Islamic Revolution Day in Afghanistan. The April revolution in Afghanistan is another round of the Great Game

April (Saur) revolution 1978- the coup and revolutionary transformations carried out by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the United Front of the Communists of Afghanistan (OFKA). Since the mid-70s in the politics of the President M. Dauda authoritarian tendencies intensified, under the influence of Iran and Pakistan, he intensified the fight against leftist forces, which, in turn, intensified the preparation of the PDPA and OFKA for a revolutionary coup. On April 17, 1978, one of the leaders of the PDPA, M. Khaibar, was shot dead in front of his house. His funeral turned into a mass anti-government demonstration, which worried the authorities and led to the arrests of the leaders of the PDPA on April 25-26. In response, H. Amin ordered the supporters of the PDPA to start a coup. OFKA officers headed by A. Kadyr also took part in it. On April 27, the tanks of the 4th brigade under the command of Major M. Watanjar opened fire on the presidential palace. They were supported by aviation and commandos. Daoud resisted for several hours and was killed while trying to arrest him. On April 28, the resistance of the remnants of the presidential guard was suppressed. As a result of the coup proclaimed by the revolution, 29.04. the Military Revolutionary Council came, soon transformed into the revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, headed by the leader of the Khalq N. M. Taraki. B. Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction, which did not participate in the coup, was elected deputy. chairman of the revolutionary council. The presence of Parchamists in the state leadership caused dissatisfaction with the "Khalkists". In June, members of the Politburo from Parcham were removed from their posts and sent as ambassadors abroad. In August 1978, the arrests of "Parchamists" began. Their leaders, as well as supporters of the Minister of Defense, OFKA leader A. Kadyr, were declared "enemies of the people", a purge of the army and the party was launched, accompanied by executions and torture. "Parcham" moved to an illegal position. All state leadership was concentrated in the hands of N. M. Taraki and H. Amin. The Revolutionary Council embarked on radical transformations, on May 02 a decision was made to confiscate property royal family, 12.07 were canceled the debts of the peasants, 17.10 it was announced the equality of men and women. Restrictions on the age of marriage were introduced, and bride price was abolished. The eradication of illiteracy has begun. On November 30, the Decree on Land and Water Reform was adopted. A land maximum of 6 hectares was introduced. Surplus land was confiscated from the traditional owners without redemption, and then distributed to the small-land peasants by 1 hectare in lifetime inheritable possession. However, the peasants sometimes did not take the land, considering such a redistribution unfair and contrary to the laws of Islam. At the same time, the alienated land was not enough for all the landless, land-poor peasants and nomads who wanted to settle down. Water passed to the disposal of the state and was provided to the peasants in proportion to the allotment. The peasants who received land were promised loans and equipment, but the state did not have the opportunity to provide them to everyone. The revision of land rights that had begun caused mass dissatisfaction due to the intricacies of land rights and the abolition of Sharia land documents. Land was received by 296 thousand families. The policy of cultural unification of the country, the imposition of the language and culture of the national majority - the Pashtuns - caused discontent among the national minorities. At the same time, attempts to establish tighter control over the nomadic Pashtuns caused conflict with them as well. The introduction of price controls worsened the supply situation. To break down the sabotage and unrest, the PDPA unleashed terror against the aristocracy and merchants, and then against the wider population. Increased emigration from the country. If in 1973 there were several hundred emigrants from Afghanistan in Pakistan, then in December 1978 there were 402,100 people. These people needed something to live on, they were hostile to the revolutionary regime. Thanks to US help, Saudi Arabia and China, opposition military camps were formed in Pakistan. Partisan groups began to be transferred to Afghanistan. In place of spontaneous riots against the new government, which had already been taking place since May 1978, in early 1979 came Civil War(cm. War in Afghanistan). By the end of 1979, the number of "mujahideen" (armed fighters for the cause of Islam) reached 40 thousand people. In this difficult situation, the revolutionaries turned to the USSR with a request for military assistance. The Soviet leadership recommended that Taraki switch to a more moderate course, replacing the radical "Khalqists" led by Amin with "Parchamists" led by Karmal. However, on September 14-16, Amin won in the struggle for power, and on October 8, Taraki was killed. Under these conditions, it was decided to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which was carried out on December 25-27, 1979, was accompanied by the destruction of Amin and led to an escalation of the war in Afghanistan.

Lit .: Allan P., Clay D. Afghan trap. The truth about the Soviet invasion. M., 1999; War in Afghanistan. M., 1991; Davydov A.D. Afghanistan: there might not have been a war. Peasants and reforms. M., 1993; Iskandarov K. Political parties and movements in Afghanistan in the second half of the XX century. Dushanbe, 2004; Lyakhovsky A. A., Zabrodin V. M. Secrets afghan war. M., 1991; Shubin A.V. Golden autumn or period of stagnation. USSR in 1975-1985. M., 2007. A. V. Shubin.

انقلاب ثور
The streets of Kabul the day after the revolution. April 28, 1978 In the foreground - the destroyed BMP-1 A country date Cause primary goal Outcome

The victory of the pro-communist forces and the armed change of government. Proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

Organizers driving forces Opponents

The first column of the 4th tank brigade, led by the commander of the tank company, senior captain Umar, appeared in front of the main entrance of the presidential palace around noon on April 27. At that time, a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers was held in the palace under the chairmanship of M. Daud. The latter was immediately informed of the appearance of tanks. Daoud ordered Defense Minister Rasouli and Chief of the Presidential Guard Major Zia to find out what was going on. Asked by Zia why the tanks had arrived, Umar replied that the brigade commander had sent them to reinforce the security of the presidential palace. Umar was ordered to return to the location of the brigade. However, leaving the position at the main entrance to the palace, he drove the tanks into a side street and waited. Soon other units of the 4th tank brigade arrived in time. The presidential palace was surrounded by tanks. Officers M. A. Watanjar, S. D. Tarun, Nazar Muhammad, Sh. Mazduryar and Ahmed Jan led their actions.

Among historians, there is still a question: were these events a revolution and was the Soviet Union behind them? In 1979, in the January issue of "Problems of Peace and Socialism", one of the members of the PDPA, Zerey, described the pre-revolutionary situation as follows:

In his book The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan, Lyakhovsky notes:

The chief military adviser of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, General Lev Gorelov, who was in 1975-1979, later assessed it as follows: “in general, this was not a revolution, but rather a coup, a coup made by the officers, the army.”

According to the Minister of Culture and Information of Afghanistan, Said Makhdum Rahin (2010), the 1978 coup halted the development of democracy in the country for several decades.

It is not customary to celebrate the anniversaries of the April Revolution in Afghanistan at present, instead of them, the next day marks the Day of the Victory of the Afghan people in jihad (the anniversary of the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government in 1992).

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An excerpt characterizing the April Revolution

- Ah, je suis vraiment au desespoir de ce qui vient d "arriver, [Ah, I really am in despair over what happened,] - Pierre said quickly, completely forgetting his role. - C" est un fou, un malheureux qui ne savait pas ce qu "il faisait. [This is an unfortunate madman who did not know what he was doing.]
The officer went up to Makar Alekseevich and seized him by the collar.
Makar Alekseich, parting his lips, as if falling asleep, swayed, leaning against the wall.
“Brigand, tu me la payeras,” said the Frenchman, withdrawing his hand.
– Nous autres nous sommes clements apres la victoire: mais nous ne pardonnons pas aux traitres, [Robber, you will pay me for this. Our brother is merciful after the victory, but we do not forgive the traitors,] he added with gloomy solemnity in his face and with a beautiful energetic gesture.
Pierre continued to persuade the officer in French not to exact from this drunken, insane man. The Frenchman listened in silence, without changing his gloomy look, and suddenly turned to Pierre with a smile. He looked at him silently for a few seconds. His handsome face took on a tragically tender expression, and he held out his hand.
- Vous m "avez sauve la vie! Vous etes Francais, [You saved my life. You are a Frenchman,]" he said. For a Frenchman, this conclusion was undeniable. Only a Frenchman could do a great deed, and saving his life, m r Ramball "I capitaine du 13 me leger [Monsieur Rambal, captain of the 13th light regiment] was, without a doubt, the greatest deed.
But no matter how undoubted this conclusion and the officer’s conviction based on it, Pierre considered it necessary to disappoint him.
“Je suis Russe, [I am Russian],” Pierre said quickly.
- Ti ti ti, a d "autres, [tell it to others] - said the Frenchman, waving his finger in front of his nose and smiling. - Tout a l "heure vous allez me conter tout ca," he said. – Charme de rencontrer un compatriote. Eh bien! qu "allons nous faire de cet homme? [Now you will tell me all this. It is very nice to meet a compatriot. Well! what should we do with this man?] - he added, addressing Pierre, already as his brother. If only Pierre was not a Frenchman, having once received this highest title in the world, he could not renounce it, said the expression on the face and tone of the French officer. To the last question, Pierre once again explained who Makar Alekseich was, explained that just before their arrival this a drunken, insane man dragged away a loaded pistol, which they did not have time to take away from him, and asked that his deed be left without punishment.
The Frenchman stuck out his chest and made a royal gesture with his hand.
- Vous m "avez sauve la vie. Vous etes Francais. Vous me demandez sa grace? Je vous l" accorde. Qu "on emmene cet homme, [You saved my life. You are a Frenchman. Do you want me to forgive him? I forgive him. Take this man away,] the French officer said quickly and energetically, taking by the arm what he had produced for saving his life into Pierre's French, and went with him to the house.
The soldiers who were in the yard, hearing the shot, went into the passage, asking what had happened, and expressing their readiness to punish the guilty; but the officer severely stopped them.
“On vous demandera quand on aura besoin de vous, [When needed, you will be called,” he said. The soldiers left. The batman, who had meanwhile been in the kitchen, approached the officer.
“Capitaine, ils ont de la soupe et du gigot de mouton dans la cuisine,” he said. - Faut il vous l "apporter? [The captain has soup and roast lamb in the kitchen. Would you like to bring it?]
- Oui, et le vin, [Yes, and wine,] - said the captain.

The French officer, together with Pierre, entered the house. Pierre considered it his duty to assure the captain again that he was not a Frenchman, and wanted to leave, but the French officer did not want to hear about it. He was so courteous, amiable, good-natured and truly grateful for saving his life that Pierre did not have the courage to refuse him and sat down with him in the hall, in the first room into which they entered. To Pierre's assertion that he was not a Frenchman, the captain, obviously not understanding how it was possible to refuse such a flattering title, shrugged his shoulders and said that if he certainly wants to be known as a Russian, then so be it, but that he, despite then, all the same forever connected with him by a feeling of gratitude for saving a life.
If this person had been gifted with at least some ability to understand the feelings of others and had guessed about Pierre's feelings, Pierre would probably have left him; but the lively impenetrability of this man to everything that was not himself defeated Pierre.
- Francais ou prince russe incognito, [Frenchman or Russian prince incognito,] - said the Frenchman, looking at Pierre's dirty, but thin underwear and the ring on his hand. - Je vous dois la vie je vous offre mon amitie. Un Francais n "oublie jamais ni une insulte ni un service. Je vous offre mon amitie. Je ne vous dis que ca. [I owe you my life, and I offer you friendship. A Frenchman never forgets insults or services. I offer my friendship to you, I say no more.]
In the sounds of his voice, in the expression of his face, in the gestures of this officer, there was so much good nature and nobility (in the French sense) that Pierre, responding with an unconscious smile to the smile of the Frenchman, shook the outstretched hand.
- Capitaine Ramball du treizieme leger, decore pour l "affaire du Sept, [Captain Ramball, thirteenth light regiment, cavalier of the Legion of Honor for the cause of the seventh of September,] - he introduced himself with a smug, uncontrollable smile that wrinkled his lips under his mustache. - Voudrez vous bien me dire a present, a qui "j" ai l "honneur de parler aussi agreablement au lieu de rester a l" ambulance avec la balle de ce fou dans le corps. [Will you be so kind as to tell me now who I am with I have the honor of talking so pleasantly, instead of being at the dressing station with this madman's bullet in his body?]
Pierre answered that he could not say his name, and, blushing, began, trying to invent a name, to talk about the reasons why he could not say this, but the Frenchman hastily interrupted him.
“De grace,” he said. - Je comprends vos raisons, vous etes officier ... officier superieur, peut etre. Vous avez porte les armes contre nous. Ce n "est pas mon affaire. Je vous dois la vie. Cela me suffit. Je suis tout a vous. Vous etes gentilhomme? [Complete, please. I understand you, you are an officer ... a staff officer, maybe. You served against us It's none of my business. I owe you my life. That's enough for me, and I'm all yours. Are you a nobleman?] - he added with a hint of a question. Pierre tilted his head. - Votre nom de bapteme, s "il vous plait? Je ne demande pas davantage. Monsieur Pierre, dites vous… Parfait. C "est tout ce que je desire savoir. [Your name? I don't ask anything else. Mr. Pierre, did you say? Fine. That's all I need.]
When roast lamb, scrambled eggs, a samovar, vodka and wine from a Russian cellar, which the French brought with them, were brought, Ramball asked Pierre to take part in this dinner and immediately, eagerly and quickly, like a healthy and hungry man, began to eat, chewing quickly their strong teeth, incessantly smacking their lips and saying excellent, exquis! [wonderful, excellent!] His face was flushed and covered with sweat. Pierre was hungry and gladly took part in the dinner. Morel, the orderly, brought a pot of warm water and put a bottle of red wine in it. In addition, he brought a bottle of kvass, which he took from the kitchen for testing. This drink was already known to the French and got the name. They called the kvass limonade de cochon (pork lemonade), and Morel praised this limonade de cochon he found in the kitchen. But since the captain had wine obtained during the passage through Moscow, he provided kvass to Morel and took up a bottle of Bordeaux. He wrapped the bottle up to the neck in a napkin and poured himself and Pierre wine. The satisfaction of hunger and wine enlivened the captain still more, and he did not stop talking during dinner.
- Oui, mon cher monsieur Pierre, je vous dois une fiere chandelle de m "avoir sauve ... de cet enrage ... J" en ai assez, voyez vous, de balles dans le corps. En voila une (on pointed to his side) a Wagram et de deux a Smolensk, - he showed the scar that was on his cheek. - Et cette jambe, comme vous voyez, qui ne veut pas marcher. C "est a la grande bataille du 7 a la Moskowa que j" ai recu ca. Sacre dieu, c "etait beau. Il fallait voir ca, c" etait un deluge de feu. Vous nous avez taille une rude besogne; vous pouvez vous en vanter, nom d "un petit bonhomme. Et, ma parole, malgre l" atoux que j "y ai gagne, je serais pret a recommencer. Je plains ceux qui n" ont pas vu ca. [Yes, my dear Mr. Pierre, I am obliged to light a good candle for you for saving me from this madman. You see, I've had enough of the bullets that I have in my body. Here is one near Wagram, the other near Smolensk. And this leg, you see, that doesn't want to move. This is during the big battle of the 7th near Moscow. ABOUT! it was wonderful! You should have seen it, it was a deluge of fire. You asked us hard work you can brag. And by God, despite this trump card (he pointed to the cross), I would be ready to start all over again. I pity those who did not see it.]
- J "y ai ete, [I was there] - said Pierre.
- Bah, vraiment! Eh bien, tant mieux, said the Frenchman. - Vous etes de fiers ennemis, tout de meme. La grande redoute a ete tenace, nom d "une pipe. Et vous nous l" avez fait cranement payer. J "y suis alle trois fois, tel que vous me voyez. Trois fois nous etions sur les canons et trois fois on nous a culbute et comme des capucins de cartes. Oh !! c" etait beau, monsieur Pierre. Vos grenadiers ont ete superbes, tonnerre de Dieu. Je les ai vu six fois de suite serrer les rangs, et marcher comme a une revue. Les beaux hommes! Notre roi de Naples, qui s "y connait a crie: bravo! Ah, ah! soldat comme nous autres! - he said, smiling, ate a moment of silence. - Tant mieux, tant mieux, monsieur Pierre. Terribles en bataille ... galants ... - he winked with a smile, - avec les belles, voila les Francais, monsieur Pierre, n "est ce pas? [Ba, really? All the better. You are dashing enemies, I must admit. The big redoubt held up well, dammit. And you made us pay dearly. I've been there three times, as you can see. Three times we were on the cannons, three times we were knocked over like card soldiers. Your grenadiers were great, by God. I saw how their ranks closed six times and how they marched exactly to the parade. Wonderful people! Our Neapolitan king, who ate the dog in these cases, shouted to them: bravo! - Ha, ha, so you are our brother soldier! “So much the better, so much the better, Monsieur Pierre. Terrible in battle, kind to beauties, here are the French, Monsieur Pierre. Is not it?]

Until the early 1970s, Afghanistan was a state whose life was of little concern to the international community. Interest in this country appeared after the coup d'etat in 1973, when the monarchical regime was replaced by a republican form of government. Moreover, for the two centers of the bipolar world, which were the Soviet Union and the United States, relations with the Republic of Afghanistan remained good neighborly, and this Central Asian country was not a territory of rivalry between the USSR and the United States.

During this period, the Soviet Union provided assistance mainly to the border provinces in the north of the country, and the United States to the provinces in the south. According to Graham Fuller, who headed the CIA station in Kabul from 1975-1978, “The United States had practically no interests in Afghanistan”. A very accurate picture of Afghanistan's relationship with the two countries comes from a secret report by US Ambassador to Afghanistan Eliot addressed to the US Secretary of State:

“US-Afghan relations during 1977 were excellent... Afghanistan's most important bilateral relationship with its northern neighbor continued to be tangible and profitable. The Soviets avoided any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

A radical change in relations in the triangle occurred after the April coup. And although in his December 1978 speech, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, called the events of April 1978 "True People's Revolution", for the Soviet government, it came as a surprise. It turned out to be the same surprise for the United States, however, very soon the Americans called the April Revolution "offensive of the Soviets".

The revolution brought to the political arena not only the communists - the People's Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), it gave strength and impetus to the formation of organizations, which are generally described as "Islamic opposition". After the PDPA came to power, the situation changed not only in this country, but throughout the region, as well as in relations between the USA and the USSR. Afghanistan has been for many years hot spot and it remains so to this day.

Omar Nessar, director of the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan, spoke to Russian Planet about the causes of the April Revolution, whether it is possible to detect a Soviet trace in it, and how modern Afghan society relates to the events of 1978.

Russian Planet (RP): In your opinion, what caused the April Revolution?

Omar Nessar (OH): The April revolution was not only the result of the internal problems of Afghanistan and the discontent of the Afghan society, but also the whole situation that was developing in Central Asia and the world. So far, the geopolitical rivalry between East and West in the region has not reached high level Afghanistan could remain neutral. When the level became critical, Afghanistan could not resist it, it was necessary either to join the East or the West.

Therefore, the so-called "white" coup in 1973, as a result of which King Zahir Shah was removed and his cousin Daoud Khan came to power, should be considered in a general context. I believe that Zahir Shah, having felt the intensification of the geopolitical confrontation between the West and the East, simply left his post to a person who was more prepared and ready to take responsibility for tough decisions. However, Daoud Khan could not balance between the two forces - West and East, as a result, all this led to a regime change, and the coming to power in 1978 of the PDPA.

Of course, internal discontent also played a certain role in the April Revolution. During the reign of Daud Khan, discontent grew, and part of the population supported the revolution. At first, the revolution was accepted with some optimism, many thought that the situation would change for the better, and, indeed, great changes took place in the country. Great changes have taken place in inter-ethnic politics, the inter-ethnic equality in Afghanistan, which we are seeing today, has its origins in the April Revolution. A striking example: the Khazarites in Afghan society today occupy a fairly significant position, and before the April Revolution they were in a discriminatory position. After the revolution, their status rose, and, surprisingly, a Hazarite was elected prime minister of Afghanistan. If we talk about the position of women in Afghan society, then it is the April Revolution that women owe their equality with men. Although it cannot be said that earlier women were in an oppressed position.

The reforms made education accessible to representatives of all peoples and all strata of society. The leaders of the PDPA understood that an educated society is the key to the successful development of the country, so from the very beginning they began to fight illiteracy in the most serious way.

RP: I.e. Did the PDPA manage to do what the Daoud government failed to do?

HE: In any case, serious measures have been taken in this regard. Another thing is that the situation developing in the coming years after the April Revolution did not allow the full implementation of the planned plans for establishing social justice, reforming education and, in general, modernizing society. Some time after the revolution, the leaders of the PDPA began to make serious, in my opinion, mistakes. This is land reform and oppression of religion. Afghan society was not ready for such reforms. An artificial attempt to reduce the role of religion and traditional Afghan institutions in the life of society led to a backlash.

Again, the confrontation between the West and the East played a big role. The United States began to support the opposition and anti-Soviet forces, and the introduction of Soviet troops aggravated the situation, many countries of the Islamic world had a serious reason to be included in the outbreak of war. The confrontation between the West and the East has become very serious, has moved to a new stage, Afghanistan has become a serious field of rivalry between the West and the East.

RP: Do you think the USSR had a hand in the revolution?

HE: In science, this issue remains debatable, in Western and Afghan sources one can come across statements that the Soviet Union played a certain role in the April Revolution, but when you start to study this issue in depth, you see that the authors who claim that the USSR was involved in the revolution do not show no evidence. Their only argument is that the PDPA was a pro-Soviet party.

The Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander Puzanov, later said that he was not aware of the impending change of power, he was only informed about the coup the next day. Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky called the news of the coup for the Soviet side "a bolt from the blue."

If we discard all the statements of politicians and take up the study of the facts, then there is no evidence that the Soviet Union had anything to do with this. And I myself, studying this issue, came to the conclusion that the leadership Soviet Union was put by the Afghan communists before a fact. And already after the completed revolution, the Soviet government was forced to support it, which was in line with the policy pursued by the USSR.

RP: What is the significance of the April Revolution in modern Afghanistan?

HE: The 1978 revolution has ambiguous assessments, but it can be noted that attitudes towards it are changing. About ten years ago, the attitude was quite negative. Now we can say that if the assessment did not become unambiguously positive, but the share of positive increased. People can already compare those years and today, was it safer then, or now? Was there social justice then, or now? And a positive assessment of those events is given rather by ordinary, ordinary people than by the modern political elite of the country.

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The overthrow of the monarchy. On July 17, 1973, a bloodless coup d'état took place in Afghanistan, leading to the overthrow of King Zahir Shah. His cousin, General Mohammed Daoud, came to power. He abolished the monarchy in Afghanistan and proclaimed himself President of the Republic of Afghanistan. Speaking to journalists a few weeks after coming to power, M. Daud said: “Having freed ourselves from the monarchical regime, we will first of all carry out land reform, guarantee the rights and freedoms of the population, improve living and working conditions, improve the education system, and fight unemployment and lawlessness. We support the policy of détente in international tension.” In this interview, M. Daoud, albeit with reservations, admitted that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan also participated in the coup: “The PDPA generally assisted us in eliminating the old regime. But let's not exaggerate its role in the July events. The army decided the fate of monarchical rule."

The reforms promised by M. Daud practically remained on paper. Consolidating his personal power, he unleashed widespread repression against his rivals and dissidents. Among the objects of persecution was the People's Democratic Party. Repressions against its leaders took on a particularly active character in the spring of 1978 (they were simply tracked down and destroyed). On April 25-26, 1978, agents of the Daoud special services arrested some of the leaders of the Central Committee of the PDPA, including her Secretary General N. M. Taraki. The threat of death hung over them. This event was the signal for a new armed uprising.

April Revolution. On April 27, 1978, a relatively small group of military men - members of the PDPA and the communists (United Front of the Communists of Afghanistan) - carried out a new revolutionary coup in Kabul. The decisive role in his success was played by the actions of the 4th tank brigade under the command of M. A. Vatandzhar (assault on the presidential palace) and the air forces of the republic, which bombarded the presidential palace and military units loyal to him. The rebel aviation was commanded by SM. Gulyabza. By the evening of the same day, the presidential palace was captured. M. Daud with his family and close associates were destroyed during the assault. Their corpses were secretly taken out and buried in Kabul.

An appeal to the people about the victory of the revolution was read on the radio, the arrested members of the PDPA were released from prison, and the creation of the Revolutionary Military Council headed by N. M. Taraki was announced.

For the Soviet leadership, the victory of the PDPA in Afghanistan came as a complete surprise. On April 29, 1978, N. M. Taraki, at a meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Kabul, said that “Afghanistan, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, may well embark on the path of building socialism and belong to the socialist camp,” but the PDPA will do this “with caution ” and tell the people about his true goals later.

DRA announcement. On April 30, 1978, the Revolutionary Military Council by Decree No. 1 announced that it was transferring its powers to the Revolutionary Council, which was declared the highest authority in Afghanistan and merged into its composition. Afghanistan is declared a Democratic Republic (DRA). N. M. Taraki becomes the head of state and prime minister, B. Karmal becomes his deputy in the party and the state, H. Amin becomes the first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.

On May 6, at his first press conference, N.M. Taraki speaks of the unity of the PDPA. To the persistent questions of journalists whether there is an intra-party struggle in the PDPA, the supreme leader of the party and the state replies that the Khalq and Parcham groups are part of the party mechanism, but with the unity of the program, there is a struggle of opinions between them. The talk that H. Amin is waging an intriguing struggle against B. Karmal and his supporters from Parcham, is rushing gradually to power, is not based on anything. About X. Amin, N. M. Taraki literally says the following: “I believe him. He is not a careerist, he will not betray the party.”

NDPA program. Three days later, the Program of the PDPA "The main directions of revolutionary tasks" was published. It provided for the implementation of anti-feudal and democratic reforms in the country. The most important component of the transformations was the land and water reform. The government freed more than 11 million peasants and 335,000 peasant families granted the right to free land. A course was taken to create a public sector in the economy. The reforms included the creation of a democratic secular state and the removal of the church from political activity. In the cultural sphere, a campaign was launched to eradicate illiteracy and develop education. All these and other undertakings soon ran into the general backwardness of the country, came into conflict with religious and national postulates and traditions.

Growing difficulties. Since May 1978, attempts at radical change in Afghanistan have met with growing resistance within the country. In June 1978, the first armed uprisings against the power of the PDPA took place in the provinces of Badakhshai, Bamiai, Kunar, Paktia and Nangarhar. Islamist forces are uniting, opposition parties and movements are emerging (mainly based in neighboring Pakistan).

Changes in Afghanistan have become the reason for the aggravation of relations between the superpowers - the USSR and the USA - and their allies. The leadership of the PDPA, with increasing intensity, is turning to the Soviet authorities with requests for military support: first - equipment and advisers, then - special military units staffed by representatives of the Central Asian peoples. Finally, there is a request for the introduction of regular army formations.

Removal of Parcham from power. The very first difficulties on the way to the implementation of reforms (June-August 1978) led to an aggravation of factional differences in the People's Democratic Party. A fever of personnel transfers begins in the apparatus of the PDPA, in state and government departments, accompanied by a search for "enemies of the people." Decrees on transfers and arrests are signed by N. M. Taraki himself. First of all, the persecution falls on the supporters of Parcham. Ambassadors abroad leave: to Iran - M. Najibulla, who worked as secretary of the Kabul city committee of the PDPA, to the USA - Hyp Ahmad Hyp - head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to Yugoslavia - Anahita Ra-tebzad, Minister of Social Welfare, to Czechoslovakia - Babrak Karmal, removed from the posts of First Deputy Head of State and First Deputy Prime Minister. In August 1978, a group of "traitors and counter-revolutionaries" was arrested - leading statesmen, officers of the army, security services and internal affairs. Among them is such a well-known and authoritative party and statesman as S. A. Keshtmand.

"You had Trotskyists." The removal of Parcham supporters from power, headed by B. Karmal, objectively strengthened the political positions and influence of their main ill-wisher H. Amin. This is how he answered Soviet journalists when asked about the arrests: “People's power punishes apostates, traitors to a great cause. The very first months after the revolution showed that there were many such people. You had Trotskyists, we had Parchamists. They dug in in the party, government apparatus, in the army. The revolution must be defended, because your history also teaches this. We are doing it. Under the leadership of the great leader, the inflexible helmsman of the Hyp revolution, Mohammed Taraki, we will get rid of all the renegades. The people will support our decisive action."

Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan continues to develop not in favor of the revolutionary leadership, its control over the situation in the country is becoming ever weaker. On February 14, 1979, in Kabul, a Tajik separatist group abducted american ambassador Adolf Dabe. The conditions put forward by the terrorists were not accepted. And during the operation to free him, the American ambassador died. The incident with the ambassador led to a sharp tightening of US policy towards the DRA.

On March 15, 1979, an anti-government revolt of the population began in Herat. It was on this day that the question of the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was first put on the agenda. The Afghan leaders asked for military assistance in putting down this rebellion by bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

The position of the Soviet leadership regarding the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the spring of 1979. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU discussed this request for three days (March 17-19) and refused. The arguments in favor of such a decision were most clearly stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko: “The question is, what will we gain? Afghanistan with its current government, with a backward economy, with little weight in international affairs. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that legally we cannot justify the introduction of troops. According to the UN Charter, a country can ask for help, and we could bring in troops if they were subjected to aggression from outside. Afghanistan was not subjected to any aggression. This is their internal affair, revolutionary civil strife, the battles of one group of the population with another. In addition, it must be said that the Afghans have not officially contacted us regarding the introduction of troops. In a word, we are dealing here with a case where, as a result of serious mistakes made, the country's leadership turned out to be not up to par, does not enjoy the proper support of the people.

If, for example, we take such a risk as bringing in troops, then, of course, we will get far fewer pluses than minuses. We still do not know how the Afghan army will behave. And if she does not support our events or remains neutral, then it turns out! that we will occupy Afghanistan with our troops. By doing this, we will create an incredibly difficult situation for ourselves in terms of foreign policy ... ". As you can see, in the spring of 1979 the Soviet leadership was quite sober and adequate! assessed the consequences of a possible entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Taraki personally asks for help. On March 20, Secretary General of the PDPA N.M. Taraki urgently flew to Moscow, where he talked with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU B.N. Ponomarev. He also met with Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet leader once again explained to N. M. Taraki the reason for the refusal to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan: “We have comprehensively considered this issue, carefully weighed it, and I will tell you straight: this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of the enemies - both yours and ours.

Subsequently, throughout 1979, the Afghan leaders repeatedly requested the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. They transmitted these requests through the Soviet representatives in Kabul to A.M. Puzanov, B. S. Ivanov, L. G. Gorelov, as well as the heads of government delegations visiting Afghanistan, B. N. Ponomarev, I. G. Pavlovsky and others.

Muslim Battalion. A special Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan was created, which closely followed the development of events in the DRA and made proposals for further steps in this region. All the numerous requests for troops from N. M. Taraki and his deputy X. Amin were met with a firm refusal. Nevertheless, in connection with the deterioration of the political situation in Afghanistan in early May 1979, the Soviet leadership decided to form a special "Muslim" battalion, staffed by representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics. The battalion had to be ready to perform "special" tasks in Afghanistan.

By the end of the year, events took place in the DRA that nevertheless forced the Soviet leadership to change its initial position on the issue of bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Establishment of the dictatorship of X. Amin. It has already been noted that the reprisal against the leaders of the Parcham group contributed to the rapid strengthening of the influence of Kh. Amin. In March 1979, he became prime minister, thereby taking away a significant part of the power from N. M. Taraki. Further, he takes over all the power departments and intensifies repression not only against opponents of the regime, but also against his competitors within the party and state leadership of the country. He is becoming more and more the de facto leader of the country, leaving NM Taraki with purely decorative functions. The Soviet secret services receive information about the intention of X. Amin to finally remove N. M. Taraki and establish his own dictatorship.

In early September 1979, N. M. Taraki flew to Havana for a session of heads of non-aligned states. On the way back, during a stopover in Moscow, N. M. Taraki was warned about X. Amin's plans to overthrow him.

Assassination attempt on Amin. On September 14, 1979, an assassination attempt on X. Amin takes place at the residence of N. M. Taraki. Until now, it remains unclear whether N. M. Taraki thus wanted to get rid of his dangerous competitor, or whether X. Amin himself staged this attempt on himself.

X. Amin was not injured, but Lieutenant Colonel S. Tarun was killed. At an urgently convened plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, N. M. Taraki and his supporters are removed from all posts and expelled from the party. They are declared "a gang that has isolated itself from the people." General Secretary Party and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council becomes H. Amin.

N. M. Taraki was completely isolated and kept under guard in the Ark Palace. On October 9, 1979, in response to N. M. Taraki's refusal to congratulate X. Amin on his "election" to the highest party and state posts, the latter gave the order to physically destroy the "great leader". On the same day, NM Taraki was strangled with a pillow by the guards. It was reported on the radio that "the great leader of the people's revolution died suddenly after a short illness." The cause of death was allegedly heart failure.

Terror campaign. Having established his sole power, X. Amin unfolds a campaign of terror in Afghanistan against the "feudal lords" and all persons personally objectionable to him. The number of refugees to Pakistan and Iran is growing sharply. At the same time, X. Amin makes a number of statements, from which it followed that he intends to continue the course towards the development of the revolution, to strengthen cooperation with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries (and in his circle there were many people who stood on the positions of Marxism-Leninism). The new leader of Afghanistan persistently appeals to the Soviet leadership with requests for the introduction of troops to "stabilize the situation" in the country and his personal protection.

Brezhnev's outrage. The seizure of power by X. Amin and especially the brutal murder of N. M. Taraki unpleasantly struck the Soviet leaders. L. I. Brezhnev experienced this event violently. Most of all, he was outraged by the fact that only on September 10, shortly before the coup, he received N.M. Taraki, promised him help and support, assured him that the Soviet Union completely trusted him. “What a bastard Amin,” L. I. Brezhnev was indignant, “to strangle a man with whom he participated in the revolution together. Who is at the head of the Afghan revolution? And what will they say in other countries? Is it possible to believe the word of Brezhnev if his assurances of support and protection remain words?

In this situation, the Soviet leadership faced the question: what to do next? Immediately change the attitude towards Afghanistan? Do not recognize the government of Amin? Or pretend like nothing happened? The Soviet leaders decided, without making official statements, to recognize Amin's de facto regime and continue to provide concrete assistance to Afghanistan. At the same time, the Soviet representatives in Kabul were instructed to closely monitor the behavior of Amin, to see how the promises given to him would be fulfilled. Taking this into account, it was supposed to adjust the actions.



April 27 marks 30 years since the victory in Afghanistan of the military coup, better known to the citizens of the former Soviet Union as the "April Revolution" or "Saur Revolution". As a result of the coup, organized by the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the support of the military, power in the country passed into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Council, chaired by Nur Mohammad Taraki, one of the founders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The "Saur Revolution" still remains one of the most mysterious events in recent Afghan history. Some historians and political experts believe that one of the reasons for the overthrow of the then head of the Afghan state, the representative of the royal house, Mohammad Daud, was his desire to distance himself from the USSR. After the last talks in Moscow with Leonid Brezhnev in 1977, Daoud made a series of visits to the countries of the region considered Western allies, and upon his return from Iran, during his speech in Herat, he condemned "ideology imposed from outside". In the same year, he began to purge the army and state apparatuses of members of the PDPA.

The military coup in Kabul under communist slogans was perceived by many foreign states as the coming to power of a regime that threatened to turn Afghanistan into a new military base of the Soviet bloc in Asia.

It is known, however, that in the late 1970s, radical Islamic groups were also preparing their own "revolution" in Kabul. Until 1978, the Islamists made several attempts to seize power by force in certain provinces of Afghanistan. So, in 1975, Ahmad Shah Massoud, an activist of the Muslim Youth organization, organized an uprising in Panjshir. However, due to the lack of support from the local population, the "youth revolution" was quickly suppressed. Afghan analyst Sanjar Gafari believes that the PDPA, with its armed breakthrough to power in 1978, only got ahead of its opponents - the Islamists, who were preparing their own putsch. Ghafari is sure that Mohammad Daoud has become a victim of the next stage of the "great game". According to him, " leading role the leaders of the then Iran and Saudi Arabia personally played in the distancing of Daoud from the Soviet Union.

Most Western authors saw the change of power in Kabul in April 1978 as the "hand of Moscow." However, Russian experts do not share this opinion. Viktor Merimsky, who 30 years ago was the representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, cites in his memoirs the story of one of the workers of the Soviet embassy, ​​who claimed that he and his colleagues “understood the situation” in Kabul too late: for this reason, about the coup in the Afghan capital in Moscow learned already from media reports. “We had a great relationship with Daud. Military-technical relations with Afghanistan became even better under him,” says Army General Valentin Varennikov. He also claims that the April 1978 coup was "a bolt from the blue" for the Soviet leadership.

Of course, the political detonator, the reason for the military coup on April 27 was murder mystery one of the leaders of the PDPA Mir Akbar Khaibar. Who committed the crime, what forces were behind the murder - this still remains a mystery. It should be noted that over the past 30 years, not a single weighty evidence of Daoud's involvement in the murder of Mir Akbar Khaybar has been presented. However, the comrades-in-arms of the deceased leader of the PDPA were not tormented then: they immediately declared the head of the Afghan state, Daud Khan, guilty of the death of Khaibar.

Khaybar's funeral ceremony turned into a protest against the ruling regime, as well as a demonstration of the strength of PDPA supporters. According to eyewitnesses, about 15 thousand "Afghan communists" took part in the mourning ceremony, who marched through the whole of Kabul. The leaders of the PDPA, in their speeches at the funeral, talked about declaring war on the current president of the country. According to the Afghan publicist Ramin Anvari, Khalqist Nur Mohammad Taraki and Parchamist Babrak Karmal threatened the Arg Palace with revenge "for every drop of spilled blood" of their comrade.

The threats of "mourning communists" irritated Daoud Khan. On April 25, Kabul radio broadcast a message about the arrest of two PDPA leaders, Taraki and Karmal. Other party leaders, such as the Khalqist Hafizullah Amin, were placed under house arrest. The sanctions of the country's leadership against the top of the PDPA, in fact, became a signal for the start of a communist uprising.

According to one of the participants in those events, Said Mohammad Gulabzoy, he received the order to start speaking out against the government through Amin's son, Abdul Rahman. Already by the morning of April 26, this information was brought to Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, who were responsible, respectively, for the air and ground armed forces of the rebels.

In the early morning of April 27, 1978, tanks of the 4th tank brigade under the command of Watanjar advanced from the eastern regions of Kabul to the center of the Afghan capital. According to the information of the Afghan publicist Razak Mamun, in the middle of the day the first shell fired from the coup's tank guns hit the building of the country's Ministry of Defense. With this one shot, the connection between the Ministry of War and the presidential palace "Arg" was destroyed.

The rebellious army units quickly disarmed the city police forces and captured the strategic facilities of Kabul. Putschist tanks surrounded the presidential palace, shelling it with their guns. The decisive role in the battle for Arg was played by Afghan military pilots under the command of Abdul Kadir: their combat aircraft, taking off from the airfield in Bagram, bombarded the presidential palace from the air.

The siege of Arga lasted all night. Only in the morning the rebel "communists" broke into the palace, killing President Mohammad Daoud and his entire family. In the evening of the same day, Hafizullah Amin informed the Afghan people through the Kabul radio about "the end of the period of the reign of the royal family" and "the victory of the military revolutionary council." The direct participants in the military coup received high government ranks and posts and sat in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA for many more years. Some "heroes of the April Revolution" still sit in the Afghan parliament today.

At first, the change of power in the country was perceived positively by the majority of the people. Soon, however, dissatisfaction with the new regime began to grow rapidly. Some historians believe that this was due to the numerous mistakes made by the Afghan "communists" during the reforms. The PDPA leaders themselves blame everything foreign states which, in their opinion, contributed to the formation of an armed opposition against the new regime. A year after the victory of the April Revolution, in 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed a directive to support the Mujahideen movement: large-scale work began on the creation and training of anti-Kabul formations in neighboring countries, in Iran and Pakistan.

After a military coup in 1978, Afghanistan entered new period his modern history. The change of power on April 27 and the socio-economic and political changes that followed it affected not only the life of the Afghans and Afghanistan. They became the beginning of a new era, both for the Central Asian region and for the whole world: it was after the "Saur Revolution" that the cold war between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA, entered its final phase.

The "Saur era" ended with the collapse of the USSR and the end of cold war. However, in Afghanistan itself, the war is still going on. Over the past 30 years, Afghans have seen and felt the "charms" of a variety of political regimes - from the communists of the PDPA to the fundamentalists, those who are commonly called "extremists" today. Perhaps no one can give an unambiguous assessment of this "troubled time" of the latest Afghan history. However, many Afghans who have survived the past 30 years seem to be united in one thing - in the desire to return back to those years when the country was stable and peaceful. Something without which a new revival of Afghanistan is impossible even today.