What is good. Material good: definition, examples

GOOD

Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. editors: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. 1983 .

GOOD

something that has value. The good is a prerequisite for moral values. Thus, for example, honesty (the moral value of the individual) assumes that there are goods (and not just things) that must be respected as the possession of others; love for neighbor presupposes such a value of a good as a gift, etc. to another, the value of a true statement. For one who is faithful, fidelity is a moral value; for one who is faithful, fidelity is a value of good.

Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .

GOOD

GOOD (Greek αγαυόν, lat. bonum) - the state and perfection of realized being; leading concept Mediterranean-European (Judeo-Christian) culture, one of the names of the divine principle traditionally accepted in it. If the synonymous concept of good is dominated by absolute moral duty and volitional choice, then the concept of good is more ontological. The goodness of the Creator is a feature of the monotheistic attitude; in archaism and polytheism it is not self-evident. In the bowels of European culture, the threat of an unkind boss of being makes itself felt every now and then (and others, the original systems of Leonardo da Vinci and Nietzsche, Descartes' deceitful god, etc.). Just as from the first lines of the Bible (“and God saw that it was good”), the dominant of the good asserts itself in the fight against suspicious distrust of the creator, which manifests itself in a residual form, for example. in the episode with the Tower of Babel, where God shows something like envy, she is constantly busy refuting the myth with its images of tyrant gods; Plato demands to “adopt a law” that prescribes to believe that “God is not everything, but only good” (“The State” II 380s; VI-VII; “Timaeus” 29a).

The Eleatics (cf. Diog. L., II 106) outlined the identity of good-deity-mind. In the circle of these ideas, the medieval about the good moved, highlighting its various aspects. The Greek invested in the concept of the good mystical immersion in the enlightened essence of things as in an environment most dear and close to a human being; the selfless, “useless” turned out to be the most enduring, expensive and essentially enriching good. In Plato, the good allocates its own to everything and leads everything by itself as a light that illuminates the truth of being, elusive in its source and therefore requiring a relentless utmost effort from a person in order to “pull himself up” to the “idea of ​​the good” (“The State” 508bc, 517bc, 534bc). Aristotle emphasized in the good a teleological optimal status, in which everything strives for fulfillment. In Neoplatonism, the good, while retaining its practical and ethical meaning, becomes the main name for the transcendent source of being (Plotinus, "Enneads" VI 9, 3). The Christian assimilates the Platonic philosophy of the good, which becomes the highest attribute of the deity. Boethius synthesizes the Platonic-Aristotelian idea as a “unity”, that is, a complete wholeness in the sense of a goal towards which everything is drawn. Thomas Aquinas returns to the old identity of goodness and being in the thesis that God, having no need for anything, could not create, but created the world out of pure desire (“The sum against the pagans.” I 74; II 31). For all that, God in his incomprehensible essence is immeasurably higher than good (he is already “super good” by Plotinus). This apophatic approach will be inherited by the new European philosophy and will make it impossible to return the good to the place of the supreme principle. In the late scholasticism of F. Suarez there is a “correspondence of beings to themselves” (“Metaphysics of Search” Χ 1, 12; 3, 10). Justifying the modern European in its reliance on a self-certifying being, Descartes varies the classical theme: since God is good, he will not allow our thought to be a victim of constant deception. In Spinoza's theses on the highest good of knowledge of God (“Ethics” IV 28), in the optimality of our world and in Leibniz's pre-established harmony, in Kant's definition (“the object of willing rational finite beings” - “Critique of Practical Reason” 12.2), in the concept the good as a predicate of being in Schelling's aspects of the classical doctrine of the good are visible. But in general, since the 17th century. the elevation of the activist principle of the (divine) will to the rank of the leader, the moralism of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation derive the good from among the principles of being and relativize it. Of the three balanced and mutually reversible concepts - good, unity, being - only the last is retained. Since being began to be determined by (free) will directly (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche) or in the form of subjectivity (Fichte, Hegel, Husserl), the good began to be interpreted as assumptions from the 19th century. value has taken its place.

V. V. Bibikhin

In the Arab-Muslim philosophy, two main lines of understanding of good and evil can be distinguished: conventional and substantial. The first is associated primarily with Kalam, the second is mainly associated with Arabic-speaking peripatetism, partly with Ismailism and Ishrakism. In Sufism, the opposition of these two lines is removed in accordance with the Sufi principle of “bewildered” reasoning.

Islamic doctrine adheres to the thesis “all good (khair) and evil (sharr) in the fate of people is from God”: in accordance with the principle of strict monotheism, God is considered the only source of good and evil. At the same time, in the authoritative sources of Islam (the Qur'an and the Sunnah), references to the good significantly prevail over the mention of evil. The blessing of the life below and the afterlife is not opposed in Islamic dogma, but rather is harmonized and associated exclusively with the acceptance or rejection of the religious Law. The good is not meant metaphysical, but the right people and everything that serves him. In addition, the concept of "adab" (decency) is associated with the category of good in Islamic culture, which is interpreted, in particular, as the presence of good traits in character and behavior.

In kalam, the concept of good is absolutized. Many even called the curse of God on the unbelievers and the torments of the afterlife prepared for them as a blessing, since this keeps them from disobedience. In a more moderate interpretation, such actions were qualified not as a blessing, but as “the most appropriate” (al-aslah). Almost all Mutazilites believed that the evil created by God, as well as bad things (sayyi "at, for example,) are called so allegorically, and not in the literal sense. According to al-" Allaf, "benefit" (manfa "a) was the basis of the divine This thesis is based on the belief that, which does not bring benefit and does not eliminate harm (darar), is vain ("abs"), and therefore meaningless. This position was generally shared by classical Arab thought and gave a utilitarian-egoistic interpretation of the goals of human action. All Mu'tazilites believed that everything in the world was created only for the benefit of people or for their edification, and most denied the creation of something that would not be perceived by people. The world created by God is the best possible, and what people consider "evil" is actually the most "suitable" (gardens) for them. When discussing whether a “good deed” (hasana) prescribed or encouraged by the Law is such in itself or by virtue of divine injunction, the Mu'tazilites expressed both of these opinions, and some divided deeds into these two.

In Arabic-speaking peripatetism, the substantial interpretation of the good was developed under the direct influence of Neoplatonism. The First Principle, or the First Cause, is understood as a pure good (khair mutlak mahd), endowing everything else with good, which is good only in relation to it, without itself receiving it from anyone. Accordingly, the good (khair, khairiya) can be independent (zatiyy) or acquired (mustafad). Because the good is identified with existence, or at least directly connected with it. The First Cause, endowing the lower with existence, endows it with goodness. The intrinsic nature of all but the absolute existence of the First Cause is the nature of "possibility" (imkan), not necessity. This nature is regarded as the source of evil. Evil, therefore, is understood as the absence of good, and endowing with existence renounces the nature of evil. The universe is an absolutely ordered hierarchy of levels of degradation of the good, in which the higher (aliya) and noble (sharif) surpasses the lower (asfal) and despicable .. (hasis) A person can achieve knowledge of the absolute good, thereby reaching his full perfection (Ibn Sta) Accordingly, “happiness” (sa "ada) is understood as an absolute good, and everything that serves to acquire it is also considered a good, although not selfish, but because of its “usefulness" (naf") for achieving good. Actually, the ethical interpretation of good and evil is connected with the concept of will: “intentionally done good” (khair iradiy) is considered “good” (jamil), and “intentionally done evil” (sharr iradiy) is considered a “bad” (kabyh) act (al-Farabi ).

In Ismailism, neither God, who is completely devoid of attributes, nor the First Reason, whose attributes do not include good, is described as a blessing. At the same time, assimilation to the principles of the universe, and with them, and here they rely on the only happiness of man, but the path to it is understood not as purely contemplative, but as without fail two principles, practical and theoretical.

According to al-Suharvardi, there is good in the world, and it is much more than evil. God is a generous source of good, evil arises as a result of the imperfection of the lower levels of being. This Neo-Platonic is expressed in terms of the emergence and growth of the “dark aspect”, characteristic of the Ishraqist metaphysics of light and darkness.

In the philosophical texts of Sufism, two significantly different understandings of good and evil are presented: as independent concepts that are fundamentally different from each other (the concept of absolute good, which asserts that in truth everything is good, since everything is in truth God, while the concept of evil is conventional, as well as and the corresponding concept of relative good), and as concepts that cannot be divided so that each of them does not pass into its own, while remaining itself and assuming a return to itself. The first takes into account the norms of everyday morality, the second is focused on the fundamental provisions of the Sufi doctrine of the instantaneously renewing embodiment of eternal being as a world, which means that the bad is done by a person also by the will of God, and therefore is good.

A. V. Smirnov

The concept of good should be distinguished from the concept of value, for this purpose, along with axiology, it seems appropriate to introduce “agatology” (from the Greek uyœ&ov- “good” and λόγος- “teaching”). As a value, something is first of all experienced by the heart, and as a good is recognized by the mind; value means, first of all, something inherently personal, while good means something universally recognized that seeks to appropriate; value therefore, in any attempt to share it with someone, remains fundamentally "subjective", while the good, with any degree of its individualized interiorization, is relatively "objective". There can be a conflict between values ​​and goods, but there can be (and most often happens) a conflict: something can be recognized by the mind as a good, but not become a treasure for the heart (which, as you know, “you can’t order”) and, conversely, to be such for the heart and not stand before the court of "practical reason" (anxiety). Value and good are realized in different ways in goal-setting, which in the second case is imperative.

If the concept of the good arises almost from the first steps of philosophical discourse and, starting from antiquity, becomes essentially the theoretical foundation of ethics (which already followed from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, where the teachings about the good and virtues were conceived approximately as teachings about ends and means), and well as soteriology (the doctrine of salvation as the realization of the highest good in the afterlife), then the new European doctrine of value - - arises only in the middle of the 19th century.

Modern concepts of the good are connected with the research of J. E. Moore (who studied, in particular, the “philosophical grammar” of the adjective “good” and the noun “good”) and the phenomenological school of M. Scheler (who introduced the term Güterethik- “ethics of the good”), N. Hartmann and G. Reiner. In discussions in the 20th century (mainly in the English-language philosophical) the following problems were posed: 1) what does the concept of “good” (as well as the adjective “good”) mean, the objective of certain objects or only their subjective assessment? 2) Is it possible to attribute the predicates “good” and “bad” to all objects, and how are they realized in this mode of their being? 3) what does the concept of the highest good (summum bonum) mean, what are its criteria and relation to “ordinary goods”? 4) how they relate to each other various varieties“goods” (hedonic, utilitarian, spiritual, etc.) and what is the place among them of ethical good – is it derived from others or autonomous? 5) is the construction of a hierarchy of goods relevant at the present time (which was relevant for antiquity and the Middle Ages)?

Lit.: Koss W. D. The Right and the Good. Oxf., 1930; EvingA. C. The Definition of Good. N.Y. 1947; Nishida To A Study of Good. Tokyo, 1960; Ferber R. Platos Idea des Guten, St. Augustin. 1984.

V. K. Shokhin

New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .

GOOD (Greek αγαθ?ν, Latin bonum), in philosophy - the ultimate object of aspiration, as well as everything contributing to its achievement; in theology, one of the names of God. In everyday speech, the words "good", "good", "good" are used both in the absolute and in the relative sense. A thing can be called "good" in itself, without regard to anything else, if it is fully what it can be. Existing is understood in this case as becoming something, and its “goodness” as the realization of all the possibilities inherent in it. With this word usage, “good” comes close in meaning to “perfect”. In another sense, a thing can be called "good" if it is good for something else. Thus, suffering, though not a good in itself, may be recognized as such because of its ability to serve to reveal character. Wealth and other so-called material goods are considered goods, since they are recognized as capable of providing a person with a happy life. With this word usage, “good” is equated with “useful”, that is, contributing to the successful achievement of the goal. This leads to a hierarchization of the concept of good: something is recognized as good because it is a means to achieve a certain goal, the goal is considered good because it serves an even higher goal, and so on. As a result, a chain of goods is built, each of which is such thanks to a higher member, and all of them together depend in their existence on some higher, or absolute, good, which is thought to be desirable for its own sake and, therefore, crowns the entire hierarchy.

IN ancient philosophy the question of the good in an irrelevant sense was first raised by Plato, for whom to understand this or that thing meant to clarify its idea, which acts in relation to the thing itself as the reason for its existence and cognition. According to this approach, any thing can be recognized as good only to the extent that the good is attached to the idea. The knowledge of this idea is the most important and necessary of knowledge, but it is as difficult to attain as it is to see the Sun, since, unlike other ideas, the good is not an intelligible object, but rather is the source of the knowability of ideas. Just as the eye sees sensible things in the light of the sun, so the mind sees ideas in the light of the idea of ​​the good. Developing an analogy with the Sun, Plato argues that the idea of ​​good is not only the beginning of knowledge, but also the beginning of the being of things, since “to be” for him means to be something definite, meaningful. As a source of being and cognition, the good necessarily turns out to be beyond both, so that in a certain sense it is unknowable and does not exist: “the good itself is not being, it is beyond being, surpassing it in seniority and strength” (“State ", VI, 509b). This allows Plato to identify the good with the One, since unity is also a necessary condition for the existence of beings and also, taken by itself, cannot be considered as existing. Neoplatonists (Plotinus, Proclus), combining the development of the concept of good in the "State" with the dialectical consideration of the one and many in the Platonic dialogue "Parmenides", developed an independent science of the good as a single - genology.

Although Aristotle limits the consideration of the good to the framework of practical philosophy (ethics and politics), nevertheless, the good is central to his whole teaching as a whole, including physics and metaphysics. Aristotle, unlike Plato, refuses to reduce all good and good things to one single idea, believing that the good is defined differently in different categories and “has as many meanings as being” (“Nicomachean Ethics”, I, 4, 1096a 20). So, in the category of essence, God or Mind is called good, in the category of quality - virtues, in the category of quantity - measure, in the category of time - an opportune moment, and so on. And, since knowledge of the good itself is impossible, Aristotle finds out what the highest good of man is. If this is a goal chosen by itself, then happiness as a life that is self-sufficient and does not need anything is usually considered such a goal. Aristotle defines happiness as “the activity of the soul in accordance with ... the best and most perfect virtue” (ibid., I, 6, 1098a 16-18), which is the virtue of the mind - wisdom; therefore, the highest good of man is contemplation and thinking. However, thinking is not only the highest, but also the divine part of the human soul, therefore, life and activity consistent with it will be not so much human as divine. Hence, the ultimate goal of man, and therefore of human society as a whole, is the achievement of a life similar to God. But the same goal is pursued, according to Aristotle, by the cosmos as a whole, since it is set in motion by the divine Mind, which acts as an object of desire and goal, that is, as a blessing.

The concept of the good in the Christian era continues to retain its ontological meaning inherited from antiquity. It is still identified with being and perfection, understood as the complete realization by a thing of its nature. According to Augustine and Boethius, being is good; according to Boethius, all things are good insofar as they exist, but are not, however, good in their essence and their accidents. According to medieval Latin theologians, every thing is good because it is perfect, and the perfection of any thing is its goodness (Thomas Aquinas, "The Sum of Theology", 5, 1-5). Hence the well-known medieval formula "being and the good are reversible" (ens et bonum convertuntur). However, now the perfection of a thing is conceived in relation to God the Creator, who represents the highest perfection, and hence the highest good. In the Bible, the goodness of created being is affirmed by virtue of its correspondence to the Creator's plan: “And God saw everything that He had created, and, behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Man, as one of God's creations, is good, since his nature fully corresponds to his purpose, which consists in knowing God and direct communication with Him. However, as a result of the fall, the nature of man, and with it the nature of the whole world, was distorted, so that neither man nor any created thing is already able to fulfill its destiny on its own and need help from above for this: without divine help - grace , restoring nature in accordance with its original design, neither man nor the world can achieve the ultimate goal of their existence.

Already in medieval philosophy, a single concept of the good reveals a tendency to dismemberment: the benefits are divided into objective and subjective, into those of utilitarian significance and desirable in themselves, and the objective ones are divided into the good of the divine and the good of created things, and the subjective - into spiritual, mental and material. In modern times, each of these private goods begins to claim the role of a good as such, as a result of which this concept gradually loses its universal ontological status, becoming partly a term of ethics, understood as a special discipline, partly becoming the property of everyday and poetic speech. The loss of the good of its former meaning leads to the fact that in its place is the concept of value borrowed from the economic lexicon (see Axiology). Value is a good, devoid of connection with being, not only not superexistent, as in Platonism and traditional theology, but also practically bearing and only attributed to being by the subject. The transformation of good into value can be traced back to R. Descartes, who, in contrast to the scholastic tradition, no longer embeds man in the created cosmos as its pinnacle and crown of creation, but opposes him to nature as a thinking substance - an extended substance. Faced with being reduced to pure objectivity, a person is forced to independently fill it with meaning and content in order to be able to somehow navigate in this alien and in no way connected with it world. In the role of this content introduced from the outside into being, endowing with meaning that which as such does not possess it, values ​​also act.

If the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries (the good of Spinoza, T. Hobbes, G. W. Leibniz, D. Hume) still actively discussed the question of whether the good is an objective property of a being or a person’s subjective attitude towards it, then already I. Kant this concept is decisively transferred inside the subject, however, the subject is transcendental, and not empirical: “It is impossible to imagine anything either in the world or even beyond its borders that, without restrictions, could be considered as good, with the exception of one good will” ( "Basic Ideas for the Metaphysics of Morals", I). Thus limited by the sphere of human activity, the good becomes a category of morality and is finally expelled from the surrounding world. According to G. W. F. Hegel, the world is conceived as being outside of me, abandoned by God and waiting “for me to bring purpose and goodness into it.” Subsequently, when a person begins to be regarded as a product of natural evolution, and traditional morality as a manifestation of the “will to power” (F. Nietzsche), the principle of the autonomy of ethics postulated by Kant leads to the fact that the good either receives a naturalistic interpretation, as, for example, in Darwinism , where he recognizes self-preservation and evolutionary prosperity of man as a species, or is at the mercy of individual arbitrariness, which, at its own request, establishes, overestimates and subverts the benefits for themselves and others.

Hegel's attempt to find a replacement for the old metaphysical coordinate system had important consequences for the concept of the good, which ultimately led to the transformation of the human good into a public good. For Hegel world history is the history of the development of the absolute Spirit, the ultimate goal of which, identified with the highest good, is the full and final awareness of the Spirit of itself in the freedom of absolute knowledge. However, an individual living in a particular historical era, as a rule, is not aware of this goal and does not make it the object of his aspirations. What will be considered good for him is what his era prescribes for him at a given historical moment, in other words, compliance with the spirit of the times. Thus, the traditional practical philosophy, aimed at the benefit of each individual, is absorbed in Hegel by the speculative philosophy of history. Hegelian historicism, which found its continuation in Marxism and positivism, had a huge impact on mass consciousness (the identification of "good" with "progressive" and the like). And since historical science as such cannot answer the question which of the many proposed interpretations of the goal of the world-historical process is correct, the choice of this interpretation is at the mercy of the private interests of various individuals or groups.

Lit.: Ewing A. S. The definition of the Good. N.Y., 1948; Kuhn H. Das Sein und das Gute. Munch., 1962.

In economic theory, the concept of "material good" is poorly developed. It is believed to be clear. In addition, there is an approximate list of benefits, so scientists think little about this. At the same time, the phenomenon has a number of features that are worth dwelling on.

The concept of good

Even the ancient Greek philosophers began to think about what is good for a person. It has always been perceived as something positive for the individual, bringing him pleasure and comfort. But for a long time there was no consensus about what it could be. For Socrates, it was the ability to think, the human mind. An individual can reason and form correct opinions - this is his main goal, value, purpose.

Plato believed that the good is a cross between rationality and pleasure. In his opinion, the concept cannot be reduced to either one or the other. The good is something mixed, elusive. Aristotle comes to the conclusion that there is no single good for all. He closely links the concept with morality, arguing that only the correspondence of pleasure with ethical principles can be good. That's why leading role in the creation of benefits for man assigned to the state. From here came two traditions to consider them a model of virtue or a source of pleasure.

Indian philosophy singled out four main benefits for a person: pleasure, virtue, benefit and liberation from suffering. At the same time, its component is the presence of a certain benefit from a thing or event. Later, material wealth began to be correlated and even identified with the concept of God. And only the emergence of economic theories translates reflections on the good into a practical area. Under them in the very broad sense something that satisfies the requirements and meets the interests of a person.

properties of goods

In order for a material good to become such, it must meet certain conditions and have the following properties:

• the good must be objective, that is, fixed in some material carrier;
• it is universal, as it has significance for many or all people;
• the good must have social significance;
• it is abstract and intelligible, as it reflects in the minds of man and society a certain concrete form, as a result of production and social relations.

At the same time, goods have the main property - this is utility. That is, they should bring real benefits to people. This is where their value lies.

The good and the needs of man

In order for a good to be recognized as such, several conditions must be met:

• it must meet the needs of the person;
• the good must have objective properties and characteristics that allow it to be useful, that is, to be able to improve the life of society;
• a person must understand that the good can satisfy his certain requirements and needs;
• a good person can dispose of it at his own discretion, that is, choose the time and method of satisfying needs.

To understand the essence of goods, you need to remember what needs are. They are understood as internal incentives that are implemented in activities. The need begins with the awareness of need, which is associated with a feeling of lack of something. It creates discomfort of varying degrees of intensity, an unpleasant feeling of lack of something. Makes you take some action, look for a way to satisfy the need.

A person is simultaneously attacked by several needs and he ranks them, choosing the most relevant ones to satisfy first. Traditionally, biological or organic needs are distinguished: in food, sleep, reproduction. There are also social needs: the need to belong to a group, the desire for respect, interaction with other people, the achievement of a certain status. As for spiritual needs, these requirements correspond to the highest order. These include cognitive need, the need for self-affirmation and self-realization, the search for the meaning of existence.

Man is constantly busy satisfying his needs. This process leads to the desired state of pleasure, gives in the final stage positive feelings, to which any individual aspires. The process of emergence and satisfaction of needs is called motivation, as it makes a person carry out activities. He always has a choice of how best to achieve the desired result and he independently selects the best ways to remove the scarce state. To satisfy needs, the individual uses various objects and it is these that can be called good, since they lead a person to a pleasant feeling of satisfaction and are part of a large economic and social activity.

Economic theory about goods

The science of economics could not ignore such a question of the good. Since the material needs of a person are satisfied with the help of objects produced on the basis of resources, then the theory of economic benefits arises. They are understood as objects and their properties that can meet the requirements and desires of a person. The peculiarity of the process of satisfying material needs is such that the needs of people always exceed production capabilities. Therefore, the benefits are always less than the needs for them. Thus, economic resources always have a special property - rarity. There are always fewer of them on the market than necessary. This creates an increased demand for economic goods and allows you to set a price for them.

Resources are always needed for their production, and they, in turn, are limited. In addition, material goods have another property - utility. They are always associated with profit. There is the concept of marginal utility, that is, the ability of a good to satisfy a need most fully. As consumption increases, marginal demand decreases. So, a hungry person satisfies the need for food with the first 100 grams of food, but he continues to eat, while the benefits decrease. The positive characteristics of different goods may be similar. A person chooses the necessary of them, focusing not only on this indicator, but also on other factors: price, psychological and aesthetic satisfaction, etc.

Classifications of goods

Diverse consumption of material goods leads to the fact that in economic theory there are several ways to divide them into types. First of all, they are classified according to the degree of limitation. There are goods for the production of which resources are spent and they are finite. They are called economic or material. There are also goods that are available in unlimited quantities, such as sunlight or air. They are called non-economic or free.

Depending on the mode of consumption, goods are divided into consumer and production goods. The former are designed to meet the needs of the end user. The latter are necessary for the production of consumer goods (for example, machine tools, technology, land). Material and non-material, private and public goods are also distinguished.

Tangible and intangible goods

Various human needs require specific means of satisfying them. In this regard, there are tangible and intangible benefits. The first includes objects that are comprehended by the senses. A material good is everything that can be touched, smelled, examined. Usually they can accumulate, be used for a long time. Allocate material benefits of one-time, current and long-term use.

The second category is intangible goods. They are usually associated with services. Intangible benefits are created in the non-productive sphere and affect the state and abilities of a person. These include health care, education, trade, service, etc.

Public and private

Depending on the mode of consumption, a material good can be characterized as private or public. The first kind is consumed by one person who has paid for it and owns it. These are means of individual demand: cars, clothes, food. The public good is indivisible, it belongs to a large group of people who collectively pay for it. This type includes security environment, cleanliness and order on the roads and in in public places, protection of law and order and the country's defense capability.

Production and distribution of wealth

Creating wealth is a complex, costly process. Its organization requires the efforts and resources of many people. In fact, the entire sphere of the economy is engaged in the production of various types of material goods. Depending on the dominant needs, the sphere can independently regulate itself, releasing the necessary goods. The process of distribution of wealth is not so simple. The market is a tool, however, there is also a social sphere. It is in it that the state assumes the functions of distribution in order to reduce social tension.

Service as a blessing

Despite the fact that it is customary to understand material goods as a means of satisfying a need, services are also a means of eliminating need. Economic theory today actively uses this concept. According to her, material services are a kind of economic good. Their peculiarity is that the service is intangible, it cannot be accumulated or evaluated before it is received. At the same time, it also has utility and rarity, like other economic goods.

The good is good (Greek άγαθον, Latin bonum, French bien, German Gut, English good) - a concept that has long occupied philosophers and thinkers, playing an important role in the field of public, economic and social, and therefore included in the sphere of state politics, causing certain aspirations and activities of the political union - the state.

I) Understanding the good in a broad sense as the satisfaction of a human need or aspiration, and therefore the goal of each aspiration, the thinkers of the ancient classical world (Plato, Aristotle and many different schools that developed their teachings) explained: firstly, that the very understanding of the good is subjective why and the aspirations of people are quite different; secondly, that, nevertheless, every good is a goal, for the achievement of which is the human aspiration, activity, enterprise of man; thirdly, that, despite the subjective understanding, human benefits in generalization can represent three categories: 1) material benefits, the achievement of which gives a person sensual pleasure, pleasure; 2) spiritual benefits - an understanding of beauty and truth, which brings spiritual pleasure, satisfaction to the rational aspirations of a person; 3) peace of mind, born from the consciousness of fulfilling a duty, is a moral good, a virtue; 4) the highest good - εύδαιμονία, well-being (see this word), which consists in achieving all the benefits that a person strives for, is the most important goal of human life, to which the most high activity political, possible only in the state, which is why the ancient thinkers considered the state as a means to achieve prosperity.

The Christian religion has significantly expanded the views of the good, greatly raising the ideas of man about the goals and objectives of human aspirations. The great sermon of Christ about all-forgiving Christian love and love for one's neighbor radically changes the idea of ​​the good: the good is no longer only satisfaction self-interest and benefits, but also delivering benefits to another. The principle of egoism that prevailed until then is placed next to the new, firmly and majestically established principle of altruism: not only one's own good, but also the good of another, constitutes the real good of a person. The lofty Christian doctrine of brotherhood and brotherly love is only gradually becoming the property of mankind. A long period of barbarism and distorting interpreters moved humanity away from a true understanding of the concept of the all-round good indicated by Christianity. But, the closer we get to our time, the more this simple, yet majestic truth about altruism grows, which strives to constantly moderate egoism and can lead forward, to a new flowering, all types and forms of human unity.

When, after medieval oppression and grave misunderstandings, thirsty thoughts turned to the works of ancient thinkers, the ethics of the latter, their views on the good and well-being, for the first time, had an enchanting effect, and in the 16th and 17th centuries. a number of eudaimonic theories(see this next), who explained and interpreted more or less successfully the teachings of Aristotle and continued his school. But there was also criticism of views on the state as a means of ensuring well-being, and at the same time criticism of views on the good. Something new in comparison with the philosophers, imitators of the ancients, says the famous Bacon (see this next):

Ethics, which is supposed to deal with the mode of action of the human will in a positive way, indicates the ideals of goodness and the way in which a person can achieve it. The ideal of goodness follows from the twofold natural striving of man: to become an independent personality and, moreover, to become a particle of some large (social) whole; The first is a private good, the second is a public good. A special breadth of views in the field of research on the principles of ethics was shown by the thinker of the 17th century. Locke (see this verse), who purged the paradoxical teaching of Gobbes (see this verse) about selfishness and became the favorite teacher of the English. Arguing about the good, he considers the pursuit of happiness to be the moral principle of human activity and completely smashes Hobbes, who believed that in the state of nature a person has the opportunity to act completely according to his will, and in the state a person can act and strive only with complete obedience. Locke proves that both in the state of nature and in the state, a person enjoys and should enjoy freedom, limited only by the good of others. These ideas of his were developed by many English. thinkers in so-called systems goodwill. Descartes came to the same approximate conclusions even earlier, from whose ideas the interpretations of Pufendorf and Thomasius came out. The ethics of Spinoza had a particularly strong influence on German scientists by explaining altruism as man's love for his neighbor as a result of his love for God (see this passage). The French thinkers of the end of the 18th century, who prepared the ground for the theory of utilitarianism, which Bentham so brilliantly developed (see this passage), who made the goal of the state the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of people, and Kant's critical philosophy, which clarified the legal tasks of the state, led the thinkers XIX table. to views, although differing in details regarding the good and well-being, but more and more approaching the correct understanding of the gospel teaching about the good, which consists in Christian love for one's neighbor.

II. In the economic and social sense, the good means everything that, having a value, can also have a market price, therefore, in a broad sense, all property benefits are understood. Gut in German and bien in French have both a special meaning of real estate. Property benefits are created, acquired, changed, distributed on the basis of internal, managing economic life. economic laws studied political economy. The acquisition of values ​​or things, both individual and a combination of such property benefits, property, affects the social position of each person, gives rise to various social classes, depending on the amount of property benefits that everyone achieves and uses. The difference between such classes, their mutual relation and mutual influence, the transitions of people from one class to another in connection with the creation of various kinds of human unities, the movement of property goods and the movement of the classes themselves, ascending and descending, occurs on the basis of internal, governing public life social or social laws studied by sociology, or social science(see this next).

III. The quantity of all kinds of goods and the ways of distributing them among the members of a society constituting a political union - the state, predetermines the power and political significance of the latter. Therefore, the task of the state and the object of its special political or police activity (see this next) should be the creation of such general and identical conditions for all under which the legitimate aspirations of citizens to achieve benefits would be possible for everyone. Such state activity is based on the ability to harmonize the norms of positive law with the requirements of the natural law of development and the laws of economic and social. The methods of such an agreement and the reasons for the different achievement of such a political goal by different states are studied by the science of "Police Law" (see this next article).
I. Andreevsky.

encyclopedic Dictionary F. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron. - St. Petersburg: Brockhaus-Efron. 1890-1907 .

Antonyms:

See what "Good" is in other dictionaries:

A positive object of interest or desire. On the second floor. 19th century the concept of wealth is directly connected with the concept of value (G. Rickert and others). In a narrower, ethical sense, the concept of B. coincides with the concept of good. The question of the relationship between B. and value ... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

GOOD- GOOD (Greek τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ εὖ, τὸ καλόν; lat. bonum) in philosophy: the ultimate object of aspiration, as well as everything contributing to its achievement; in theology, one of the divine names. The words "good", "good", "good" (ἀγαθός, bonus, English good, ... ... ancient philosophy

Good, goodness (Greek agaJon, Latin bonum, French bien, German Gut, English good.) is a concept that has long occupied philosophers and thinkers, playing an important role in the field of public, economic and social, and therefore also included in the sphere of state policy ... Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron

1. GOOD, a; pl. good and (colloquial) good, kind. good; dates blessings and blessings. cf. 1. only units High Prosperity, happiness, kindness. Striving for the common good. Use power b. to whom l. Consider it for good (recognize it as correct, reasonable). 2. only… … encyclopedic Dictionary

Good- Good ♦ Bien, Tout Est Everything is good, declared Leibniz, and Voltaire, in his Candide, subjected this optimism to convincing ridicule. Indeed, all our experience inexorably testifies to the complete absurdity of the formula proposed by Leibniz ... Philosophical Dictionary of Sponville

In philosophy, that which contains a certain positive meaning. The highest good (the term was introduced by Aristotle, lat. summum bonum) is that, depending on which the relative value of all other goods was determined in philosophical teachings: bliss ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

Cm … Synonym dictionary

1. BLAGO1, good, cf. 1. Good, happiness. Striving for the common good. I wish you all the best. 2. more often pl. That which serves to satisfy needs, the material comforts of life (book). I'll go to the south: there are all earthly blessings. ❖ All the best (colloquial family) to ... Dictionary Ushakov

[Greek τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ εὖ, τὸ καλόν; lat. bonum, bonitas], the final (ultimate) object of a person's aspiration, the movement towards Krom does not need further justification; in theology - one of the Divine names (see Name of God). As a philosophical category B. has a superexistential status of the highest universal value, which is not comprehended by any of the senses, is inaccessible to the imagination, surpasses any rational construction and is not contained by the mind. The combination of B.'s transcendence with its immediate reality is due to the fact that its superexistential nature always manifests itself as true being.

In ancient philosophy

the considered hierarchy of B. turns out to be fundamental for the hierarchy of being and knowledge. But at the same time, the doctrine of B. never acts as an independent branch of philosophical knowledge, although Plato says that “the idea of ​​the good is the most important subject of scientific consideration” (Resp. 505a 2). The doctrine of B. receives a special and independent development in late Platonism as genology, that is, the doctrine of the one, built on the basis of combining the development of the concept of B. as the central theme of Plato's "State" with a dialectical consideration of the provisions on the one and many in his own " Parmenides."

B. as a category of practical ethics

I. Good-pleasure. The first manifestation of B., to which every soul reacts instantly, was considered pleasure as a sensual reality. In connection with it, reflection may arise post factum, it may not arise at all, but this property of B., which is primarily found in its most obvious and first manifestation: to attract to oneself, will not be canceled. Pleasure was considered the highest B. by the representative of the Cyrenian school, the Socratic Aristippus and Epicurus (Euseb. Praep. Ev. I 8. 8. 3-I 8. 9. 1). The Cyrenaics, unlike Epicurus, recognized only pleasures at rest (Diog . Laert . X 136. 1-3), while Epicurus also recognized pleasures in motion. According to Epicurus, “pleasure at rest is serenity and painlessness, pleasures in motion are joy and pleasure” (Ibid. X 136. 10-12). Merylom B. among Epicurus and the Epicureans is affect (πάθος). Therefore, despite the assertion of Epicurus that “the greatest of goods is understanding (φρόνησις) and all virtues come from it”, for him “all virtues are akin to a sweet life and a sweet life is inseparable from them” (Ibid. X 132. 6-12) , i.e. we are talking about affects.

II. Good-virtue. Unlike the Epicureans, the ideas of B. and virtue among the followers of Stoicism are inconceivable without the intervention of reason. This makes them treat pleasure as something absolutely inferior to the soul; the manifestation of B. requires preliminary reflection: arguing, we understand that something attracts us by virtue of the benefits it brings. To appreciate the benefit, you need to acquire a certain experience, while we are attracted to pleasure at the first contact with the object that causes it. The Stoics, following the example of the Platonic Academy and Aristotle, introduced ethics into the routine practice of school reasoning, defined B. in general as a kind of utility, in particular as a benefit or something coinciding with a benefit (Ibid. VII 94. 1-2). Another particular Stoic definition of B.: “the natural perfection of a rational being in its rationality” (Ibid. VII 94. 7-8). The Stoics divide B. into mental, external, neither one nor the other: mental B. - virtues and virtuous deeds; external - a worthy homeland, a worthy friend; B., which is neither spiritual nor external, is to be worthy and happy himself (Ibid. VII 95. 6 - VII 96. 1). Some B. are goals, others are means, others are both goals and means: goals are courage, reasonableness, freedom, pleasantness, joy (εὐφροσύνη), painlessness (ἀλυπία) and every virtuous deed; means - a friend and benefit from him; both ends and means are virtues: as ends they enter into happiness, as means lead to it (Ibid. VII 96.6 - VII 97.3). Of the mental B., some are certain states (ἕξεις): such are habits; other essence of disposition (διαθέσεις): such are the virtues; B., which are neither one nor the other, are actions (Ibid. VII 98. 1-6). Perfect B. is beautiful (Ibid. VII 100. 1); only the beautiful - B. (Ibidem); nothing ugly is not B. Since pleasures are ugly, they are not B. (Ibid. VII 103.9 - VII 104.1). Virtues - B. (Ibid. VII 102. 1-3), but life and death, health and disease, pleasure and torment, beauty and ugliness, strength and impotence, wealth and poverty, glory and dishonor, nobility and rootlessness - none of that nor others, but indifferent objects, because they can be turned both for good and for harm (Ibid. VII 102.3 - VII 103.6).

III. Good-knowledge. Being on a par with useful and useless, B., not only in the early Stoics, but also in Epictetus, reveals ambiguity: unlike virtue, which alone is unconditional B., everything else bears signs of dubiousness, so that virtue cannot in what to show itself, although it must constantly show itself in everything. Therefore, instead of the good-virtue, the primary object of aspiration is a certain reasonableness, a reasonable basis for an act that allows one to live in harmony with nature, which also turns out to be a kind of pseudo-good. In the idea of ​​B., the Stoics keep a succession with the sophists, Socrates and Socrates, who recognized as the highest B. knowledge that can be learned, and the process of acquiring this knowledge was called "paydeya". According to Socratic Euclid, a single B. is hidden under the plural. names: some call it reason, others call it god, others call it mind, etc.; at the same time, he denied the existence of evil (Ibid. II 106. 9-12). Here, the transition to a higher idea of ​​​​B. as a sphere of the immaterial (mainly mind) is obvious, which rises above the “spiritual” and “practical” B.

metaphysics b.

I. Teleological aspect (in ethics, politics, physics, in the doctrine of the mind). B. is the goal of any activity. In academic disputes (known from Plato's Philebus and a number of Aristotle's texts), pleasure, utility and knowledge were included in the sphere of ideas about B. within a completely different approach and in the spirit of the general intellectualist orientation of the Platonic Academy. The mathematician Eudoxus considered B.'s pleasure (Arist. EN. 1172b 9-15), but his concept of good-pleasure is not psychological, but teleological. The most consistent teleological approach to the concept of B. was carried out by Aristotle. He emphasizes that one of the causes is the goal, or "that for which" (τὸ οὗ χάριν), since the goal moves as an object of desire. The ends are different: those that we choose for their own sake are more perfect than those that are means for another. Therefore, one can speak of different B., “and what is best seems to be perfect” (τὸ δ̓ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι - Ibid. 1097a 28). Everyone agrees that happiness is chosen for its own sake, but it is not so obvious what should be understood by this: every living being can have a happy life, but for a person the most appropriate life for him as a rational being is “the activity of the soul, consistent with the judgment” ( Ibid. 1098a 7-8), or the activity of the soul "according to the best and most perfect virtue" (Ibid. 1098a 16-18). Aristotle emphasizes the need for activity to achieve B., because “in life, the beautiful and good are achieved by those who do the right things” (Ibid. 1099a 5-7). Higher B. is what is desirable for the people and the state, therefore it belongs to the conduct of the most important science, which is recognized in the Nicomachean Ethics as politics, that is, the art of governing the state (Ibid. 1094b 11). At the beginning of the "Politics" (1252a 3-7), Aristotle also emphasizes that communication, called the state, is organized for the sake of some B. (like any activity), and this communication is the best, and B., to which it strives, - the highest. At the same time, Aristotle argues that B. as something in common does not exist, meaning that it is impossible to find any one idea that justifies various B. (EN. 1096b 25-26). Aristotle proposes to specifically consider this issue in another part of philosophy, since, even if there is a single absolute B. as such, B. is considered in ethics, which can be carried out in an act or acquired (Ibid. 1096b 32-35).

The teleological understanding of B. is also manifested in Aristotle's physics (the treatises Physics and On the Sky). B. is the ultimate goal of any movement, therefore the elements in the sublunar sphere move simple movements to its "natural places" (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν φορά), while the ether resides in the supralunar sphere: nature always realizes the best of what is possible (De caelo. 288a 2-3). An animated being moves, recognizing B. and rejecting evil: it strives for the 1st, it avoids the 2nd (De anima. 431a 15-16). Clarifying the original thesis “it is driven by desire and the mind,” Aristotle emphasizes that the mind itself does not move if there is no object of desire. Hence, the true engine is the object of aspiration (τὸ ὀρεκτόν), and it is either B., or apparent B., and not everything, but achievable in activity (τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν - 433a 27-29). As the object of aspiration moves the first engine: the object of aspiration is the final goal, and according to Aristotle, only the best (τὸ βέλτιστον) can be this goal (Phys. 193a 32-33). In contrast to ethics and politics in physics, Aristotle proves the uniqueness and immobility of this B.

Developing the thesis about the coincidence of the object of desire and the object of the mind (identified with the will), which move as a goal and themselves remain motionless, Aristotle states: “The higher objects of desire and mind are identical to each other, because the object of desire is that which seems beautiful, and the highest object of the will is that which is actually beautiful” (Met. 1072a 26-28). At the same time, the mind as a thinker coincides with the intelligible-thinkable, since it is non-material, and for the non-material "the speculative cognition and the speculative cognized are one and the same" (De anima. 430a 3-5). According to Aristotle, the mind as the highest object of aspiration is the highest B., that is, God (Met. 1072b 14-30). Showing that B. must be the final goal of any striving, Aristotle does not explain what is the object of striving of the mind that coincides with the given object. Specially considering in the "Eudemic Ethics" (1217b 1 - 1218b 19) various ideas about the idea of ​​B., Aristotle shows that B. is spoken of in the same sense as the being, therefore B., in accordance with the category of "something", or the first essence, it will be mind and god, in accordance with the category of quality - justice, quantity - measure, etc. But the presence of mind and god in the sphere of being does not, according to Aristotle, make B. something independently existing, absolute. Meanwhile, asking in Metaphysics (1075a 11-15) the question of which of the 2 ways the nature of the world whole contains B. and the best (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον) - as something existing separately and in itself or as an order, - Aristotle replies that, perhaps, both those and others, as, for example, with the army, where B. is both order and leader, and the leader is to a greater extent, since he establishes order. Arguing that the highest mind is something most divine (1074b 33 - 1075a 5), ​​Aristotle concludes that the mind cannot think of some even more worthy object and therefore thinks of itself, i.e. its thought is “thinking of thinking”; if his thought and what it thinks were different, then it would be unclear, in accordance with which of them the mind belongs to B. (τὸ εὖ). This understanding of God as the mind, true being, beauty, as that which is desired, desired, and is B., accessible to thought, entered the philosophy of the so-called. middle Platonism. Alkina in the “Textbook of Platonic Philosophy” discusses the transition from the “great sea of ​​beauty” to B itself. Being an object of love and aspiration, it appears before the soul ascending to it like a revealed and shining light (φῶς φανὲν καὶ οἷον ἐκλάμψαν), in which the soul recognizes God by its great jewel (10. 6.3-7; cf.: Plat. Symp. 210e 3-5). In the 5th book. treatise "On Good" Numenius speaks of the mind as the only thing that can be considered B. (fr. 16. 3-4). The mind is the first god and B. as such, which is imitated by the good creator of becoming (fr. 16. 9-15). However, the identity of thought and what is thought in the mind does not yet explain why what is thought can be thought at all by the mind, how one can think oneself, in what sense one can speak of the simplicity of the mind, if it already has a fundamental opposition of the thinker to the thinkable. This question was raised and resolved by Plato, setting a new horizon for considering the problem of B.

II. Superexistential B. as the basis of being and mind. Plato solves the problem of B., thinking through the ontological structure of the universe, as well as in the course of considering the hierarchy of cognitive abilities and knowledge as such. In the 6th book. "States" Plato, assuming the possibility of putting philosophers at the head of the state, asserts through the mouth of Socrates that the main science, which they must comprehend, has the subject of the idea of ​​B. (505a 2), without which all other acquisitions are of no use . Although it seems to most that B. is pleasure, more subtle people see it rather in the mind (φρόνησις - Ibid. 505b 5-6) and science (ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν - 506b 23).

Refusing to define what B. is in itself, Socrates proposes to consider an analogy: just as in the world of the sensually perceived eye can see objects thanks to the sun, so in the world of the intelligible mind can think something thanks to B. - the sun of the intelligible world; therefore, sight and the visible are related to the sun in the same way as the mind and the intelligible are to B. (508b 11 - 508c 3). B. as such is above knowledge, truth and science, since it is their cause (509a 4-7). It follows from this that B. gives the knowable not only the possibility of being known, but also being and essence; thus, it must be recognized that B. itself is not a certain essence, but in dignity and power rises beyond the limits of essence (509b 6-10). Just as the light of the sun unites the seer with the visible, so the light of B. unites the intelligible being with the thinking mind.

The super-existential nature of B., as the cause (beginning) of being and knowledge, but surpassing both, puts it in a special relation to the sciences. In the 7th book. "States" Plato showed that arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music should accustom thought to supersensible reality, to the world of being, which does not know the constant fluidity of the sensible world, that is, the sphere of becoming. Usually these disciplines are called sciences, because they are more reliable than opinion; but, since they are based on premises that have no real justification, they are weaker than science. Science in the "State" Plato calls the dialectic, which tops the other. science, relies on true being and brings us to the beginning without prerequisites, i.e. to B. as such, which is the limit of the thinkable just as the sun is the limit of the visible (532a 5 - 532b 2).

The voluntaristic aspect of the doctrine of B.

B. as such has no motive for c.-l. actions other than his good will, which is no different from himself, i.e., is B himself.

Combining the position of the Platonic “State” about the superexistential nature of B. with the reasoning from “Parmenides” about the one-many (Plat. Parm. 141e 9-12), Plotinus and the later Platonists developed a special “science of B.” as "the science of the one" (Enn. 6.9, 5.1 and 5.2; cf. also 6.7.42.15-24). The “science of the one” preserves the closest connection with the problem of B. in the question of the freedom of the will of the higher B. and why the higher united principle gives rise to the multiple world of the mind and allows the emergence of the sensory world. According to Plato, this world is the most beautiful, its demiurge is the best, and the only reason for the creation of the world by a completely unenviable demiurge was its goodness (Tim. 29a 5-6, 29e 1-2). Plato explains the origin of evil both for the individual and for the cosmos as a whole. In the 3rd book. “State”, he argues that, contrary to the general opinion, God is not the cause of everything, but only of the good, and he is innocent of evil, so another reason must be sought for evil (379b 1 - 379c 7). Plato develops this thesis in relation to the individual soul in the 10th book. “States”, where he draws a famous picture of the choice of souls of their lot: virtue, which allows them to choose a good fate, is free, it does not obey any master: honoring or rejecting it, everyone is responsible for his own choice; god ¾ is innocent (617e 3-5). With regard to the world as a whole, this question is considered in Politics, where the cosmos, while it nourishes living beings together with the helmsman, gives them a lot of good (273c 4), but without a helmsman, left to its own will, it degenerates, so that it remains little good (273d 1-2). In the "Laws" Plato admits that it is the soul that is responsible for B. and evil in the world (896d 5-7), he introduces the evil soul of the world, responsible for all the evil that happens in it (897c 4 - 897d 1). The cause of evil, therefore, in Plato is the soul created by the good mind-demiurge (Tim. 41d 4 sqq.), which turned away and fell away from the mind, its creator, and thereby united with unreason (Leg. 897b 3). The same thing happens with the human soul. Consequently, the cause of evil in the world is the evil will manifested in the creature.

Plotinus, in turn, proceeds from the fact that every being desires B., strives for it, and, until it has it, is ready to change itself, i.e., voluntarily makes itself different; when he reaches it and possesses it, he wishes to remain himself; thus, his essence and his will coincide in him (Enn. 6.8.13.11 sqq.). The same can be said about the highest B., so that truly the nature of B. is his will (ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ - 6. 8. 13. 38). The omnipotence and perfect freedom to create B. is not diminished by the fact that it cannot do evil: its will from the very beginning was such, and there was no such time when something would precede its will. Therefore, it is first of all will (βούλησις - 6.8.21.16), and everything else exists, since it participates and is raised to it (6.8.21.21-22). Iamblichus argued about the divine will of B. (De mysteriis. 1. 12. 8-9), but B. for him is no longer the first and highest principle, but one of its manifestations.

Mystic Aspect B

In Platonism, we are talking about the fact that every soul can avoid depravity, i.e., various forms of manifestation of evil, and achieve its own B., which in the end always coincides with B. as such. According to Plotin, B. cannot be considered without a soul, for which turning to B. gives a real perspective of moving away from evil and death and ascending to true life. Evil is located precisely in the soul and represents the absence of B., without which the soul cannot animate, be life, and, consequently, ceases to be a soul, i.e., perishes (Enn. 1. 8. 11. 8-14) . At first, the soul turned to B. is adorned with virtues; however, virtue is not B. as such, but something good and beautiful only by participation (1. 8. 13. 9-12). Reaching the sphere of the mind through the virtues and merging with it, the soul, already being above virtue, understands that here is its true life and that it is directly on the eve of B. (5. 9. 2. 25-26; cf.: Plat. Phileb. 64c) with all the multiplicity of intelligent manifestations testifies to it, although B. itself is one. The soul understands that it can neither name nor know it, that it cannot be thought, that is, it is not an intelligible being; rushing to B., the soul can only feel the border in a certain touch to it, it is not given to cross it: here it is already higher than wisdom and rationality, higher than thought, it is no longer the mind (Enn. 1. 2. 6. 12- 13). And when this desire for B. reaches its highest tension, B., exalted above the mind and soul, can itself descend into them and unite them with itself; this knowledge, or touching B., is that “higher science” that Plato spoke about (6. 7. 37. 3-5).

Unlike Aristotle and the middle Platonists, Plotinus knows that, even having reached the sphere of the mind and becoming one with it, the soul is not satisfied and does not acquire undisturbed bliss, but experiences dissatisfaction: contemplating, that is, while still in the sphere of forms, the soul experiences approximately the same as a person who, under a beautiful appearance, guesses the invisible soul of another person and is addressed primarily to her (6. 7. 33. 22 sqq.). And as the gods have B. and there is no evil, so there is B. and the soul, which retains its purity; if the soul does not save it, then death will not be evil for it, but life (1. 7. 3. 10-12).

Theological interpretation of B. in middle Platonism and Neoplatonism

Consideration of the mystical aspect of B. revealed that B. as such is in principle inaccessible to the first philosophy. It can only be presented apophatically, or within a very artificial theology. Due to the fact that after Iamblichus (4th century A.D.) the technique of scholastic interpretation of Platonic dialogues developed, the 12 most representative dialogues constituted the curriculum of Platonic philosophy, with certain dialogues representing ethics, logic, physics and theology. The problem of B. was considered respectively in ethics (Olympiodorus's commentary on Gorgias, fragments of Damascius's commentary on Phaedo) and theology (interpretations of Damascius on Philebus, Proclus Diadochus on Timaeus, as well as fragments of Proclus and Damascus' comments on Parmenides ").

New Testament

Puts forward the concept of the coming kingdom as the Kingdom of God, which is not food and drink (Rom 14:17). In the Word made flesh, full of grace and truth (Jn 1:14), a person acquires the highest B., or the bliss of communion with God. Faith in the risen from the dead Jesus Christ is already in present. life subjectively pre-fulfills our hopefully expected future. beatitude (Heb 11:1). However, the complete possession of the higher B. in earthly life is impossible: the final realization for the person revealed in Christ, the higher B. becomes eternal life. In this sense, Hebrews refers to Christ as "the High Priest of the good things to come" (9:11), and the law of the OT is referred to as having "the shadow of the good things to come" (10:1). B. here means the fruits of the redeeming Sacrifice of the Savior, which, according to the gospel parable, are accepted only by those who have been “good and faithful” (Mt 25:21). These bud. B. are the only real ones, since in them sin and death will finally disappear. In present life, the law of sin hinders the good order of human existence, manifesting itself in the moral-religious. dualism of good and evil: “... I know that good (ἀγαθόν) does not live in me, that is, in my flesh ... The good that I want, I do not do, but the evil that I do not want, I do” (Rom 7 . 18-19).

The concept of B. in patristic theology

3. Abelard believed that God can be the Supreme Good only under 3 conditions: He must be able to do whatever he wants; to be able to reason and arrange everything in accordance with the truth; finally, to be absolutely free from envy and generous in giving gifts (Theologia Christiana. I 2). God can be the Highest Good, that is, if He possesses Omnipotence (omnipotentia), Wisdom (sapientia) and Goodness (benignitas), which correspond to the three Persons of the Holy Trinity (Ibidem). This, according to Abelard, is all the fullness and perfection of B. (Ibidem). Objecting to Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux rightly noted that in this case inequality would inevitably arise between the Persons of the Holy Trinity: the Father is omnipotentia (Omnipotence), the Son (Wisdom) is semipotentia (half-power), St. Spirit (Goodness) - nulla potentia (weakness - Contr. Abaelard. III 5; I 2; III 8). However, Bernard notes, in God each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is wholly the same as the other Persons. They do not divide into parts That True and Supreme Good which They are, because They do not possess It in parts, but are It Itself in essence (Ibid. II 4). Abelard's contemporaries and supporters of Bernard, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Peter of Lombard and others, also accepted this threefold concept of the Supreme Good, but unlike Abelard, they allowed the possibility of referring these properties both to the Divine essence (primarily) and to the Three Persons . According to Peter of Lombard, “in the Trinity resides the highest perfection (summa perfectio). For if She lacks power, wisdom, or goodness, She will not be the Highest Good. But since in Her there is perfect Power, infinite Wisdom, incomprehensible Goodness, She is truly called and considered the Highest Good ”(Petrus Lombardus. Sententiae. I 34. 6; cf.: Hugo de S. Victore. De sacramentis. I 2. 5- 8).

4. Middle and lower (created) B. Boethius also drew attention to the fact that for everything complex being (esse) and it itself (ipsum) are not the same, therefore one thing in things is that they are good (quod bona sunt), and others - that they exist (quod sunt - Quomodo substantiae bonae sint // PL. 64. Col. 1311B, 1312C); i.e., the goodness of created things is not identical with their essence, but is its property. Following. Because of this, created B. are secondary, changeable, and in need of the Higher Good. As the being of created things comes from the Highest Being, so the B. of created things comes from the First Good, whose very being is good (Ibid. 1313A; cf.: Anselmus. Monolog. I). Consequently, the very being of things is B., although not like the B. from which it comes (Ibid. 1313B). According to the general opinion of scholastic theologians, any B., which is not identical with its goodness, is called B. according to participation (per participationem) in the Higher Good (Thom. Aquin. Sum. contr. gent. I 38; I 41; Sum. Th. Ia. IIae. 2. 8; Boetius Dacus. De summo bono. 210). As for the differences among created B., the spiritual B. (angel, soul), created in the image and likeness of God, are more perfect than bodily (Bonaventura. Itinerarium. I 2-3, 6; II 2). According to Thomas Aquinas, the corporeal essence (corporalis substantia) is subordinate to the spiritual as to its own B., for in the spiritual essence goodness is fuller (bonitas plenior), and the corporeal substance strives to become like it (Sum. contr. gent. I 42). Moreover, only spiritual beings can consciously and voluntarily aspire to the Greater Good, which is their ultimate goal.

II. B. as a subjective category. Most medieval. theologians, starting with Boethius, believe that B. in the subjective sense, that is, B. for a person, is the goal (finis) of his aspiration / desire (Boetius . Consol. III 2, 3, 10, 11; Thom . Aquin Sum. Th. Ia. 5.1-5; Bonaventura. Itinerarium. III 4; Boetius Dacus. De summo bono. 88). Despite the variety of judgments regarding what and how many goals-goods a person has, the general opinion is that from the lower material and bodily virtues one should ascend to the average spiritual virtues (virtues), and from them to the Higher Good, God, the last goal of man's aspiration, in whose union lies his bliss (beatitudo, felicitas).

According to Boethius, the highest B. for a person is “what he desires more [everything] else” (Consol. III 2). But different people desire different things: wealth, ranks, power, glory, pleasures, but none of this constitutes a true B. for a person (Ibid. III 2-9). A person's natural desire leads to true B., but numerous delusions lead him away (Ibid. III 3). Particular B. are only “external manifestations” of true B., they are imperfect and cannot bring true and perfect B. (Ibid. III 9). Higher B. and the goal of man Boethius, like blzh. Augustine (De Trinitate. XIII 3), defines it as “bliss” (beatitudo): “Bliss is a blessing that, when it is achieved, leaves nothing more to be desired. It is the highest of all blessings, containing all other blessings ... it is a perfect state, which is a combination of all blessings ... a state that is not subject to any anxieties, or sadness, or painful grief ”(Consol. III 2).

The thoughts of Boethius are developed in later scholastic theology. Anselm of Canterbury argues that B. as a goal for a person is twofold. The immediate goal of a person is the B. of the soul - the achievement of purity of heart, the ultimate goal - eternal life (Tractatus asceticus. I). Eternal life is life with God, Who is the ultimate goal of man's striving, for, according to Anselm, there is nothing that should be desired so strongly as to remember, know and love the Supreme Good; a rational creature was created in order to love the Highest Essence above all B., since this Essence is the Highest Good (Monolog. 68). As a reward to those who love and desire God with all their hearts as the Highest Good, He bestows Himself, and the possession of Him for a person constitutes “highest bliss” (summam beatitudinem - Ibid. 70). Bernard of Clairvaux indicates 3 types of subjective B.: 2 types belong to the B. of this age - B. of the body and B. of the soul, the 3rd type of B. - the bliss of eternal life (Sermones in quadragesima. 5. 8). Peter of Lombardy, following Blessed. Augustine calls the lower B. “what should be used” (res quibus utendum est), that is, the created world and all the creatures contained in it, and the Higher Good is “what should be enjoyed” (res quibus fruendum est), i.e. God the Trinity (Sententiae. I 1. 2). What should be enjoyed makes people happy, and what should be used helps people in their pursuit of happiness (Ibidem). The virtues of the soul, according to Peter of Lombard, are not only “what should be used”, but also “what we enjoy” (Ibid. I 1. 8): they delight those who possess them with pure and holy pleasure. and spiritual joy, but we should not stop at them, because the movement of love does not stop here, this is not its limit, which refers to the Highest Good, to which only one should cling, since He should be loved only for His own sake and beyond Him nothing more is to be sought (Ibidem). Therefore, Peter of Lombardy believes that the virtues of the soul as “natural goods” (naturalia bona) should be used at the same time, and thanks to them, enjoy the Supreme Good (Ibidem).

One of the most harmonious doctrines of subjective ethics was developed by Thomas Aquinas under the influence of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The concept of B., according to Thomas, is that it is “something desired” or “what everyone strives for” (Sum. Th. Ia. 5. 1), that is, it has the meaning of a goal (Ibid. Ia.5.4). In every choice of a person, Thomas sees the desire of B., inherent in our will by nature. In his opinion, everything that a person desires, he desires as B. (sub ratione boni), whether it be real or apparent B. (Ibid. Ia. IIae. 1. 6). Even if people desire something other than perfect B., which is the ultimate goal, they desire what strives for perfect B., since the beginning of something is always correlated with its completion, and secondary objects of desire cannot cause desire, except by being related to the first object of desire (ad primum appetibile), which is the final goal (Ibidem). All people desire to achieve the fullness of perfection, which is the concept of the ultimate goal. However, not all people agree on what this ultimate goal is, because someone wants wealth as perfect B., someone wants pleasure, etc. (Ibid. 1. 7). But neither honor, nor glory, nor power, nor pleasures, nor any bodily blessings can be the ultimate goal of a person's striving (Ibid. 2. 1-6). Thomas notes that the concept of “goal” has 2 meanings: firstly, it is the thing itself (ipsa res), which we want to achieve, and secondly, the very achievement, possession, use or enjoyment of this thing (Ibid. 3. 1). In the 1st meaning, the ultimate goal of man is the Uncreated Good (bonum increatum), that is, God, Who alone with His infinite Goodness can fully satisfy the will of man (Ibidem). In the 2nd sense, the ultimate goal of a person is something created (aliquid creatum) that exists in him, that is, nothing else than “the achievement or enjoyment of the final goal” (Ibidem). Bliss, to which everyone desires, is undoubtedly considered such an ultimate goal (Ibid. 1. 8; cf.: 3. 1). Bliss, according to Thomas, is “the perfect good of a thinking nature” (bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae - Ibid. Ia. 26. 1, 2). The Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of B. (however, completely devoid of specific Christian features) was also developed by a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, Boethius of Dacius, in a special treatise On the Higher Good. In his opinion, the highest possible for a person B. should be given to him in the best ability, which is “mind and thinking” (ratio et intellectus - Boetius Dacus. De summo bono. 10). Since there is a distinction between the theoretical and practical mind of a person, then the highest B. The theoretical reason of a person will be the knowledge of truth (i.e., all that exists and its Origin) and pleasure in this, and the highest B. of practical reason will be the implementation of B. in practice (operatio boni), i.e., in moral virtues, and pleasure in this (Ibid. 53). This highest B. is nothing but bliss (Ibid. 64).

A. R. Fokin

In modern philosophy

The problem of B. is interpreted, as a rule, in 4 main aspects: B. as such, Divine B., B. of objects (objects) of the world and B. of man. Answering the question what is B., the philosophers of the New Age fix the varieties of “goodness”: spiritual, hedonistic, utilitarian; establish relationships between them; they single out the problem of the B. criterion, analyzing the role of feelings and reason in it; they strive to understand whether B. is an objective property of an object or a person’s subjective attitude towards it, they try to combine both approaches. B. Spinoza denies that the terms "good", "B." (bonum) and "evil" (malum) are independent of the individual. Studying the causes of affects, he came to the conclusion that a person recognizes a thing as good because it causes pleasure and desire in him, but does not want it as the final cause, which B. has in itself. B. or evil k.-l. things depend on pleasure or pain, to-rye it causes in a person, and all B. human desires are affects of joy, which give strength to his existence (Spinoza. T. 1. S. 487-488). Each individual, therefore, in accordance with his affects, is the measure of good and evil. In this position, Spinoza follows T. Hobbes (Hobbes. T. 2. S. 39), however, he also accepts the position of R. Descartes, showing that there is a real qualitative difference between affects due to the nature of objects (Spinoza. T. 1. S. 501-503); traces., there is a formal basis in the nature of things for our judgment about B. and evil. Spinoza seeks to combine here a realistic theory with a nominalist doctrine, which rejects an objective basis for judging B. and evil (Bidney, R. 106-109).

The philosophy of modern times raises such important questions as the attitude to Divine B. (or Divine will - according to Descartes) and the place of the attribute of goodness among other attributes of God. Descartes believed that the will of God is indifferent (Oeuvres de Descartes. T. 4. P. 110-120); G. W. Leibniz opposes those “who believe that in the nature of things or in the ideas that God has about them, there are no laws of goodness at all”, he considers the opinion dangerous, according to which the goodness attributed to the acts of God is only invention of people; equally dangerous, he believes, is the opinion that the laws of goodness are only the actions of the will of God (Leibniz, vol. 1, pp. 125-126). Leibniz recognizes that God is good and B. is contained in the Divine essence, so the principles of B. are inherent in His wisdom, which in turn determines the Divine will. At the same time, Divine autonomy and independence are not violated in any way, since B. is not imposed on God in the form of s.-l. debt or responsibility from outside. To do B. is a requirement of His own nature. Therefore, acting in a good way, God acts according to what He is.

The highest B. for a person (connected with pleasure and happiness) often turns out to be his connection with God, truth (F. Bacon) or virtue (Descartes), manifested in a firm will to do good and in satisfaction, hence what happens: “... It is in this one all the virtues are composed, this alone deserves ... praise and glory, and, finally, only from here does the greatest and most reliable satisfaction in life arise. Therefore, I believe, - concludes Descartes, - that it is in this that the greatest good lies ”(Oeuvres de Descartes. T. 5. P. 82-83).

The principle of “autonomy” of the human will, consistently carried out in the phenomenal world, Kant believes, leads to the idea that in the highest for a person B. “virtue and happiness are necessarily interconnected, so that pure practical reason cannot recognize the first if it does not belong to the good. the second ”(T. 4. Part 1. S. 444). Believing that the connection between virtue and happiness must have the nature of cause and effect, Kant formulates the antinomy of practical reason as follows: “... either the desire for happiness must be the motivating cause of the maxim of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the active cause of happiness” (Ibid., p. 445). 1st is impossible, because the desire for happiness as the cause of a virtuous deed, according to Kant's teaching on morality and legality, cannot be considered a moral maxim; 2nd is impossible in our earthly world because it lacks the necessary connection (or correspondence) between virtuous deeds and happiness; according to Kant, “it is impossible to expect a combination of happiness and virtue in the world, necessary and sufficient for the highest good, [even] with the help of the most punctual observance of moral laws” (Ibid.). Therefore, it is wrong to consider morality as a “teaching about happiness”, it is not a means of achieving happiness on earth (Ibid., p. 465), and the teaching of eudemonism is fundamentally wrong.

However, the correspondence between virtue and happiness, according to Kant, which is impossible in the earthly (phenomenal) world, becomes possible in the intelligible and Divine world. The antinomy of practical reason, which touches upon the problem of the higher biological nature of man, is resolved in the following way: its thesis regarding the phenomenal world is false, and the antithesis is true only in relation to the noumenal world. Thus, with the help of moral arguments, Kant proves not only the existence of God and the moral world order, the guarantor of which can only be God, but also the possibility of a higher B. of a person within this world order and the justice of Divine retribution for virtuous deeds in earthly life. The premise of B., according to Kant, is “good will”, guided by the “categorical imperative”, and “hope for happiness begins only with religion” (Ibid., p. 464).

In the doctrine of the unconditional B., or God, Kant uses both moral and moral-theological arguments. On the one hand, he relies on the final conclusions of autonomous ethics and understands God as the only and necessary basis for the moral world order: only in God, according to Kant, do moral will and perfect reason coincide; et al. - in a theological discussion about the properties of God, he notes that “there are three properties that are exclusively ... attributed to God, and all of them are moral properties: He is the only saint, the only blessed, the only wise, for these concepts already contain unlimitedness. According to their order, He is the holy Legislator (and Creator), the good Ruler (and Preserver) and the just Judge” (Ibid., p. 465).

I. G. Fichte in "The system of the doctrine of morals according to the principles of science" develops the basic premises of the Kantian doctrine of morality, deduces the moral law from the essence of self-consciousness of our Self. The essence of the Self and the condition of consciousness, according to Fichte, is conscience, which allows us to realize our freedom as a goal. In traditional understanding of God as the Giver of all B. he sees eudemonism; he himself understands God exclusively rationalistically and approaches Spinoza's pantheism. Op. “Instructions for a blissful life, or also the Doctrine of Religion” Fichte is inclined to identify B. and beatitude, the latter for him is “union with God as the One and Absolute” (p. 61), he supplements his intellectualistic position with the doctrine of love for God: now “bliss itself consists in love and the eternal satisfaction of love, and reflection is inaccessible ...” (Ibid., p. 143). A believer, according to Fichte, knows “that he lives in the world of God and that there can be nothing in it that would not be intended for good” (Ibid.).

F. V. J. Schelling in The System of Transcendental Idealism discusses the problem of B. in connection with the difficulties arising from the Kantian antinomy of practical reason, and believes that the relationship between “happiness” and “pure will” is not a synthetic relationship, between “ conditioning and conditioned” (according to Kant). Schelling writes about the interdependence of happiness and free will, questions Kant's thesis about the formal nature of morality, believes that morality becomes objective for a person "only through the external world." According to Schelling, “pure will, dominating the external world, is the only highest good” (T. 1. S. 446), that is, he recognizes freedom as the highest B., which he associates with the moral order and the legal system. In writings relating to the late period of creativity ("The System of World Ages" and "Philosophy of Revelation"), Schelling claims that God is the "Lord of Being" and good will (The System of World Ages, p. 185).

G. W. F. Hegel in his “Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion” criticizes the basic principle of the autonomous ethics of Kant and Fichte, believes that “with such an understanding, there is a world outside of me left by God, and this world is waiting for me to bring a goal into it, good" (p. 385). Hegel's concept of B. is basically limited to the B. of a private person and involves 2 aspects - moral-teleological and state-legal. In the 1st case, considering good as an idea, “the ultimate goal of the world” and realized freedom, Hegel believes that the B. of an individual and formal law are present as removed and preserved definitions of the idea of ​​good, in the 2nd, when it comes to “ the right of a real concrete spirit”, i.e., about the B. of the state or the general good, “formal law” and the B. of a person act as subordinate moments of the state. About the connection between B. and law, Hegel wrote in the Philosophy of Law that “good without law is not good” and, accordingly, “right is not good without good” (p. 172). A. Schopenhauer considers B. as “own” and “alien” in the context of the concepts of egoism and justice correlated with them, subsumes “compassion”, which is the basis of his entire moral teaching, under the concept of someone else's B.. F. Nietzsche, a thinker of another era and other traditions, in his philosophy of "revaluation of values" sharply criticizes hedonism, eudemonism, utilitarianism and pessimism, characteristic of modern Europe. philosophy, refers to tradition. concepts of moral philosophy, including B., to “the long-tailed scythe of concepts that our grandfathers hung to the back of their heads, and quite often to their minds” (T. 2, p. 339). In the interpretation of B. Nietzsche, on the one hand, he tries to rethink it on the basis of his understanding of the Greek. and lat. etymology (ἀγαθόν - the antonym of cowardice, bonus - a warrior, to know) and thereby justifies his explanation of the origin of morality from the "will to power" as establishing a hierarchy of moral values ​​(T. 2. S. 419-420), with others, - for understanding of B. it seems to him the main subjective-psychological problem: “what is considered ... for the actual possession and possession of some good?” (T. 2. S. 313-314). After Nietzsche, the doctrine of B. in ethics finally loses its independent significance and gives way to the theory of values.

Source: Schleiermacher F . Talk about religion. Monologues. M., 1911; Schleiermacher F. Ethik. Hamburg, 19902; HartmannN. Ethik. b.; Lpz., 1926; Scheler M. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und materiale Wertethik. Hamburg; Bern, 1954; Sheler M . Fav. prod. M., 1994; Brentano F. Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Hamburg, 1955; idem. Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik. Hamburg, 1975; Kant I . Cit.: V 6 t. M., 1965. T. 4. Part 1-2; he is. Op. On him. and Russian lang. M., 1997. T. 3; he is. Lectures on ethics. M., 2000; Hegel G. IN . F . Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion // Philosophy of Religion: In 2 vols. M., 1975. Vol. 1; he is. Philosophy of law. M., 1990; Hegel G. W. F. System der Sittlichkeit: Critik des Fichtischen Naturrechts. Hamburg, 2002; Schelling F . IN . Y . The system of transcendental idealism // Works: In 2 vols. M., 1987. Vol. 1; he is. The system of world epochs. Tomsk, 1999; he is. philosophy of revelation. St. Petersburg, 2000; Nietzsche F. Cit.: In 2 vols. M., 1990. Vol. 2; Fichte J. G. System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre. Hamburg, 1995; Fichte I . G . Instructions for a blessed life. M., 1997; idem. Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. Hamburg, 2000.

Lit.: Fischer K . Arthur Schopenhauer. M., 1896; he is. History of new philosophy. SPb., 1901-1910. T. 4-8; Jodl F. The history of ethics in the new philosophy. M., 1898. Vol. 2: [Kant and ethics in the nineteenth century]; Fullie A . Criticism latest systems morals. St. Petersburg, 1900; Vysheslavtsev B . Fichte's ethics. M., 1914; Ilyin I . A . Philosophy of Hegel as the doctrine of the concreteness of God and man. M., 1918. T. 2; Asmus W. F . Immanuel Kant. M., 1973; Kroner R. Von Kant bis Hegel. Tüb., 19773. 2 Bde; Gaidenko P . P . Fichte's philosophy and modernity. M., 1979; Mamardashvili M . TO . Kantian variations. M., 1997; Sudakov A . TO . I. G. Fichte: Life and Teaching // Fichte I . G . Guidance for a blessed life. M., 1997. S. 324-389; he is. Absolute Morality: The Ethics of Autonomy and the Unconditional Law. M., 1998.

G. V. Khlebnikov

The concept of B. in Russian thought

In ancient Russian language, the term "B." is used in the meaning of "good" ("" - Sreznevsky I. I. Materials for the dictionary of the Old Russian language according to written monuments: In 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1893. T. 1. S. 90), and also "good". The ambiguity of the use of the word "B." in ancient Russian language fixes modern. "Dictionary of the Old Russian language of the XII-XIV centuries." (M., 1988. T. 1. S. 166-168). Distinguishing the words "B." and "dobro" represents the happy feature of Rus. language, - a prerequisite for attributing "B." to the highest metaphysical reality - God, and "good" to the ethical characteristic.

In Russian Orthodox theological literature,

based in its foundations and conclusions on the Holy. Scripture and Tradition, the experience of life in the Church and patristic literature, God is understood as the All-Good, the Source and Giver of all B., the Savior for eternal and good life.

St. Tikhon Zadonsky in Op. “On True Christianity” justifies the need to imitate God, emphasizing the imitation of the goodness of God: “...Christians, as if they were born again from God, owe God, their Father, to be like their morals; should imitate the good God in His goodness...” (T. 3, p. 83). Human B. St. Tikhon divides into spiritual, necessary for “our true bliss”, and bodily, temporary, associated with the continuation of life, health, etc. “The great goodness of God”, he considers the very ability of a person to turn to the “incomprehensible” God with prayers and requests for the gift of B (Ibid., p. 91). Metropolitan Macarius (Bulgakov) in "Orthodox Dogmatic Theology", discussing the essential properties of God, divides them into properties of the being, mind and will of God, refers to the latter "infinite goodness", which "according to the difference in the conditions of the beings on which it acts ”(T. 1. S. 135), calls it “grace”, “mercy”, “long-suffering”, “mercy”. Metropolitan Macarius emphasizes that God is not only called good, but, as the Holy. Scripture is “the only good one” (Ibid., p. 136), at the same time, the goodness of God is manifested in relation to the created world, to people (Ibid., p. 136-139).

St. Theophan the Recluse is convinced of the impossibility of achieving Divine B. by human efforts alone: ​​in isolation from God, a person is not able to achieve B. In the book. "The Way to Salvation" St. Theophan examines the Divine grace given in the sacrament of St. Communion, as a source and an indispensable condition for gaining Divine B., and the bliss of a person - as a result of participation in the Divine B. and a righteous life. St. Theophanes writes that "God Himself brings the spirit of man into His treasury and gives to taste from its blessings" (p. 127).

Ep. Sylvester (Malevansky) in his "Experience in Orthodox Dogmatic Theology" builds his reasoning about B. on the religious-anthropological principle, on the understanding of man as "the image and likeness of God." Considering the spiritual and sensual nature of man, his “love for the good and the sweet feeling of this good”, ep. Sylvester notes that what is inherent in man “should be conceivable in God, but only with the consciousness of that infinite difference that exists in this case between our finite spirit and the infinite Spirit of God” (T. 2. Part 1. S. 163). If God, as an “infinite Spirit,” contains in Himself the conditions for the realization of B. and is B. itself and bliss, then a person does not have these conditions in himself, he must find them outside himself and finds them in God, in the Supreme Good, which is the most perfect fullness of being and the harmonious unity of life. God's love for B., writes Bishop. Sylvester, first of all, “focuses on Himself” (Ibid.), but being good by nature (B. himself), God is good to the world and man. In relation to the world and man, the goodness and love of God are manifested, according to Bishop. Sylvester, in the creation of the world and man, in the "paternal providence", in the grace given to man, in the love of mankind, mercy and longsuffering of God, in salvation for eternal life and the blessedness of the righteous. Touching upon the question of the relationship between B. and the Truth of God, understood as a reward, ep. Sylvester insists on their unity and is convinced that the Truth of God, “giving bliss for good alone and depriving it for evil” (Ibid., p. 169), contributes to B.

F. A. Golubinsky in his “Lectures on Speculative Theology” considers the highest B. for people to be the presence of God in the world, the manifestation of His perfections and the realization of His will in life. Although the Wisdom of God, notes Golubinsky, man was created as an independent being, capable of spiritual and moral perfection, in his striving for B. man can always hope for God's help and His assistance (p. 147). V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov in the book. The Elementary Foundations of Philosophy critically analyzes eudemonism, utilitarianism, and Kant's theory of moral duty; he sees the main drawback of these moral teachings in their isolation from the "natural connection" with God. Absolute B., considers Kudryavtsev-Platonov, cannot be an abstract “concept or ideal of moral perfection”, it is a property of a “good personal Being” (p. 437).

In book. archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) (later Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus') "Orthodox teaching about salvation", revealing the moral and subjective side of salvation, B. is analyzed from the v. sp. man, his relationship to God and the economy of salvation. Outlining his view on the understanding of B., Archbishop. Sergius refers to the teachings about B. blzh. Augustine, St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Macarius of Egypt and others. The highest B. for a person archbishop. Sergius considers eternal life, which is the ultimate goal of the economy of salvation, and the condition for achieving eternal life is the knowledge of God, as fundamentally different from the abstract-rational knowledge of God, "purification of the heart" and "experiencing the presence of God in oneself" (p. 95) . Seeing in the knowledge of God "personal communion with God", which makes a person a partaker of the Divine sacraments and B., archbishop. Sergius develops the concept of "likeness" to God. Assimilation, he believes, is possible only with the help of Divine grace, it allows you to reproduce the "image of God" (p. 96), leads to holiness and "gives eternal life" (p. 97); only “likeness to God makes communion with God the true good of man” (p. 107). Noting the inner unity in the communion with God of holiness and blessedness, Archbishop. Sergius insists that "the benefit of communion with God consists in holiness, and not in delight" (p. 111).

V. V. Bolotov in the book. "The Teaching of Origen about the Holy Trinity" in ch. “The Goodness of the Son” subjects Origen’s views on B. to a thorough textual and critical analysis in connection with his teaching about the differences between the B. Father and the B. Son as “the image of His goodness” (Bolotov V.V. Sobr. Church-historical works. M ., 1999. T. 1. S. 295-308). P. Ya. Svetlov in the book. "The idea of ​​the Kingdom of God and its significance for the Christian worldview" considers the Kingdom of God as "the totality of all blessings" bestowed by Christ on people. S. M. Zarin in the book. "Asceticism in Orthodox Christian Teaching" notes that, according to the teachings of St. John Chrysostom and St. Isaac the Syrian, Divine love and goodness of God are also revealed in the punishment of sinners (p. 209). The plan of one of the most detailed concepts of B. in Russian. theology is planned by M. D. Muretov. In his study of the New Testament revelation, along with the doctrine of the God-Man-Savior, the theme of B. becomes a key one; in Op. " New Testament as a subject of Orthodox theological study” B. and beatitude are considered in the following aspects: 1) theological, cosmological and anthropological - as the root cause, meaning and ultimate goal of being; 2) Christological and soteriological - the God-man as "an objective condition for the realization of the good" and the salvation of people; 3) pistological - faith as a subjective condition for a person to achieve B.; 4) ecclesiological - the Church as "an objective historical realization of the good in the world"; 5) eschatological - eternal life as "the last realization of the good" (Muretov M.D. Selected works. M., 2002. S. 55-88). Muretov's idea was not fully realized. In the work “The Four Gospels”, Muretov substantiates the presence of B. in the world, on the one hand, by the existence of God, identified with B. himself (“God ... can only realize in the world the idea of ​​goodness, for the whole world in general - the idea of ​​well-being (in Him there is life was), but for humanity - the idea of ​​moral good (and life was the light of people) ”- Ibid., p. 183). On the other hand, the presence of B. in the world is due to the god-likeness of a person, which allows him to realize in life "the ideal of the good and bliss of the Truth of God." Muretov is convinced of the existence of moral progress, the goal of which is to achieve the ideal of B. in history, and is overly optimistic about its present and future course.

In Russian philosophy of the XIX-XX centuries.

B.'s theme is developed in accordance with the peculiarities of its main directions; in religious and philosophical currents, the concept of B. is mainly considered in connection with the teachings of religion. And moral attitude a person to the world, God and the Kingdom of God and is focused on the problem of higher B.; at the other extreme—in deistic, materialistic, and nihilistic teachings—the topic of banking is subordinated to the utilitarian-political problems of social banking and its future structure; between these poles is a spectrum of philosophical teachings, in which the discussion of the concept of B. is limited to ethical issues proper.

AI Galich in his ethical and psychological characteristics of B. is close to the teachings of Spinoza, Locke, Hobbes; in the Lexicon of Philosophical Subjects, he defines B. as opposed to evil, as something that “by its perfection” gives a person “pleasure and contentment” and is consistent with his desire for a “sorrowless state” (T. 1. S. 84). The prototype and “ideal” of such a sorrowless state, according to Galich, is the absolute supreme B., which cannot be considered as a means and forms the “ultimate goal of desires and aspirations” (Ibid.). Galich reproduces the tradition. the division of B. (pleasures) into sensual (Epicureanism), spiritual (Stoics, “ascetics”), and spiritually reasonable; the former are temporary and transient, the latter are characteristic of "disembodied spirits", and not of a person in his current state; only spiritually reasonable B. correspond to human nature; in them “earthly goods acquire the meaning of heavenly gifts” (Ibid., p. 85).

P.I. Pestel in his constitutional project “Russian Truth” wrote: “The government exists for the Good of the People ... while the people exist for their own Good and for the Fulfillment of the Will of the Most High ...” (Rebellion of the Decembrists. M., 1958. Vol. 7 pp. 116). The problems of “folk” or “public” biosphere are discussed in the works of P. Ya. Chaadaev, A. I. Herzen, N. G. Debol’skii, and other authors.

The most complete and deep teaching about B. in Russian. philosophical literature developed by Vl. S. Solovyov. Complex in meaning and structure, Solovyov's concept is presented in metaphysical and ethical writings ("Readings on God-manhood", "Justification of the Good", etc.), as well as in articles devoted to the study of individual philosophical teachings and special moral problems. Solovyov's concept in "Justification of the Good" includes a critical part and a positive disclosure of the doctrine of B. The general methodological indications include Solovyov's remark about the "affinity" of B. and the good; the internal semantic unity of good and goodness makes it possible to identify them in ordinary word usage (Soloviev, vol. 8, p. 181), but requires distinction in theoretical research. In the critical part, Solovyov analyzed the main philosophical teachings about B. Epicurus, Aristotle, the Stoics, Kant, Hegel, etc. Starting from the fundamental position for his teaching that “pleasure is not the essence of good”, Solovyov gives strong arguments against eudemonism in a variety of ways. its forms; he criticizes the concepts of sensual, spiritual and "reasonable pleasure" and "carefree state", as well as utilitarianism, with its ideas about B. as a benefit.

Solovyov's own concept develops in several. directions, united by the unity of design - the doctrine of unity. Religious-ontological and metaphysical interpretation B. proceeds from the understanding of God as “the highest, supreme good,” the Absolute, and finds its expression in an extremely important position, only in form reminiscent of Platonism: “The Absolute realizes good through truth in beauty” (T. 3. S. 111). In theodicy, Solovyov proceeds from traditions. for Christianity, the idea that God rejects evil, that the final victory over evil is possible only thanks to God, and without God it is impossible for man. At the same time, Solovyov notes, God allows evil "as a superior condition for freedom, that is, a greater good." God's destruction of evil in the human world would mean, according to Solovyov, the denial of human freedom in relation to good, would deprive good of moral value. “God allows evil,” Solovyov writes, “because in his Wisdom he has the ability to extract greater good from evil ...” (T. 8. S. 203).

The theme of human freedom is central to Solovyov's ethics; he considers man as a being "supernatural", spiritual and moral, connected with God by invisible ties. Death, as a consequence of original sin, according to Solovyov, enters a person's life and represents the unremovable alone. human strength evil. Solovyov tries to reconcile the principles of heteronomous and autonomous ethics. Reflecting on the differences between good and good, Solovyov, on the one hand, emphasizes that a person himself is not able to make “his good a real good”, it is from God, for only He is “the inseparable and unchanging identity of Good, Good and Bliss” (Ibid., p. 178), with others, that only “moral goodness… is the way to actually achieve real good” (Ibid.). The idea of ​​B. (good), Solovyov believes, is inherent in the human mind as a being created by God, a person in prayerful invocation of God can and should hope for God's help, but moral good must be revealed and implemented in life by a free being. Finally, in the doctrine of God-manhood, the Church and the Kingdom of God, the question of B. in Solovyov comes to an end. The world in which a person lives, Solovyov believes, is not B. “The disaster of all disasters - death, turns out to be an absolute necessity here, and the good of all blessings - immortality - is an absolute impossibility. This means that a person cannot receive real freedom from the world. Only God-manhood, or the Church, based on inner unity and the all-round combination of manifest and secret life in the order of the Kingdom of God, only the Church, affirming the essential primacy of the spirit and promising the final resurrection of the flesh, opens to man the realm of the positive realization of his freedom, or the real satisfaction of his will. Ibid., p. 475). In the Church, in striving for God and the Kingdom of God, all believers, living and dead, unite: “both sides have their prayer books in each other, both help each other in achieving eternal good” (Ibid., p. 487).

In the religious and journalistic works of L. N. Tolstoy “Religion and Morality”, “Christian Doctrine”, and others, religion is considered as a person’s attitude to the world, and a person’s desire for personal or public B. is in the form of a certain negative feature; if 1st is proper primitive religion, then the 2nd - pagan. Tolstoy condemns a person’s desire for personal and social B., claims that “a person wants good for himself, sees the meaning of his life in this,” but over time he becomes convinced of the impossibility of achieving B. for himself (Christian teaching. St. Petersburg, 1906. C . eleven). Nevertheless, B., according to Tolstoy, is achievable and achievable only in true religion, in Christianity, in the subordination of man to the will of God. In Art. “Thoughts about God” Tolstoy formulates his understanding of B.: “Love for God means to desire what God desires. He wishes well for everything” (Ibid., p. 20). However, from Tolstoy’s further reasoning, the dubious nature of his constructions becomes clear: he completely identifies B. with love, and “the desire for the good of everything that exists” calls God, the Being “who is revealed to man by consciousness” (Ibid., p. 96), i.e. questions of faith can be resolved only by self-consciousness and self-deepening of a person. The rational-moralistic understanding of B. and man is expressed with all certainty by Tolstoy in the program essay “What is my faith”. Here Tolstoy wrote: “Following reason to achieve good - this has always been the teaching of all the true teachers of mankind, this is the whole teaching of Christ, and it is something, that is, reason, that cannot be denied by reason” (PSS: V 22 v. Moscow, 1913, vol. 11, p. 484).

N. F. Fedorov in his teaching criticizes Vl. Solovyov and L. N. Tolstoy for their "inconsistency" in the matter of overcoming death (or evil). In book. “Philosophy of the common cause”, he identifies evil with death, and life with good (B.) and reduces the whole complex problem of B. to the main goal of his religious utopian project - to “resurrection of the dead”. Speaking about man's falling away from God, Fedorov believes that only the resurrection of the dead destroys "sin, death and alienation from the Being of the All-Good" and contributes to the expansion of the "realm of good" (Ibid., p. 450).

Book. S. N. Trubetskoy in the doctrine of the Kingdom of God notes that “It is the highest good that is given by God, but together it constitutes the goal and task of the human will, its only true and reasonable goal” (Teaching on the Logos, p. 418). Holy P. Florensky considers the source of B. the All-good God; to the blessings and gifts of God, along with others, he refers the name of a person (T. 3. Part 2. S. 202); the highest B., given by God to man, he believes eternal life. “Eternal Life ... or simply “Life” ... means the greatest blessing to which a person is called to possess” (T. 1, p. 472). S. N. Bulgakov in the book. "The Light of Non-Evening", discussing in line with Christ. Platonism and Sophiology, the question of the creation of the world from nothing, ontologizes nothing, understands it as a kind of potential foundation of the world, which becomes the world of creation, or being, due to the goodness of the Creator; nothing "becomes good by joining the good, from a dark insignificance becoming being" (p. 260). Considering the problem of the fall into sin and the origin of evil, Bulgakov notes that a good God cannot be the cause of evil, evil is not created by God and, accordingly, is not being, but its negation. Bulgakov reduces his views to a very peculiar formula: “There is only good, and everything that is not good is not” (Ibid., p. 262).

An original attempt to develop the doctrine of B. in connection with the name of the New Testament books - εὐαγγέλιον, "good news" - is made by S. L. Frank in his work "Light in the Darkness". He believes that the meaning of the "good news" is revealed only with a consistent understanding of Christ. teachings about the Kingdom of God, the Person of Jesus Christ, the Church and the grace-filled powers of God. In his reflections, Frank comes to the conclusion that the "good news" should be understood primarily as the Divine B. of man's salvation. In book. “God is with us,” Frank notes the exceptional nature of the concept of B. in Christianity: the Divine “invisible good is infinitely more valuable than all earthly blessings, and the bliss of a person - the achievement of the true goal of his life - is carried out despite his suffering in the world and even through these sufferings "(p. 171). Dr. Frank's important thought concerns the ontological priority of the highest good, the source of which is God, the need to distinguish between the "highest good" and "moral good" and the inadmissibility of their identification. Frank writes: "... the human soul knows some good, or yearns for some good, higher than moral good: this is the good that saves the soul" (p. 184-185). In the ethics of N. A. Berdyaev, N. O. Lossky and L. P. Karsavin, the central place is given to the problems of good and evil and the concept of values; B. is identified with “absolute good” or “Good itself”, but as an independent topic it is developed episodically. Berdyaev opposes the understanding of B. as a striving for happiness and satisfaction, against the teachings inherent in the pre-Kantian philosophy of modern times, and believes that the task of "creative ethics" should be the creation of "eternal, enduring, immortal goods and values" (On the appointment of man. With 227), but his very interpretation of these benefits remains very vague. Lossky writes about a person's disinterested love for the All-Benevolent as absolute good (Conditions for absolute good, p. 60). Karsavin, to his doctrine of total unity, gives the meaning of “all-one good” or “all-one good” (On Good and Evil, p. 282). Historical and philosophical aspects of the problems of biochemistry are considered in the works of V. N. D. Karpov. G . The wisdom and goodness of God in the fate of the world and man. SPb., b. G.; Filaret (Gumilevsky), archbishop. Orthodox dogmatic theology. St. Petersburg, 18823; Debolsky N . G . About the highest good or about the supreme goal of moral activity. St. Petersburg, 1886; Yanyshev I . L . Orthodox Christian doctrine of morality. M., 1887; he is. natural moral law. Serg. P., 1897; Tikhon of Zadonsk, St. Creations: In 5 vols. M., 18895. Vol. 2; Anthony (Khrapovitsky), archim. How does serving the public good relate to caring for the salvation of one's own soul // VFiP. 1892. No. 12. S. 64-90; Sylvester (Malevansky), bishop. Theology. T. 2. Part 1; Sergius (Stragorodsky), archim. [follow . Patriarch]. Orthodox teaching about salvation. Kaz., 18982, 1991; he is. Eternal life as the highest good // Alpha and Omega. M., 1999. No. 2 (29). pp. 147-172; No. 3 (21). pp. 130-145; Berdyaev N . A . Ethical problem in the light of philosophical idealism // Problems of idealism. M., 1903, 2002p; he is. About the appointment of a person. M., 1993; Svetlov P . I . The idea of ​​the Kingdom of God and its significance for the Christian world outlook. Serg. P., 1906; Trubetskoy S. N . The doctrine of the Logos in its history. M., 1906, 2000p; Fedorov N . F . Philosophy of the common cause. Faithful, 1906. Vol. 1; Zarin S. M . Asceticism in Orthodox Christian teaching. SPb., 1907, M., 1996; Theophan [The Recluse], bishop . The Way to Salvation: A Brief Essay on Asceticism. M., 1908; Solovyov V . WITH . Sobr. cit.: In 10 vols. St. Petersburg, 2; Stelletsky N . WITH . The experience of moral theology. Kh., 1914; Kudryavtsev-Platonov IN . D . Basic foundations of philosophy. Serg. P., 19159; Bulgakov C . N . The Light of the Night. M., 1917; Lossky N . ABOUT . value and existence. P., 1931; he is. Conditions of absolute goodness. M., 1991; Frank S. L . The light in the darkness. P., 1949; he is. God is with us. P., 1964; Karsavin L . P . On Good and Evil // Small Op. SPb., 1994; Florensky P ., Priest . Cit.: In 4 vols. M., 1994-1999.

A. T. Kazaryan