestan Military District (formed in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan)
- 57 Special Airborne Brigade in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay town)
- 58 ODShBR in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug)
- 83 ODSBR in Northern Group Troops, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard)
- 1318 ODShP in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps (5 UAC)
- 1319 ODShP in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps (48 UAC)
These brigades included a command and control unit, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion, and combat support and logistics support units. The personnel of the deployed brigades reached 2,500 military personnel. For example, the regular number of personnel is 56 Guards. As of December 1, 1986, the ODSBR numbered 2,452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 warrant officers, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).
The regiments differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: one parachute and one air assault (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the units of the regimental set.
Participation of the Airborne Forces in the Afghan War
Organizational and staffing structure of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment, for the summer of 1988.
In the Afghan War, the airborne and air assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces included one airborne division (103rd Guards Airborne Division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56th Guards Special Airborne Brigade), one separate parachute regiment (345th Guards Airborne Regiment). OPDP) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (in the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade and in the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade). In total, in 1987 these were 18 “line” battalions (13 parachute and 5 air assault), which amounted to a fifth of the total number of all “line” OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .
In almost the entire history of the Afghan war, no situation arose that would justify the use of parachute landing for the transfer of personnel. The main reasons for this were the complexity of the mountainous terrain and the unjustification of material costs in using such methods in guerrilla warfare. The transfer of personnel of airborne and air assault units to mountainous combat areas impassable for armored vehicles was carried out exclusively by landing from helicopters. As in all motorized rifle, tank and artillery units within the OKSVA, up to half of all units of the airborne and air assault formations were assigned to guard duty at outposts, which made it possible to control roads, mountain passes and the vast territory of the country, thereby significantly constraining enemy actions. For example, the 2nd parachute battalion from the 345th Guards. The OPDP was dispersed among 20 outposts in the Panjshir Gorge near the village of Anava. With this, 2 PDB 345 OPDP (together with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment of the 108th MSD, stationed in the village of Rukha) blocked the western exit from the gorge, which was the enemy’s main transport artery from Pakistan to the strategically important Charikar Valley.
The most massive combat airborne operation in the USSR Armed Forces in the period after the Great Patriotic War, should be considered the 5th Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, during which for the first time a mass landing was carried out in Afghanistan: during the first three days alone, over 4 thousand people were landed from helicopters. In total, about 12 thousand military personnel of various military branches took part in this operation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result, most of the Panjshir Gorge was taken under control.
In the period from 1982 to 1986, all OKSVA airborne units systematically replaced standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD-1, BTR-D) with armored vehicles standard for motorized rifle units (BMP-2D, BTR-70). First of all, this was due to the low security and low motor life of structurally lightweight armored vehicles of the Airborne Forces, as well as the nature of combat operations, where the tasks performed by paratroopers were not much different from the tasks assigned to motorized riflemen.
Also, in order to increase the firepower of the airborne units, additional artillery and tank units were introduced into their composition. For example, the 345 ODDP, modeled on a motorized rifle regiment, was supplemented with an artillery howitzer division and a tank company, in the 56 ADSB the artillery battalion was deployed to 5 fire batteries (instead of the required 3 batteries), and the 103rd Guards. The airborne division will be reinforced with the 62nd separate tank battalion, which was unusual for the organizational structure of airborne units on the territory of the USSR.
Training of officers for airborne troops
Officers were trained by the following military educational institutions according to the following military registration specialties:
- Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - commander of an airborne (airborne) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School - commander of an automobile/transport platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School - deputy company commander for political affairs ( educational work).
- Airborne Faculty of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School - commander of an anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.
In addition to the graduates mentioned educational institutions, in the Airborne Forces, graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments that trained to become motorized rifle platoon commanders were often appointed to the positions of platoon commanders. This was due to the fact that the specialized Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, which graduated on average about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s there were about 60,000 personnel in them) platoon commanders. For example, the former commander of the 247th Guards. RDP (7th Guards Airborne Division), Hero Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander in the 111th Guards. PDP 105 Guards Airborne Forces, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.
For a long time, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces (now called army special forces) were mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that during the Soviet period, as now, there were and are no troops in the Russian Armed Forces special purpose, and there were and are units and units of Special Purpose (SpN) of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In the press and in the media, the phrases “special forces” or “commandos” were mentioned only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).
Starting from the emergence of these units, the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s completely denied the existence of such units and units. To the point that military personnel know about their existence conscript service They were recognized only when they were accepted into the personnel of these units and units. Officially in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were announced either airborne units- as in the case of the GSVG (officially there were no Special Forces units in the GDR), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSB). For example, 173rd separate detachment special purpose (173 OOSpN), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion (3 MRB).
In everyday life, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces wore the dress and field uniforms adopted by the Airborne Forces, although neither in terms of subordination nor in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities they belonged to the Airborne Forces. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and the units and units of the Special Forces was the majority of the officers - graduates of the RVVDKU, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.
Airborne assault formations of the Soviet Army.In addition to parachute units and formations, the airborne troops and ground forces (ground forces) of the USSR Armed Forces also had air assault units and formations, but they were subordinate to the commanders of military districts (groups of forces), armies or corps. They were no different in anything except their tasks, subordination and general education system. Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms of military personnel were the same as those of parachute units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ADSBr), separate air assault regiments (ADAS) and separate air assault battalions (ADSB).
The reason for the creation of air assault formations in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The emphasis was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the enemy's near rear, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical capability for such a landing was provided by the significantly increased fleet of transport helicopters in the army aviation by this time.
By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were stationed on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per military district, which has land access to the State Border of the USSR, one brigade in the internal Kiev Military District (23 airborne assault brigade in Kremenchug, subordinate to the High Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ADSB in the GSVG in Cottbus and 83 ADSB in the SGV in Bialogard). 56th Guards The separate airborne assault brigade in OKSVA, stationed in the city of Gardez, Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District in which it was formed.
Individual air assault regiments were subordinate to the commanders of individual army corps.
The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:
- Availability of standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns “Nona”, etc.). In the air assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of the airborne units.
- Subordinate to the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of forces), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters were in Moscow.
- In assigned tasks. It was assumed that the airborne assault units, in the event of the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land near the enemy's rear, mainly by landing from helicopters. The parachute units were supposed to be used deeper behind enemy lines with parachute landing from military air transport aircraft. At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne formations.
- Unlike the guards parachute units of the Airborne Forces deployed at full strength, some air assault brigades were squadroned (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the name Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division, disbanded in 1979 - the 35th, 38th and 56th.
In the mid-80s, the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces included the following brigades and regiments: 9
- 11 airborne assault brigade in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Trans-Baikal Territory, Mogocha and Amazar),
- 13th airborne assault brigade in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk),
- 21 Special Airborne Brigade in the Transcaucasian Military District (Georgian SSR, Kutaisi),
- 23 ADSB of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 35gv. ODSB in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus),
- 36th airborne assault brigade in the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad region, Garbolovo village),
- 37 Special Airborne Brigade in the Baltic Military District (Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk),
- 38th Guards ODShBr in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest),
- 39 Special Airborne Brigade in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyrov),
- 40 airborne assault brigade in the Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev),
- 56 Guards Special Airborne Brigade in the Turkestan Military District (formed in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan),
- 57 airborne assault brigade in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay town),
- 58 ADShBr in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 83 ADSB in the Northern Group of Forces, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard),
- 1318 ODShP in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps.
- 1319 ODShP in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps.
These brigades included a command and control unit, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion, and combat support and logistics support units. The personnel of the deployed brigades reached 2,500 military personnel. For example, the regular number of personnel is 56 Guards. As of December 1, 1986, the Specialized Brigade consisted of 2,452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 warrant officers, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).
The regiments differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: one parachute and one air assault (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the units of the regimental set.
In the Afghan war, one airborne division (103rd Guards Airborne Division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56th Guards Special Airborne Brigade), one separate parachute regiment participated from the airborne and air assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces (345th Guards OPDP) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (66 Motorized Rifle Brigade and 70 Motorized Rifle Brigade). In total, in 1987 these were 18 “line” battalions (13 parachute and 5 air assault), which amounted to a fifth of the total number of all “line” OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .
Training of officers for airborne troops.
Officers were trained by the following military educational institutions in the following military specialties (MSS):
- Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - commander of an airborne (airborne) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School - commander of an automobile/transport platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School - deputy company commander for political affairs (educational work).
- Airborne Faculty of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School - commander of an anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.
In addition to graduates of these educational institutions, the Airborne Forces often appointed platoon commanders, graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments that trained to become motorized rifle platoon commanders. This was due to the fact that the specialized Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (RVVDKU), which graduated on average about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s there were about 60,000 personnel in them ) in platoon commanders. For example, the former commander of the 247th Guards. PDP, Hero of the Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.
For a long time, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces (now called army special forces) were mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, there were and are no special forces in the Russian Armed Forces, but there were and are Special Forces units and units of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In the press and in the media, the phrases “special forces” or “commandos” were mentioned only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).
Starting from the emergence of these units in the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s, the existence of such units and units was completely denied. To the point that conscripts only learned about their existence when they were recruited into these units and units. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were declared either units of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of the GSVG (officially in the GDR there were no units of the Special Forces), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSB). For example, the 173rd separate special forces detachment (173 OOSpN), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion (3 OMSB).
In everyday life, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces wore the dress and field uniforms adopted by the Airborne Forces, although neither in terms of subordination nor in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities they belonged to the Airborne Forces. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and the units and units of the Special Forces was the majority of the officers - graduates of the RVVDKU, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.
Acquisition
To create and staff the “second wave” of air assault units, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards Airborne Division and the 80th Guards. PDP 104th Airborne Division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for additional staffing. Thus, the 36th Airborne Brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th Guards PDP (it was squadroned) which allocated officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on officers of the headquarters of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the air assault units of the military districts, most of the officers were from the military units of the districts: for the airborne assault forces, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb of groups of forces, the battalion commander was supplemented with a deputy battalion commander, and also, partially, company commanders. To staff the newly created units, in 1979, enrollment in military schools training officers for the Airborne Forces was increased, and from 1983-84. Most of the officers already went to the Airborne Forces having been trained under the Airborne Forces program. Mostly they were appointed to groups of troops in the Oshbr, less often - in the OshBR of districts, and even less often in the Odshb. In 1984-85 a reshuffling of officers in groups of troops was carried out - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most trained graduates of military schools and academies were always assigned to the Airborne Forces.
With regard to the recruitment of conscript soldiers, the same rules apply to the military personnel medical requirements and other selection rules as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed conscript contingent was selected. High selection requirements (height – not lower than 173 cm; physical development– not below average; education - not lower than secondary, absence of medical restrictions, etc.) determined fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large “Gaizhyunay training” - the 44th Airborne Forces; DShV were staffed by junior commanders and specialists, mostly those who had graduated from training divisions Ground Forces and to a lesser extent, from the Gaizhyunai "training", the air assault battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade was also replenished from the Fergana "training, military unit 52788
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