What is the objectivity of truth. The concept of truth. Objectivity of truth and concreteness

2. The concept of truth. Objectivity of truth

The concept of truth is one of the most important common system worldview problems. It is on a par with such concepts as "justice", "good", "meaning of life".

From how the truth is interpreted, how the question is solved, whether it is achievable, often depends on the life position of a person, his understanding of his purpose.

This means that the process of scientific research also depends, because a scientist who makes a discovery must be sure that he really enriches the scientific picture of the world, and does not introduce another element of delusion.

There are different definitions of truth:

"Truth is the correspondence of knowledge to reality";

"Truth is experimental confirmation";

"Truth is a property of self-consistency of knowledge";

"Truth is the usefulness of knowledge, its effectiveness";

"Truth is an agreement."

The first proposition, according to which truth is the correspondence of thoughts to reality, is the main one in the classical conception of truth. It is called so because it turns out to be the oldest of all conceptions of truth: it is with it that the theoretical study of truth begins. The first attempts to study it were made by Plato and Aristotle.

Modern interpretation The truth, shared by most philosophers, includes the following points:

Firstly, the concept of "reality" is interpreted as an objective reality that exists before and independently of our consciousness, as consisting not only of phenomena, but also of entities hiding behind them, manifesting in them.

Secondly, "reality" also includes subjective reality; spiritual reality is also perceived and reflected in truth.

Thirdly, knowledge, its result - truth, as well as the object itself are understood as inextricably linked with the subject-sensory activity of a person, with practice; the object is given through practice; true, i.e. reliable knowledge of the essence and its manifestations, reproducible in practice.

Fourth, it is recognized that truth is not only a static but also a dynamic entity; truth is a process.

These moments delimit the dialectical-realistic understanding of truth from agnosticism, idealism and simplified materialism.

One of the definitions of objective truth is as follows: truth is an adequate reflection of the object by the cognizing subject, reproducing the cognizable object as it exists by itself, outside of consciousness.

3. Dialectics of absolute and relative truth

However, truth is by no means only a process moving without stopping, but the unity of process and result. Truth is secondary. And in this sense, she is a "child of the era." The concept of ultimate or unchanging truth is just a phantom. Any object of knowledge is inexhaustible, it is constantly changing, has many properties and is connected by countless threads of relationships with the outside world. It was considered, for example, that chemical composition, properties and condition of water are thoroughly studied. However, the so-called heavy water with previously unknown properties was discovered.

IN forward movement human knowledge proceeds from relative truths to absolute ones. Absolute and relative truths differ only in the degree of penetration of consciousness into objects, phenomena and processes of the external world, in the degree of completeness and accuracy of their reflection.

Each stage of cognition is limited by the level of development of science, the historical conditions of society, the level of practice, as well as the cognitive abilities of a given scientist, the development of which is determined both by specific historical circumstances and, to a certain extent, by natural factors. Scientific knowledge, including the most reliable, accurate, is relative. The relativity of knowledge lies in their incompleteness and probabilistic nature. Truth is therefore relative, because it does not reflect the object completely, not entirely, not in an exhaustive way. And within certain limits, conditions, relationships that are constantly changing and developing.

Relative truth is limitedly true knowledge about something. Our knowledge of the solar system, for example, is relative truth. They contain a lot of correct information about her. However, solar system revealed to man far from all its secrets. Relative truth is our knowledge about any subject and phenomenon, since each of them is infinitely diverse in its features and properties, connections and relationships. Relative is our knowledge about the world as a whole. Any object of knowledge is inexhaustible, it is constantly changing. Therefore, our knowledge of it is always limited, relatively, incomplete. It reflects this object within certain limits, conditions, relationships that are constantly changing. Any scientific theory is relative in nature, because sooner or later it is replaced by a new theory, more fully, more accurately and more deeply explaining and describing certain aspects of reality.

It is paradoxical, but true: in science, every step forward is the discovery of both a new secret and new horizons of ignorance. Cognition is a process going to infinity. Mankind has always striven to get closer to the knowledge of absolute truth, trying to narrow the "sphere of influence" of the relative in the content of scientific knowledge as much as possible. However, even the constant expansion, deepening and refinement of our knowledge, in principle, cannot completely overcome their probability and relativity. But one should not go to extremes, as, for example, K. Popper, who argued that any scientific position is just a hypothesis. It turns out that scientific knowledge is just a chain of conjectures stretching from the depths of centuries, devoid of a stable support of reliability.

Speaking of the relative nature of truth, we should not forget that we mean truths in the field of scientific knowledge, but by no means the knowledge of absolutely certain facts, such as the fact that today there is no king of France. It is the presence of absolutely reliable and therefore absolutely true facts that is extremely important in practical activities people, especially in those areas of activity that are associated with the decision of human destinies. So, the judge does not have the right to argue: "The defendant either committed a crime or not, but just in case, let's punish him." The court does not have the right to punish a person if there is no complete certainty that there is a corpus delicti. A doctor, before operating on a patient or applying a potent drug, must base his decision on absolutely reliable data about a person’s disease.

In contrast to the relative, absolute truth is a complete, exhaustive knowledge about an object, phenomenon or the world as a whole. Absolute truth is the truth forever, in the last instance, it cannot be refuted with the further development of knowledge. The very term "absolute truth" is ambiguous. It is used in at least three senses.

Firstly, it is used to denote complete, exhaustive knowledge about the world as a whole or about an ideal object and phenomenon. It is like reaching those boundaries beyond which there is nothing more to know. But, since the world cannot be fully known due to its infinite diversity and constant change, development, the question arises: is there an absolute truth in this sense? Maybe this is a myth, behind which there is simply nothing real. In fact, absolute truth here appears as a kind of ideal, as the ultimate knowledge, to which our knowledge strives, but at the same time never reaches it. The term "absolute truth" is used here to record the fact that the cognitive possibilities of the human mind are limitless. At the same time, the development of science appears as a series of successive approximations to absolute truth, each of which is more complete, deeper and more accurate than the previous ones.

Secondly, the term is used to designate the moments of absolute knowledge that are necessarily contained in every relative truth, inasmuch as it is objective. And in this sense, we can say that any truth is absolutely relative. In the total knowledge of mankind, the proportion of the absolute is constantly increasing. The development of any truth is the buildup of moments of the absolute. Each subsequent scientific theory, in comparison with the previous one, is more complete, with profound knowledge. But new scientific truths do not at all throw their predecessors “down the slope of history”, but supplement, concretize or include them as moments of more general and deeper truths. The old theory is a special case, part of the new theory. For example, the modern physical picture of the world is a relative truth, since science today does not yet have exhaustive knowledge about physical structure Universe. But this relative truth also contains absolute truths, which are further irrefutable. These include, for example, such judgments as "material bodies consist of molecules, and molecules of atoms", "atoms have a complex structure", etc.

Thirdly, this term denotes such knowledge in which any facts are fixed. The validity of these facts is either obvious or proven by science. Absolute truths include reliably established facts (dates of events, birth, death, etc.). An example of such absolute truths can be judgments like "the philosopher Hegel was born in 1770", "Hawaiian Islands are in Pacific Ocean", "water at normal atmospheric pressure boils at 100 ° Celsius ", etc. Such truths are always strictly "tied" to a certain place and time. They are absolute truths only within the limits of their applicability, with the exact observance of all necessary, strictly defined conditions. The judgment that "the philosopher Hegel was born in 1770, "is true only in the modern system of chronology. Even the fact that" "is true only in the decimal system of calculation. When conditions change, these judgments cease to be true.

Absolute truths, once expressed with complete clarity and certainty, no longer meet with evidentiary objections. In other words, absolute truth is the identity of the concept and the object in thinking - in the sense of the completeness of coverage, coincidence and essence and all forms of its manifestation. Such, for example, are the provisions of science: “Nothing in the world is created from nothing, and nothing disappears without a trace”; "The earth revolves around the sun", etc. Absolute truth is such a content of knowledge that is not refuted by the subsequent development of science, but is enriched and constantly confirmed by life. Any judgment is true only when the specific conditions for the existence of an object or phenomenon are taken into account.

There is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete. This means that it is necessary to evaluate facts, phenomena and events in specific, real conditions and circumstances. For example, "rain - is it good or evil?". It is impossible to answer this question without taking into account specific conditions, since rain can be a blessing in some conditions and evil in others.

Then there is the question of the attainability of absolute truth. There is a fairly widespread opinion that absolute truth is not achievable in principle. However, it should be noted that at each specific historical moment of time, the cognizing subject has only the relative truth about the world as a whole, and only in his developing potency, as his cognitive power strengthens, is he able to approach absolute truth.

In other words, the absolute truth about the world as a whole exists only as a limit and an ideal towards which mankind aspires. Truth is objective in content, but relative in form. Its objectivity is the basis of the continuity of truths.

So, science has not only absolute truths, but to an even greater extent - relative truths, although the absolute is always partially realized in our actual knowledge. It is unreasonable to be carried away by the assertion of absolute truths. It is necessary to remember the immensity of the still unknown, the relativity of our knowledge.

truth knowledge dialectics practice

Considering Plato's doctrine of the knowledge of necessity, one must first of all keep in mind that the question of knowledge is by no means posed by Plato either as a separate, isolated, or as the main problem of philosophy. The epistemological problem received such significance only starting from the 17th century. and only in some teachings and directions of philosophy. Plato's doctrine of knowledge is inseparable from his doctrine of being, from his...

Consciousness. Therefore, it is still relevant to discuss these issues from the standpoint of a variety of concepts that more or less adequately reflect at least certain aspects of the theory of knowledge and the problem of truth. Positivism relied on the formal-logical means of analyzing scientific knowledge, referring the problems of its development to the field of psychology and sociology of knowledge. Initially along the same lines...

Having considered the three kinds of truth, I understand that in philosophy they concentrate on absolute and relative truth. The following considerations will be about how these truths are interpreted in philosophy in detail and how they arose. 3. The concept of truth in philosophy I think that having touched on such a serious topic, which requires a lot of time to draw at least a few correct conclusions, be sure ...

Trubetskoy, P.A. Florensky, S.L. Frank...) who made up the course of God-seeking with its characteristic irrationalism, personalism and mystical understanding of freedom and creativity. It is impossible not to mention GV Plekhanov Ticket 8 1. Philosophy of Hegel. The first expounded the principle of the dialectical method. The true significance and revolutionary character of Hegelian philosophy consisted in the fact that it dealt with...

Truth and its criteria

The category "truth", along with the concepts of "good" and "beauty", can be attributed to the main values ​​of society. As the Russian philosopher V.S. Solovyov wrote, it is important for a person “that the subject of his will ... be an objective good ... the subject and content of his thought be objectively true and the subject of his feelings be objectively beautiful, that is, not only for him, but also for everyone unconditionally.
Questions about what kind of knowledge should be considered true, to what extent it is available to a knowing person and in what ways is achieved, have been and remain the subject of discussion in philosophy and science.
You already know that some philosophers asserted the fundamental unknowability of the world. They were called agnostics. But even those who recognize the possibility of obtaining true knowledge give different interpretations of the category "truth", see its criteria in different ways.

Here are two classic definitions of truth. The medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas argued that "truth is the identity of a thing and an idea." 17th century French philosopher R. Descartes wrote: "The word" truth "means the correspondence of thought to the subject." Thus, knowledge can be considered true, which accurately expresses the essence and properties of the subject under consideration. This expresses the most important property of true knowledge - its objectivity, independence from the consciousness of a person, his passions and interests.
This interpretation of truth goes back to Aristotle. He criticized the position of the philosopher Protagoras, who denied the objectivity of truth and declared: "What seems to everyone is certain." If Protagoras is right, Aristotle argued, it means “that the same thing exists and does not exist, that it is both bad and good, that other statements that are opposed to each other are also true.” But “it is absurd to attach equal importance to the opinions of people arguing with each other: it is clear that some of them must be wrong.”
In the future, as already noted, the role of the subject in the process of cognition, its influence not only on the means, but also on the result, became more and more clearly revealed. cognitive activity.
However, the main question remained how a person can verify the truth of his knowledge about the subject, if the subject itself is given to him in indirect forms - sensory representation and rational understanding. This is where the problem arises of those indicators that allow us to draw a conclusion about the truth of the knowledge received.
Science is especially strict in the selection and verification of criteria, methods of substantiating the truth.

The further development of the classical concept of truth by dialectical materialism consists primarily in substantiating the objectivity of truth. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the concept of objective truth characterizes such a content of human ideas that does not depend on the subject, does not depend either on a person or on humanity! This does not mean that objective truth is an element of the objective world. Characterizing human knowledge, it manifests itself in subjective

1 See V. I. Lenin. Full coll. cit., vol. 18, p. 123.

active form. But it characterizes human knowledge not in terms of this subjective form, but in terms of their objective content. Objective truth can be defined as the content of human knowledge that corresponds to the objective world, that is, reproduces it. It is precisely because of this circumstance that objective truth does not depend on the subject.

What, strictly speaking, is new in the concept of objective truth in comparison with the classical concept of truth? Is the main meaning of the concept of the objectivity of truth contained in the interpretation of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to facts? Popper, without any qualifications, calls the classical concept of truth the theory of objective truth. The reason for this kind of qualification of the classical concept of truth is that the alternative theories - coherent, pragmatic, etc. - are clearly subjective in nature. In contrast to them, the classical concept understands by truth something that does not depend on the subjective point of view, and that is why it can be considered a theory of objective truth. “This can be deduced,” writes Popper, “from the fact that it allows us to make the following statements: a theory can be true even if no one believes in it, and even if we have no grounds for accepting it and for believing that that it is true" 1.

It should be noted here that the recognition of the correspondence of knowledge to facts is not yet equivalent to the recognition of their correspondence to the objective world. The following two circumstances must be kept in mind. First, what scientists usually call a fact is not an element of the objective world, but a certain kind of our knowledge of it. Correspondence of a certain theoretical proposal to an empirical fact is a relation that is realized within the framework of a knowledge system. It is possible to judge the objective truth of a sentence that corresponds to the facts only on the basis of a non-trivial analysis of the facts from the point of view of their relationship to the objective world and the materialistic interpretation of this relationship. Secondly, the recognition of the correspondence of statements to the facts as true does not in itself eliminate subjectivism. An illustration of this can be

" K. Popper. Conjectures and refutations, p. 225.

L. Wittgenstein's correspondence theory of truth, which was developed on the basis of solipsistic philosophy.

The most important feature dialectical materialist doctrine of truth is that it introduces the concept of objective reality, which is regarded as the referent of truth. Dialectical materialism claims that a person in his cognitive activity is able to establish a connection between logical constructions not just with the world of sensations, but with the objective world lying outside him. This idea is fundamental to the dialectical-materialist doctrine of truth.

The idea that truth is knowledge corresponding to the objective world may not seem new and, moreover, very elementary. It is indeed not new in the sense that attempts to introduce the concept of objective truth occurred long before dialectical materialism. However, these attempts did not lead to the creation of a logically coherent concept of objective truth. And this is due to the complexity of the problem of displaying the objective world in the system of knowledge.

In the past, the idea of ​​the objectivity of truth was developed mainly by pre-Marxian materialism. Its representatives believed that true knowledge is knowledge obtained without taking into account the influence of the cognitive process. But this concept of truth turned out to be unsatisfactory due to the fact that it did not take into account the complexity of the process of cognition. Identifying truth with the reflection of the objective world in its “pure” form, it did not take into account or ignored the fact that in real cognition a person deals not only with the objective world “in itself”, but with the world specified through sensations and concepts. At the same time, sensations and concepts are only partially conditioned by the objects they represent. They are characterized by a subjective form, depending on the structure of the senses and thinking.

Unlike the materialists of the past, some representatives of idealism and agnosticism emphasized the subjective form of knowledge, which they interpreted as an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of objective truth. This line of criticism of the concept of objective truth, at the origins of which stood Berkeley, Hume, Kant, in modern times found support among neopositivists. Neopositivists, just like theirs

predecessors, chose the concept of objective reality, which is a prerequisite for the concept of objective truth, as the main object of their criticism. True, unlike the extreme subjective idealists, the neopositivists admitted the existence of an objective world. However, the thesis about the existence of this world is not, from their point of view, a scientific statement, because any such statement must be based on experience and allow empirical verification. The concept of objective reality is the concept of a transcendent essence, which, by definition, is outside experience and therefore cannot be controlled by it. The thesis about the existence of an objective world expresses only the metaphysical faith of people. Only within the framework of metaphysics does a person have the right to use the concept of objective reality.

The rejection of the concept of objective reality and, at the same time, of the concept of objective truth had fatal consequences for the classical concept of truth. Indeed, if the concept of objective reality is eliminated from scientific knowledge, then what kind of reality does true knowledge correspond to? Neo-positivists answered: direct sensually given reality. However, this kind of "reality" is conceptualized, i.e. dependent on human thinking. Clarification of this circumstance leads in this case to the rejection of the classical concept of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality. As already mentioned, the neopositivist Neurath came to the conclusion that truth is not a one-sided correspondence of theoretical propositions to propositions about sense perceptions, but a property of the mutual coherence of these two types of propositions.

Some contemporary Western philosophers understand the role played by the notion of objective reality in substantiating the classical concept of truth. They rightly believe that the classical concept of truth can only be preserved in the form of the concept of objective truth. However, ignorance of dialectics or ignoring it dooms attempts to restore the concept of objective truth to failure. The most that these philosophers achieve is a return to the contemplative interpretation of the pre-Marxist objective truth.

sky materialism. In this respect, the example of the English philosopher O'Connor is very remarkable.

O'Connor, in The Correspondence Theory of Truth, which we have already mentioned, points out that the classical concept faces the fundamental difficulty that the facts that are the basis of truth are not reality in themselves, but something dependent on our conceptualization. He believes that this difficulty can be overcome if a hypothesis is adopted that introduces the concept of objective reality into consideration. According to this hypothesis, the theory of truth must take into account the following components:

A. Status reroom (reality itself).

IN. Things and their properties, situations, events in their conceptualized form.

WITH. Empirical statements.

Connections between A and IN are cognitive processes of the formation of sensations, perceptions and concepts. IN is a selectively flowing and editorial version of reroom status, WITH - selectively leaked and edited version IN. Truth relation connects C with A.

O'Connor rejects Austin's view that truth is the result of a semantic convention, and emphasizes that although sentences expressing truth presuppose semantic conventions, they are, however, "not responsible" for truth. The purpose of these conventions is to explain meaning, which is a necessary condition for truth (as well as for falsehood). But if any statements are true—and we know which ones—then there must be status.reroom traits that are conveyed to the statements in such a way that we can use them as reliable substitutes for reroom status.

Language, according to O'Connor, must be in some sense a credible map or model of a non-conceptualized world. And if X is a model or map y, That X should have some structural features y.“The schema of hypotheses ... has such structural features of the status of the rerum that are conveyed conceptually and linguistically. Precisely the presence of these traits depends primarily on

of our sensory apparatus and our conceptualizing abilities" 1.

Against the background of idealistic conceptions of truth and attacks on the doctrine of objective truth, which are so characteristic of modern bourgeois philosophy, O'Connor's work appears as a progressive phenomenon. Its pathos is in the defense of the classical concept of truth, moreover, in its materialistic version. However, it must be admitted that O'Connor's position is flawed and vulnerable to idealistic criticism. It is very reminiscent of the positions taken on the question of truth by the representatives of the old, contemplative materialism. One of the shortcomings of O'Connor's concept is that key concepts and the principles of materialism are not substantiated here, but simply declared and accepted in the form of hypotheses. Thus, the necessity of the hypothesis of objective reality is explained by him only by referring to the fact that such a hypothesis makes it possible to overcome the possible "slipping" to the point of view of the coherent theory of truth and preserve the classical concept of truth.

The approach to the problem of the objectivity of truth, which develops on the basis of dialectical materialism, is completely different. Dialectical materialism sees the way to rehabilitate the concept of objective truth not in a return to the contemplative concepts of pre-Marxian materialism, but in the development of this concept on the basis of dialectics. The most important feature of the dialectical approach to the problem of the objectivity of truth is the consideration of objective truth in connection with socio-historical practice.

The category of practice makes it possible to understand what exactly determines the need for objectively true knowledge and what is the mechanism of its formation. The role of practice as a factor that connects and compares human knowledge with the objective world is manifested in the fact that it acts, on the one hand, as a material activity that forms the objective object of knowledge by identifying and highlighting certain properties of the objective world, and on the other hand, as an activity forming the subject of knowledge.

The most important feature of dialectical materialism is a completely new understanding of objectivity.

" D. O "Connor. The correspondence theory of truth, p. 131.

a new object of knowledge to which true statements correspond. For dialectical, materialism, the real object of knowledge is not the objective world “in itself”, but the objective world, given through practice. The quality of things, objects of the material world, what they are, can only be judged by those properties in which these qualities are manifested. But the properties of a given object can be revealed through its interaction with other objects. Moreover, the nature of this interaction depends on what properties of the object are revealed. The predetermination of objects of the material world through practice is determined by those properties that are revealed through a system of interactions organized through the material activity of a person. It is these properties that form the object of our statements about the external world, the object of objective truth, formed by practice.

The identification of only a certain number of properties in objects of the material world, which become the subject of knowledge, means in a certain sense a change in these objects. They cease to be objects that exist "by themselves". However, their practical assignment does not deprive them of the property of objectivity. This only makes objectivity relative to a certain level of practice, relative in the sense that through the practice of a historically defined period it becomes possible to reveal a certain set of properties of nature and form a historically defined object of scientific knowledge.

Practice is "responsible" not only for the subject, but also for the subject of cognition. Logical categories are not an arbitrary invention of the human mind. They were formed on the basis of practical activity and act as a reflection of practice. Practice has played an important role in shaping not only the logical apparatus, but also human sensations. Although sensations arose in the course of biological evolution, their conceptual component can be seen as the result of social evolution.

The adaptation of the subject to practice does not mean that he is separated from the objective world. Actively influencing the objective world with his material activity, a person not only modifies this world, but at the same time subordinates his activity to the laws of the objective world.

foot world. Because of this, human practice cannot be regarded as a purely subjective human activity. It contains an objective content, reveals and expresses the properties of the objective world. Correspondence to practice means, therefore, correspondence to the objective world.

In view of the foregoing, we can propose the following alternative to D. O'Connor's scheme, which follows from the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge:

1. The objective world "in itself" (status rerum).

2. An objective subject of knowledge, given through practice.

3. The subject of knowledge, formed on the basis of practice.

4. Structurally constructed logical forms - statements of the theory.

Truth is the ratio of (4) to (2). Knowledge that has the form of statements, theories, is true if they correspond to the objective world, but not to the objective world in itself, as pre-Marxian materialists represented it, but to those of its properties that are revealed by the practice of a given historical era. It is this attitude that determines the content of objective truth in its dialectical-materialistic understanding.

So, only the concept of objective truth, based on the introduction of the concept of objective reality into the theory of knowledge, makes it possible to consistently develop the classical concept of truth. Any deviation from the concept of the objectivity of truth, consisting in the exclusion of objective reality from the cognitive process, leads to a revision of the classical concept of truth and its replacement with alternative concepts - coherent, pragmatic, conventionalist theories. But the very concept of objective truth can be preserved and substantiated only within the framework of the dialectical approach, which considers the process of cognition in connection with socio-historical practice.

End of work -

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The nature of scientific truth

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Locke and Leibniz
The attempts of Bacon and Descartes to solve the problem of the nature of the truth of scientific knowledge were alternative and ended in failure, since both alternatives, one of which claimed empiricism, and the other

The problem of a priori truths in neopositivist philosophy
As is known, the principle of empirical reductionism, which requires the reduction of scientific knowledge to the data of experience, belongs to the central principles of neopositivist philosophy. According to neopositivists, their

Quine's critique of the neo-positivist doctrine of a priori truths
The neo-positivist doctrine of the division of scientific knowledge into empirical and a priori was criticized by the famous logician W. Quine. Quine devoted a number of articles to the criticism of neopositivism, among which

D-thesis
Criticizing the neopositivist concept of the division of scientific knowledge into a priori and empirical parts, Quine sought to show that there are no scientific statements that would be completely independent.

Geometry and apriorism
Geometry was one of the important prerequisites for the emergence of a priori concepts of scientific truth. The axiomatic construction of geometry and its relative autonomy from the experience of generating

Conventionalism and Poincaré's apriorism
Poincare believed that geometry, in principle, does not allow empirical verification. This applies not only to pure geometry, but also to physical geometry. His thesis about the impossibility of empirical verification

The thesis of a separate empirical verification of geometry and its inconsistency
So, the idea of ​​the relationship between physics and geometry, as it was accepted by Poincaré, leads to conventionalism, which is combined with apriorism. What needs to be done to overcome them?

Geochronometric conventionalism
The thesis of a separate empirical verification of geometry was put forward with the aim of separating geometries and physics and thus preventing the conventionalist interpretation of geometry proposed by P.

Consistency of physical knowledge and empirical substantiation of physical geometry
The impossibility of a separate empirical verification of geometry confirms Quine's idea of ​​the systematic nature of scientific knowledge. As applied to the relationship between geometry and physics, this means that the physical geome

Methodological principles of physics and their normative interpretation
The methodological principles of science are also sometimes interpreted in the spirit of a priori and conventionalism. Their a priori and conventionalist interpretation has its own characteristics that distinguish it from the ana

The failure of the a priori interpretation of methodological principles
The epistemological premises of the a priori interpretation of methodological principles are close to the premises of a similar interpretation of geometry. In both cases, apriorism arises as a consequence of futilities.

The activity of the subject and the problem of the objectivity of truth
In the development of scientific knowledge, the regularity of the increase in the activity of the subject is clearly visible. This is manifested not only in the fact that the subject, by his material and practical activity, influences

The myth of the special role of the observer in modern physics
One of the popular Western philosophy versions of the activity of the subject in physical cognition is a concept that reduces this activity to an increase in the role of the observer in physical theories. And this

The Observer and Special Relativity
Idealistic interpretations of the role of the observer in the special theory of relativity boil down to the assertion that the relativity of space and time is devoid of an objective character and depends on postures.

Observer and quantum mechanics
Idealistic concepts, according to which the observer has a decisive influence on the object, are not imposed on physics from the outside. They are rooted in physical cognition itself and arise as a result of one

Conceptualization of the subject of knowledge and the theorized world
The actual increase in the activity of the subject in physical cognition, including in the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, is manifested not at all in the special role of the observer, but in the further development

The Necessity of a Theorized World
Having discovered the role that the conceptualization of sensory material plays in the construction of the theorized world, Kant, however, did not reveal the objective grounds that necessitate this process.

Theorized world and the problem of reality
The main epistemological function of the theorized world is to express the nature of the objectively real world in its essential aspects that are not directly given to a person.

Truth and the theorized world
The presence of the theorized world as a representation of the essential aspects of objective reality determines the specifics of posing the question of the objective truth of scientific theories. Scientific statements

What are equivalent descriptions?
Although the scientist strives to ensure that the theories he creates correspond to the objective world, they do not directly refer to himself, but to his ideal representation. In view of this, the concept of

The paradox of alternative ontologies
It would seem that equivalent descriptions differ only in the way they describe phenomena and are identical in their content. An analogy arises between them and the expression of the same information in

Neo-positivist solution to the paradox of alternative ontologies and its failure
It is easy to see that the paradox of alternative ontologies arises when the following two premises are simultaneously assumed: 1) equivalent descriptions are completely identical; 2) ontolo corresponding to them

Identity and difference of equivalent descriptions
So, attempts to solve the paradox of alternative ontologies by rejecting its second premise, i.e., from the assumption of the real meaning of alternative ontologies corresponding to equivalent descriptions,

Divergence of equivalent descriptions
Not all equivalent descriptions differ only in the degree of clarity and completeness of the expression of the physical meaning. Among them there are those that equally well express the physical meaning, but I distinguish

Gnoseological functions of equivalent descriptions
The problem of equivalent descriptions does not always appear as a problem of choosing one description from many available. In a number of situations, an inverse problem arises, which consists not in narrowing, but, on

The failure of the finitist interpretation of the development of science
Dialectical materialism considers scientific knowledge as a process of ever deeper and more complete reflection of the material world. This process is basically unlimited. Any scientific theories, what would

Scientific revolutions and the problem of continuity
Considering the development of scientific knowledge as a change in scientific theories leads to the overcoming of finitist concepts. But at the same time, it gives rise to two new problems - the problem of defining the concept of scientific

Continuity and absoluteness of truth
It is appropriate to compare the problem of alternative ontologies, which arises in connection with the change of various theories - old and new, with a similar problem associated with equivalent descriptions. Between them

The correspondence principle and Kuhn's relativism
The idea of ​​the absoluteness of truth in philosophy is opposed by relativism, which hypertrophies the moment of the relativity of truth and opposes it to the objectivity of truth. Denying the objective

Scientific knowledge and delusion
The picture of developing science will be essentially incomplete if we limit ourselves to consideration only of scientific truth and do not show what place delusions occupy in science. Misconceptions are an important

On the cognitive function of delusions
When we say that errors are inevitable, and not just inevitable, but are a necessary element of scientific knowledge from the point of view of the internal logic of its development, we are not at all going to affirm

Fallacies in the Structure of Relative Truth
Particular attention should be paid to the question of the occurrence of errors in scientific theories, which are relative truths. What underlies this phenomenon? Here, in our opinion, the decisive

Dialectics of Truth and Error and K. Popper's Plausibility Theory
In conclusion, let us consider the difference between the dialectical-materialistic concept of truth and error and Popper's theory of likelihood mentioned in the first chapter. In this theory, which is currently

The concept of truth is one of the most important in the general system of worldview problems. It is on a par with such concepts as "justice", "good", "meaning of life".

From how the truth is interpreted, how the question is solved, whether it is achievable, often depends on the life position of a person, his understanding of his purpose.

This means that the process of scientific research also depends, because a scientist who makes a discovery must be sure that he really enriches the scientific picture of the world, and does not introduce another element of delusion.

There are different definitions of truth:

"Truth is the correspondence of knowledge to reality"; "Truth is experimental confirmation"; "Truth is a property of self-consistency of knowledge"; "Truth is the usefulness of knowledge, its effectiveness"; "Truth is an agreement."

The first proposition, according to which truth is the correspondence of thoughts to reality, is the main one in the classical conception of truth. It is called so because it turns out to be the oldest of all conceptions of truth: it is with it that the theoretical study of truth begins. The first attempts to study it were made by Plato and Aristotle.

The modern interpretation of truth, shared by most philosophers, includes the following points:

Firstly, the concept of "reality" is interpreted as an objective reality that exists before and independently of our consciousness, as consisting not only of phenomena, but also of the entities hiding behind them, manifesting in them.

Secondly, “reality” also includes subjective reality; spiritual reality is also perceived and reflected in truth.

Thirdly, knowledge, its result - truth, as well as the object itself are understood as inextricably linked with the subject-sensory activity of a person, with practice; the object is given through practice; true, i.e. reliable knowledge of the essence and its manifestations, reproducible in practice.

Fourth, it is recognized that truth is not only a static, but also a dynamic entity; truth is a process.

These moments delimit the dialectical-realistic understanding of truth from agnosticism, idealism and simplified materialism.

One of the definitions of objective truth is as follows: truth is an adequate reflection of the object by the cognizing subject, reproducing the cognizable object as it exists by itself, outside of consciousness.

There are a number of forms of truth: ordinary or worldly, scientific truth, artistic truth and moral truth. On the whole, there are almost as many forms of truth as there are kinds of occupations. A special place among them is occupied by scientific truth, characterized by a number of specific features. First of all, this is a focus on revealing the essence, in contrast to ordinary truth. In addition, scientific truth is distinguished by the system, orderliness of knowledge within its framework and the validity, evidence of knowledge. Finally, scientific truth is distinguished by repetition and general validity, intersubjectivity.

Let us now turn to the main characteristics of true knowledge. The key characteristic of truth, its main feature is its objectivity. Objective truth is the content of our knowledge that does not depend on either man or humanity. If our knowledge is a subjective image of the objective world, then the objective in this image is the objective truth.

The question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth expresses the dialectic of cognition in its movement towards truth, as already discussed above, in the movement from ignorance to knowledge, from less complete knowledge to more complete knowledge. The comprehension of truth - and this is explained by the infinite complexity of the world, its inexhaustibility in both large and small - cannot be achieved in one act of cognition, it is a process. This process goes through relative truths, relatively true reflections of an object independent of a person, to the absolute truth, exact and complete, exhaustive reflection of the same object.

We can say that relative truth is a step on the way to absolute truth. Relative truth contains within itself grains of absolute truth, and each advance step of cognition adds new grains of absolute truth to the knowledge about the object, bringing it closer to complete mastery of it.

So, there is only one truth - it is objective, since it contains knowledge that does not depend either on a person or on humanity, but at the same time it is relative, because. does not give exhaustive knowledge about the object. Moreover, being objective truth, it also contains particles, grains of absolute truth, and is a step on the way to it.

And at the same time, truth is concrete, since it retains its meaning only for certain conditions of time and place, and with their change it can turn into its opposite. Is the rain good? There can be no single answer, it depends on the conditions. Truth is specific. The truth that water boils at 100°C retains its significance only under strictly defined conditions. But the path to truth is by no means strewn with roses, knowledge is constantly developing in contradictions and through contradictions between truth and error.