History of the airborne troops. Airborne assault troops of the USSR 37th separate airborne assault brigade
Domestic DShV had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.Massively formed in 1979 "second wave" DShN consisted only of the ground component - i.e. unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. This situation can be explained by several theses.
Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they should be included in their composition for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts for use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the right desire to give helicopter forces to each association, in fact, led to the dispersion of helicopters over very numerous formations in view of the overall immensity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to force the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.
Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the dominant this moment doctrine. As mentioned above, the "volumizers" who advocated the creation of a rise in the air of part of the ground forces, and therefore a sharp increase in the number of air vehicles needed for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was a consequence of rather objective prerequisites, the objective course of development of the country's Armed Forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.
Third, the very fact of combining the air and ground components in a tactical formation caused, apparently, many military leaders objections - and not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, "attached" exclusively to ensuring the actions of the airborne troops. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by military aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the DSHO / DShD?
Finally, fourthly, as it is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient in order, like the Americans, to equip all the formations with which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to be a lot of confusion here. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the authors' calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in the disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 machines that have exhausted their resources be disabled, but then where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.
So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with a focal (non-linear) nature of hostilities, due to the lack of an aviation component that imparts maneuverability in their composition, sharply reduced their potential, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of the current situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (DShCh from the SV or Airborne Forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and, at the same time, all interested departments "keep their own sheep."
Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for DShV. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The grouping consists of one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one detachment. airborne assault brigade(3rd battalion) and three det. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks characteristic of airborne assaults in the course of it show that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne brigade as an ATIA and eight to ten TakVD as part of an airborne assault brigade and reinforced small and medium armored personnel carriers. The average standards for the allocation of transport and assault helicopters are: ATS - up to four regimental sorties (p / a) rebvp *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p / in otbvp; reinforced SSB - one p / a bvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a detachment of escort combat helicopters is needed. Estimated composition: otbvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; obvp - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.
* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on armored vehicles in the odshbr sharply increased the required outfit of helicopters for transportation, and especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport ok. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation in better side. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb by Mi-6A helicopters.
It would be superfluous to prove that landing three flights, let alone four, of the ATMO is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer by no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without the withdrawal of transport and combat helicopters from the air force for the period of its operations (total for 1-2 p / a), i.e., they will have to be left without Mi-8T / MT.
The duration of the disembarkation of the ATC in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of helicopters, only a day later, one can count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense units remain without the Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then practically all the air defense forces are left without troop-carrying helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the recovery time of the combat capability of the odshbr, the re-landing of the airborne division is practically not feasible. In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the special air defense unit / us.msb. However modern experience testifies: up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TakVD. Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force for the landing of the DShV - mainly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, the dshb on the BTT had to independently follow to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality
A certain problem was the suitability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family for air assault operations and, more broadly, for airborne landing in general. This problem has already been discussed on the pages of the VIF-Almanac in the article "What kind of helicopter do special forces need". In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former. The overall picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.
Brigades and regiments in the period 1988-91:
|
With individual battalions, they acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.
Separate battalions in the period 1988-91:
|
Notes:
* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former air assault units in composition of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply. Dnepropetrovsk December 2003 - July 2004, additions and changes - for February 2005.
Private-K
Hello dear!
Please do not judge me for the text, I'm not a writer - I'm a reader.
At one time, under the USSR, and then in Ukraine ..., he had the honor to serve as an officer in military unit A0224 (40th separate airborne assault brigade). The brigade was directly subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the servicemen will understand what this means. Under the USSR, the brigade was fully secured, in every sense. Starting from 1992-93, the provision, to put it mildly, began to limp ... I will not describe all the moments. It got to the point that a sign "kuren commander" (platoon commander) was hung on the doors of the officer's room. The brigade commander looked like ...., looked at this and at the next morning divorce on the parade ground announced:
Return the old signs to their place, we do not breed chickens, we are defending the Motherland!
In 1995, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry decided to create an elite unit - the National Guard of Ukraine and place one of these units on the basis of our unit. By the way: on the territory there was absolutely everything that is necessary for the VDP (airborne training), including repair shops for the maintenance of domes.
And the entire composition of the landing unit was transferred to Salt (Nikolaev) to the base of the military communications unit ...., i.e. I mean, of course, there were neither VDP nor VDK (airborne complex) on the territory of signalmen, and no one was going to build it ...
After the 40th Airborne Brigade, the 79th Airborne Regiment (Khmelnitsky) was attached, and as such, my unit ceased to exist.
Let's go back to the national guards of Ukraine, which, starting from 1995, began to be formed on the basis of paratroopers in B. Korenikh. This elite did not last long, if I'm not mistaken for a year and a half, and then .........
By chance, yesterday, December 28, 2017, I was on the territory of my landing unit, or rather, in the place that was left of it .....
I'll start in order of my detour:
there was a park of equipment (shishariks, Urals, BMD-shki, D-30, etc., etc.), a fuel and lubricants warehouse. Of course, all the boxes were capital execution.
Checkpoint part (central entrance/entrance)
to the right of the checkpoint there was a 2-story building, on the 1st floor - an officer's canteen (in which we, among other things, held festive events), on the second floor - an officer's hostel, where I lived.
at this place there were capital barracks, which housed the parachute battalion, attached - a division of artillerymen on the D-30 and mortars.
this is what these barracks looked like from the side of the parade ground.
the platform itself ......
as it was (in the background a soldier's canteen), preparations for building on the parade ground, morning divorce.
this is how the left side entrance to the soldier's canteen looks now (for loading food)
and here is our own shooting range for firing automatic weapons and pistols, which was equipped with two long steel turrets, an automatic target control point. On last photo- perhaps even God does not know how much lead is buried in this hill.
what was left at the location of the VDK .....
as it was ... (repair shops for maintenance of domes are in the background, a sports complex begins on the right and further behind it, to the right, the same VDK was located)
places for tactical training, which were equipped with concrete trenches and trenches for throwing live grenades.
Central checkpoint (took an angle to grab a road sign)
Opposite the checkpoint is a field where Kherson turntables (6-ki and 8-ki) came to us for parachute jumps.
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge of the airborne assault units of the Soviet Army and, briefly formulating, lay them out for public viewing and study. Please note that this study is not definitive. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still not a single official open (i.e. not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat strength, not to mention their organizational and staffing structures, methods and methods of combat use and etc. Everything that you read here was naturally collected bit by bit, from many different sources - the overwhelming majority of the work is based on surveys of veterans of the DShV, people who came into contact with them by occupation, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me strictly, but fairly, because "... if in this book it is written by my rudeness or negligence, I pray you: do not look down on my reproach, do not curse, but correct, it was not an angel of God who wrote, but a sinful person and full of ignorance..."
The author expresses his deep gratitude to everyone who helped him by providing his memory and took the time to answer.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion about the article, point out inaccuracies, inaccuracies, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (which was indispensable).
Below is the third edition of the article.
- ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING.
- BACKGROUND.
- TRIAL STEP.
- The capitalists.
- We have.
- THE IDEA PAVES THE WAY FOR ITSELF.
- "Volumes"
- New wave.
- Subordination.
- Acquisition.
- Outfit and equipment.
- ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS.
- Organizational structure of 11, 13 and 21 odshbr for the 1970s
- Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th Guards for 1979-88
- Organizational structure 11, 13 and 21 odshbr for 1979-88.
- Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th guards, 36th, 37th, 38th guards, 40th, 56th guards, 83rd air brigade for 1990-91
- Organizational structure of 224 UTs for 1990-91.
- HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM.
- Quantity.
- Quality
- RESULTS.
- Brigades and regiments in the period 1988-91
- Separate battalions in the period 1988-91.
"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the ratio of various branches of the military."
K. Clausewitz, "On War"
ON THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING
It is not known when the idea of airborne assaults appeared, as the sending of military formations to the rear of the enemy by air, arose no one knows when. However, for a long time it had a strictly fantastic character, and only during the First World War, was it able to receive at least some material basis in the form of the creation of an air vehicle - an airplane-airplane. And if at first, the idea was exclusively of a sabotage and reconnaissance nature, then soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and capacious aircraft, it began to take on a larger-scale logical form, which led to Mitchel's idea of landing in the rear of the German troops first divisions, and then the whole "airborne" army. However, we can only guess whether this project would have been realized, whether the war would have lasted another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, this idea, although it did not receive a serious material embodiment, continued to soar in the air, exciting the minds. The "positional nightmare" of the Western Front was in full view, and many innovative military theorists (or who consider themselves so) were persistently looking for innovative ways to prevent such a situation in the future.
Thus, for the airborne troops (VDV), the main, defining goal was immediately revealed - to assist the advancing groupings of ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assaults (AD) confirms this thesis *.
* A special position is occupied by the VD to the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of assistance to amphibious assaults or in general as part of various-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
The absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan VD operation (VDO), which did not have a rigid link with the actions of either ground or sea forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if linkage with the Ground Forces was not possible for completely understandable and objective reasons, then weak communication with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of such a goal, the Airborne Forces were also assigned the task, which consisted, as a rule, in capturing a certain area of \u200b\u200bthe terrain (usually behind the line of contact) and then holding it for a while (for example, until the approach of advancing ground forces).
A specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces, which consist in landing (dropping, disembarking), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.
This leads to a general definition of the combat capabilities of the VD formation, which are:
- in the ability to capture a certain territory (a piece of land, an object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy located there;
- in the ability to organize an effective defense of the captured territory (object) for a certain period;
- but, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be airlifted.
I needed such a lengthy introduction so that the reader (perhaps a completely outsider, but interested in the issue) immediately grasped the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.
Now, let's turn to the actual topic of the article.
BACKGROUND
The appearance of DShV is tightly linked with the appearance of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new types and types of armed forces to the arena of battles. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the VD, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.
... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of the macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of our ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces.
The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensives of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors involved.
Firstly, the failures of large-scale VDO somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, with the existing material and technical base and general level organizations).
Secondly, the very idea of small landings probably seemed wrong; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were envisaged by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).
Third, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to manage with tried and tested purely ground-based methods.
But this is all just speculation. Personally, it seems quite possible to the author to single out several dozens of excellent military transport aircraft Li-2 and S-47 from the many hundreds already available by 1944 (more than 1000 units by 1945) and throw them along the same paths along the parachute battalion supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - in some cases this could already significantly facilitate the actions of ground forces. But what was, was.
... In con. 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just break out onto the stage - new class aircraft. Helicopters (which at this point reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) successfully proved themselves in the Incheon amphibious assault operation (MDO) and in subsequent actions of American troops in Korea. Hurrying domestic designers present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. enlist in the army en masse.
Already in 1954, the first large-scale experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also conducted (including those with real application nuclear weapons) for the landing of battalion and regimental-scale helicopter landings behind enemy lines ... However, the matter died out on that. That is, no organizational measures for the creation of specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this appear to be the following:
Firstly, the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played a negative role.
Secondly, the overdimension of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. have as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already impudence, especially since the "Khrushchev" general reduction of the Armed Forces has begun.
Third, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without the protection of armored personnel carriers) riflemen-infantry; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" compared to the armored personnel carrier.
Fourth, in addition to the paratrooper units of the Airborne Forces, there were in abundance until 1957 and rifle divisions, units of both of them, could, if such a task was set, be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.
And finally fifth, brought up on the power of tank armored fists to Soviet military leaders, clumsy, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on top (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swift licked aerodynamics!) Did not seem to be the means that could give the troops new hitherto unseen opportunities.
TRIAL STEP
Capitalists
In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the theory of VDO. The following phrase of the American Airborne Forces General James Gavin from his book "Airborne Warfare" can serve as a better illustration: "...<воздушно-десантные>troops should be used en masse, not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many points where they are able to achieve only local tactical successes. "However, their experience of the war in what later became known as" poorly equipped theater of war, ie. e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about it and act more flexibly. The helicopter proved to be a very promising means of transportation in conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain and the absence of roads. The number of helicopters jumps greatly - by the end of the war, there were already 1140 units in the army aviation. while at the beginning there were only 56 units.The American command is also creating an experimental formation - the 11th Air Assault Division. Based on it and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). funds with a total number of up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was deployed to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of a proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was ok. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!
Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived rather as a kind of exotic, purely auxiliary purposes. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from aircraft) landing as such.
We have
Such an active and such a successful use of helicopters made an impression on the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - in the course of the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. PDP formed an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training of the Airborne Forces Major-General Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion deployed by helicopters with attached self-propelled guns also participates. In a specially created working group at the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (ovshbr). Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FAR) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other data, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).
The brigades were formed, as they say, from scratch. Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (VDS) and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the former commander of 51 1st Guards PDP Colonel Reznikov).
But even here, a number of subjective factors of the peculiarities of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, the underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to operate on EuroTVD. That is why they were deployed in directions with a lesser threat compared to the western one - it was considered expedient to have them only for operations on mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground equipment, where the focality of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster of visual propaganda with a somewhat surreal inscription: "Attack paratrooper - time limit".) The aviation component of each of the brigades was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Army, and the air - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.
For the implementation of air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to involve ordinary paratroopers or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of airborne and combined arms divisions.
A little about terminology should also be said here. It is not good to use the terms created by the capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms "air assault" and "airmobile" gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet DShCh and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.
By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OShS).
IDEA PAVES THE WAY
"Volumes"
In the 70s. behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and research institutions, a scientific discussion, clearly serious in its intensity and extremely important in its consequences, was unfolding, combined with an undercover and behind-the-scenes struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...
In 1975, working group under the leadership of Lieutenant General I. Yurkovskiy, she put forward the idea of creating a new type of operation - the so-called. "bulk operation" instead of, as they claimed, the obsolete concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to "gnaw through" the enemy's defense, but to "jump" over it, bypassing the infection zones and defense nodes - thus the pace of the offensive increased sharply. The idea was supported by some military leaders (lieutenant generals I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was raised about the global change of the entire theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new "air echelon" of ground forces.
The implementation of such an idea required a radical change in priorities in military development and fundamentally pushed back the positions of the supporters of armored armadas who dominated the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of an understanding of the dialectics of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the "volumes" were crushed...
New wave
And yet, the "traditionalists" still had to make room a little - painfully interesting arguments were presented by the "volumizers". In the middle of 1978 the new head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, it was decided to form, in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of air assault units of two types.
Firstly, eight separate air assault brigades of district (group) subordination:
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 11 odshbr | July 1968 | Trans-Baikal Military District | gg. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* |
| 13 odshbr | July 1968 | Far Eastern Military District | |
| 21 odshbr | 1973 | Transcaucasian Military District | gg. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany | Cottbus (GDR)** |
| 36 odshbr | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District | town Garbolovo (Leningrad region) |
| 37 odshbr | December 1979 | Baltic VO | |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | December 1979 | Belarusian VO | Brest (Belarus) |
| 39 odshbr | December 1979 | Carpathian VO | Khyriv (Ukraine) |
| 40 odshbr | December 1979 | Odessa Military District | |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District | |
| 57 odshbr | December 1979 | Central Asian VO |
Notes:
- * Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
- ** Literally ok. month, the brigade was originally referred to as the 14th Guards, and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
- *** Formally, the 56th Guards. the brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagay, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as its formal cadre, was originally stationed in Chirchik.
Secondly, twenty separate LH battalions:
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 48 odshb | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District, 1st AK / 40th OA (*) | unknown |
| 139 odshb | December 1979 | Baltic VO, 11th Guards. OA | |
| 145 odshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 5th OA | |
| 899 odshb | December 1979 | 20th Guards OA | Burg (GDR) |
| 900 odshb | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 8th Guards OA | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) |
| 901 odshb | December 1979 | Central Group of Forces | |
| 902 odshb | December 1979 | Southern Group of Forces | Kecskemét (Hungary) |
| 903 odshb | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 28th OA | Brest (Southern), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus) |
| 904 dshb | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 13th OA | |
| 905 odshb | December 1979 | Odessa Military District, 14th OA | Bendery (Moldova) |
| 906 dshb | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 36th OA | |
| 907 dshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 43rd AK / 47th OA | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) |
| 908 dshb | December 1979 | Kyiv Military District, 1st Guards OA | Konotop, since 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) |
| 1011 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards TA | |
| 1044 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 1st Guards TA | |
| 1156 slut | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 8th TA | |
| 1179 slut | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District, 6th OA | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) |
| 1151 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 7th TA | Polotsk (Belarus) |
| 1185 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 2nd Guards TA | Ravensbrück (GDR) |
| 1604 slut | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 29th OA | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) |
Notes:
* Literally a few months after the formation, 48 odshb (or, presumably, the 148th) was merged into the 66th brigade (omsbr) in Afghanistan. In general, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) in Afghanistan, there were two brigades of a special organization known "to the people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (but in reality bearing the name "detachment combined arms brigade" - brig.) . In their composition there was one odshb.
During August-December 1979, these units were basically created.
In 1984, 83 odshbr and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th odshp for full-time Operational-Maneuvering Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate army corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.
|
Thus, at the end of 1986, the Soviet Army had 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total staffing of the DShCh for wartime was 65-70 thousand people. However, in Peaceful time, parts were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.
The principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out is not known to me. But, it can be argued with a certain accuracy that it was the same for odshbr, obrSpN and omsbr - i.e. within all SWs. The differences in the numbering of the odshb are due to the three consecutive orders by which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination
Many are interested in the question - were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn't. DShCh were part of the High Command of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the military personnel of the DShCh are not airborne? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the GK SV DShCh, they were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with parts special purpose- there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. It was the commander's office tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no control of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the SV. The "second-rate" (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the secret intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruiting and training, etc. In the minds of the officers of both the Airborne Forces and the SV, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "link" (perhaps with the exception of units in groups of troops - there, all places, of course, were valued higher).
In operational terms (combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of DShV units and their training was in charge of the combat training department of the Civil Code of the SV together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces command. General principles combat use of the DShV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.
This had two opposite consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that DShCh thus found a "father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and an evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of the combined arms formations was disrupted. DShV, designed to act in the interests of combined arms formations, ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, drastically reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. apparently best solution there would be such a subordination scheme: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (staffing, development of methods and forms of actions, armament and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - by the commander of operational and operational-strategic formations in whose interests this formation is supposed to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces All this played little role. But that is another story…
Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DShV
If the Airborne Forces, according to the established opinion, are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (ADO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km or more), then the idea of using DShV lies in the field rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not tough - they are thrown out in the interests of at least the front (a group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (VGK), then for the DShV this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They operate within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro-target" determines the "micro-target" of the landing forces, it also determines the task, composition of forces, method of application.) is produced in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the level of the army-corps, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command instance, the smaller, as a rule, the scale of the forces involved by the LH. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the DShV - in companies and battalions, less often - in a brigade / regiment.
Acquisition
To create and staff the "second wave" of the DShCh, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. airborne division and 80th guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards. PDP (he was framed) who singled out the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the staff officers of the 105th Guards. Airborne Forces, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the DShCh of the military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the ODSHB, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To complete the newly created parts, in 1979. in military schools preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it was not without patronage, but this only concerned the distribution into groups of troops - there was a war in Afghanistan, airborne officers went there in the second circle, and the temptation to attach their own away was great.
With regard to the recruitment of conscripts, the same applies to the DShCh medical requirements and other selection rules, as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173cm; physical development- not below average; education - not lower than secondary, the absence of medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Gayzhunay pupils.
Outfit and equipment
Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowances almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment with the landing specifics, it did not take into account the moral factor either. In general, until ser. 1983, the entire l / s DShV went in the usual form of motorized riflemen - however, for a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags-sidors were replaced with RD-54 landing backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also "hazing" deviations from this rule. So, one could see airborne "birds" on red buttonholes, and those who were dismissed from active service tried to get a "normal" paratrooper uniform - with a vest and a beret - and in this form go "for demobilization". For parachute jumps, so-called. "Jump" overalls of the Airborne Forces.
In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DSHV to supply standards and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the hateful and despised "red color".
For a combat situation, you can outline the standard view of a Soviet paratrooper as follows. Underwear incl. and a vest (a T-shirt, with a long sleeve and a double-knit vest, that is, insulated); so-called greenish-olive jumpsuit; a head-hugging cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with a lining), boots with side lacing (or, less often, with belts); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit was worn, consisting of a short jacket and trousers; all khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - the backpack of the paratrooper RD-54. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for magazines for an SVD sniper rifle, cases for carrying shots for RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases for small arms and a cargo container GK-30 were used.
Also, in Ser. In the 80s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed that was structurally reminiscent of the GeDeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS
Speaking about the organizational and staffing structure (OShS) and the equipment of subunits and units of the DShV with weapons and equipment (AME), the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OShS and equipment of weapons and military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied both to the lower divisions and the general structure of the units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSH with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local features; which is connected with the notorious regime of secrecy in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OShS DShV quite problematic and requires a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the ODSHBR and ODSHB.
Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we must limit ourselves to overall structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three paratroopers (airborne standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault (the airborne assault had the original OShS reinforced compared to the airborne assault rifle) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not typical for the Soviet landing units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.
organizational structure 11th, 13th and 21st odshbr for the 1970s:
- brigade management
-
- three air assault companies (SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first-aid post.
- air group(until 1977, since this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of airfield technical support (two companies of communications and RT support, two technical units, a security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 ATGM "Malyutka", later - "Fagot")
- reactive battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- Battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 211 air group consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... an air group consisting of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 1171 air groups consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
- In addition to those indicated in the brigade, there were also the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special department of the KGB with a security platoon, economic structures.
organizational structure 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th And 128th odshbr for 1979-88:
- brigade management
-
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (in armored vehicles) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82-mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- from 1981 - a mortar battery (120-mm M PM-38) was added, and from the beginning. 1983 it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120 mm SAO 2S9 Nona) *
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- reactive battery (122-mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery (MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: management, support.
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Fagot)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and economic company (from 1986 - )
- platoon of radiochemical reconnaissance, and since 1984, in part of the brigades - a company of radiochemical and biological protection
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- * Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatr in the dshb.
- ** The anti-aircraft division was in the majority of the odshbr since 1983. For some time, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" was also in the 35th guards odshbr.
Total population the brigade deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.
Some brigades had a structure different from the one presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratroopers (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three airborne assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one paratrooper (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization, moreover, changing over time.
organizational structure 11th, 13th and 21st odshbr for 1979-88:
- brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate air assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82-mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122-mm G D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain gun battery (76-mm GP 2A2 arr. 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and economic company
- radiochemical reconnaissance platoon
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- * Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 329th Helicopter Regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (at the beginning of 1988 it was withdrawn from the brigade).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 325 helicopter regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
- For some time there were no ZRVs in the battalions - the ZROs were part of the DSHR.
- The 802nd (1st) odshb 21 odshbr had a different organization from the standard.
organizational structure odshp differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: the 1st airborne (foot) and 2nd airborne assault (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the regimental units. The total number of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.
organizational structure odshb in the European theater of operations and the Far East theater of operations, it was generally similar to the OShS of the infantry brigade, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault (on BMD) and a platoon (either from BMD or UAZ-469), and in the mortar battery the number of barrels increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in wartime states reached 650-670 people.
In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began, which were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time when the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.
organizational structure 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 40th, 56th Guards, 83rd ovdbr for 1990-91:
- brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) airborne (foot) battalions:
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3 / Igla), communications, support, first-aid post.
- howitzer artillery battalion:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm G D-30)
- platoons: management, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Fagot")
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- radiochemical biological protection company
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
organizational structure 224 CA for 1990-91:
- brigade management
- 1st Airborne Training Battalion:
- three parachute training companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd Airborne Training Battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- medical training company
- communications training company
- training artillery battalion:
- training howitzer battery (122-mm G D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- a company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communications company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- paratrooper platoon
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM
Domestic DShV had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.
Massively formed in 1979 "second wave" DShN consisted only of the ground component - i.e. unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. This situation can be explained by several theses.
Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they should be included in their composition for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts for use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the right desire to give helicopter forces to each association, in fact, led to the dispersion of helicopters over very numerous formations in view of the overall immensity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to force the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.
Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the prevailing doctrine at the moment. As mentioned above, the "volumizers" who advocated the creation of a rise in the air of part of the ground forces, and therefore a sharp increase in the number of air vehicles needed for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was a consequence of rather objective prerequisites, the objective course of development of the country's Armed Forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.
Third, the very fact of combining the air and ground components in a tactical formation caused, apparently, many military leaders objections - and not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, "attached" exclusively to ensuring the actions of the airborne troops. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by military aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the DSHO / DShD?
Finally, fourthly, as it is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient in order, like the Americans, to equip all the formations with which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to be a lot of confusion here. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the authors' calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in the disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 machines that have exhausted their resources be disabled, but then where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.
So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with a focal (non-linear) nature of hostilities, due to the lack of an aviation component that imparts maneuverability in their composition, sharply reduced their potential, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of the current situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (DShCh from the SV or Airborne Forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and, at the same time, all interested departments "keep their own sheep."
Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for DShV. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The grouping consists of one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one detachment. air assault brigade (3rd battalion) and three det. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks characteristic of airborne assaults in the course of it show that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne brigade as an ATIA and eight to ten TakVD as part of an airborne assault brigade and reinforced small and medium armored personnel carriers.
The average allocation rates for troop-carrying helicopters are: ATS - up to four regimental sorties (p / a) rebvp *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p / in otbvp; reinforced SSB - one p / a bvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a detachment of escort combat helicopters is needed.
Estimated composition: otbvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; obvp - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.
* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on armored vehicles in the odshbr sharply increased the required outfit of helicopters for transportation, and especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport ok. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb by Mi-6A helicopters.
It would be superfluous to prove that landing three flights, let alone four, of the ATMO is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer by no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without the withdrawal of transport and combat helicopters from the air force for the period of its operations (total for 1-2 p / a), i.e., they will have to be left without Mi-8T / MT.
The duration of the disembarkation of the ATC in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of helicopters, only a day later, one can count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense units remain without the Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then practically all the air defense forces are left without troop-carrying helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the recovery time of the combat capability of the odshbr, the re-landing of the airborne division is practically not feasible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the special air defense unit / us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving tasks not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TakVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force for the landing of the DShV - mainly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, the dshb on the BTT had to independently follow to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality
A certain problem was the suitability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family for air assault operations and, more broadly, for airborne landing in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.
The overall picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.
| Number | Transformations | |
| 11 odshbr | Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by 1 Aug. 1990 transferred to the states air-dec. brigades. |
| 13 odshbr | Magdagachi city (Amur region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. |
| 21 odshbr | Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) | |
| 23 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | Cottbus (GDR)** | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 36 odshbr | village Garbolovo (Leningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 37 odshbr | Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | Brest (Belarus) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 39 odshbr | Khyriv (Ukraine) | In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Training Center. |
| 40 odshbr | With. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the state air-dec. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev. |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | settlement Azadbash (district, Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** | In the winter of 1989, it was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 57 odshbr | town Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) | Transferred to s. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989. |
| 58 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | Disbanded in December 1989. |
| 83 odshbr | Bialogya RD (Poland) | Transferred to the city of Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990, transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 128 odshbr | Stavropol (Stavropol AK) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 130 odshbr | Abakan (Khakas Autonomous Okrug) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 1318 slut | Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus) | Disbanded in August 1989. |
| 1319 slut | Kyakhta (Chita region) | Disbanded in March 1988. |
With individual battalions, they acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.
| Number | Point of permanent deployment at the beginning of transformations | Transformations |
| 139 odshb | Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) | |
| 145 odshb | settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 899 odshb | Burg (GDR) | In 1989 he was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991. |
| 900 odshb | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) | Withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded. |
| 901 odshb | in the district of n.p. Riechki (Czechoslovakia) | In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. In 1991, disbandment began, but soon the battalion was redeployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (the city of Gudauta). |
| 902 odshb | Kecskemét (Hungary) | In 1989 he was transferred to Grodno (Belarus). |
| 903 odshb | Grodno (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 904 dshb | Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 905 odshb | Bendery (Moldova) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 906 dshb | settlement Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 907 dshb | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 908 dshb | town Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1011 slut | Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1044 slut | Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück) | Translated in 1989 in Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1156 slut | Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1179 slut | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1151 slut | Polotsk (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1185 slut | Ravensbrück (GDR) | Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1604 slut | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) | Disbanded no later than 1989 |
Notes:
* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply.
Abbreviations and abbreviations
- VDV - airborne troops
- SW - ground troops
- SA - Soviet Army
- DShV (DShCh, DShF) - air assault troops (units, formations)
- DShD - here, air assault operations
- DShO - here, air assault operation.
- VDO - airborne operation.
- TakVD - tactical airborne assault.
- DIA (AA) - SV aviation (army aviation)
- AVG - air group
- FA - front-line aviation (fighters, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft)
- MFA - rocket troops and artillery
- vdd - airborne division (avdd - training airborne division)
- odshbr - a separate airborne assault brigade
- odshb - a separate airborne assault battalion
- odshp - separate air assault regiment
- ovdbr - a separate airborne brigade
- ovshbr - a separate air assault brigade
- guards – guard
- minbatr, minv - mortar battery, platoon
- ptbatr, ptv - anti-tank battery, platoon
- VO - military district
- GV - group of troops
- OA and TA - combined arms (tank) army
- G - howitzer
- P - gun (GP - mountain gun)
- M - mortar
- ATGM - anti-tank missile system
- RPG - hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher
- SPG - mounted anti-tank grenade launcher
- AGS - easel automatic grenade launcher
- RKhBZ - radio-chemical-biological protection
- RHR - radio-chemical intelligence
Dnepropetrovsk
December 2003 - July 2004,
additions and changes - as of February 2005.
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Oleg KOVSHAR
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