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Kuptsov V.I. xii

The transition from one paradigm to another, according to Kuhn, is impossible through logic and references to experience.

In a sense, defenders of different paradigms live in different worlds. According to Kuhn, different paradigms are incommensurable. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another must be carried out abruptly, like a switch, and not gradually through logic.

Scientific revolutions

Scientific revolutions usually affect the ideological and methodological foundations of science, often changing the very style of thinking. Therefore, their significance can extend far beyond the specific area where they occurred. Therefore, we can talk about specific scientific and general scientific revolutions.

The emergence of quantum mechanics is a striking example of a general scientific revolution, since its significance goes far beyond physics. Quantum mechanical concepts at the level of analogies or metaphors have penetrated into humanitarian thinking. These ideas encroach on our intuition, common sense, and affect our worldview.

The Darwinian revolution went far beyond biology in its significance. She radically changed our ideas about man's place in Nature. It had a strong methodological impact, turning the thinking of scientists towards evolutionism.

New research methods can lead to far-reaching consequences: changing problems, changing standards scientific work, to the emergence of new areas of knowledge. In this case, their introduction means a scientific revolution.

Thus, the appearance of the microscope in biology meant a scientific revolution. The entire history of biology can be divided into two stages, separated by the appearance and introduction of the microscope. Entire fundamental branches of biology - microbiology, cytology, histology - owe their development to the introduction of the microscope.

The advent of the radio telescope meant a revolution in astronomy. Academician Ginsburg writes about it this way: “After the Second World War, astronomy entered a period of especially brilliant development, a period of “ second astronomical revolution“(The first such revolution is associated with the name of Galileo, who began to use telescopes) ... The content of the second astronomical revolution can be seen in the process of transforming astronomy from optical to all-wave.”

Sometimes the researcher is faced with new area the unknown, the world of new objects and phenomena. This can cause revolutionary changes in the course of scientific knowledge, as happened, for example, with the discovery of such new worlds as the world of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms and molecules, the world of electromagnetic phenomena, the world elementary particles, upon the discovery of the phenomenon of gravity, other galaxies, the world of crystals, the phenomenon of radioactivity, etc.

Thus, the basis of the scientific revolution may be the discovery of some previously unknown areas or aspects of reality.

Fundamental scientific discoveries

Many major discoveries in science are made on a well-defined theoretical basis. Example: discovery of the planet Neptune by Le Verrier and Adams by studying disturbances in the motion of the planet Uranus on the basis of celestial mechanics.

Fundamental scientific discoveries are different from others in that they do not involve deduction from existing principles, but rather the development of new fundamental principles.

In the history of science, fundamental scientific discoveries related to the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts such as Euclidean geometry, Copernican heliocentric system, Newtonian classical mechanics, Lobachevsky geometry, Mendelian genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics. These discoveries changed the idea of ​​reality as a whole, that is, they were ideological in nature.

There are many facts in the history of science when a fundamental scientific discovery was made independently of each other by several scientists almost at the same time. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was constructed almost simultaneously by Lobachevsky, Gauss, Bolyai; Darwin published his ideas about evolution almost simultaneously with Wallace; The special theory of relativity was developed simultaneously by Einstein and Poincaré.

From the fact that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, it follows that they are historically conditioned.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems, that is, problems that have a deep, ideological, and not a private nature.

Thus, Copernicus saw that two fundamental ideological principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature - were not realized in astronomy; solving this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

Non-Euclidean geometry was constructed when the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry ceased to be a particular problem of geometry and turned into a fundamental problem of mathematics, its foundations.

Ideals of scientific knowledge

In accordance with classical ideas about science, it should not contain “ no admixture of delusions" Now truth is not considered as a necessary attribute of all cognitive results that claim to be scientific. It is the central regulator of scientific and cognitive activity.

Classical ideas about science are characterized by a constant search for “ began to learn», « reliable foundation", on which the entire system of scientific knowledge could rely.

However, in modern scientific methodology, the idea of ​​the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge is developing, when experience is no longer the foundation of knowledge, but mainly performs a critical function.

Fundamentalist validity as the leading value in classical ideas about scientific knowledge is increasingly being replaced by such a value as efficiency in solving problems.

Throughout the development of science, various areas of scientific knowledge acted as standards.

« Beginnings“Euclid has long been an attractive standard in literally all areas of knowledge: philosophy, physics, astronomy, medicine, etc.

However, the limits of the significance of mathematics as a standard of science are now well understood, which, for example, are formulated as follows: “In the strict sense, proofs are possible only in mathematics, and not because mathematicians are smarter than others, but because they themselves create the universe for their experiments, nevertheless the rest are forced to experiment with a Universe they did not create.”

The triumph of mechanics in the 17th–19th centuries led to the fact that it began to be viewed as an ideal, an example of scientific knowledge.

Eddington said that when a physicist sought to explain something, “his ear struggled to catch the noise of the machine. The man who could construct gravity from gears would be a Victorian hero."

Since modern times, physics has been established as a reference science. If at first mechanics acted as the standard, then later – the whole complex of physical knowledge. The orientation towards the physical ideal in chemistry was clearly expressed, for example, by P. Berthelot, in biology - by M. Schleiden. G. Helmholtz argued that “ final goal"of all natural sciences - " dissolve in mechanics" Attempts to build " social mechanics», « social physics", etc. were numerous.

The physical ideal of scientific knowledge has certainly proven its heuristic, but today it is clear that the implementation of this ideal often hinders the development of other sciences - mathematics, biologists, social sciences, etc. As N.K. Mikhailovsky noted, the absolutization of the physical ideal of scientificity leads to such a formulation of social questions when " to which natural science gives the Judas kiss to sociology”, leading to pseudo-objectivity.

The humanities are sometimes offered as a model of scientific knowledge. The focus in this case is the active role of the subject in the cognitive process.

Among the diverse types of scientific discoveries, a special place is occupied by fundamental discoveries that change our ideas about reality as a whole, i.e. having an ideological character.

1. Two kinds of discoveries

A. Einstein once wrote that a theoretical physicist “as a foundation needs some general assumptions, so-called principles, from which he can draw consequences. His activity is thus divided into two stages. Firstly, he needs to find these principles, secondly. develop the consequences arising from these principles. To perform the second task, he has been thoroughly equipped since school. Consequently, if for a certain area and, accordingly, a set of relationships, the first problem is solved, then the consequences will not be long in coming. The first of these tasks, i.e., is of a completely different kind. establishing principles that can serve as a basis for deduction. There is no method here that can be learned and systematically applied to achieve the goal.”

We will be primarily concerned with discussing problems associated with solving problems of the first type, but first we will clarify our ideas about how problems of the second type are solved.

Let's imagine the following problem. There is a circle through the center of which two mutually perpendicular diameters are drawn. Through point A, located on one of the diameters at a distance of 2/3 from the center of the circle O, we draw a straight line parallel to the other diameter, and from the point B of intersection of this line with the circle we lower a perpendicular to the second diameter, designating their point of intersection through C. We need express the length of the segment AC through a function of the radius.

How will we solve this school problem?

To do this, let us turn to certain principles of geometry and restore the chain of theorems. In doing so, we try to use all the data we have. Note that since the drawn diameters are mutually nonpendicular, the triangle OAS is rectangular. Value OA=2/Zr. Let us now try to find the length of the second leg, so that we can then apply the Pythagorean theorem and determine the length of the hypotenuse AC. You can try using some other methods. But suddenly, after carefully looking at the figure, we discover that OABC is a rectangle, which, as we know, has equal diagonals, i.e. AC=OB. 0B is equal to the radius of the circle, therefore, without any calculations it is clear that AC = r.

Here it is – a beautiful and psychologically interesting solution to the problem.

In the above example, the following is important.

Firstly, problems of this kind usually belong to a clearly defined subject area. By solving them, we clearly understand where, in fact, we need to look for a solution. In this case, we do not think about whether the foundations of Euclidean geometry are correct, whether it is necessary to come up with some other geometry, some special principles in order to solve the problem. We immediately interpret it as belonging to the field of Euclidean geometry.

Secondly, these tasks are not necessarily standard, algorithmic ones. In principle, their solution requires a deep understanding of the specifics of the objects under consideration and developed professional intuition. Here, therefore, some professional training is needed. In the process of solving problems of this kind, we discover new way. We notice “suddenly” that the object under study can be considered as a rectangle and there is no need to single out a right triangle as an elementary object to form the correct way to solve the problem.

Of course, the above task is very simple. It is needed only to generally outline the type of problems of the second kind. But among such problems there are also immeasurably more complex ones, the solution of which requires great importance for the development of science.

Consider, for example, the discovery of a new planet by Le Verrier and Adamsom. Of course, this discovery is a great event in science, especially considering How it was done:

First, the trajectories of the planets were calculated;

Then it was discovered that they did not coincide with the observed ones; – then it was suggested that a new planet exists;

Then they pointed the telescope at the appropriate point in space and... discovered a planet there.

But why can this great discovery be attributed only to discoveries of the second kind?

The whole point is that it was accomplished on a clear foundation of already developed celestial mechanics.

Although problems of the second kind can, of course, be divided into subclasses of varying complexity, Einstein was right in separating them from fundamental problems.

After all, the latter require the discovery of new fundamental principles, which cannot be obtained by any deduction from existing principles.

Of course, there are intermediate instances between problems of the first and second kind, but we will not consider them here, but will go straight to problems of the first kind.

In general, not so many such problems arose before humanity, but their solutions each time meant enormous progress in the development of science and culture as a whole. They are associated with the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as Euclid's geometry, Copernicus's heliocentric theory, Newton's classical mechanics, Lobachevsky's geometry, Mendel's genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, structural linguistics.

All of them are characterized by the fact that the intellectual basis on which they were created, unlike the area of ​​discoveries of the second kind, was never strictly limited.

If we talk about the psychological context of the discoveries of different ""s^^, then it is probably the same. - In its most superficial form, it can be characterized as direct vision, a discovery in the full sense of the word. A person, as Descartes believed, “suddenly” sees, that the problem should be considered this way and not otherwise.

Further, it should be noted that the opening is never one-act, but has, so to speak, a “shuttle” character. At first there is some sense of idea; then it is clarified by deducing certain consequences from it, which, as a rule, clarify the idea; then new consequences are derived from the new modification, etc.

But in epistemological terms, discoveries of the first and second types differ radically.

Almost everyone who is interested in the history of the development of science, technology and technology has at least once in their life thought about what path the development of humanity could take without knowledge of mathematics or, for example, if we did not have such a necessary object as a wheel, which has become almost the basis of human development. However, often only key discoveries are considered and given attention, while discoveries less known and widespread are sometimes simply not mentioned, which, however, does not make them insignificant, because each new knowledge gives humanity the opportunity to climb a step higher in its development.

The 20th century and its scientific discoveries turned into a real Rubicon, after crossing which progress accelerated its pace several times, identifying itself with a sports car that is impossible to keep up with. In order to stay on the crest of the scientific and technological wave now, considerable skills are needed. Of course you can read scientific journals, various kinds of articles and works of scientists who are struggling to solve this or that problem, but even in this case it will not be possible to keep up with progress, and therefore it remains to catch up and observe.

As you know, in order to look into the future, you need to know the past. Therefore, today we will talk specifically about the 20th century, the century of discoveries, which changed the way of life and the world around us. It is worth noting right away that this will not be a list of the best discoveries of the century or any other top, it will be a brief overview of some of those discoveries that changed, and perhaps are changing, the world.

In order to talk about discoveries, the concept itself should be characterized. Let's take the following definition as a basis:

Discovery is a new achievement made in the process of scientific knowledge of nature and society; establishment of previously unknown, objectively existing patterns, properties and phenomena of the material world.

Top 25 great scientific discoveries of the 20th century

  1. Planck's quantum theory. He derived a formula that determines the shape of the spectral radiation curve and the universal constant. He discovered the smallest particles - quanta and photons, with the help of which Einstein explained the nature of light. In the 1920s, quantum theory developed into quantum mechanics.
  2. Discovery of X-rays - electromagnetic radiation with a wide range of wavelengths. The discovery of X-rays by Wilhelm Roentgen greatly influenced human life and today it is impossible to imagine modern medicine without them.
  3. Einstein's theory of relativity. In 1915, Einstein introduced the concept of relativity and derived an important formula connecting energy and mass. The theory of relativity explained the essence of gravity - it arises as a result of the curvature of four-dimensional space, and not as a result of the interaction of bodies in space.
  4. Discovery of penicillin. The mold Penicillium notatum, when it gets into the culture of bacteria, causes their complete death - this was proven by Alexander Flemming. In the 40s, a production one was developed, which later began to be produced on an industrial scale.
  5. De Broglie waves. In 1924, it was discovered that wave-particle duality is inherent in all particles, not just photons. Broglie presented their wave properties in mathematical form. The theory made it possible to develop the concept of quantum mechanics and explained the diffraction of electrons and neutrons.
  6. Discovery of the structure of the new DNA helix. In 1953, a new model of the structure of the molecule was obtained by combining the X-ray diffraction data of Rosalyn Franklin and Maurice Wilkins and the theoretical developments of Chargaff. She was bred by Francis Crick and James Watson.
  7. Rutherford's planetary model of the atom. He hypothesized the structure of the atom and extracted energy from atomic nuclei. The model explains the basic laws of charged particles.
  8. Ziegler-Nath catalysts. In 1953, they carried out the polarization of ethylene and propylene.
  9. Discovery of transistors. A device consisting of 2 p-n junctions, which are directed towards each other. Thanks to its invention by Julius Lilienfeld, the technology began to shrink in size. The first operational bipolar transistor was introduced in 1947 by John Bardeen, William Shockley and Walter Brattain.
  10. Creation of radiotelegraph. Alexander Popov's invention using Morse code and radio signals first saved a ship at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. But Gulielmo Marcone was the first to patent a similar invention.
  11. Discovery of neutrons. These uncharged particles with a mass slightly greater than that of protons allowed them to penetrate the nucleus without obstacles and destabilize it. It was later proven that under the influence of these particles, nuclei fission, but even more neutrons are produced. This is how the artificial one was discovered.
  12. In vitro fertilization (IVF) technique. Edwards and Steptoe figured out how to extract an intact egg from a woman, created optimal conditions for its life and growth in a test tube, figured out how to fertilize it and at what time to return it back to the mother’s body.
  13. The first manned flight into space. In 1961, it was Yuri Gagarin who was the first to realize this, which became the real embodiment of the dream of the stars. Humanity has learned that the space between planets is surmountable, and bacteria, animals, and even humans can safely exist in space.
  14. Discovery of fullerene. In 1985, scientists discovered a new type of carbon - fullerene. Nowadays, due to its unique properties, it is used in many devices. Based on this technique, carbon nanotubes were created - twisted and cross-linked layers of graphite. They show a wide variety of properties: from metallic to semiconducting.
  15. Cloning. In 1996, scientists managed to obtain the first clone of a sheep, named Dolly. The egg was gutted, the nucleus of an adult sheep was inserted into it and implanted into the uterus. Dolly was the first animal to survive; the rest of the embryos of various animals died.
  16. Discovery of black holes. In 1915, Karl Schwarzschild hypothesized the existence of black holes, the gravity of which is so great that even objects moving at the speed of light cannot leave it.
  17. Theory. This is a generally accepted cosmological model that describes the earlier development of the Universe, which was in a singular state, characterized by infinite temperature and density of matter. The model was started by Einstein in 1916.
  18. Discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation. This is cosmic microwave background radiation, preserved from the beginning of the formation of the Universe and uniformly filling it. In 1965, its existence was experimentally confirmed, and it serves as one of the main confirmations of the Big Bang theory.
  19. Getting closer to creation artificial intelligence. It is a technology for creating intelligent machines, first defined in 1956 by John McCarthy. According to him, researchers can use methods of understanding humans to solve specific problems that may not be biologically observed in humans.
  20. Invention of holography. This special photographic method was proposed in 1947 by Dennis Gabor, in which three-dimensional images of objects close to real ones are recorded and restored using a laser.
  21. Discovery of insulin. In 1922, Frederick Banting discovered pancreatic hormone and diabetes ceased to be a fatal disease.
  22. Blood groups. This discovery in 1900-1901 divided blood into 4 groups: O, A, B and AB. It became possible to give a correct blood transfusion to a person without ending tragically.
  23. Mathematical information theory. Claude Shannon's theory made it possible to determine the capacity of a communication channel.
  24. Invention of Nylon. Chemist Wallace Carothers discovered a method for producing this polymer material in 1935. He discovered some of its varieties with high viscosity even at high temperatures.
  25. Discovery of stem cells. They are the progenitors of all existing cells in the human body and have the ability to self-renew. Their capabilities are great and are just beginning to be explored by science.

There is no doubt that all these discoveries are only a small part of what the 20th century showed to society and it cannot be said that only these discoveries were significant, and all the others became just background, this is not at all the case.

It was the last century that showed us new boundaries of the Universe, saw the light of day, quasars (super-powerful sources of radiation in our Galaxy) were discovered, and the first carbon nanotubes, which have unique superconductivity and strength, were discovered and created.

All these discoveries, one way or another, are just the tip of the iceberg, which includes more than a hundred significant discoveries over the past century. Naturally, all of them became a catalyst for changes in the world in which we now live, and the fact remains undoubted that the changes do not end there.

The 20th century can be safely called, if not the “golden”, then certainly the “silver” age of discoveries, however, looking back and comparing new achievements with the past, it seems that in the future we will have quite a few more interesting great discoveries, in fact, the successor of the last century, the current 21st century only confirms these views.

Among the diverse types of scientific discoveries, a special place is occupied by fundamental discoveries that change our ideas about reality as a whole, i.e. having an ideological character.

TWO KINDS OF DISCOVERIES

A. Einstein once wrote that a theoretical physicist “as a foundation needs some general assumptions, so-called principles, from which he can draw consequences. His activity is thus divided into two stages. Firstly, he needs to find these principles, and secondly, to develop the consequences arising from these principles. To perform the second task, he has been thoroughly equipped since school. Consequently, if for a certain area and, accordingly, a set of relationships, the first problem is solved, then the consequences will not be long in coming. The first of these tasks, i.e., is of a completely different kind. establishing principles that can serve as a basis for deduction. There is no method here that can be learned and systematically applied to achieve the goal.”

We will be primarily concerned with discussing problems associated with solving problems of the first type, but first we will clarify our ideas about how problems of the second type are solved.

Let's imagine the following problem. There is a circle through the center of which two mutually perpendicular diameters are drawn. Through point A, located on one of the diameters at a distance of 2/3 from the center of the circle O, we draw a straight line parallel to the other diameter, and from point B, the intersection of this line with the circle, we lower a perpendicular to the second diameter, designating their point of intersection through K. We it is necessary to express the length of the segment AC through a function of the radius.

How will we solve this school problem?

To do this, turning to certain principles of geometry, we will restore the chain of theorems. In doing so, we try to use all the data we have. Note that since the diameters are mutually perpendicular, the triangle UAC is rectangular. OA value = 2/3r. Let us now try to find the length of the second leg, so that we can then apply the Pythagorean theorem and determine the length of the hypotenuse AK. You can try using some other methods. But suddenly, after carefully looking at the figure, we discover that OABC is a rectangle, which, as we know, has equal diagonals, i.e. AK = OB. OB is equal to the radius of the circle, therefore, without any calculations it is clear that AK = r.

Here it is – a beautiful and psychologically interesting solution to the problem.

In the above example, the following is important.

– Firstly, tasks of this kind usually relate to a clearly defined subject area. By solving them, we clearly understand where, in fact, we need to look for a solution. In this case, we do not think about whether the foundations of Euclidean geometry are correct, whether it is necessary to come up with some other geometry, some special principles in order to solve the problem. We immediately interpret it as belonging to the field of Euclidean geometry.

– Secondly, these tasks are not necessarily standard, algorithmic ones. In principle, their solution requires a deep understanding of the specifics of the objects under consideration and developed professional intuition. Here, therefore, some professional training is needed. In the process of solving problems of this kind, we open up a new path. We notice “suddenly” that the object under study can be considered as a rectangle and there is no need to single out a right triangle as an elementary object to form the correct way to solve the problem.

Of course, the above task is very simple. It is needed only to generally outline the type of problems of the second kind. But among such problems there are also immeasurably more complex ones, the solution of which is of great importance for the development of science.

Consider, for example, the discovery of a new planet by W. Le Verrier and J. Adams. Of course, this discovery is a great event in science, especially considering how it was made:

– first the trajectories of the planets were calculated;

– then it was discovered that they do not coincide with the observed ones;

– then it was suggested that a new planet exists;

– then they pointed the telescope at the appropriate point in space and... discovered a planet there.

But why can this great discovery be attributed only to discoveries of the second kind?

The whole point is that it was accomplished on a clear foundation of already developed celestial mechanics.

Although problems of the second kind, of course, can be divided into subclasses of varying complexity, A. Einstein was right in separating them from fundamental problems.

After all, the latter require the discovery of new fundamental principles that cannot be obtained by any deduction from existing principles.

Of course, there are intermediate instances between problems of the first and second kind, but we will not consider them here, but will go straight to problems of the first kind.

In general, not so many such problems arose before humanity, but their solutions each time meant enormous progress in the development of science and culture as a whole. They are associated with the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as

Euclidean geometry?

heliocentric theory of Copernicus,

classical Newtonian mechanics,

Lobachevsky geometry,

Mendelian genetics,

Darwin's theory of evolution,

Einstein's theory of relativity,

quantum mechanics,

structural linguistics.

All of them are characterized by the fact that the intellectual basis on which they were created, unlike the field of discoveries of the second kind, was never strictly limited.

If we talk about the psychological context of the discoveries of different classes, then it is probably the same.

– In its most superficial form, it can be characterized as direct vision, discovery in the full sense of the word. A person, as R. Descartes believed, “suddenly” sees that the problem needs to be considered exactly this way and not otherwise.

– Further, it should be noted that the opening is never one-act, but has, so to speak, a “shuttle” character. At first there is some sense of idea; then it is clarified by deducing certain consequences from it, which, as a rule, clarify the idea; then new consequences are derived from the new modification, etc.

But in epistemological terms, discoveries of the first and second types differ radically.


Related information.


Science is a specific activity of people, the main goal of which is to obtain knowledge about reality.

Knowledge is the main product of scientific activity, but not the only one. Products of science include: scientific style rationality, which extends to all spheres of human activity; and various devices, installations, techniques used outside science, primarily in production. Scientific activity is also a source of moral values.

Although science is focused on obtaining true knowledge about reality, science and truth are not identical. True knowledge can also be unscientific. It can be obtained in a variety of areas of human activity: in everyday life, economics, politics, art, and engineering. Unlike science, obtaining knowledge about reality is not the main, defining goal of these areas of activity (in art, for example, such a main goal is new artistic values, in engineering - technology, inventions, in economics - efficiency, etc.).

It is important to emphasize that the definition of “unscientific” does not imply a negative assessment. Scientific activity is specific. Other spheres of human activity - everyday life, art, economics, politics, etc. - each have their own purpose, their own goals. The role of science in the life of society is growing, but scientific justification is not always and not always possible or appropriate.

The history of science shows that scientific knowledge is not always true. The term "scientific" is often used in situations that do not guarantee true knowledge, especially when it comes to theories. Many scientific theories have been refuted. It is sometimes argued (for example, Karl Popper) that any theoretical statement always has a chance of being refuted in the future.

Science does not recognize parascientific concepts - astrology, parapsychology, ufology, etc. It does not recognize these concepts not because it does not want to, but because it cannot, because, as T. Huxley put it, “by taking anything for granted, science commits suicide.” But there are no reliable, precisely established facts in such concepts. Possible coincidences.

Regarding this kind of problem, F. Bacon wrote this: “And therefore the one who answered correctly was the one who, when they showed him the image of those who had escaped shipwreck by taking a vow displayed in the temple and at the same time sought an answer whether he now recognizes the power of the gods, asked in turn: “Where are the images of those who died after making a vow?” This is the basis of almost all superstitions - in astrology, in beliefs, in predictions and the like. People who delight themselves with this kind of vanity, celebrate the event that has come true, and pass without attention the one that deceived, although the latter happens much more often.”

Important features of the appearance of modern science are related to the fact that today it is a profession.

Until recently, science was a free activity of individual scientists. It was not a profession and was not specially funded in any way. Typically, scientists supported their living by paying for their teaching jobs at universities. However, today a scientist is a special profession. In the 20th century, the concept of “scientist” appeared. Now in the world about 5 million people are professionally engaged in science.

The development of science is characterized by confrontation various directions. New ideas and theories are established in intense struggle. M. Planck said on this occasion: “Usually new scientific truths win not in such a way that their opponents are convinced and they admit they are wrong, but for the most part in such a way that these opponents gradually die out, and the younger generation assimilates the truth immediately.”

Life in science is a constant struggle of different opinions, directions, a struggle for the recognition of ideas.

Criteria of scientific knowledge

What are the criteria of scientific knowledge, its characteristic features?

One of the important distinctive qualities of scientific knowledge is its systematization. It is one of the criteria of scientific character.

But knowledge can be systematized not only in science. Cookbook, telephone directory, road atlas, etc. and so on. – everywhere knowledge is classified and systematized. Scientific systematization is specific. It is characterized by a desire for completeness, consistency, and clear grounds for systematization. Scientific knowledge as a system has a certain structure, the elements of which are facts, laws, theories, pictures of the world. Individual scientific disciplines are interconnected and interdependent.

The desire for validity and evidence of knowledge is an important criterion for scientific character.

Justification of knowledge, bringing it into unified system has always been characteristic of science. The very emergence of science is sometimes associated with the desire to prove knowledge. Various methods of substantiating scientific knowledge are used. To substantiate empirical knowledge, multiple tests, reference to statistical data, etc. are used. When substantiating theoretical concepts, their consistency, compliance with empirical data, and ability to describe and predict phenomena are checked.

In science, original, “crazy” ideas are valued. But its focus on innovation is combined with the desire to eliminate from the results of scientific activity everything subjective related to the specifics of the scientist himself. This is one of the differences between science and art. If the artist had not created his creation, it simply would not have existed. But if a scientist, even a great one, had not created a theory, it would still have been created, because it represents a necessary stage in the development of science and is intersubjective.

Methods and means of scientific knowledge

Although scientific activity is specific, it uses reasoning techniques used by people in other areas of activity, in everyday life. Any type of human activity is characterized by reasoning techniques that are also used in science, namely: induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalization, idealization, analogy, description, explanation, prediction, hypothesis, confirmation, refutation, etc.

The main methods of obtaining empirical knowledge in science are observation and experiment.

Observation is a method of obtaining empirical knowledge in which the main thing is not to introduce any changes into the reality being studied during the process of observation itself.

Unlike observation, within the framework of an experiment, the phenomenon being studied is placed in special conditions. As F. Bacon wrote, “the nature of things reveals itself better in a state of artificial constraint than in natural freedom.”

It is important to emphasize that empirical research cannot begin without a certain theoretical orientation. Although they say that facts are the air of a scientist, nevertheless, comprehension of reality is impossible without theoretical constructions. I.P. Pavlov wrote about this as follows: “... at every moment a certain general idea of ​​​​the subject is required in order to have something to attach facts to...”

The tasks of science cannot be reduced to collecting factual material.

Reducing the tasks of science to the collection of facts means, as A. Poincaré put it, “a complete misunderstanding of the true nature of science.” He wrote: “The scientist must organize the facts. Science is made up of facts, like a house is made of bricks. And one mere accumulation of facts does not constitute science, just as a pile of stones does not constitute a house.”

Scientific theories do not appear as direct generalizations of empirical facts. As A. Einstein wrote, “no logical path leads from observations to the basic principles of theory.” Theories arise in the complex interaction of theoretical thinking and empiricism, in the course of solving purely theoretical problems, in the process of interaction between science and culture as a whole.

When constructing a theory, scientists use various ways theoretical thinking. Thus, Galileo began to widely use thought experiments in the course of theory construction. During the thought experiment, the theorist seems to lose possible options behavior of the idealized objects he developed. A mathematical experiment is a modern type of thought experiment in which the possible consequences of varying conditions in a mathematical model are calculated on computers.

When characterizing scientific activity, it is important to note that in its course scientists sometimes turn to philosophy.

Of great importance for scientists, especially for theorists, is the philosophical understanding of established cognitive traditions, consideration of the reality being studied in the context of the picture of the world.

Turning to philosophy is especially relevant at critical stages in the development of science. Great scientific achievements have always been associated with the advancement of philosophical generalizations. Philosophy contributes to the effective description, explanation, and understanding of reality by the science being studied.

Important features of scientific knowledge are reflected in the concept of “style of scientific thinking.” M. Born wrote this: “...I think that there are some general trends in thought that change very slowly and form certain philosophical periods with their characteristic ideas in all areas of human activity, including science. Pauli, in a recent letter to me, used the expression “styles”: styles of thinking - styles not only in art, but also in science. By adopting this term, I assert that physical theory also has styles, and it is precisely this circumstance that gives a kind of stability to its principles.”

The famous chemist and philosopher M. Polanyi showed at the end of the 50s of our century that the premises on which the scientist relies in his work cannot be completely verbalized, i.e. express in language. Polanyi wrote: “That a large number of academic time that chemistry, biologist and medical students devote to practical classes, indicates the important role played in these disciplines by the transfer of practical knowledge and skills from teacher to student. From what has been said, we can conclude that in the very center of science there are areas of practical knowledge that cannot be conveyed through formulations.”

Polanyi called this type of knowledge tacit. This knowledge is transmitted not in the form of texts, but through direct demonstration of samples.

The term “mentality” is used to designate those layers of spiritual culture that are not expressed in the form of explicit knowledge, but nevertheless significantly determine the face of a particular era or people. But any science has its own mentality, which distinguishes it from other areas of scientific knowledge, but is closely related to the mentality of the era.

Speaking about the means of scientific knowledge, it should be noted that the most important of them is the language of science.

Galileo argued that the book of Nature was written in the language of mathematics. The development of physics fully confirms these words of Galileo. In other sciences, the process of mathematization is very active. Mathematics is part of the fabric of theoretical constructions in all sciences.

The progress of scientific knowledge significantly depends on the development of the means used by science. The use of the telescope by Galileo, and then the creation of telescopes and radio telescopes, largely determined the development of astronomy. The use of microscopes, especially electronic ones, played a huge role in the development of biology. Without such means of knowledge as synchrophasotrons, the development of modern particle physics is impossible. The use of computers is revolutionizing the development of science.

The methods and means used in different sciences are not the same.

Differences in methods and tools used in different sciences are determined by the specifics of subject areas and the level of development of science. However, in general, there is a constant interpenetration of methods and means of various sciences. The apparatus of mathematics is being used more and more widely. According to Yu. Wiener, “the incredible effectiveness of mathematics” makes it an important means of knowledge in all sciences. However, one should hardly expect in the future the universalization of methods and tools used in different sciences.

Methods developed in one scientific field can be effectively applied in a completely different field.

One of the sources of innovation in science is the transfer of methods and approaches from one scientific field to another. For example, this is what Academician V.I. Vernadsky wrote about L. Pasteur, referring to his work on the problem of spontaneous generation: “Pasteur... acted as a chemist who owned experimental method, who entered a new field of knowledge for him with new methods and techniques of work, who saw in it something that the naturalist observers who had previously studied it had not seen in it.”

Speaking about the specifics of different sciences, we can note the features of philosophical knowledge. In general, philosophy is not a science. If in the classical philosophical tradition philosophy was interpreted as a special kind of science, then modern thinkers often develop philosophical constructs that are sharply separated from science (this applies, for example, to existentialists and neopositivists). At the same time, within the framework of philosophy there have always been and are constructions and studies that can claim scientific status. M. Born refers to this as “the study of the general features of the structure of the world and our methods of penetration into this structure.”

The emergence of natural science

To understand what it is modern natural science, it is important to find out when it arose. Various ideas have developed in this regard.

Sometimes the position is defended that natural science arose in the Stone Age, when man began to accumulate and transmit to others knowledge about the world. Thus, John Bernal in the book “Science in the History of Society” writes: “Since the main property of natural science is that it deals with the effective manipulation and transformation of matter, the main stream of science follows from the practical technical techniques of primitive man...”

Some historians of science believe that natural science began around the 5th century BC. V Ancient Greece, where, against the background of the decomposition of mythological thinking, the first programs for studying nature arise. Already in Ancient Egypt and Babylon, significant mathematical knowledge had been accumulated, but only the Greeks began to prove theorems. If science is interpreted as knowledge with its justification, then it is quite fair to assume that it arose around the 5th century BC. in the cities-polises of Greece - the center of future European culture.

Some historians associate the emergence of natural science with the gradual liberation of thinking from the dogmas of Aristotelian views, which is associated with the activities of Oxford scientists of the 12th-14th centuries. – Robert Grosset, Roger Bacon and others. These researchers called for relying on experience, observation and experiment, and not on the authority of legend or philosophical tradition.

Most historians of science believe that we can talk about natural science in the modern sense of the word only from the 16th-17th centuries. This is the era when the works of I. Kepler, H. Huygens, G. Galileo appeared. The apogee of the spiritual revolution associated with the emergence of science is the work of I. Newton. The birth of science and natural science is here identified with the birth of modern physics and the mathematical apparatus necessary for it. At the same time, science was born as a special social institution. In 1662, the Royal Society of London was founded, and in 1666, the Paris Academy of Sciences.

There is a point of view that modern natural science arose at the end of the 19th century. At this time, science was formalized into a special profession thanks primarily to the reforms of the University of Berlin, which took place under the leadership of the famous naturalist Wilhelm Humboldt. As a result of these reforms, a new model of university education has emerged, in which learning is combined with research activities. This model was best realized in the laboratory of the famous chemist J. Liebig in Giessen. As a result of the approval of a new model of education, such goods have appeared on the world market, the development and production of which requires access to scientific knowledge (fertilizers, pesticides, explosives, electrical goods, etc.). The process of transforming science into a profession completes its formation as a modern science.

Structure of scientific knowledge

The question of the structure of scientific knowledge deserves special consideration. It is necessary to distinguish three levels: empirical, theoretical, philosophical foundations.

At the empirical level of scientific knowledge, as a result of direct contact with reality, scientists obtain knowledge about certain events, identify the properties of objects or processes that interest them, record relationships, and establish empirical patterns.

To clarify the specifics of theoretical knowledge, it is important to emphasize that the theory is constructed with a clear focus on explaining objective reality, but it directly describes not the surrounding reality, but ideal objects, which, unlike real objects, are characterized not by an infinite, but by a well-defined number of properties. For example, such ideal objects as material points, which mechanics deals with, have a very small number of properties, namely, mass and the ability to be in space and time. The ideal object is constructed in such a way that it is completely intellectually controlled.

The theoretical level of scientific knowledge is divided into two parts: fundamental theories, in which the scientist deals with the most abstract ideal objects, and theories that describe a specific area of ​​reality on the basis of fundamental theories.

The power of theory lies in the fact that it can develop as if on its own, without direct contact with reality. Since in theory we are dealing with an intellectually controlled object, the theoretical object can, in principle, be described in any detail and obtain as far-reaching consequences from the initial concepts as desired. If the initial abstractions are true, then the consequences from them will be true.

In addition to the empirical and theoretical, one more level can be distinguished in the structure of scientific knowledge, containing general ideas about reality and the process of cognition - the level of philosophical prerequisites, philosophical foundations.

For example, the famous discussion between Bohr and Einstein on the problems of quantum mechanics was essentially conducted precisely at the level of the philosophical foundations of science, since it was discussed how to relate the apparatus of quantum mechanics to the world around us. Einstein believed that the probabilistic nature of predictions in quantum mechanics is due to the fact that quantum mechanics is incomplete, since reality is completely deterministic. And Bohr believed that quantum mechanics is complete and reflects a fundamentally irreducible probability characteristic of the microworld.

Certain ideas of a philosophical nature are woven into the fabric of scientific knowledge and embodied in theories.

Theory turns from an apparatus for describing and predicting empirical data into knowledge when all its concepts receive an ontological and epistemological interpretation.

Sometimes the philosophical foundations of science clearly manifest themselves and become the subject of heated discussions (for example, in quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, the theory of evolution, genetics, etc.).

At the same time, there are many theories in science that do not cause controversy regarding their philosophical foundations, since they are based on philosophical concepts that are close to generally accepted ones.

It should be noted that not only theoretical, but also empirical knowledge is associated with certain philosophical concepts.

At the empirical level of knowledge there is a certain totality general ideas about the world (about causality, stability of events, etc.). These ideas are perceived as obvious and are not the subject of special research. Nevertheless, they exist, and sooner or later they change at the empirical level.

The empirical and theoretical levels of scientific knowledge are organically interconnected. The theoretical level does not exist on its own, but is based on data from the empirical level. But the essential thing is that empirical knowledge is inseparable from theoretical concepts; it is necessarily immersed in a certain theoretical context.

Awareness of this in the methodology of science has sharpened the question of how empirical knowledge can be a criterion for the truth of a theory?

The fact is that despite the theoretical load, the empirical level is more stable, more durable than the theoretical one. This happens because the empirical level of knowledge is immersed in such theoretical concepts that are unproblematizable. Empirically verified more than high level theoretical constructions than what is contained in it itself. If it were otherwise, then a logical circle would result, and then empirics would not test anything in theory. Since empiricism tests theories at a different level, experiment acts as a criterion for the truth of a theory.

When analyzing the structure of scientific knowledge, it is important to find out which theories are part of modern science. Namely, do modern physics, for example, include theories that are genetically related to modern concepts, but created in the past? Thus, mechanical phenomena are now described on the basis of quantum mechanics. Is classical mechanics included in the structure of modern physical knowledge? Such questions are very important when analyzing the concepts of modern natural science.

They can be answered based on the idea that scientific theory gives us a certain slice of reality, but no single system of abstraction can capture the entire richness of reality. Different systems of abstraction dissect reality on different planes. This also applies to theories that are genetically related to modern concepts, but were created in the past. Their systems of abstractions relate to each other in a certain way, but do not overlap each other. Thus, according to W. Heisenberg, in modern physics there are at least four fundamental closed consistent theories: classical mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics, quantum mechanics.

In the history of science, there is a tendency to reduce all natural science knowledge to a single theory, to reduce it to a small number of initial fundamental principles. Modern scientific methodology recognizes the fundamental impracticability of such information. It is due to the fact that any scientific theory is fundamentally limited in its intensive and extensive development. A scientific theory is a system of certain abstractions with the help of which the subordination of essential and insignificant properties of reality is revealed. Science must necessarily contain various systems of abstractions that are not only irreducible to each other, but dissect reality on different planes. This applies to all natural sciences and to individual sciences - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – which are irreducible to one theory. One theory cannot cover all the diversity of ways of knowing, styles of thinking that exist in modern science.

Scientific discoveries

F. Bacon believed that he had developed a method of scientific discovery, which was based on a gradual movement from particulars to ever greater generalizations. He was confident that he had developed a method for discovering new scientific knowledge that anyone could master. This discovery method is based on inductive generalization of experimental data. Bacon wrote: “Our path of discovery is such that it leaves little to the sharpness and power of talent, but almost equalizes them. Just as in drawing a straight line or describing a perfect circle, firmness, skill and testing of the hand mean a lot if you use only your hand, they mean little or nothing if you use a compass or ruler. This is the case with our method."

Bacon built a rather sophisticated scheme of the inductive method, which takes into account cases not only of the presence of the property being studied, but also of its various degrees, as well as the absence of this property in situations where its manifestation was expected.

Descartes believed that the method of obtaining new knowledge relies on intuition and deduction.

“These two paths,” he wrote, “are the surest paths to knowledge, and the mind should no longer allow them - all others should be rejected as suspicious and leading to error.”

Descartes formulated 4 universal rules to guide the mind in the search for new knowledge:

« First- never accept as true anything that I do not clearly recognize as so, that is, carefully avoid haste and prejudice to include in my judgments only what appears to my mind so clearly and distinctly that in no way can give rise to doubt.

Second- to divide each of the difficulties I consider into as many parts as necessary in order to better resolve them.

Third- to arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the simplest and easily cognizable objects, and ascend little by little, as if by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing for the existence of order even among those that do not precede each other in the natural course of things.

AND last thing- to make lists everywhere so complete and reviews so comprehensive as to be sure that nothing is missed.”

In modern scientific methodology it is realized that inductive generalizations cannot make the leap from empirical to theory.

Einstein wrote about it this way: “It is now known that science cannot grow on the basis of experience alone and that in constructing science we are forced to resort to freely created concepts, the suitability of which can be a posteriori check experimentally. These circumstances eluded previous generations, who thought that theory could be constructed purely inductively, without resorting to the free, creative creation of concepts. The more primitive the state of science, the easier it is for a researcher to create the illusion that he is an empiricist. Back in the 19th century. Many believed that Newton's principle - hypotheses non fingo- should serve as the foundation of any sound natural science.

Recently, the restructuring of the entire system of theoretical physics as a whole has led to the fact that recognition of the speculative nature of science has become a common property.”

When characterizing the transition from empirical data to theory, it is important to emphasize that pure experience, i.e. one that would not be determined by theoretical concepts does not exist at all.

On this occasion, K. Popper wrote this: “The idea that science develops from observation to theory is still widespread. However, the belief that we can begin Scientific research without something resembling a theory is absurd. Twenty-five years ago I tried to impress this idea on to a group of physics students in Vienna by beginning my lecture with the following words: “Take pencil and paper, observe carefully and write down your observations!” They asked, of course, what exactly they should observe. It's clear that simple instructions « Watch!"is absurd... Observation is always selective. You need to choose an object, a specific task, have some interest, point of view, problem...”

The role of theory in the development of scientific knowledge is clearly demonstrated by the fact that fundamental theoretical results can be obtained without direct recourse to empiricism.

A classic example of constructing a fundamental theory without direct reference to empirical evidence is Einstein’s creation of the general theory of relativity. The special theory of relativity was also created as a result of consideration theoretical problem(Michelson's experience was not significant for Einstein).

New phenomena can be discovered in science both through empirical and theoretical research. A classic example of the discovery of a new phenomenon at the theoretical level is the discovery of the positron by P. Dirac.

The development of modern scientific theories shows that their basic principles are not obvious in the Cartesian sense. In a sense, the scientist discovers the original principles of the theory intuitively. But these principles are far from Cartesian obviousness: the principles of Lobachevsky’s geometry, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, Big Bang cosmology, etc.

Attempts to construct various kinds of logics of discovery ceased in the last century as completely untenable. It became obvious that in principle there was no logic of discovery, no algorithm of discovery.

Models of scientific knowledge

The German philosopher and logician Reichenbach wrote about the principle of induction as follows: “This principle determines the truth of scientific theories. Removing it from science would mean nothing more and nothing less than depriving science of its ability to distinguish between the truth and falsity of its theories. Without him, science would obviously no longer have the right to talk about the difference between its theories and the whimsical and arbitrary creations of the poetic mind.”

The principle of induction states that universal statements of science are based on inductive conclusions. This is the principle we actually refer to when we say that the truth of a statement is known from experience. Reichenbach considered the main task of scientific methodology to be the development of inductive logic.

In modern scientific methodology, it is realized that it is generally impossible to establish the truth of a universal generalizing judgment using empirical data.

No matter how much a law is tested by empirical data, there is no guarantee that new observations will not appear that will contradict it. Carnap wrote: “One can never achieve complete verification of a law. In fact, we shouldn't talk about " verification“If by this word we mean the final establishment of truth, but only about confirmation.”

R. Carnap formulated his program as follows: “I agree that an inductive machine cannot be created if the purpose of the machine is to invent new theories. I believe, however, that an inductive machine can be built for a much more modest purpose. If some observations are given e and hypothesis h(in the form of, say, a prediction or even a set of laws), then I am confident that in many cases it is possible by a purely mechanical procedure to determine the logical probability, or degree of confirmation h based e».

If such a program were implemented, then instead of saying that one law is well substantiated and another is poorly substantiated, we would have accurate, quantitative estimates of the degree of their confirmation. Although Carnap constructed the probabilistic logic of the simplest languages, his methodological program could not be realized. Carnap, through his persistence, demonstrated the futility of this program.

In general, it has been established that the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis by facts is not decisive in the process of scientific knowledge. F. Frank wrote: “Science is like a detective story. All the facts support a certain hypothesis, but in the end a completely different hypothesis turns out to be correct.” K. Popper noted: “It is easy to obtain confirmation, or verification, for almost every theory if we look for confirmation.”

Since there is no logic of scientific discovery, no methods guaranteeing the acquisition of true scientific knowledge, scientific statements are hypotheses(from the Greek “assumption”), i.e. are scientific assumptions or assumptions whose truth value is uncertain.

This position forms the basis of the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific knowledge, developed in the first half of the 20th century. In accordance with this model, the scientist puts forward a hypothetical generalization, from which various kinds of consequences are deductively derived, which are then compared with empirical data.

K. Popper drew attention to the fact that when comparing hypotheses with empirical data, the procedures of confirmation and refutation have completely different cognitive status. For example, no number of observed white swans is a sufficient basis for establishing the truth of the statement " all swans are white" But it is enough to see one black swan to recognize this statement as false. This asymmetry, as Popper shows, is crucial for understanding the process of scientific knowledge.

K. Popper developed the idea that the irrefutability of a theory is not its merit, as is often thought, but its vice. He wrote: “A theory that cannot be falsified by any conceivable event is unscientific.” Refutability and falsifiability act as a criterion for the scientific nature of a theory.

K. Popper wrote: “Every real test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, i.e. refute. Verifiability is falsifiability...Confirmatory evidence should not be taken into account unless it is the result of a genuine test of the theory. This means that it must be understood as the result of a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory."

In the model of scientific knowledge developed by K. Popper, all knowledge turns out to be hypothetical. Truth turns out to be unattainable not only at the level of theory, but even in empirical knowledge due to its theoretical load.

K. Popper wrote: “Science does not rest on a solid foundation of facts. The rigid structure of her theories rises, so to speak, above the swamp. It is like a building erected on stilts. These piles are driven into the swamp, but do not reach any natural or " given» grounds. If we stop driving the piles further, it is not at all because we have reached solid ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are strong enough to support, at least for a while, the weight of our structure.”

Karl Popper remained a consistent supporter of empiricism. Both the acceptance of a theory and the rejection of it in his model are completely determined by experience. He wrote: “As long as a theory stands up to the strictest tests we can offer, it is accepted; if she cannot bear them, she is rejected. However, the theory is in no sense derived from empirical evidence. There is no psychological or logical induction. Only the falsity of a theory can be inferred from empirical evidence, and this inference is purely deductive.”

K. Popper developed the concept “ third world» – « the world of language, assumptions, theories and reasoning».

He distinguishes three worlds:

first- a reality that exists objectively,

second– state of consciousness and its activity,

third- “the world of the objective content of thinking, first of all, the content of scientific ideas, poetic thoughts and works of art.”

The third world is created by man, but the results of his activities begin to lead their own life. The third world is a “universe of objective knowledge”; it is autonomous from other worlds.

Popper wrote: “What happens to our theories is what happens to our children: they tend to become largely independent of their parents. The same thing can happen with our theories as with our children: we can acquire from them large quantity knowledge than was originally invested in them.”

Growth of knowledge in " third world"is described by Popper with the following diagram

P –> TT –> EE –> P ,

where P is the original problem, TT is the theory that claims to solve the problem, EE is the evaluation of the theory, its criticism and elimination of errors, P is the new problem.

“This is how,” writes Popper, “we lift ourselves by the hair from the quagmire of our ignorance, this is how we throw a rope into the air and then climb up it.”

Criticism turns out to be the most important source of growth for the Third World.

The merit of Lakatos in modern scientific methodology is that he clearly emphasized the stability of the theory and research program. He wrote: “Neither a logical proof of inconsistency nor a scientific verdict on an experimentally discovered anomaly can destroy a research program at one blow.” The main value of a theory or program is the ability to expand knowledge and predict new facts. Contradictions and difficulties in describing any phenomena do not significantly affect the attitude of scientists to the theory or program.

Many scientific theories have encountered contradictions and difficulties in explaining phenomena. For example, Newton could not explain stability on the basis of mechanics solar system and argued that God corrects deviations in the movement of the planets caused by various disturbances (Laplace managed to solve this problem only at the beginning of the 19th century). Darwin could not explain the so-called " Jenkin's nightmare" In Euclid's geometry, for two thousand years it was not possible to solve the problem of the fifth postulate.

Such difficulties are common in science and do not lead scientists to abandon theory, because the scientist is unable to work outside of theory.

A scientist can always protect a theory from inconsistency with empirical data using some tricks and hypotheses. This explains why there are always alternative theories and research programs.

The main source of the development of science is not the interaction of theory and empirical data, but the competition of theories and research programs in the field better description and explanations of observed phenomena, predictions of new facts.

Lakatos noted that one can "rationally stick with a regressing program until it is overtaken by a competing program and even after that." There is always hope that failures will be temporary. However, representatives of regressive theories and programs will inevitably face increasing social, psychological and economic problems.

Scientific traditions

Science is usually presented as a sphere of almost continuous creativity, a constant striving for something new. However, in modern scientific methodology it is clearly understood that scientific activity can be traditional.

The founder of the doctrine of scientific traditions is T. Kuhn. Traditional science is called in his concept " normal science", which is "research firmly based on one or more past achievements that have been recognized for some time by a particular scientific community as the basis for the development of its further practical activities."

T. Kuhn showed that tradition is not a brake, but, on the contrary, a necessary condition for the rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge. " Normal Science“develops not in spite of traditions, but precisely because of its traditionality. Tradition organizes the scientific community, gives rise to “ industry» knowledge production.

T. Kuhn writes: “By paradigms I mean scientific achievements recognized by all, which over a certain period of time provide a model for posing problems and their solutions to the scientific community.”

Quite generally accepted theoretical concepts such as the Copernican system, Newtonian mechanics, Lavoisier’s oxygen theory, Einstein’s theory of relativity, etc. determine the paradigms of scientific activity. The cognitive potential inherent in such concepts, which determine the vision of reality and ways of comprehending it, is revealed during periods of “ normal science“when scientists in their research do not go beyond the boundaries determined by the paradigm.

T. Kuhn describes crisis phenomena in the development of normal science: “An increase in competing options, a willingness to try something else, an expression of obvious dissatisfaction, an appeal to philosophy for help and a discussion of fundamental provisions are all symptoms of the transition from normal to extraordinary research.”

Crisis situation in development " normal science"is resolved by the emergence of a new paradigm. Thus, a scientific revolution occurs, and the conditions for the functioning of “ normal science».

T. Kuhn writes: “The decision to abandon a paradigm is always simultaneously a decision to accept another paradigm, and the verdict leading to such a decision includes both a comparison of both paradigms with nature and a comparison of paradigms with each other.”

The transition from one paradigm to another, according to Kuhn, is impossible through logic and references to experience.

In a sense, advocates of different paradigms live in different worlds. According to Kuhn, different paradigms are incommensurable. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another must be carried out abruptly, like a switch, and not gradually through logic.

Scientific revolutions

Scientific revolutions usually affect the ideological and methodological foundations of science, often changing the very style of thinking. Therefore, their significance can extend far beyond the specific area where they occurred. Therefore, we can talk about specific scientific and general scientific revolutions.

The emergence of quantum mechanics is a striking example of a general scientific revolution, since its significance goes far beyond physics. Quantum mechanical concepts at the level of analogies or metaphors have penetrated into humanitarian thinking. These ideas encroach on our intuition, common sense, and affect our worldview.

The Darwinian revolution went far beyond biology in its significance. She radically changed our ideas about man's place in Nature. It had a strong methodological impact, turning the thinking of scientists towards evolutionism.

New research methods can lead to far-reaching consequences: to a change in problems, to a change in the standards of scientific work, to the emergence of new areas of knowledge. In this case, their introduction means a scientific revolution.

Thus, the appearance of the microscope in biology meant a scientific revolution. The entire history of biology can be divided into two stages, separated by the appearance and introduction of the microscope. Entire fundamental branches of biology - microbiology, cytology, histology - owe their development to the introduction of the microscope.

The advent of the radio telescope meant a revolution in astronomy. Academician Ginsburg writes about it this way: “After the Second World War, astronomy entered a period of especially brilliant development, during the “ second astronomical revolution“(the first such revolution is associated with the name of Galileo, who began to use telescopes) ... The content of the second astronomical revolution can be seen in the process of transforming astronomy from optical to all-wave.”

Sometimes a new area of ​​the unknown opens up before the researcher, a world of new objects and phenomena. This can cause revolutionary changes in the course of scientific knowledge, as happened, for example, with the discovery of such new worlds as the world of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms and molecules, the world of electromagnetic phenomena, the world of elementary particles, with the discovery of the phenomenon of gravity, other galaxies, the world of crystals , radioactivity phenomena, etc.

Thus, the basis of the scientific revolution may be the discovery of some previously unknown areas or aspects of reality.

Fundamental scientific discoveries

Many major discoveries in science are made on a well-defined theoretical basis. Example: discovery of the planet Neptune by Le Verrier and Adams by studying disturbances in the motion of the planet Uranus on the basis of celestial mechanics.

Fundamental scientific discoveries are different from others in that they do not involve deduction from existing principles, but rather the development of new fundamental principles.

In the history of science, fundamental scientific discoveries are highlighted related to the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as Euclid's geometry, Copernicus' heliocentric system, Newton's classical mechanics, Lobachevsky's geometry, Mendel's genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, and quantum mechanics. These discoveries changed the idea of ​​reality as a whole, i.e. were ideological in nature.

There are many facts in the history of science when a fundamental scientific discovery was made independently of each other by several scientists almost at the same time. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was constructed almost simultaneously by Lobachevsky, Gauss, Bolyai; Darwin published his ideas about evolution almost simultaneously with Wallace; The special theory of relativity was developed simultaneously by Einstein and Poincaré.

From the fact that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, it follows that they are historically conditioned.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems, i.e. problems that have a deep, worldview, and not a private nature.

Thus, Copernicus saw that two fundamental ideological principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature - were not realized in astronomy; solving this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

Non-Euclidean geometry was constructed when the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry ceased to be a particular problem of geometry and turned into a fundamental problem of mathematics, its foundations.

Ideals of scientific knowledge

In accordance with classical ideas about science, it should not contain “ no admixture of delusions" Now truth is not considered as a necessary attribute of all cognitive results that claim to be scientific. It is the central regulator of scientific and cognitive activity.

Classical ideas about science are characterized by a constant search for “ began to learn», « reliable foundation", on which the entire system of scientific knowledge could rely.

However, in modern scientific methodology, the idea of ​​the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge is developing, when experience is no longer the foundation of knowledge, but mainly performs a critical function.

Fundamentalist validity as the leading value in classical ideas about scientific knowledge is increasingly being replaced by such a value as efficiency in solving problems.

Throughout the development of science, various areas of scientific knowledge acted as standards.

« Beginnings“Euclid has long been an attractive standard in literally all areas of knowledge: philosophy, physics, astronomy, medicine, etc.

However, the limits of the significance of mathematics as a standard of science are now well understood, which, for example, are formulated as follows: “In the strict sense, proofs are possible only in mathematics, and not because mathematicians are smarter than others, but because they themselves create the universe for their experiments, nevertheless the rest are forced to experiment with a Universe they did not create.”

The triumph of mechanics in the 17th-19th centuries led to the fact that it began to be considered as an ideal, an example of scientific knowledge.

Eddington said that when a physicist sought to explain something, “his ear struggled to catch the noise of the machine. The man who could construct gravity from gears would be a Victorian hero."

Since modern times, physics has been established as a reference science. If at first mechanics acted as the standard, then later – the whole complex of physical knowledge. The orientation towards the physical ideal in chemistry was clearly expressed, for example, by P. Berthelot, in biology - by M. Schleiden. G. Helmholtz argued that “ final goal"of all natural sciences - " dissolve in mechanics" Attempts to build " social mechanics», « social physics" and so on. were numerous.

The physical ideal of scientific knowledge has certainly proven its heuristic, but today it is clear that the implementation of this ideal often hinders the development of other sciences - mathematics, biologists, social sciences, etc. As N.K. Mikhailovsky noted, the absolutization of the physical ideal of scientificity leads to such a formulation of social questions when " to which natural science gives the Judas kiss to sociology”, leading to pseudo-objectivity.

The humanities are sometimes offered as a model of scientific knowledge. The focus in this case is the active role of the subject in the cognitive process.

However, the humanitarian ideal of scientific knowledge cannot be extended to all sciences. In addition to sociocultural conditioning, any scientific knowledge, including the humanitarian, should be characterized by internal, subject-specific conditioning. Therefore, the humanitarian ideal cannot be realized even in its subject area, much less in natural science.

The humanitarian ideal of scientificity is sometimes considered as a transitional step to some new ideas about science that go beyond the classical ones.

In general, classical ideas about science are characterized by the desire to highlight “ scientific standard”, to which all other areas of knowledge must “catch up”.

However, such reductionist aspirations are criticized in the modern methodology of science, which is characterized by a pluralistic tendency in the interpretation of science, the assertion of the equivalence of various standards of scientificity, and their irreducibility to any one standard.

If, in accordance with classical ideas about science, its conclusions should be determined only by the reality itself being studied, then modern methodology of science is characterized by the acceptance and development of the thesis about the socio-cultural conditionality of scientific knowledge.

Social (socio-economic, cultural-historical, worldview, socio-psychological) factors in the development of science do not have a direct impact on scientific knowledge, which develops according to its internal logic. However, social factors indirectly influence the development of scientific knowledge (through methodological regulations, principles, standards).

This externalist tendency in modern scientific methodology means its radical break with classical ideas about science.

Functions of science

The methodology of science distinguishes such functions of science as description, explanation, prediction, and understanding.

With all the empiricism characteristic of Comte, he was not inclined to reduce science to a collection of isolated facts. He considered foresight to be the main function of science.

O. Comte wrote: “True positive thinking consists primarily in the ability to know, to foresee, to study what is, and from here to conclude what should happen according to general situation about the immutability of natural laws."

E. Mach declared description to be the only function of science.

He noted: “Does the description give everything that a scientific researcher can require? I think yes!" Mach essentially reduced explanation and foresight to description. From his point of view, theories are like compressed empirics.

E. Mach wrote: “The speed with which our knowledge expands thanks to theory gives it some quantitative advantage over simple observation, while qualitatively there is no significant difference between them, either in terms of origin or in terms of the final result.”

Mach called the atomic-molecular theory " mythology of nature" The famous chemist W. Ostwald took a similar position. On this occasion, A. Einstein wrote: “The prejudice of these scientists against the atomic theory can undoubtedly be attributed to their positivist philosophical attitude. This - interesting example how philosophical prejudices prevent the correct interpretation of facts even by scientists with bold thinking and subtle intuition. A prejudice that has survived to this day is the belief that facts by themselves, without free theoretical construction, can and should lead to scientific knowledge.”

V. Dilthey shared the sciences of nature and “ spiritual sciences" (Humanities). He believed that the main cognitive function of the natural sciences is explanation, and “ spiritual sciences" - understanding.

However, the natural sciences also serve a function of understanding.

Explanation is related to understanding, since explanation convincingly demonstrates to us the meaningfulness of the existence of an object, and therefore allows us to understand it.

Ethos of science

Ethical standards not only govern the use scientific results, but also contained in scientific activity itself.

Norwegian philosopher G. Skirbekk notes: “Being an activity aimed at searching for truth, science is regulated by norms: “ seek the truth», « avoid nonsense», « be clear», « try to test your hypotheses as thoroughly as possible“This is approximately what the formulations of these internal norms of science look like.” In this sense, ethics is contained in science itself, and the relationship between science and ethics is not limited to the question of good or poor use scientific results.

The presence of certain values ​​and norms that are reproduced from generation to generation of scientists and are mandatory for a person of science, i.e. a certain ethos of science is very important for the self-organization of the scientific community (at the same time, the normative and value structure of science is not rigid). Individual violations of the ethical standards of science in general are more likely to be fraught with great trouble for the violator himself than for science as a whole. However, if such violations become widespread, science itself is under threat.

In conditions when the social functions of science are rapidly multiplying and diversifying, giving a summary ethical assessment of science as a whole turns out to be insufficient and unconstructive, regardless of whether this assessment is positive or negative.

The ethical assessment of science should now be differentiated, relating not to science as a whole, but to individual directions and areas of scientific knowledge. Such moral and ethical judgments play a very constructive role.

Modern science involves the human and social interactions that people engage in regarding scientific knowledge.

« Clean“The study of a cognizable object by science is a methodological abstraction, thanks to which one can obtain a simplified picture of science. In fact, the objective logic of the development of science is realized not outside the scientist, but in his activities. Recently, the social responsibility of a scientist has become an integral component of scientific activity. This responsibility turns out to be one of the factors determining the trends in the development of science, individual disciplines and research areas.

In the 70s of the 20th century, scientists first declared a moratorium on dangerous research. In connection with the results and prospects of biomedical and genetic research, a group of molecular biologists and geneticists led by P. Berg (USA) voluntarily declared a moratorium on such experiments in the field of genetic engineering that may pose a danger to the genetic constitution of living organisms. Then, for the first time, scientists, on their own initiative, decided to suspend research that promised them great success. The social responsibility of scientists has become an organic component of scientific activity, significantly influencing the problems and directions of research.

The progress of science expands the range of problem situations for which all the moral experience accumulated by humanity is not sufficient. A large number of such situations arise in medicine. For example, in connection with the success of experiments on heart and other organ transplants, the question of determining the moment of death of the donor became acute. The same question arises when an irreversibly comatose patient is supported by technical means to maintain breathing and heartbeat. In the United States, such issues are dealt with by a special Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical Issues in Medicine, Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Under the influence of experiments with human embryos, the question becomes acute about at what point in development a creature should be considered a child with all the ensuing consequences.

It cannot be assumed that ethical issues are the property of only some areas of science. Value and ethical foundations have always been necessary for scientific activity. In modern science they are becoming a very noticeable and integral aspect of activity, which is a consequence of the development of science as a social institution and the growth of its role in the life of society.

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