Treaties on the reduction of nuclear weapons. USA and Russia - history of nuclear disarmament

Over the past 50 years, the central link of Russian-American interaction has been relations in the military-strategic field and in the area directly related to it international control over weapons, primarily nuclear ones. It seems that from now on bilateral, and therefore multilateral, control over nuclear weapons is becoming a historical monument.

Today the United States does not intend to tie its hands with any agreements on issues of arms limitation and reduction.

There are noticeable changes in US military policy for reasons deeper than the need to combat transnational terrorism. The START II and CTBT (on nuclear testing) treaties, which they did not ratify, have long been forgotten. Washington announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon budget has been increased sharply (by almost $100 billion). A new nuclear doctrine has been adopted, providing for the modernization of strategic offensive weapons, the creation of low-yield penetrating nuclear warheads that can be used in combination with high-precision conventional weapons, as well as the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

In addition to the political component - the continuation of the US line of global military-political dominance in the 21st century - this course also has technological and economic dimensions related to the interests of American military-industrial corporations, as well as the intention of the American leadership through massive financial injections into large military-technological programs ensure an increase in the scientific and technical level of American industry.

According to a number of our experts, changes military policy Washington does not pose an immediate threat to national security Russia, at least for the next 10-15 years, until the Americans actually deploy a strategic missile defense system. However, these changes, primarily the termination of the ABM Treaty, call into question the international arms control regime, may cause a new round of the arms race, and give additional impetus to the process of proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles.

Russia's tactical line regarding US actions appears to have been correct: the Russian leadership did not panic, did not take the path of rhetorical threats, and did not declare a desire to compete with the United States in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, it is also obvious that the steps taken by the Americans are considered strategic and therefore require us to make strategic decisions regarding our own nuclear policy.

Important in determining our future line, it seems, are the following factors.

Despite the significant improvement in the international situation and the minimization of the likelihood of major wars and military conflicts between leading states, there has not been a dramatic decrease in the role of nuclear weapons in their policies. On the contrary, September’s unprecedented terrorist attacks and changing threat priorities are leading, judging by the new US nuclear doctrine, to lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons with the emergence of the possibility of poorly controlled escalation. This is also facilitated by the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as increasing regional instability.

Whatever direction the political relations between Moscow and Washington develop, as long as nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals, the military departments will be forced to develop plans for their use against each other, at least “for extreme case».

Features of the period after graduation cold war lies in the unpredictability of the development of the military-political situation in the world. In this situation, the United States continues to modernize its nuclear forces and maintains the ability to rapidly increase them; At the same time, the question of concluding new legally binding and verifiable agreements with Russia on irreversible reductions in strategic offensive arms continues to remain open.

The technological backlog accumulated in the United States and the results of full-scale tests of individual missile defense components indicate the possibility, already in the medium term, of deploying a fully operational limited anti-missile system, the density of which can be constantly increased in the future.

Based on this, Russia has no choice but to remain a powerful nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The current plans for the development of Russian strategic nuclear forces, on the one hand, were designed for the entry into force of the START-2 Treaty and the preservation of the ABM Treaty, and on the other hand, were aimed at their transformation into a semblance of the American “triad” with an increase in the contribution of naval and aviation components to the detriment of the ground group of ICBMs.

In the new strategic situation created by the United States, it becomes necessary to urgently revise our plans in the field of strategic nuclear forces in the direction of maximizing the service life of the ground-based group of ICBMs with MIRVs; maintaining the planned combat strength of the naval part of the “triad”, as well as the aviation component, capable of solving both nuclear and non-nuclear tasks. Neither from a military nor from an economic point of view would it be justified to preserve the old plans developed for a qualitatively different situation. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

A nuclear balance with the United States over a relatively wide range of total warheads and combat capabilities (we are not talking about an unrealistic restoration of parity) would continue to ensure a special strategic relationship with the United States and a politically significant role for Russia in the world. At the same time, the US interest in continuing the dialogue on offensive and defensive weapons, across the entire complex of political and economic relations, would be maintained. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

Diplomatically, everything possible must be done to preserve the negotiated arms control regime, including the task of concluding a new START treaty with the United States.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the United States will most likely not agree to a full-scale agreement providing for irreversible and controlled reductions in strategic arms, which the Russian side initially insisted on. In addition, despite previously repeatedly given assurances that the American missile defense system being developed will be limited (capable of intercepting only a few dozen warheads), Washington is clearly not yet inclined to record such restrictions. If behind this are US plans for the active use of space systems, then it becomes all the more obvious that the future American missile defense system could potentially threaten Russia as well.

The Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SATR), concluded in May 2004 in Moscow, does not satisfy the fundamental requirements for the irreversibility and controllability of reductions and, moreover, does not provide for restrictions on the capabilities of the missile defense system. Essentially, it means that the United States is not actually reducing either strategic delivery vehicles or nuclear warheads for them. By conditionally dividing their strategic offensive forces into operationally deployed and reserve ones, they only transfer part of the currently deployed assets into the operational reserve, thereby increasing the return potential. This means that at any time the Americans can increase their operationally deployed strategic weapons to almost the current level. We, taking into account the characteristics of our strategic offensive weapons, their remaining service life, the collapse of previously existing cooperation among manufacturers and a number of other factors, are forced to actually reduce our strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the economic costs of their liquidation and disposal are quite significant for us.

Under these conditions, the United States, especially taking into account the creation of an anti-missile potential in the near future, will gain absolute strategic dominance in the world, the ability to act without any hesitation from a position of strength in resolving any international issues, including in relation to Russia.

On our part, it is advisable to move towards signing a new agreement that includes the following fundamental elements:

An agreed upon maximum level of warheads (in the range of 1700-2200 units), achieved within 10 years, combined with the freedom to place warheads on carriers and the irreversibility of strategic offensive arms reductions;

Maintaining the control measures established under the START-1 Treaty in a “light” mode;

Fixing the provisions on the limitations of the future missile defense system, which the American side talks about, by establishing a maximum agreed upon number of warheads that such a missile defense system will be able to intercept;

Ban on the deployment of space-based systems;

Ensuring transparency and a strengthened regime of confidence-building measures in the field of strategic weapons.

With this option, Russia would largely retain the independence of its nuclear policy and at the same time seek acceptable restrictions on the development of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

If it is not possible to reach an agreement on this basis, then the Americans could be invited to sign a joint statement on the readiness of the parties to conclude consultations (negotiations) on the issue of strategic weapons in the near future. Such a decision would allow us to more carefully and comprehensively analyze the current situation, including taking into account the long-term consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as well as calculate various options for the development of our strategic nuclear forces in new conditions, not limited by treaty obligations.

At the same time, it is advisable to put forward our deeply thought-out and well-reasoned proposals for cooperation with the United States in the field of missile defense that does not undermine strategic stability, including the joint creation and use of global information systems, as well as for a new generation of confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear weapons - how strategic as well as tactical. The political benefit of such a step for Russia is obvious.

In particular, it would be possible to propose the joint development of a Russian-American space-based information system (now the Americans themselves are working on such a low-orbit system, called SBIRS-Low, which for us is one of the most critical components of the future American missile defense system). This idea of ​​ours can be motivated by the new nature of Russian-American relations, the readiness of the United States for cooperation between our two countries, including in the field of missile defense, the strengthening of trust and the fact that the future missile defense system, according to the US President, will not be directed against Russia. The attitude of the Americans towards our proposal will clearly demonstrate how true the statements of American officials are about the absence of a Russian orientation to the missile defense system being developed in the United States.

At the same time, it would be highly desirable to involve the American leadership in a broader political and strategic dialogue. For these purposes, a proposal could be made on the need to jointly seek ways to minimize the risks emanating from the objectively existing situation of mutual nuclear deterrence.

If the Americans show no interest at all in developing any mutually acceptable agreement that takes into account Russia's security interests, we, in all likelihood, will have no choice but to move on to an independent nuclear policy. In the new situation, Russia could independently determine the quantitative and high-quality composition its nuclear forces, placing the traditional emphasis on ground-based ICBMs, and above all with MIRVs, which will provide it with the ability to guarantee the preservation of the US nuclear deterrent potential in any scenario of the development of the military-political situation. As estimates show, we have economic opportunities for this.

Under these conditions, it is necessary to weigh the advisability of resuming work on means that ensure effective counteraction to the American missile defense system, including various ways both its overcoming and its neutralization. It is also important to outline a set of measures for the active and passive protection of domestic strategic nuclear forces. This is estimated to be the most cost-effective way to counter US missile defense plans. In addition, here we have a solid reserve that would be advisable to claim.

When developing Russia's long-term line in the nuclear field, it seems that we need to proceed from the following obvious provisions:

The previous understanding of strategic stability, based primarily on the nuclear balance of Russia and the United States, is outdated, and in this sense, the ABM Treaty has lost its quality as a “cornerstone” of strategic stability;

The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence, based on the parties' ability to achieve mutually assured destruction, fundamentally contradicts the proclaimed principle of partnership in bilateral relations;

The ABM Treaty is also outdated in the sense that it was an integral part of the strategic relationship between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War era, a kind of instrument for managing the nuclear arms race during a period of acute confrontation between the two superpowers;

Although the emphasis on nuclear deterrence is proclaimed in the military doctrines of the leading countries of the world, it should be clear that nuclear weapons are not weapons of the 21st century: they will inevitably be devalued by the deployment of missile defense systems, high-precision conventional weapons and other latest military technologies. We must be prepared for the fact that the United States will at some point raise the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, at least for propaganda purposes. In this sense, “nuclear greatness” will not be able to provide great power status to anyone after some time. Moreover, those countries that continue to focus on nuclear weapons may find themselves morally defeated over time.

Therefore, the point is that, taking into account these strategic paradigms for the development of world military policy, which are objective in nature and do not depend on the will of certain political figures, to calculate the most optimal nuclear policy of Russia essentially for the transition period - from nuclear to post-nuclear (non-nuclear) ) to the world. Even if such a transition drags on for decades, a meaningful line of behavior in this matter is needed now - at least taking into account the length of the life cycles of modern nuclear weapons systems (from 10 to 30 years or more).

At the same time, it would be possible to invite the Americans to begin a broad political dialogue about transferring the partnership from the declarative phase to the real one. For example, invite them to conclude a new large-scale agreement of a political nature, similar to the “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA” (1972), but meeting new realities, challenges and threats international security and a new partnership level of bilateral relations. (It is clear that the Declaration on the Strategic Framework of Russian-American Relations, adopted in Sochi on April 6, 2008, does not solve this problem.) It would be possible to include in this kind of document a provision on the need to jointly seek a way out of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, confirming previously assumed commitments to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment, in particular, could be concretized by an agreement to begin consultations on ways of a joint and balanced step-by-step movement towards a nuclear-free world and the conditions for maintaining it.

If a substantive dialogue begins in this area, then the mutual concerns of the parties regarding offensive and defensive weapons will fade into the background, if not eliminated altogether. And then the relationship between the parties in the military-strategic field will finally cease to be the dominant feature of bilateral interaction, giving way to cooperation in other areas that are more responsive to the challenges and threats of the 21st century

Reducing the number of nuclear warheads does not improve the security situation in the world. Experts from the International Swedish Peace Research Institute have found that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons has led to a significant increase in the quality of the remaining arsenals. Observers were also concerned about the emergence of a new type of military conflict.

Despite the countries' declared desire for nuclear disarmament, the reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction is happily offset by an increase in their quality.

These findings are contained in an annual report released Monday by the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to the institute's experts, the arsenals of eight countries - the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel - today contain a total of about 19 thousand nuclear weapons, which is about one and a half thousand less compared to 2011.

At the same time, 4.4 thousand nuclear weapons are ready for use, half of which are in a state of high alert.

Quantitative and qualitative parameters of restrictions on strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States in the START-1 and START-3 treaties

Institute analysts see the main reasons for the reduction of nuclear warheads in the steps taken by Russia and the United States within the framework of the START treaty. Let us recall that the treaty provides that each of the parties reduces strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter their total quantities do not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles; 1550 units for warheads on them; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB.

According to official data as of April of this year, Russia had 1,492 deployed nuclear warheads, and Washington had 1,737. According to a certificate published six months ago, Washington had 1,800 operationally deployed warheads, and Moscow had 1,537. Thus, in about six months, Russia destroyed 45 warheads, and the United States - 63. However, the reduction in the number of warheads, SIPRI experts state, only led to the improvement of the remaining arsenals. The five officially recognized nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States, the report notes, are either deploying new nuclear weapons delivery systems or have announced similar programs.

India and Pakistan continue to develop new nuclear weapons delivery systems. According to the Stockholm Institute, the first has from 80 to 110 nuclear warheads, in Pakistan their number can vary from 90 to 110, and about 80 more units are in Israel.

The latter, in particular, as the German media wrote the other day, intends to place nuclear warheads on submarines purchased in Germany.

“Despite the world's renewed interest in disarmament efforts, none of the nuclear-weapon states has yet shown more than a rhetorical willingness to give up their nuclear arsenals,” states one of the report's authors, Shannon Kyle.

However, both Russia and the United States, when signing the START treaty in 2010, did not hide their intentions to modernize their nuclear potential. In particular, this right was assigned to Moscow during the ratification of the document in the State Duma. Moreover, as Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov noted at the time, after the treaty comes into force de facto, Russia will not eliminate a single missile, since the country will not be able to reach the level of warheads specified in the treaty until 2018. installations, we will reach the level specified in the agreement only by 2028. As for warheads, we will reach the level of 1.55 thousand units by 2018. I say again that we will not cut a single unit,” he emphasized.

Another point that SIPRI experts draw attention to in their report is the emergence of a new type of military conflict in general. The experts made this conclusion based on recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Arab Spring, the report notes, demonstrated the growing complexity of armed conflict. “The events of the past year are not isolated when it comes to trends modern conflict. In fact, they echo changes that have taken place during decades of armed conflict. All these changes suggest the emergence of a new type of conflict, which is increasingly complicating international intervention,” explained Neil Melvin, director of the institute’s program on armed conflict, in this regard.

In 1958, in response to the launch of the first artificial satellite On Earth, Americans founded DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) - an advanced defense agency research projects. The main task of the new agency was to maintain primacy in US military technology.

Today, like half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining global technological superiority armed forces USA. DARPA's concerns also include the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, agency specialists began actively preparing for nuclear war. Was project launched on protection against radiation damage, including using techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new treatment methods, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the human body's susceptibility to high doses of radiation. For those who will be treated with latest technologies, chances of survival are high.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) decrease in level negative consequences and prevention of death and the development of cancer complications; c) modeling the effects of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and system-wide levels.

The agency took up the new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a nuclear power plant disaster, or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not arise out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs like Truman, he's on foreign countries on reset. And in general, he constantly talks about reducing nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also his own, American ones.

This peacemaking of his went so far that very influential gentlemen turned to him with a written petition, in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA Director James Woolsey, former US Representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps General Carl Mundy and others. International affairs analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to a certain secret report, the authors of which include individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US Strategic Command (in short, a complete military-secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in the country's arsenal today “far exceeds the quantity necessary to ensure nuclear deterrence,” but in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite sufficient. But a group of influential politicians, who, of course, know this data, still demand that Obama abandon the “rash step.”

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that “the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran” can lead to “catastrophic changes.” And the “American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability,” can restrain the aspirations of Iran and North Korea, and only it, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold established by the New START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States should leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue negotiations with Moscow on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The concerns of eighteen people are based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What “catastrophic changes” can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that the American politicians and military men who signed the letter to their president were afraid of Ahmadinejad’s recent words that Iran is a “nuclear power.” Or are 1,550 warheads not enough to defeat North Korea?

The reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles, which Obama will most likely implement this time, is by no means a “workout” Nobel Prize peace. The US President is faced with the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being resolved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts to military programs and tax increases that are extremely unpopular among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a way to save money: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Broek (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called “automatic reduction”. The Pentagon estimates that by the end of the current fiscal year (September 30) it will have to cut spending by $46 billion. former minister Defense Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses in Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. An entire army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial losses in earnings will amount to $180 million.

When it comes to maintenance, states with large warehouses will suffer, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two major maintenance depots that modernize complex weapons systems, including the Patriot, for example. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communications devices and vehicles. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

There is no up-to-date data on the expected losses of nuclear service contractors. But there is no doubt that there will be such. Obama will look for any reserves in order to reduce budget expenditures.

As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear: America alone is somehow not comfortable reducing atomic weapons. That’s why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a major reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the USA.

Vladimir Kozin (“Red Star”) reminds Regarding information about further reductions in strategic offensive arms, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements on this matter in the next presidential address to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13 american president only indicated Washington’s readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of “nuclear weapons”, without specifying any quantitative parameters. However, the fact remains: reductions are planned. Another thing is in what way and by what types.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on further reduction of strategic offensive arms. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a “lightning strike” at any point the globe..." According to the analyst, the United States is "trying to hide behind various kinds of 'new proposals and ideas' in the field of arms control its far-reaching plans to deploy forward-based weapons in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been created over several decades.”

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel a European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a diversionary maneuver for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. Given the budget sequestration, this is a very topical topic.

It is useless to accuse Americans of deceit or double standards: politics is politics. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”, speaks , that “the idea of ​​freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away.”

“Moreover,” he continues, “if you trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people, like Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four, in a second article published about two years after their first article, were already talking about reducing and Even the destruction of nuclear weapons was a good goal, but it really required increasing the efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding this whole situation perfectly, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - without blinking an eye, announced that they also advocate complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit bloodthirstiness. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

The scientist’s confession is also interesting:

“I once studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended in World War III.”

According to Karaganov, Russians should thank Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates for the current sense of security.

Let's return to the USA. According to the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it has narrowed the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. The strategic document also stated: “... the United States is not prepared to pursue a policy according to which deterrence of a nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.” This indicates the possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations given above.

Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not exclude the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and using them first. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea- and she adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to the adoption of the doctrine of no-first use, writes the American magazine " Foreign policy”, is based on the fact that the enemy can “act dishonestly” and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would the enemy create a nuclear disaster for himself? After all, the threat of assured retaliatory destruction remains a very powerful deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same 2010 doctrine was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. What if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? US President in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation...”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction of nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the “taming” of what was called 3 years ago “the greatest threat to the United States and global security.” The fewer nuclear weapons, the Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely it is that they will fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clean logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is becoming like its artificially cultivated enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of “need” and given the appropriate opportunity, she will arrange an explosion first (we are not necessarily talking about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to the first, albeit “preventive”, nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten the world. Like al-Qaeda.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, Le Figaro offers you an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic weapons? The nuclear deterrence policy of the Cold War led to a frantic arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the United States and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: The first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The agreement limited the number ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addition to the 1974 treaty reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the contract allowed the parties to terminate the contract unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 to begin deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The date for the final withdrawal of the United States from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This “historic” agreement was especially intended to help restore the balance of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First and foremost, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the capability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “Being able to arrange approximately 27 ends of the world - I don’t know the exact number - gives them a sufficient sense of security and allows them to spare us many additional methods of destruction. For this we have their kind hearts to thank.”

Treaty 2: Easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of the SALT III negotiations. .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the treaty was signed, Jimmy Carter said in a speech: “These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if not limited, general rules and restrictions can only lead to disaster.” At the same time, the American president clarified that “this agreement does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power.” But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On December 8, 1987, in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the permanent Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in May 1988. This “historic” treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of weapons. We were talking about medium- and short-range missiles with a range from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented 3 to 4% of the total arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, within three years from the moment it came into force, all medium and short-range missiles were to be destroyed. The agreement also provided for procedures for mutual “on-site” inspections.

At the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: “For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of arms reduction.” Both presidents specifically pushed for a reduction of 50% of their strategic arsenals. They were guided by the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START I: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement marked the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, countries were to reduce the number of the most dangerous species weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

The number of warheads was supposed to be reduced to 7 thousand for the USSR and 9 thousand for the USA. A privileged position in the new arsenal was given to bombers: the number of bombs was supposed to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the USA and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures, and it finally came into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the “infrastructure of fear.”

New START: radical cuts

Context

The end of the INF Treaty?

Defense24 02/16/2017

INF Treaty dead?

The National Interest 03/11/2017

START-3 and Russia's nuclear push

The Washington Times 10/22/2015

The United States will discuss nuclear disarmament with Russia

Russian service of the Voice of America 02.02.2013 On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START-2 treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it called for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the agreement entered into force in 2003, American stocks were supposed to decrease from 9 thousand 986 warheads to 3.5 thousand, and Russian ones - from 10 thousand 237 to 3 thousand 027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .

The contract also included one more important point: Elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia abandoned the precision-guided weapons that formed the basis of its deterrent, while the United States removed half of its submarine-mounted missiles (virtually undetectable). New START was ratified by the United States in 1996 and Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw it as a source of hope, and George W. Bush considered it a symbol of “the end of the Cold War” and “a better future free from fear for our parents and children.” Be that as it may, the reality remains less idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times over.

SNP: a point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in the Kremlin. The talk was about reducing arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain verification measures. Its role from the point of view of the parties’ image was more important than its content: this was not the first time that reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: not having the necessary economic capabilities, Russia abandoned its claims to superpower status. In addition, the treaty opened the door to " new era" because it was accompanied by a statement about a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the agreement allows one to get rid of the “legacy of the Cold War” and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protecting national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after the expiration of START I in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was established for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: a reduction in nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers - to 700 units.

The agreement also calls for a review of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after it enters into force. It is worth noting here that the established levels are not too different from those specified in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and strategic bombs. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. A few days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump said he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

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