Stepin in Philosophy of Science and Gardariki. Stepin V.S., Gorokhov V.G., Rozov M.A.

V.G.Gorokhov

M.A. Rozov

Philosophy of science and technology

ABOUT CHAPTER

Introduction .THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Rozov M.A., Stepin V.S.

Section I. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON

Stepin V.S.

Chapter 1. FEATURES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS ROLE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION

Science in the technogenic world

Global crises and the problem of value

scientific and technological progress

Specificity scientific knowledge

Chapter 2 GENESIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Section II. SCIENCE AS A TRADITION

Rozov M.A.

Chapter 3. THE EVOLUTION OF APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF SCIENCE

Chapter 4 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE AS A TRADITION

What is science like?

Types and connections of scientific programs

Chapter 5 INNOVATIONS AND THEIR MECHANISMS

Types of innovations in the development of science

Traditions and innovations

Chapter 6 TRADITIONS AND THE PHENOMENON OF KNOWLEDGE

Chapter 7 SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM WITH REFLECTION

The concept of a reflective system

Reflexive symmetry and connections of scientific disciplines

Section III. STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Stepin V.S.

Chapter 8 EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LEVELS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

The concepts of empirical and theoretical (main features)

Structure of the empirical study

The structure of the theoretical study

Foundations of Science

Chapter 9 DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Interaction of the scientific picture of the world and experience

Formation of particular theoretical schemes and laws

The logic of constructing advanced theories in classical physics

Features of the construction of developed, mathematicized theories in modern science

Chapter 10 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND CHANGE OF TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY

The phenomenon of scientific revolutions

Global scientific revolutions: from classical to post-non-classical science

Historical types of scientific rationality

Section IV. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Gorokhov V.G.

Chapter 11 THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

What is the philosophy of technology?

The problem of the relationship between science and technology

Specificity of natural and technical sciences

Fundamental and applied research in technical sciences

Chapter 12 PHYSICAL THEORY AND TECHNICAL THEORY. GENESIS OF CLASSICAL TECHNICAL SCIENCES

The structure of technical theory

Functioning of technical theory

Formation and development of technical theory

Chapter 13 THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES AND DESIGN AND THE NEED FOR SOCIAL ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY

Classical engineering activity

System engineering activity

Sociotechnical design

The problem of assessing the social, environmental and other consequences of technology

Introduction THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Now, at the end of the twentieth century, looking back, we can say with confidence that no other sphere of spiritual culture has had such a significant and dynamic impact on society as science. Both in our worldview and in the world of things around us, we everywhere deal with the consequences of its development. With many of them, we have grown so close that we are no longer inclined to notice them, let alone see them as special achievements.

Nothing can compare with the rates of its own growth and transformation of science. Almost no one, except historians, reads the works of even such luminaries of natural science of the last century as Alexander Humboldt, Faraday, Maxwell or Darwin. No one studies physics any more according to the works of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, although they are almost our contemporaries. Science is all about the future.

Every scientist, even a great one, is doomed to the fact that his results will eventually be reformulated, expressed in a different language, and his ideas will be transformed. Science is alien to individualism, it calls everyone to sacrifice for the sake of a common cause, although it keeps in social memory the names of great and small creators who contributed to its development. But ideas after their publication begin to live an independent life, not subject to the will and desires of their creators. Sometimes it happens that a scientist until the end of his days cannot accept what his own ideas have become. They no longer belong to him, he is not able to keep up with their development and control their use.

It is not surprising that in our time science is often the object of fierce criticism, it is accused of all mortal sins, including the horrors of Chernobyl and the environmental crisis in general. But, firstly, criticism of this kind is only an indirect recognition of the enormous role and power of science, because it would never occur to anyone to blame modern music, painting or architecture for anything like that. And secondly, it is absurd to blame science for the fact that society is not always able to use its results for its own benefit. Matches were not made for children to play with fire.

What has already been said is enough to understand that science is a completely worthy object of study. In our time, it has come under the cross attention of several disciplines at once, including history, sociology, economics, psychology, science of science. The philosophy and methodology of science occupy a special place in this series. Science is multifaceted and multifaceted, but above all it is the production of knowledge. Science does not exist without knowledge, just as the automotive industry does not exist without the automobile. One can therefore be interested in the history of scientific institutions, the sociology and psychology of scientific collectives, but it is the production of knowledge that makes science a science. And it is from this point of view that we will approach it in the future. The philosophy of science tries to answer the following basic questions: what is scientific knowledge, how it is arranged, what are the principles of its organization and functioning, what is science as the production of knowledge, what are the patterns of formation and development of scientific disciplines, how do they differ from each other and how do they interact? ? This, of course, is by no means a complete list, but it gives a rough idea of ​​what the philosophy of science is primarily interested in.

So, we will consider science as the production of knowledge. But even from this point of view, it is something extremely multicomponent and heterogeneous. These are the experimental means necessary for the study of phenomena - instruments and installations with the help of which these phenomena are recorded and reproduced. These are the methods by which the subjects of research (fragments and aspects of the objective world, to which scientific knowledge is directed) are distinguished and cognized. These are people engaged in scientific research, writing articles or monographs. These are institutions and organizations such as laboratories, institutes, academies, scientific journals. These are knowledge systems fixed in the form of texts and filling the shelves of libraries. These are conferences, discussions, dissertation defenses, scientific expeditions* The list of this kind can go on and on, but even now the huge heterogeneity of the listed phenomena is striking. What unites them? Is it possible to reduce all this diversity to one thing?

The simplest and fairly obvious assumption may be that science is a certain human activity, isolated in the process of division of labor and aimed at obtaining knowledge. It is worth characterizing this activity, its goals, means and products, and it will unite all the listed phenomena, for example, the activity of a carpenter combines boards, glue, varnish, a desk, a planer and much more. In other words, the thought suggests itself that to study science means to study a scientist at work, to study the technology of his activity in the production of knowledge. It is difficult to object to this.

True, to a large extent, the scientist himself studies and describes his own activities: scientific texts, for example, contain detailed description experiments done, problem solving methods, etc. But having described the experiment, the scientist, with rare exceptions, does not try to trace exactly how he came to the idea of ​​this experiment, and if he tries, then the results of such work are no longer organically included in the content of special scientific works.

Without going into details and coarsening the picture, we can say that a scientist working in one or another special field of science, as a rule, confines himself to describing those aspects of his activity that can also be represented as a characteristic of the phenomena being studied. So, for example, when a chemist describes a method for obtaining certain compounds, then this is not only a description of the activity, but also a description of the compounds themselves: such and such a substance can be obtained in such and such a way. But not everything in the activity of a scientist can be represented in this way. The procedures of scientific search in different fields of knowledge have much in common, and this already takes them beyond the narrow professional interests of one or another special science.

So, one aspect of the study of science can be the study of a scientist at work. The results of such a study can be of a normative nature, because by describing an activity that led to success, we unwittingly propagate a positive model, and a description of an unsuccessful activity sounds like a warning.

But is it right to reduce the study of science to the description of the activities of individuals? Science is not only an activity. Activity is always personified, one can talk about the activity of a specific person or group of people, and science acts as some kind of supra-individual, transpersonal phenomenon. This is not just the activity of Galileo, Maxwell or Darwin. Of course, the works of these scientists had an impact on science, but each of them worked within the framework of the science of his time and obeyed its requirements and laws. If we somehow understand the meaning of the expressions "work in science", "influence science", "submit to the requirements of science", then we have already intuitively contrasted science with the activity of an individual or a group of people and must now answer the question: what is represents this impersonal whole peeping out from behind the back of each of its individual representatives?

Looking ahead, we can say that we are talking about scientific traditions within which the scientist works. The strength of these traditions is recognized by the researchers themselves. Here is what our famous geographer and soil scientist B.B. Polynov writes, allegedly quoting excerpts from the diary of a foreign scientist: “Whatever I take, be it a test tube or a glass rod, whatever I approach: an autoclave or a microscope, - all this was once invented by someone, and all this makes me make certain movements and take a certain position. I feel like a trained animal, and this similarity is all the more complete because, before learning to accurately and quickly carry out the silent orders of all these things and the ghosts of the past hidden behind them, I really went through a long school of training as a student, doctoral student and doctor* "And further:" Nobody can reproach me for the incorrect use of literary sources. it did not take much effort to make sure that in several dozen of my works, which have made me a reputation as an original scientist and are readily quoted by my colleagues and students, there is not a single fact and not a single thought that would not have been foreseen, prepared or in one way or another provoked by my teachers, predecessors or wranglings of my contemporaries".

It may seem that we have before us a caricature. But B.B. Polynov himself sums up the above entries as follows: “Everything that the author of the diary wrote is nothing but the real real conditions for the creativity of many tens, hundreds of naturalists around the world. Moreover, these are the very conditions that only can guarantee the development of science, i.e. the use of the experience of the past and the further growth of an infinite number of germs of all kinds of ideas, sometimes hidden in the distant past.

So, science is an activity that is possible only thanks to tradition, or, more precisely, the multitude of traditions within which this activity is carried out. It can itself be seen as a special type of tradition transmitted in human culture. Activities and traditions are two different, albeit inextricably linked, aspects of science, requiring, generally speaking, different approaches and research methods. Of course, activities are carried out in traditions, i.e. does not exist without them, and traditions, in turn, do not exist outside of activity. But studying traditions, we describe some natural process, while acts of activity are always purposeful. They involve the choice of values ​​and goals by the subject of activity, and it is impossible to understand the activity without fixing the goal. The philosophy of science, being a discipline of the humanities, is faced here with the dilemma of explanation and understanding, which is cardinal for humanitarian knowledge.

Let's consider it in more detail. Imagine an experimenter in a laboratory, surrounded by instruments and various kinds of experimental setups. He must understand the purpose of all these devices, for him they are a kind of text that he can read and interpret in a certain way. Of course, the microscope on his desk was not invented and made by him, of course, it had been used before. Our experimenter is traditional. He, however, may object and say that he uses the microscope not at all because it was done before him, but because it suits his current goals. True, the goals are quite traditional, but our experimenter again chose them not because of their traditional nature, but because they seemed to him interesting and attractive in the current situation. All this is true, our experimenter does not deceive us. Having studied traditions, therefore, we will not yet understand activity. To do this, we need to delve into its goals and motives, to see the world through the eyes of an experimenter.

The ratio of understanding and explanatory approach is very difficult problem not only the philosophy of science, but also humanitarian knowledge in general.

The analysis of science as a tradition and as an activity are two methods of analysis that complement each other. Each highlights a particular aspect of the complex whole that science is. And their combination allows you to develop a more complete picture of science.

Considering science as an activity aimed at the production of new knowledge, and as a tradition, it is important to take into account the historical variability of the scientific activity itself and the scientific tradition. In other words, the philosophy of science, analyzing the patterns of development of scientific knowledge, must take into account the historicism of science. In the process of its development, there is not only the accumulation of new knowledge and the restructuring of previously established ideas about the world. In this process, all components of scientific activity change: the objects studied by it, the means and methods of research, the features of scientific communications, the forms of division and cooperation of scientific work, etc.

Even a cursory comparison of modern science and the science of previous eras reveals striking changes. A scientist of the classical era (from the 17th to the beginning of the 20th century), for example, Newton or Maxwell, would hardly have accepted the ideas and methods of quantum mechanical description, since he considered it unacceptable to include references to the observer and means of observation in the theoretical description and explanation. Such references would have been perceived in the classical era as a rejection of the ideal of objectivity. But Bohr and Heisenberg - one of the creators of quantum mechanics - on the contrary, argued that it is this way of theoretical description of the microworld that guarantees the objectivity of knowledge about the new reality. Another era - other ideals of science.

In our time, the very nature of scientific activity has changed in comparison with the studies of the classical era. The science of small communities of scientists has been replaced by modern "big science" with its almost industrial use of complex and expensive instrumentation systems (such as large telescopes, modern systems for the separation of chemical elements, elementary particle accelerators), with a sharp increase in the number of people involved in scientific activities and serving her; with large associations of specialists in various fields, with targeted state funding of scientific programs, etc.

The functions of science in the life of society, its place in culture and its interaction with other areas of cultural creativity also change from era to era. Already in the XVII century. the emerging natural science declared its claims to the formation of dominant worldview images in culture. Acquiring ideological functions, science has become more and more active in influencing other spheres of social life, including the ordinary consciousness of people. The value of education based on the assimilation of scientific knowledge began to be taken for granted.

In the second half of the 19th century, science is increasingly being used in engineering and technology. While retaining its cultural and ideological function, it acquires a new social function - it becomes the productive force of society.

The 20th century can be characterized as an ever-expanding use of science in the most diverse areas of social life. Science is beginning to be increasingly applied in various areas of social process management, acting as the basis for qualified expert assessments and managerial decision-making. Connecting with the authorities, it really begins to influence the choice of certain paths. social development. This new feature the sciences are sometimes characterized as turning it into a social force. At the same time, the ideological functions of science and its role as a direct productive force are strengthened.

But if the very strategies of scientific activity and its functions in the life of society change, then new questions arise. Will the face of science and its functions in the life of society continue to change? Has scientific rationality always occupied a priority place in the scale of values, or is it characteristic only for a certain type of culture and certain civilizations? Is it possible for science to lose its former value status and its former social functions? And finally, what changes can be expected in the system of scientific activity itself and in its interaction with other spheres of culture at the next civilizational turning point, in connection with the search by mankind for ways out of modern global crises?

All these questions act as formulations of the problems discussed in modern philosophy of science. Accounting for this issue allows you to clarify the understanding of its subject. The subject of the philosophy of science are general patterns and trends of scientific knowledge as a special activity for the production of scientific knowledge taken in their historical development and considered in a historically changing socio-cultural context.

Modern philosophy of science considers scientific knowledge as a sociocultural phenomenon. And one of its important tasks is to study how historically the ways of forming new scientific knowledge are changing and what are the mechanisms of the influence of sociocultural factors on this process.

In order to reveal the general patterns of development of scientific knowledge, the philosophy of science must be based on the material of the history of various specific sciences. It develops certain hypotheses and models of the development of knowledge, testing them on the relevant historical material. All this determines the close connection between the philosophy of science and historical and scientific research.

The philosophy of science has always turned to the analysis of the structure of the dynamics of knowledge of specific scientific disciplines. But at the same time, it is focused on comparing different scientific disciplines, on identifying common patterns of their development. Just as it is impossible to demand from a biologist that he limit himself to the study of one organism or one type of organisms, so it is impossible to deprive the philosophy of science of its empirical basis and the possibility of comparisons and comparisons.

For a long time in the philosophy of science, mathematics was chosen as a model for studying the structure and dynamics of cognition. However, there is no pronounced layer of empirical knowledge here, and therefore, when analyzing mathematical texts, it is difficult to identify those features of the structure and functioning of the theory that are associated with its relationship to the empirical basis. That is why the philosophy of science, especially since the end of the 19th century, has increasingly focused on the analysis of natural science knowledge, which contains a variety of different types of theories and a developed empirical basis.

The ideas and models of the dynamics of science developed on the basis of this historical material may require adjustment when transferred to other sciences. But the development of cognition is exactly what happens: ideas developed and tested on one material are then transferred to another area and modified if they are found to be inconsistent with the new material.

One can often come across the assertion that ideas about the development of knowledge in the analysis of the natural sciences cannot be transferred to the field of social cognition.

The basis for such prohibitions is the distinction made in the 19th century between the sciences of nature and the sciences of the spirit. But at the same time, it is necessary to be aware that knowledge in the social sciences, the humanities and the sciences of nature has common features precisely because it is scientific knowledge. Their difference is rooted in the specifics of the subject area. In the social sciences and humanities, the subject includes a person, his consciousness, and often acts as a text that has a human meaning. The fixation of such an object and its study require special methods and cognitive procedures. However, for all the complexity of the subject of the social sciences and the humanities, the focus on its objective study and the search for laws is a mandatory characteristic of the scientific approach. This circumstance is not always taken into account by supporters of the "absolute specificity" of humanitarian and socio-historical knowledge. His opposition to the natural sciences is sometimes made incorrectly. Humanitarian knowledge is interpreted extremely broadly: it includes philosophical essays, journalism, art criticism, fiction and so on. But the correct formulation of the problem should be different. It requires a clear distinction between the concepts of "socio-humanitarian knowledge" and "scientific social-humanitarian knowledge". The first includes the results scientific research, but is not limited to them, since it also implies other, non-scientific forms of creativity. The second is limited only by the scope of scientific research. Of course, this research itself is not isolated from other spheres of culture, it interacts with them, but this is not a basis for identifying science with other, albeit closely related, forms of human creativity.

If we proceed from a comparison of the sciences of society and man, on the one hand, and the sciences of nature, on the other, then we must recognize the presence in their cognitive procedures of both general and specific content. But the methodological schemes developed in one area may capture some common features of the structure and dynamics of knowledge in another area, and then the methodology may well develop its concepts in the same way as it is done in any other area of ​​scientific knowledge, including the social sciences and humanities. . It can transfer models developed in one field of knowledge to another and then correct them, adapting them to the specifics of a new subject.

In doing so, at least two factors should be taken into account. First, the philosophical and methodological analysis of science, regardless of whether it is oriented towards natural science or the social sciences and the humanities, itself belongs to the sphere of historical social cognition. Even when a philosopher and methodologist deals with specialized texts of natural science, his subject is not physical fields, not elementary particles, not the processes of development of organisms, but scientific knowledge, its dynamics, research methods taken in their historical development. It is clear that scientific knowledge and its dynamics is not a natural, but a social process, a phenomenon of human culture, and therefore its study is a special kind of science about the spirit.

Secondly, it must be taken into account that the rigid demarcation between the sciences of nature and the sciences of the spirit had its foundations for science in the 19th century, but it is largely losing force in relation to the science of the last third of the 20th century. This will be discussed in more detail later on. But let us preliminarily note that in the natural sciences of our time, the study of complex developing systems, which have "synergistic characteristics" and include a person and his activity as their component, is beginning to play an increasingly important role. The methodology for studying such objects brings together natural science and humanitarian knowledge, erasing the rigid boundaries between them.

What does the philosophy of science give to a person who studies it without being a specialist in this field? In our pragmatic age, learning is usually expected to be of immediate benefit. What benefit can be derived from the philosophy of science by one who works or is preparing to work in science on its specific problems? Can they find in the philosophy of science a universal method for solving problems, a kind of "algorithm of discovery"? Mentally referring to specialists in the field of specific sciences on this occasion, one could say the following: no one will help you in solving your specific problems, except yourself. The philosophy of science does not make it a mandatory task to teach you something in your own field. It does not specifically formulate any specific recipes or prescriptions; it explains, describes, but does not prescribe. Of course, as already noted, any description of activity, including the activity of a scientist, can also be considered as a prescription - "do the same", but this can only be a by-product of the philosophy of science. The philosophy of science in our time has overcome its earlier illusions in creating a universal method or system of methods that could ensure the success of research for all sciences at all times. It revealed the historical variability not only of specific methods of science, but also of deep methodological guidelines that characterize scientific rationality. Modern philosophy of science has shown that scientific rationality itself evolves historically and that the dominant attitudes of scientific consciousness can change depending on the type of objects studied and under the influence of cultural changes to which science makes its specific contribution. Does this mean that the philosophy of science is generally useless for the scientist? No, it doesn't. Let's try to clarify this somewhat paradoxical situation.

Is it possible to work in the field of science without understanding what it is? Probably possible, albeit to a certain extent. To the same extent, for example, you can screw some bolt on the conveyor of a car factory, having no idea either about the production process as a whole, or about what a car is. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that expanding your understanding of the manufacturing process can significantly help in screwing a single bolt. However, if you set yourself the creative task of further development of the automotive industry, then here you may already need ideas about the previous stages and patterns of this development, and knowledge of related areas, and much, much more. It's hard to even predict what you might need. The uncertainty of the proposed preliminary information is the specificity of creative tasks. In fact, we have a tautology: if you know exactly what you need to solve a problem, then the problem is not creative. That is why the philosophy of science is not needed by a scientific craftsman, is not needed when solving typical and traditional problems, but genuine creative work, as a rule, leads the scientist to the problems of philosophy and methodology. He needs to look at his field from the outside, to understand the patterns of its development, to comprehend it in the context of science as a whole, he needs to broaden his horizons. The philosophy of science provides such an outlook, and whether you benefit from it is your business.

It is possible to approach the issue from slightly different positions, from the standpoint of value orientations, from the point of view of the meaningfulness of human life. Is it possible to satisfy us simply by screwing a bolt on a conveyor without realizing a more global goal, without understanding the process of which we are a participant? Probably not capable. And this means that any scientist needs to understand what science and scientific knowledge are, to understand the global historical process of cognition, on the altar of which he selflessly lays his head. The philosophy of science serves these tasks as well.

Book: Stepin, V.S. Philosophy of science and technology / V.S. Stepin, V.G. Gorokhov, M.A. Rozov. - M.: Gardariki, 1996.

Characteristic: one of best books on the philosophy and methodology of science and technology, combining a rigorous scientific approach to the material presented with conciseness and specificity of presentation. Despite the complexity of the issues raised, the book is distinguished by an accessible style of presentation. Philosophical problems are considered without the deliberate use of refined terminology, which makes the book accessible to students and graduate students of non-philosophical specialties. Scientific knowledge is considered as a sociocultural phenomenon. The features of scientific knowledge are described, its role in modern society. The emergence and development of scientific knowledge is traced. The approaches of Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn to the development of science are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge. The empirical and theoretical levels of knowledge are characterized, the concept of scientific revolutions is given. A separate section is devoted to the philosophy of technology.

Attention! The pagination of the proposed electronic version of the book does not match the pagination of the original paper edition. The electronic version is recommended for studying the material, but not for writing term papers and theses.

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CONTENT
INTRODUCTION THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Section I. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON
Chapter 1. FEATURES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS ROLE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION
Science in the technogenic world.
Specificity of scientific knowledge. Main features Sciences.
Chapter 2 GENESIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The state of "pre-science" and advanced science
Spiritual Revolution of Antiquity. Philosophy and Science
Section II. SCIENCE AS A TRADITION
Chapter 3 THE EVOLUTION OF APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF SCIENCE
Karl Popper and the problem of demarcation
The concept of research programs by I. Lakatos
Normal Science T. Kuhn
Difficulties and problems
Chapter 4 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE AS A TRADITION
What is science like?
The concept of cumatoid
Social Cumatoids and Social Relay Races
Types and connections of scientific programs
Science and social memory
Research and collection programs
Relay model of science
Ways of formation of science
Chapter 5 INNOVATIONS AND THEIR MECHANISMS
Types of innovations in the development of science
Variety of innovations and their relative nature
New methods and new worlds
Ignorance and ignorance
What is a discovery?
Traditions and innovations
Mounting phenomenon
Traditions and by-products of the study
Movement with transfers
Metaphorical programs and interaction of sciences
The problem of stationarity of social relay races
Chapter 6 TRADITIONS AND THE PHENOMENON OF KNOWLEDGE
"Third World" by Karl Popper
Knowledge as a mechanism of social memory
The structure of knowledge and its content
The concept of a representative
Descriptions and prescriptions
Representation in artistic thinking
Chapter 7 SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM WITH REFLECTION
The concept of a reflective system. What is scientific reflection?
Socratic dialogue and reflection
Analogies with natural science
Paradoxes of reflection and the problem of the research position
Reflection and activity
Reflexive symmetry and connections of scientific disciplines. An episode in the development of paleogeography
Reflexive symmetry
Reflexive symmetry and the symmetry of knowledge
Subject-subject and program-subject disciplinary complexes
Object-instrumental disciplinary complexes
History of science and cumulativeism
Section III. STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Chapter 8 EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LEVELS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The concepts of empirical and theoretical (main features)
Structure of the empirical study
Experiments and Observational Data
Systematic and random observations
Procedures for transition to empirical dependencies and facts
The structure of the theoretical study
Theoretical models in the structure of theory
Features of the functioning of theories. Mathematical apparatus and its interpretation
Foundations of Science
Ideals and norms of research activity
Scientific picture of the world
Philosophical foundations of science
Chapter 9 DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Interaction of the scientific picture of the world and experience
Scientific picture of the world as a regulator of empirical search in developed science
Formation of particular theoretical schemes and laws
Hypotheses and their prerequisites
Procedures for constructive substantiation of theoretical schemes
Logic of discovery and logic of hypothesis justification
The logic of constructing advanced theories in classical physics
Features of the formation of a scientific hypothesis
Paradigm patterns of problem solving
Features of the construction of developed, mathematicized theories in modern science
Application of the mathematical hypothesis method
Features of the interpretation of the mathematical apparatus
Chapter 10 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND CHANGE OF TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
The phenomenon of scientific revolutions
What is the scientific revolution?
Scientific revolution as a choice of new research strategies
Global scientific revolutions: from classical to post-non-classical science
Historical types of scientific rationality
Section IV. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
Chapter 11 THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
What is the philosophy of technology?
The problem of correlation between science and technology.
Specificity of natural and technical sciences
Fundamental and applied research in technical sciences
Chapter 12 PHYSICAL THEORY AND TECHNICAL THEORY. GENESIS OF CLASSICAL TECHNICAL SCIENCES
The structure of technical theory
Functioning of technical theory
Formation and development of technical theory
Chapter 13
Classical engineering activity
System engineering activity
Sociotechnical design
The problem of assessing the social, environmental and other consequences of technology

Tutorial. M.: Publishing house: Gardariki,
1999. - 400 pp. study guide famous Russian philosophers V. S. Stepin, V. G. Gorokhov, M. A. Rozov "Philosophy of science and technology" the key problems of the philosophy of science and technology are considered: the subject of the philosophy of science, scientific knowledge as a socio-cultural phenomenon, its features and role in conditions modern civilization, the genesis of scientific knowledge, the subject of the philosophy of technology, the current stage of development of engineering and design, the need for a social assessment of technology. Introduction: The subject of the philosophy of science.
scientific knowledge as a sociocultural phenomenon.
Features of scientific knowledge and its role in modern civilization.
science in the technogenic world.
ballroom crises and the problem of the value of scientific and technological progress.
specificity of scientific knowledge.
Genesis of scientific knowledge.
science as a tradition.
Evolution of approaches to the analysis of science.
The structure of science as a tradition.
what science is like.
types and connections of scientific programs.
Innovations and their mechanisms.
types of innovations in the development of science.
traditions and innovations.
Traditions and the phenomenon of knowledge.
Science as a system with reflection.
the concept of a reflective system.
reflexive symmetry and connections of scientific disciplines.
structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge.
Empirical and theoretical levels of scientific research.
concepts of empirical and theoretical (Basic features).
The structure of empirical research.
structure of theoretical research.
foundations of science.
Dynamics of scientific knowledge.
interaction between the scientific picture of the world and experience.
formation of private theoretical schemes and laws.
the logic of constructing developed theories in classical physics.
features of the construction of developed, mathematicized theories in modern science.
Scientific revolutions and change of types of scientific rationality.
phenomenon of scientific revolutions.
ballroom scientific revolutions: From classical to post-non-classical science.
historical types of scientific rationality.
philosophy of technology.
The subject of the philosophy of technology.
what is the philosophy of technology?
The problem of correlation between science and technology.
specificity of natural and technical sciences.
fundamental and applied research in technical sciences.
Physical theory and technical theory. Genesis of classical technical sciences.
structure of technical theory.
functioning of technical theory.
formation and development of technical theory.
The current stage of development of engineering and design and the need for social assessment of technology.
classical engineering activity.
systemic activity.
sociotechnical design.
the problem of assessing the social, environmental and other consequences of technology.

Stepin V.S., Gorokhov V.G., Rozov M.A.

Philosophy of science and technology

Tutorial. Moscow: Contact-Alpha. 1995, p. 372.

Introduction. THE SUBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Section I. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON

Science in the technogenic world

Global crises and the problem of the value of scientific and technological progress

The specifics of scientific knowledge

Chapter 2. GENESIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Section II. SCIENCE AS A TRADITION

Chapter 3. EVOLUTION OF APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF SCIENCE

Chapter 4. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE AS A TRADITION

Chapter 5. INNOVATIONS AND THEIR MECHANISMS

Types of innovations in the development of science

Traditions and innovations

Chapter 6. TRADITIONS AND THE PHENOMENON OF KNOWLEDGE

Chapter 7. SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM WITH REFLECTION

The concept of a reflective system

Reflexive symmetry and connections of scientific disciplines

Section III. STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Chapter 8. EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LEVELS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

The concepts of empirical and theoretical (main features)

Structure of the empirical study

The structure of the theoretical study

Foundations of Science

Chapter 9. DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Interaction of the scientific picture of the world and experience

Formation of particular theoretical schemes and laws

The logic of constructing advanced theories in classical physics

Features of the construction of developed, mathematicized theories in modern science

Chapter 10

The phenomenon of scientific revolutions

Global scientific revolutions: from classical to post-non-classical science

Historical types of scientific rationality

Section IV. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Chapter 11

What is the philosophy of technology?

The problem of the relationship between science and technology

Specificity of natural and technical sciences

Fundamental and applied research in technical sciences

Chapter 12. PHYSICAL THEORY AND TECHNICAL THEORY. GENESIS OF CLASSICAL TECHNICAL SCIENCES

The structure of technical theory

Functioning of technical theory

Formation and development of technical theory

Chapter 13

Classical engineering activity

System engineering activity

Sociotechnical design

The problem of assessing the social, environmental and other consequences of technology

Section I. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON

Chapter 1. FEATURES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS ROLE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION

Science in the technogenic world

Science plays a special role in modern civilization. The technological progress of the twentieth century, which led to a new quality of life in the developed countries of the West and East, is based on the application scientific achievements. Science revolutionizes not only the sphere of production, but also influences many other spheres of human activity, starting to regulate them, restructuring their means and methods.

It is not surprising that the problems of the future of modern civilization cannot be discussed outside of analysis. current trends development of science and its prospects. Although there are also anti-scientist movements in modern society, in general, science is perceived as one of the highest values ​​of civilization and culture.

However, this was not always the case, and not in all cultures did science occupy such a high place in the scale of value priorities. In this regard, the question arises about the features of the type of civilizational development that stimulated the widespread use of scientific knowledge in human activity.

In the development of mankind, after it had overcome the stage of barbarism and savagery, there were many civilizations - specific types of society, each of which had its own original history. The famous philosopher and historian A. Toynbee singled out and described 21 civilizations. All of them can be divided into two large classes according to the types of civilizational progress - into traditional and technogenic civilizations.

Technogenic civilization is a rather late product of human history. For a long time this history proceeded as an interaction of traditional societies. Only in the XV-XVII centuries in the European region a special type of development was formed, associated with the emergence of technogenic societies, their subsequent expansion to the rest of the world and the change under their influence of traditional societies. Some of these traditional societies were simply absorbed by technogenic civilization, having gone through stages of modernization, they then turned into typical technogenic societies. Others, having experienced inoculations with Western technology and culture, nevertheless retained many traditional features, turning into a kind of hybrid formation.

The differences between traditional and technogenic civilization are radical.

Traditional societies are characterized by a slow pace of social change. Of course, they also produce innovations both in the field of production and in the field of regulation. social relations, but progress is very slow compared to the lifetimes of individuals and even generations. In traditional societies, several generations of people can change, finding the same structures public life reproducing them and passing them on to the next generation. Types of activity, their means and goals can exist for centuries as stable stereotypes. Accordingly, in the culture of these societies, priority is given to traditions, patterns and norms that accumulate the experience of ancestors, canonized styles of thinking. Innovation activity is by no means perceived here as the highest value, on the contrary, it has limitations and is permissible only within the framework of centuries-old traditions. Ancient India and China, Ancient Egypt, the states of the Muslim East of the Middle Ages, etc. These are all traditional societies. This type social organization has survived to this day: many Third World states retain the features of a traditional society, although their clash with modern Western (technogenic) civilization sooner or later leads to radical transformations of traditional culture and way of life.

As for the technogenic civilization, which is often referred to by the vague concept of "Western civilization", referring to the region of its origin, this is a special type of social development and a special type of civilization, the defining features of which are to a certain extent opposite to the characteristics of traditional societies. When the technogenic civilization was formed in a relatively mature form, the pace of social change began to increase at a tremendous speed. It can be said that the extensive development of history here is replaced by an intensive one; spatial existence - temporary. The reserves of growth are no longer drawn from the expansion of cultural zones, but from the restructuring of the very foundations of the former ways of life and the formation of fundamentally new opportunities. The most important and truly epoch-making, world-historical change associated with the transition from a traditional society to a technogenic civilization is the emergence new system values. Value is innovation itself, originality, generally new. In a certain sense, the Guinness Book of Records can be considered a symbol of a technogenic society, in contrast to, say, the seven wonders of the world, which clearly shows that each individual can become one of a kind, achieve something unusual, and she, as it were, calls for this. The seven wonders of the world, on the contrary, were intended to emphasize the completeness of the world and show that everything grandiose, really unusual, had already taken place. Further, one of the highest places in the hierarchy of values ​​is the autonomy of the individual, which is generally unusual for a traditional society. There, a person is realized only through belonging to a particular corporation, being an element in a strictly defined system of corporate relations. If a person is not included in any corporation, he is not a person.

In a technogenic civilization, a special type of personal autonomy arises: a person can change his corporate ties, he is not rigidly attached to them, he can and is able to build his relations with people very flexibly, he is immersed in different social communities, and often in different cultural traditions.

Technogenic civilization began long before computers, and even long before the steam engine. Its threshold can be called the development of ancient culture, especially the culture of the polis, which gave mankind two great inventions - democracy and theoretical science, the first example of which was Euclidean geometry. These two discoveries - in the sphere of regulation of social relations and in the way of knowing the world - have become important prerequisites for the future, a fundamentally new type of civilizational progress.

The second and very important milestone was the European Middle Ages with a special understanding of man, created in the image and likeness of God, with the cult of the man-god and the cult of man's love for the man-god, for Christ, with the cult of the human mind, capable of understanding and comprehending the mystery of divine creation, deciphering those letters, which God put into the world when he created it. The last circumstance should be specially noted: the purpose of knowledge was considered to be the deciphering of God's providence, the plan of divine creation realized in the world - a terribly heretical thought from the point of view of traditional religions. But this is all a prelude.

Subsequently, in the Renaissance, many achievements of the ancient tradition are restored, but at the same time the idea of ​​the god-likeness of the human mind is assimilated. And from that moment on, the cultural matrix of technogenic civilization is being laid, which begins its own development in the 17th century. It goes through three stages: first - pre-industrial, then - industrial, and, finally, post-industrial. The most important basis of its life is, first of all, the development of technology, technology, and not only through spontaneous innovations in the sphere of production itself, but also through the generation of ever new scientific knowledge and their implementation in technical and technological processes. This is how a type of development arises, based on an accelerating change in the natural environment, the objective world in which a person lives. Changing this world leads to active transformations of people's social ties. In a technogenic civilization, scientific and technological progress is constantly changing the types of communication, forms of communication of people, personality types and lifestyle. The result is a distinctly forward-looking progress direction. The culture of technogenic societies is characterized by the idea of ​​irreversible historical time that flows from the past through the present into the future. Let us note for comparison that other understandings dominated in most traditional cultures: time was most often perceived as cyclic, when the world periodically returns to its original state. In traditional cultures, it was believed that the "golden age" had already passed, it was behind, in the distant past. The heroes of the past created models of deeds and actions that should be imitated. The culture of technogenic societies has a different orientation. In them, the idea of ​​social progress stimulates the expectation of change and movement towards the future, and the future is relied upon as the growth of civilizational conquests that ensure an ever happier world order.

Technogenic civilization has existed for just over 300 years, but it turned out to be very dynamic, mobile and very aggressive: it suppresses, subjugates, overturns, literally absorbs traditional societies and their cultures - we see this everywhere, and today this process is going on all over the world. Such an active interaction of technogenic civilization and traditional societies, as a rule, turns out to be a collision that leads to the death of the latter, to the destruction of many cultural traditions, in fact, to the death of these cultures as original entities. traditional cultures not only pushed to the periphery, but also radically transformed when traditional societies enter the path of modernization and technogenic development. Most often, these cultures are preserved only in fragments, as historical vestiges. It happened and is happening with traditional cultures. Eastern countries who carried out industrial development; the same can be said about peoples South America, Africa, embarked on the path of modernization - everywhere the cultural matrix of technogenic civilization transforms traditional cultures, transforming their meaning-of-life attitudes, replacing them with new worldview dominants.

These ideological dominants took shape in the culture of technogenic civilization even at the pre-industrial stage of its development, in the era of the Renaissance, and then the European Enlightenment.

They expressed cardinal ideological meanings: understanding of man, the world, goals and purpose of human life.

Man was understood as an active being, which is in an active relation to the world. Human activity should be directed outward, to the transformation and alteration of the external world, primarily nature, which a person must subjugate. In turn, the external world is regarded as an arena of human activity, as if the world were intended for a person to receive the benefits necessary for himself, to satisfy his needs. Of course, this does not mean that other, including alternative, worldview ideas do not arise in the new European cultural tradition.

Technogenic civilization in its very existence is defined as a society that is constantly changing its foundations. Therefore, its culture actively supports and appreciates the constant generation of new models, ideas, concepts, only some of which can be implemented in today's reality, and the rest appear as possible programs for future life, addressed to future generations. In the culture of technogenic societies, one can always find ideas and value orientations that are alternative to the dominant values. But in the real life of society, they may not play a decisive role, remaining, as it were, on the periphery. public consciousness and without setting in motion masses of people.

The idea of ​​transforming the world and man's subjugation of nature has been a dominant in the culture of technogenic civilization at all stages of its history, up to our time. If you like, this idea was the most important component of the "genetic code" that determined the very existence and evolution of technogenic societies. As for traditional societies, here the active attitude to the world, which is a generic feature of a person, was understood and evaluated from fundamentally different positions.

For a long time this ideological attitude seemed obvious to us. However, it is difficult to find in traditional cultures. peculiar traditional societies the conservatism of activities, the slow pace of their evolution, the dominance of regulatory traditions constantly limited the manifestation of the activity-transforming activity of a person. Therefore, this activity itself was interpreted rather not as directed outward, towards changing external objects, but as directed inward of a person, towards self-contemplation and self-control, which ensure adherence to tradition.

The principle of a transformative act, formulated in European culture during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, can be opposed as an alternative model to the principle of the ancient Chinese culture "wu-wei", which requires non-interference in the course of the natural process and adaptation of the individual to the established social environment. This principle ruled out the desire for its purposeful transformation, required self-control and self-discipline of an individual who is included in one or another corporate structure. The principle of "wu-wei" covered almost all the main aspects of human life. It expressed a certain understanding of the specifics and values ​​of agricultural labor, in which much depended on external, natural conditions and who constantly demanded to adapt to these conditions - to guess the rhythms of weather changes, patiently grow plants, accumulate centuries of experience in observing natural environment and properties of plants. There was a well-known parable in Chinese culture that ridiculed a man who was impatient and dissatisfied with the slow growth of cereals and began to pull the plants to speed up their growth.

But the wu-wei principle was also a special way of including an individual in the established traditional order of social relations, orienting a person to fit into the social environment in such a way that freedom and self-realization of the individual is achieved mainly in the sphere of self-change, but not changes in existing social structures.

The values ​​of technogenic culture set a fundamentally different vector of human activity. Transformative activity is considered here as the main purpose of man. The activity-active ideal of man's relationship to nature then extends to the sphere of social relations, which also begin to be considered as special social objects that a person can purposefully transform. This is connected with the cult of struggle, revolutions as locomotives of history. It is worth noting that the Marxist concept of class struggle, social revolutions and dictatorship as a way to solve social problems arose in the context of the values ​​of technogenic culture.

The second important aspect of value and ideological orientations, which is characteristic of the culture of the technogenic world, is closely connected with the understanding of human activity and purpose - the understanding of nature as an ordered, regularly arranged field in which a rational being who knows the laws of nature is able to exercise his power over external processes and objects, put them under your control. It is only necessary to invent technology to artificially change natural process and put it at the service of man, and then tamed nature will satisfy human needs on an ever-expanding scale.

As for traditional cultures, we will not find such ideas about nature in them. Nature is understood here as a living organism into which man is organically built, but not as an impersonal subject field governed by objective laws. The very notion of a law of nature, distinct from the laws that govern social life, was alien to traditional cultures.

At one time, the famous philosopher and science expert M.K. Petrov proposed a kind of thought experiment: imagine how a person brought up in the system of values ​​of traditional civilization would look at the ideals of new European culture? Referring to the work of S. Powell "The role of theoretical science in European civilization", M.K. Petrov cited the testimonies of missionaries about the reaction of Chinese sages to descriptions of European science. "The sages found the very idea of ​​science absurd, because, although the ruler of the Celestial Empire is given to establish laws and interpret their execution under the threat of punishment, only those who are able to "understand" these laws, and "wood, water and stones" , which the European hoaxers talk about, obviously do not possess this property of "understanding": they cannot prescribe laws and cannot be required to comply with them.

The pathos of conquering nature and transforming the world, characteristic of technogenic civilization, gave rise to special treatment to the ideas of the dominance of force and power. In traditional cultures, they were understood primarily as the direct power of one person over another. In patriarchal societies and Asiatic despotisms, power and domination extended not only to the subjects of the sovereign, but was also exercised by a man, the head of the family over his wife and children, whom he owned in the same way as a king or emperor, the bodies and souls of his subjects. Traditional cultures did not know the autonomy of the individual and the idea of ​​human rights. As A.I. Herzen wrote about the societies of the ancient East, a person here "did not understand his dignity; therefore he was either a slave lying in the dust, or an unbridled despot."

In the technogenic world, one can also find many situations in which domination is carried out as a force of direct coercion and power of one person over another. However, the relations of personal dependence cease to dominate here and are subject to new social ties. Their essence is determined by the general exchange of the results of activity, which take the form of a commodity.

Power and dominance in this system of relations involves the possession and appropriation of goods (things, human abilities, information as commodity values having a monetary equivalent).

As a result, in the culture of technogenic civilization, there is a kind of shift in emphasis in understanding the objects of domination of force and power - from a person to a thing produced by him. In turn, these new meanings were easily connected with the ideal of the activity-transforming destiny of man.

The transforming activity itself is regarded as a process that ensures the power of a person over an object, dominance over external circumstances that a person is called upon to subdue.

A person must turn from a slave of natural and social circumstances into their master, and the very process of this transformation was understood as the mastery of the forces of nature and the forces of social development. The characterization of civilizational achievements in terms of force ("productive forces", "power of knowledge", etc.) expressed the attitude towards the acquisition by man of ever new opportunities, allowing him to expand the horizon of his transformative activity.

By changing not only the natural but also the social environment through the application of mastered forces, a person realizes his mission as a creator, a world changer.

This is connected with the special status of scientific rationality in the system of values ​​of technogenic civilization, the special significance of the scientific and technical view of the world, because knowledge of the world is a condition for its transformation. It creates confidence that a person is able, having discovered the laws of nature and social life, to regulate natural and social processes in accordance with his goals.

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