Tank Matilda Land Lease. Lend-Lease tanks

Tank Lend-Lease

Deliveries of armored vehicles to Soviet Union began already in the fall of 1941. On September 3, Stalin sent a letter to Churchill, the contents of which the latter conveyed to President Roosevelt. Stalin's message spoke of mortal threat, hanging over the Soviet Union, which could only be removed by opening a second front and urgently sending 30 thousand tons of aluminum to the USSR, as well as at least 400 aircraft and 500 tanks monthly. In accordance with the First (Moscow) Protocol, the United States and Great Britain pledged to supply 4,500 tanks and 1,800 wedges within nine months. Under the latter, the British armored personnel carriers “Bren” and “Universal” often appeared in Soviet documents of those years.

Loading Matilda tanks destined for the USSR in one of the British ports. 1941

The first 20 British tanks were delivered to Arkhangelsk by ships of convoy PQ-1 on October 11, 1941. Already on October 28, these vehicles were delivered to Kazan. In total, by the end of the year, 466 tanks and 330 armored personnel carriers arrived in the Soviet Union from Great Britain. As for the USA, in 1941 they were able to send only 182 tanks to the USSR, which arrived at their destination already in 1942. The arrival of a significant amount of imported equipment required the creation of a military acceptance service and a personnel training system.

Initially, the acceptance and development of foreign tanks took place at the training center in Gorky, where the combat vehicles were sent immediately after unloading. However, already on January 20, 1942, the department for military acceptance of foreign equipment was organized directly in Arkhangelsk, and on April 4 - in Iran. At the same time, the department in Iran dealt only with cars, while the tanks were transported to Gorky, where they were received.

By mid-1942, the Arkhangelsk armored vehicle acceptance department included groups in Bakaritsa, Molotovsk and Ekonomiya. In addition to it, there was a tank acceptance department in Murmansk, and an acceptance department for cars and motorcycles in Gorky and Iran. Due to the increase in supplies along the Persian Corridor and through ports Far East departments for military acceptance of armored vehicles were organized in Baku (March 1943) and Vladivostok (September 1943). Finally, in February 1945, due to the collapse of the Baku unit, a military acceptance department was opened in Odessa.

MZL and Valentine tanks (in the background) from the 5th Guards Tank Brigade. North Caucasus Front, August 1942.

As for the training of crews for foreign tanks, it initially took place at the Kazan Tank Technical School. Already on October 15, 1941, 420 crews were sent from training tank regiments to Kazan for retraining on British tanks. However, it appears that the capacity of the school base was limited. Therefore, already in November, crews for the Matildas began to be trained at the 132nd and 136th separate tank battalions. Under the 10th reserve tank regiment, training was organized for another 100 crews (50 each for Matildas and Valentines). At the 2nd reserve auto regiment, 200 armored personnel carrier drivers were trained. They also took care of the repair of imported vehicles: the repair and restoration company of the 146th Tank Brigade arrived at Plant No. 112 in November 1941 to undergo training for the repair of Valentine tanks and armored personnel carriers.

This situation continued until the spring of 1942, that is, until the resumption of mass supplies of armored vehicles under Lend-Lease. Already in March 1942, the 23rd and 38th tank training regiments and the 20th tank regiment were transferred to train crews for foreign tanks. Soon, however, this turned out to be not enough. In June 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the 190th and 194th training tank brigades were formed to train crews of American and British tanks, respectively, and the 16th and 21st training tank regiments were transferred from training crews for the T-60 to training crews of British and American tanks. The staffing strength of training regiments and brigades made it possible to train monthly 645 crews for light tanks MZl, 245 for medium MZs, 300 crews of Matildas and 370 crews of Valentines.

To ferry tanks arriving along the Iranian route, the 191st Tank Brigade was formed. This formation received trained crews from the 21st training tank regiment, stationed in Yerevan. In February 1943, to train crews directly in Baku, on the basis of the 191st tank brigade, the 27th training tank regiment was formed, and the 21st regiment was transferred to the T-34.

In the winter of 1943, the 190th training tank brigade was transformed into the 5th, and the 194th training tank brigade into the 6th training tank brigade, which, together with the 16th training tank regiment, became part of the Armored Training Center in Gorky. However, the new brigades did not last long in their training capacity. The supply of armored vehicles under Lend-Lease began to decline, and already in October 1943 the 5th training tank brigade was disbanded, and the 6th training tank brigade was reorganized into an officer training brigade in June of the same year.

By the end of the war, the Red Army had three separate training tank regiments for training crews for Lend-Lease equipment: the 16th in Gorky and the 27th in Baku trained crews of M4A2 tanks, and the 20th in Ryazan trained crews of all types of armored personnel carriers.

Personnel for units and subunits armed with various types of self-propelled artillery units, was trained at the Self-Propelled Artillery Training Center in Klyazma near Moscow.

In 1942, the command and technical staff were trained by the Chkalovsk (for Matilda tanks) and Kazan (for the Valentine tanks) tank schools. At the end of the war, the Kazan Tank School trained platoon commanders of Sherman and Valentine tanks, the 3rd Saratov School of Armored Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers trained command and technical personnel for units armed with M2, Scout and Universal armored personnel carriers, and the Kiev The tank technical school trained technicians to service Sherman tanks.

In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War 16,322 crews were trained by various training units for imported armored vehicles.

MZl and MZs tanks from the 241st Tank Brigade during exercises before the battles. Stalingrad area, October 1942.

In connection with joining the Red Army large quantity foreign tanks, a special staff of a separate tank battalion was developed, which made it possible to use Lend-Lease vehicles both as part of a battalion and as part of a brigade. At the same time, foreign materiel could be combined into divisions and units in various combinations, since there were at least seven separate tank brigades alone in 1941–1942. In 1943, separate tank regiments of army and front-line subordination began to form, also armed with Lend-Lease equipment. In addition, starting from 1943, M4A2 and Valentine tanks were often equipped with tank regiments of mechanized brigades in mechanized corps. At the same time, a tank brigade as part of a mechanized corps could be equipped with both imported and domestic tanks. As a result, the Red Army had separate tank and mechanized corps of three types of equipment: completely domestic tanks, completely foreign ones, and those with a mixed composition. As for army units, in addition to individual tank regiments, they could include SU-57 self-propelled artillery brigades, reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions and regiments. The latter were often armed with imported tanks and armored personnel carriers. Thus, the armored reconnaissance battalion was armed with up to 20 Scout armored personnel carriers and 12 BA-64 armored vehicles, and the motorcycle battalion was armed with up to 10 T-34 or Valentine tanks and 10 armored personnel carriers. The motorcycle regiment had the same number of tanks, but it had more armored personnel carriers.

Almost immediately after the start of operation of foreign armored vehicles in the Red Army, the question arose about organizing its repair. Already in December 1941, repair base No. 82 was formed in Moscow for this purpose. In 1942–1943, repair bases No. 12 in Baku (then in Saratov), ​​No. 66 in Kuibyshev (then in Tbilisi) and No. 97 in Gorky. The last one was the largest. During January - March 1943, 415 tanks underwent major, medium and current repairs. various types and 14 Universal armored personnel carriers. Repair base No. 2 in Moscow was mainly involved in the repair of armored personnel carriers.

During the war, 2,407 foreign-made tanks were overhauled through the efforts of repair bases.

It should be noted that from the end of 1943, repair shops of American and Canadian production on automobile chassis began to arrive in the Soviet Union. The full fleet of American workshops numbered up to 10 units and was actually a field tank repair plant. The American fleet included mechanical workshops M16A and M16B, metalworking and mechanical workshop M8A, forging and welding workshop Ml2, electrical repair shop M18, weapons repair shop M7, tool workshop and warehouse vehicles M14. All of them were based on the chassis of the Studebaker US6 three-axle off-road truck. The fleet of tank repair shops also included 10-ton M1 Ward LaFrance 1000 or (less commonly) Kenworth 570 truck cranes, as well as M31 (T2) armored repair and recovery vehicles.

The Canadian workshop fleet was smaller than the American one and consisted of mechanical workshops A3 and D3, an electromechanical workshop (all on the chassis of an American GMC 353 truck), a mobile charging station OFP-3 and an electric welding workshop KL-3 (on Canadian chassis Ford F60L and Ford F15A, respectively) . A forging and welding workshop on an American Chevrolet G7107 chassis or a Canadian-made Chevrolet (most likely 8441/SZO) was supplied directly to the repair units of tank units. In total, in 1944–1945, 1,590 automobile repair shops of all types were supplied to the USSR from Canada.

American and Canadian parks were used to staff mobile tank repair plants, separate repair and restoration battalions, etc., of army and front-line subordination. This made it possible to carry out not only medium, but also major repairs of armored vehicles, both imported and domestically produced. At the same time, mobile workshops of domestic production could only provide current repairs.

Finally, the turn of the quantitative aspect of tank Lend-Lease has come. In this regard, it should be noted that, as in the case of deliveries of other types of equipment and weapons, data on deliveries of tanks to the USSR, given in various sources, differ from each other. In the late 1980s, data from Western sources became the first to become available to domestic researchers. Thus, in the book Soviet Armor of the Great Patriotic War 1941–45, American researcher Stephen Zaloga provides fairly complete data on Lend-Lease supplies. According to Zalogi, 7,164 tanks of all types arrived from the USA to the Soviet Union, and 5,187 from Great Britain. Information is also reported on equipment lost during transportation: 860 American and 615 British tanks. Thus, a total of 12,351 tanks were delivered to the USSR and 1,475 tanks were lost. True, it is not entirely clear what we are talking about, about sent or arrived tanks. If we talk about those sent, then taking into account the losses, the number of tanks that arrived looks a little different - 6304 American and 4572 British and Canadian. And in total - 10,876.

Let's try to find out how accurate the Western data is. To do this, we use the figures given in M. Suprun’s book “Lend-Lease and Northern Convoys.”

Deliveries of tanks to the USSR

	Liabilities	Sent to USSR
From USA	From Britain and Canada	Total
1st Protocol	4500	2254	2443	4697*
2nd Protocol	10 000	954	2072	3026**
3rd Protocol	1000	1901	1181	3082
4th Protocol	2229***	2076	80	2156
Total	17 729	7185	5776	12 961

* 470 tanks were lost along the route:

** the USSR refused 928 tanks from Great Britain and almost 6 thousand tanks from the USA, asking to compensate them with other supplies under the 3rd Protocol;

*** corrected application.

So, we are convinced that both domestic and foreign books provide almost identical data on tanks sent to the Soviet Union. As for losses, this number is quite consistent: according to M. Suprun, before November 1, 1942, 1,346 tanks were lost during convoys. Considering that this was the period of greatest opposition to the allied caravans from German submarines and aircraft, which entailed the greatest losses in ships and in the cargo transported on them, then the “missing” 129 tanks could well have been lost later. If we subtract the lost ones from the number of vehicles sent, we get 11,615 tanks, which is even slightly more than according to American data.

However, in order to understand how many tanks actually arrived in the USSR, it is necessary to attract additional sources. One of these sources, and the most reliable, is information from the selection committees of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU). According to them, in 1941–1945, 5,872 American and 4,523 British and Canadian tanks arrived from the United States to the Soviet Union (that is, arrived!). In total - 10,395 tanks.

This number, which should be accepted as the most correct, correlates well with the data of S. Pledges. However, the difference is 481 cars, which is generally natural. In most foreign sources, data exceeds Soviet data by 300–400 units. This can be explained either by incomplete accounting of losses during transportation, or by confusion with applications, shipping and receiving data. Very often, data from Soviet applications is presented as dispatch data.

All of the above is also true in relation to the supply of other types of armored vehicles. It no longer makes sense to conduct research here; we will use the data from the military acceptance of the GBTU as the most reliable from the point of view of counting the arriving combat vehicles. From 1941 to 1945, the USSR received 5,160 armored personnel carriers of all types. But this is only through GBTU. In addition, another 1,082 armored personnel carriers were transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army for use as artillery tractors. In addition, 1802 self-propelled artillery units arrived in the USSR different types and 127 armored repair and recovery vehicles (ARV).

To summarize, it turns out that 10,395 tanks, 6,242 armored personnel carriers, 1,802 self-propelled guns and 127 armored vehicles arrived in the USSR. And in total - 18,566 units of armored vehicles.

Let's try to compare these data with the data of S. Pledges. According to them, 10,876 tanks, 6,666 armored personnel carriers, 1,802 self-propelled guns, 115 armored vehicles and 25 tank bridge laying vehicles were delivered to the Soviet Union. Total - 19,484 armored vehicles. In general, these data correlate with information from Soviet military acceptance. At the same time, it is curious that they partially exceed, partially coincide, and partially are even less than Soviet data.

British cruiser tank "Cromwell" at the Kubinka training ground. 1945

Many domestic publications claim that the tanks supplied by the Allies accounted for only 10% of the 103 thousand tanks produced in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Such a comparison looks not only incorrect, but also illiterate. In the USSR, from the 2nd half of 1941 (from July 1) to June 1, 1945, 97,678 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced (according to other sources - 95,252), but military acceptance was accepted from industrial plants from July 1, 1941 by September 1, 1945, there were actually 103,170 tanks and self-propelled guns. As you can see, in both cases we are talking about tanks and self-propelled guns, and from the Lend-Lease side only tanks are taken into account. If we take into account that Lend-Lease equipment arrived in the USSR in the summer of 1945, then we need to take into account the number 78,356. That is how many tanks were accepted by military acceptance from Soviet factories during the specified period of time. The number of self-propelled guns received was 24,814 vehicles. As a result, it can be argued that Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 13% of Soviet production, self-propelled guns - 7%. As for armored personnel carriers, they were not produced at all in the USSR, which means that Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to 100%. If we make a comparison according to the criterion of “light armored vehicles” and compare it with the production of armored vehicles in the USSR (8944 units), we get 70%. It should also be noted that out of 1,800 Lend-Lease self-propelled guns, 1,100 were anti-aircraft guns, which we also practically never produced (75 ZSU-37, produced in 1945–1946, did not take part in combat operations). If we talk about armored vehicles in general, Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to about 16% of Soviet production.

However, this fact, as well as the fact that foreign supplies of armored vehicles were constantly declining, does not at all indicate any malicious intent of the Western allies, as was often noted in Soviet literature. Supplies were adjusted by the Soviet side, as evidenced by the following document from the Red Army State Technical University:

"About tanks for armor tank troops Red Army for the summer campaign of 1943:

For tanks made in Britain and Canada:

1. The order for the Mk-3 “Valentine” light infantry tank with enhanced armament will be extended by an additional 2000 units.

2. Abandon the Mk-6 Tetrarch cruiser tank.

3. Add the Mk-2 “Matilda” medium infantry tank to the total quantity of 1000 units. according to the current protocol. The remaining tanks will be armed with 76 mm cannons. In the future, we will stop ordering this type of tank.

4. Receive the heavy infantry tank Mk-4 “Churchill” for heavy tank regiments in quantities according to the current protocol.

5. Receive at least 500 armored infantry and weapons transporter “Universal”. with a 13.5 mm Boys anti-tank rifle.

For US-made tanks:

1. American light tanks M-ZL “Stuart” to be added to the total number of 1200 units. current protocol. In the future, we will stop ordering tanks of this type.

2. American light tank M-5L. Refuse the order due to the lack of advantages over M-ZL.

3. Medium tanks M-ZS “Grant” will be received at the rate of 1000 units. current protocol. In 1943, consider replacing them with the supply of new M-4S medium tanks with a diesel engine and improved armor protection in an amount of at least 1000 units.

4. Include in the supply list the light anti-tank self-propelled gun SU-57 in an amount of at least 500 units.”

Until now, we have been talking about the supply of large quantities of armored vehicles. However, there were also minor, so-called trial deliveries, when the Soviet side requested certain samples from the allies and the allies provided them. Moreover, sometimes it was about the most modern, newest combat vehicles. As part of the familiarization deliveries from Great Britain to the USSR, six English Cromwell cruising tanks, three Sherman-Crab minesweeper tanks, five Churchill-Crocodile flamethrower tanks, one copy each of AES and Daimler armored vehicles, and a Wasp flamethrower armored personnel carrier arrived "("Wasp"), as well as six Canadian Bombardier snowmobiles. In 1943–1945, five M5 Stuart light tanks, two M24 Chaffee light tanks, the newest T26 General Pershing heavy tank and five self-propelled units T70 "Witch". All these combat vehicles underwent a wide range of tests and were carefully studied by Soviet specialists.

American self-propelled gun - tank destroyer T70 "Witch", known in the US Army as the M18 "Hellkzt". Test site in Kubinka, 1945.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that such tests were not carried out out of simple curiosity to find out how imported tanks work there. Based on their results, a list of recommendations was compiled for borrowing certain components and assemblies, certain design solutions. At Valentine, for example, NIIBT Polygon specialists recognized the American GMC engine, hydraulic shock absorbers and synchronized gearbox as very valuable. Of particular interest to Soviet specialists was the connection of the gearbox with a “differential planetary rotation mechanism” installed on the “Churchill” and “Cromwell”, and on the “Matilda” - the hydraulic drive for turning the turret. All British tanks without exception liked the Mk IV periscope observation devices. They liked them so much that they were copied and, under the slightly modified designation MK-4, starting from the second half of 1943, they were installed on all Soviet tanks.

By the way, if we are talking about the MK-4 device, then we need to make a small “lyrical” digression. The fact is that this device is not an English invention. It was designed in the mid-1930s by the Polish engineer Gundlach. Soviet specialists were able to become familiar with the design of this device back in 1939, after studying captured Polish 7TP tanks and TKS wedges. Even then, recommendations were given for its borrowing, but this was not done, for which they had to pay in blood.

However, for various reasons, not all successful solutions migrated from Lend-Lease cars to Soviet ones. For example, according to the results of field tests of prototypes of heavy domestic tanks in the summer of 1943, proposals were made to improve the combat qualities of the IS tank. Regarding armament, among other things, it was recommended to develop and install by November 15, 1943 a hydraulic turret rotation mechanism of the type American tank M4A2 and a turret anti-aircraft machine gun mount on the hatch of the commander's cupola (also not without the influence of the M4A2, which had a large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun). In the image and likeness of the Sherman, it was planned to place the loader on the left, and the gunner and commander to the right of the gun, to work out the installation of a hydraulic gun stabilizer and a 50-mm breech-loading mortar for self-defense and setting up smoke screens.

A train with M4A2 tanks in Romania. September 1944.

As you can see, the list of recommendations is very impressive. However, as far as is known, in addition to the anti-aircraft machine gun installation on the IS tank, none of the above was introduced. Technological difficulties played an important role in this.

The nomenclature of mass deliveries of armored vehicles to the USSR under Lend-Lease and the list of vehicles received for review leaves no stone unturned from the widespread opinion that the Allies allegedly specifically supplied us with bad military equipment. The British and Americans supplied us with the same vehicles that they used to fight. Another question is that they did not really correspond to ours climatic conditions and operating principles. Well, the characteristics and reliability of these machines are best judged not by idle speculation, but by specific facts. The first to arrive in the USSR were the English “Matildas” and “Valentines”. Let's start with them.

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Formation of tank units equipped with vehicles manufactured in the USA and Great Britain.

Due to the difficult situation at the front, foreign weapons were used for their intended purpose immediately. Initially, tank crews were trained at the Kazan Technical Tank School. Already on October 15, 1941, 420 crews were sent to Kazan to familiarize themselves with the Matilda and Valentine type vehicles. The training lasted 15 days. In March 1942, tank crews were trained on British and American tanks in the 23rd and 38th training regiments. The training of armored personnel carrier crews was carried out on the basis of the 20th tank regiment in Uryupinsk, which was reorganized into a training tank regiment on March 1, 1942.

"Valentine VII" of the Canadian production of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, destroyed by artillery fire, November 3, 1942.

Valentine IV tanks from an unidentified part of the Western Front, spring 1943.

In May 1942, in connection with an increase in the size of supplies of foreign armored vehicles, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 510 of June 23, 1942, the following were formed:

A tank training brigade equipped with American tanks (190th Tank Training Brigade).

A tank training brigade equipped with British tanks (191st Training Brigade).

Two training regiments equipped light tanks T-60s were reorganized into training regiments equipped with American and British tanks (17th and 21st tank training regiments).

The mentioned parts made it possible to prepare monthly:

245 crews of medium tanks MZ "Lee".

645 crews of light tanks MZ "Stuart".

300 crews of Mk infantry tanks

370 crews of Mk infantry tanks

III "Valentine".

Total: 1560 crews per month.

Canadian-built Valentine VII infantry tank, destroyed by artillery fire, Vitebsk area, January 1944.

In connection with the start of deliveries of armored vehicles in the southern direction, another brigade of 800 people was formed on the basis of the 191st Tank Brigade. The crews of this brigade were trained on the basis of the 21st training regiment in Yerevan.

On January 3, 1943, the 190th Tank Training Brigade became the 5th Brigade, and the 191st Tank Training Brigade became the 6th Brigade. The 6th brigade, together with the 16th training tank regiment, became part of the tank forces training center in Gorky.

In February 1943, the personnel training system underwent reorganization. Since from the beginning of 1943, the receiving detachment in Baku received tanks intended to be sent directly to the front, there was a need to train crews right at the place where the tanks were received.

By order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense No. 24777 of February 18, 1943, the 191st training tank brigade was reorganized into the 27th training regiment, which was to be stationed in Baku. The 21st training regiment was re-equipped with Soviet T-34 tanks.

Valentine and T-34 tanks from the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, May 1944.

The crew of the Valentine IV of the 511th Flamethrower Regiment of the 3rd Baltic Front, summer 1944.

Tank "Valentine IV" destroyed by artillery fire, Southern Front, summer 1942.

Since November 1943, the percentage of tanks received under Lend-Lease to domestically produced tanks has decreased, the 6th training tank brigade was reorganized into a personnel training brigade on June 18, 1943, and the 5th training tank brigade was disbanded. Training of crews for foreign tanks continued only in the 16th training tank regiment. At the end of the war, the Red Army had three separate training tank regiments training crews for American and British-made vehicles: the 16th training regiment in Gorky, the 27th training regiment in Baku (both trained tank crews for the M4A2 Sherman), and also the 20th training regiment in Ryazan (training crews of armored personnel carriers M2, MZ, M5, “Universal Carrier” and MZ A1 “Scout Car”). To train motorcyclists of units equipped with motorcycles of the brands “Naneu-Davidson”, “Indian”, “BSA”, two training motorcycle regiments were formed: the 14th in Berdichev and the 15th in Tashino.

Tanks "Valentine" of the group of General I.A. Pliev (4th Guards Mechanized Corps and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps), Bobruisk area, June 1944.

The crews of the American self-propelled guns SU-57 (T48) and Ml0 were trained at the self-propelled artillery training center in Klyazma, formed on October 25, 1942. On December 10, 1943, a temporary training regiment of self-propelled artillery (1st self-propelled artillery regiment) was formed in the center, intended to train crews of M15 and Ml7 self-propelled guns. Having completed the training cycle, the regiment was disbanded, and the remaining M15 and M17 vehicles were received by one of the battalions of the 256th Tank Brigade. Officer cadres were trained in tank schools specializing in one type or another of armored vehicles. In 1942, personnel for foreign tanks were trained in Chkalovsk (Matilda tanks) and Kazan (Valentine) in tank schools operating there.

Until the end of the war, the Kazan Tank School trained platoon commanders of Sherman and Valentine tanks, and the 3rd Tank School in Saratov trained tank and armored personnel carrier commanders, as well as technicians for the MZA1 Scout Car and Universal Carrier. The Kiev Technical Tank School trained technicians for Sherman tanks.

Motorcycle platoon commanders were trained by the motorcycle school in Vyuki, and artillery officers were trained by tank schools that trained crews of SU-76 self-propelled guns.

Tanks "Valentine IX" of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Vilnius, July 1944.

"Valentine IX" 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, Romania, summer 1944.

In total, during the war years, the Soviet Union trained 16,322 crews for foreign tanks. 1243 marching companies were sent to the front. From these figures it follows that the Soviet military leadership was able to quickly organize the training of crews and commanders for foreign-made tanks, cars, and motorcycles. This allowed as soon as possible begin the operation and combat use of foreign equipment. Units equipped with British and American-made tanks actively participated in the fighting.

Tanks were directly transferred to units of the active army from field convoys and training units.

At the time when foreign tanks began to arrive in combat units, the main type of tank unit in the Red Army was the brigade. The transition from mechanized corps to tank brigades occurred in the fall of 1941 due to heavy losses and the transition to a defensive war.

There were several staffing schedules for mixed tank brigades. But for units equipped with foreign tanks, special battalion staffs were created.

As a result, foreign armored vehicles could be used both as part of a battalion and an entire brigade. The British tank battalion (staff number 010/395) included 24 Mk II "Matilda" tanks and 21 T-60 tanks. The battalion consisted of 150 soldiers, sergeants and officers.

The tank battalion of American tanks (staff number 010/396) consisted of 23 MZs ("Lee") and 12 MZL ("Stuart") tanks, as well as 190 soldiers and officers.

Tank battalions could form a brigade (state number 010/345 dated February 15, 1942), numbering 1,107 people and 46-48 tanks (in two battalions). In practice, battalions could be combined in different combinations. For individual tank brigades in 1941-1942. There were at least 7 staffing tables. In November 1942, the staffing list No. 010/267 of the separate Guards regiment of heavy breakthrough tanks appeared. Such a regiment consisted of 214 people and 21 KB-1 tanks or British Mk IV "Churchill" tanks. The regiment received the status of a guards regiment already upon formation. The task of the heavy tank regiment was to break through enemy defenses in close cooperation with its infantry and artillery.

Tank "Valentine IX", 9th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army, Bucharest, August 1944.

"Valentine IX" of the 4th Motorcycle Regiment of the 6th Tank Army, Bucharest, August 1944.

In 1942-1943. formed several regiments of heavy breakthrough tanks equipped with British Churehill vehicles. The regiments were used in different sectors of the Eastern Front. In addition to the Guards regiments of heavy breakthrough tanks, since 1944, separate regiments of heavy tanks were formed (staff number 010/463), subordinate directly to the command of the army or front. Such regiments included various tanks, most often foreign-made. There were several options for staffing, the most common option was 11 KB-lc and ten Mk IV "Churchill" (82nd Tank Regiment) or 11 M4A2 and ten "Valentine" IX (212th Tank Regiment). In 1942, they began to form larger tank formations. Tank corps began to be formed on March 31, 1942 in accordance with Directive of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 72421 Sec. The corps consisted of a headquarters (staff No. 010/369), two tank brigades (staff No. 010/345 and 010/352) and one motorized rifle brigade. In total, the corps included 5,603 people and 100 tanks. In 1942, the 9th, 10th and 11th Tank Corps were equipped with foreign guns. British and American tanks were used in conjunction with Soviet T-60 and T-70 light tanks. On September 8, 1942, mechanized corps were formed (Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1104308ss). The mechanized corps consisted of a headquarters, three motorized rifle and one tank brigade, as well as the necessary units. The only corps equipped with foreign tanks was the 5th Mechanized Corps, which operated as part of the Southwestern Front (1943-1944). Later, many tank and mechanized regiments received M4A2 tanks.

In 1942-1944, six tank armies were formed. The composition of each army was determined individually based on the formation order. The approximate structure of the tank army was determined by GKO order No. 2791.

"Valentine IV", unidentified part, Germany, April 1945.

The tank army consisted of a headquarters, two tank and one mechanized corps, a motorcycle regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a self-propelled artillery regiment, a howitzer regiment and a regiment of guards mortars. The tank army consisted of 46,000-48,000 people, 620-654 tanks and 189 self-propelled guns.

Tank armies (especially at the end of the war) were equipped with Soviet-made tanks. Other units and units within the tank armies received foreign equipment.

For example, in the 1st Guards Tank Army in 1944, the 6th Motorcycle Regiment operated, which had ten Valentine IX tanks, eight SU-57, 13 Scout Car, 12 Willis and 204 BSA and Indian motorcycles. And

Harley-Davidson. The 19th self-propelled artillery brigade had 65 SU-57s. The 67th evacuation company had two Diamond T-980 tractors.

Reconnaissance battalions were equipped with armored vehicles. The tank corps used the following staffing schedules: No. 010/389 (20 armored personnel carriers, 12 armored vehicles, 208 people) and staff No. 010/289 (22 armored vehicles, seven tanks, 112 people).

To form reconnaissance units, wheeled “Scout Cars” or half-tracked M2/MZ were used.

Motorcycle battalions and regiments had different staffs, the most common being the following:

"Valentine IV" of an unidentified part of the Western Front, Shma 1942.

“Churchill Mk III” “Alexander Nevsky” from the 50th separate guards breakthrough tank regiment.

1) Motorcycle battalion (staff number 010/432) consisting of 10 T-34 (or “Valentino) IX” tanks, five armored vehicles, ten armored personnel carriers, 111 motorcycles and 451 people.

2) A separate motorcycle regiment (staff number 010/433) consisting of ten tanks (T-34 or Valentine"). 13 "Scout Cars", five armored personnel carriers M2/MZ or "Universal Carrier", three armored vehicles (BA-64), 214 motorcycles and 1188 people.

Motorcycle battalions were corps reconnaissance units, and motorcycle regiments were army reconnaissance units.

On May 1, 1945, 4 separate, 37 corps motorcycle battalions, as well as 11 separate motorcycle regiments, more or less equipped with foreign-made equipment, operated as part of the Red Army,

In June 1944, they began to form light self-propelled artillery brigades equipped with American-made SU-57 (T48) self-propelled guns. Such brigades had three divisions total number 60 guns.

Each division (20 guns) consisted of 4 batteries of 5 SU-57s each.

"Churchill IV" of the 36th Separate Guards Tank Breakthrough Regiment, August 1943.

Two Churchill IIIs (204 and G-01) of the 48th Heavy Tank Regiment, Kyiv, November 1943.

"Churchill IV" of the 36th Separate Guards Tank Breakthrough Regiment, Vyborg, Finland, July 1944.

The 16th and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades were organized in accordance with staffing schedule No. 010/408. In addition to the SU-57, the divisions often used British Valentine tanks (five pieces), which played the role of command vehicles. The 19th self-propelled artillery brigade had staffing schedule No. 010/508. In addition to 60 self-propelled guns, the brigade had 5 command SU-57s equipped with a radio station. Additionally, in 1944, several individual mouth with 6 “Scout Cars” and a battery of four SU-57s.

Separate divisions of SU-57 self-propelled guns, consisting of two batteries (eight vehicles), were often assigned to separate motorcycle regiments and motorcycle battalions, as well as other units. In accordance with the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 3/306747 of March 22, 1944, the 1223rd and 1239th separate tank battalions were reorganized into self-propelled artillery regiments with the same numbers. The regiments were equipped with Ml0 self-propelled guns, 21 guns in each regiment (staff number 010/484).

Since only 52 M10 self-propelled guns were received, the mentioned regiments remained the only units equipped with vehicles of this type. Almost from the very beginning of the operation of British and American armored vehicles in the Soviet Union, serious problems arose with their repair. Already in December 1941, repair base No. 82 was formed in Moscow, and in 1942-1943. Repair base No. 12 (Baku, later Saratov), ​​No. 66 (Kuibyshev, later Tbilisi), and also No. 97 (Gorky) were involved in the repair of allied armored vehicles.

Since 1943, the repair of armored personnel carriers was carried out by repair base No. 2 in Moscow, and foreign-made motorcycles were repaired at base No. 135, formed in Kyiv in 1944. The largest was repair base No. 97, organized in Gorky in July 1942. The base served not only linear units, but also training, and also repaired equipment damaged during transportation.

From January to March 1943 alone, the repair base carried out current, medium and major repairs of 415 tanks, including 61 Matildas, 23 Valentines, 161 MZ Lees, 126 MZ Stuarts, 39 Shermans. , 5 Churchills and 14 Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers. During the war years, the base repaired 2,407 allied tanks (overhaul).

During World War II, the Soviet Union operated six schools training crews for allied tanks, developed special staffing schedules for units equipped with allied tanks, and developed tactics adapted to technical specifications And design features Western-made tanks. An effective system for repairing allied armored vehicles was established.

British and Canadian-made armored vehicles in combat on the Eastern Front and in the war with Japan

During the four years of the war, tanks, armored cars and trucks supplied under Lend-Lease were used in different parts Red Army. Therefore, we have sufficient evidence about the combat value of allied weapons. The opinion of mid-level commanders often differs sharply from the opinion of the crews. But this is quite understandable. If commanders paid attention to the tactical and technical data of the equipment and its capabilities, then for the crew members, ease of operation was in the first place. And while the ease of operation was excellent, the same cannot be said about the combat value of Western equipment.

"Jupiversal Yurier" from the reconnaissance unit in battle. Southwestern Front, 1943.

Western technology was designed for conditions of a completely different technical culture, which was reflected in the method of operation. At first, tankers tried to operate Western tanks the way they were used to doing with Soviet-made tanks, which led to constant accidents. But the difficulties of the period of familiarization with new technology managed to overcome, so the first failures quickly became a thing of the past. Experienced crews successfully used the equipment in combat operations.

For the first time, Lend-Lease equipment reached combat units shortly before the start of the counteroffensive near Moscow. Only a small part of the 145 Matildas, 216 Valentines and 330 Universal Carriers delivered to the Soviet Union managed to take part in the battle.

As part of the troops of the Western Front, British tanks were located in the 146th Tank Brigade (two T-34s, ten T-60s and four Valentines), the 23rd Tank Brigade (one T-34 and five Valentines), 20- th tank brigade (T-34, T-60, two Valentines and a BA-20 armored car) from the 16th, 49th and 3rd armies. In the 112th tank division The 50th Army had one KB tank, eight T-26s and six Valentines.

The 170th and 171st separate tank battalions fought on the North-Western and Kalinin fronts. The 170th battalion, attached to the 3rd Shock Army, had 10 T-60 tanks and 13 Matildas, while the 171st battalion had 10 T-60s, 12 Matildas and nine Valentines. The 171st battalion was part of the 4th Shock Army of the Kalinin Front.

"Universal Carriers" were used in different parts of the mentioned fronts, we do not have specific data. Typically, two or three transporters were assigned to reconnaissance companies of tank brigades.

In the battle of Moscow, about 2% of the total amount of cargo delivered from the west was used, so no mass application there is no question.

Infantry tanks A12 Mk II "Matilda" II appeared on the Eastern Front at the end of 1941. The tanks were equipped with so-called summer tracks, which turned out to be completely unsuitable for use in conditions of autumn-winter thaw.

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers from an unidentified reconnaissance unit, Belarus, February 1944.

There are numerous cases of tanks driving into roadside ditches; there are photographs showing tanks overturned and standing on the tower. To avoid slipping on the road, the tracks began to be equipped with steel linings. In extreme cold, the engine cooling system often froze, and this sometimes happened even when the engine was running. Snow and dirt packed under the track screens, freezing and immobilizing the tank. But in comparison with the old T-26, BT and light T-60, the allied tanks did not look so bad. They had powerful armor, good weapons, and were powered by diesel engines. In terms of maneuverability, they were second only to the new T-34 and KV.

In addition to vehicles with a 40-mm cannon, Matilda II CS (Close Support) tanks armed with a 76.2-mm howitzer were supplied from the spring of 1942. With the help of high-explosive shells, close support tanks could successfully destroy enemy fortifications.

Analyzing the use of Matilda II tanks on the Eastern Front, it can be argued that the Red Army suffered the main losses in tanks due to insufficiently established interaction between tanks and infantry. Counter tank battles occurred rarely and did not play a significant role in the balance of losses.

In January 1942, the 170th separate tank battalion, which had four KB, 13 Matildas and 18 T-60s, was added to the 3rd Shock Army on the North-Western Front.

The battalion supported the actions of the 23rd Infantry Division. On January 29, Matilda Company entered the battle, supporting the attack of the 225th Infantry Regiment. On January 23 at 14:00 the Matildas advanced in the direction of Georgievka. When the Germans realized that they were being attacked by tanks, they retreated to Maltowice. Here the infantry dug in on the outskirts of the village of Myshkino. The Matildas, having used up their ammunition, retreated to the rear. After the battle, it turned out that the tanks were advancing without infantry support, since the infantry received a retreat, but no one notified the tankers about this.

In February 1942, bloody battles took place in the Kholm area. They involved Matilda Company, attached to the 128th Infantry Regiment, 391st Infantry Division, whose mission was to attack German positions south of the Hill. The operation was carefully prepared. The thickness of the snow cover reached one meter, which made it difficult for infantry and tanks to operate. At night, the Matilda company took up its original positions. The tankers conducted reconnaissance of the nearby area and carefully coordinated their actions with the infantry. Sappers must clear the section of highway and streets along which the tanks will move. Passages in minefields are marked with poles and flags. Tanks go into battle carrying infantry troops on their armor. Having reached the target, the infantry dismounts and begins to advance independently, attacking enemy strongholds. It should be added that one Matilda, instead of the standard two-pounder gun, had a Soviet forty-five. On February 13, around noon, tanks with infantry troops formed a column and moved to attack. But the sappers did not have time to make full passages of the minefields. On the forefield, the leading tank hit a mine. Other tanks tried to tow the lost vehicle, but this led to the loss of three more tanks. The infantry came under heavy fire, retreated and dug in in the cemetery. The tanks continued to fire at the enemy.

Despite the preparations, the offensive ended in failure due to insufficiently coordinated actions of the infantry and tanks.

During the Battle of Kholm, the 82nd Infantry Battalion received support in the form of two Matilda tanks. The tank crews knew how to conduct street battles. They fired at enemy firing points discovered by the infantry.

The tanks of Lieutenants Danilov and Zhuravlev constantly interacted with the infantry, and the radio operator Private Khalipov climbed onto the roof of the house and from there adjusted the fire of his tank.

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers from the reconnaissance unit of Captain Bogdasarov, 1st Guards Tank Corps, January 4, 1944.

On February 17, Lieutenant Zhuravlev, who commanded a unit from the 84th Infantry Regiment, captured three houses during hand-to-hand combat. From February 15 to February 20, the 170th separate tank battalion destroyed 5 anti-tank guns, 12 anti-tank rifles, 4 machine guns, 12 mortars, 20 vehicles and up to two infantry companies. The crews of each tank fired on average 200 40 mm shells and about 5,000 machine-gun rounds per day. According to the reports of the commanders, in the battles for the Hill, the Matilda tanks fully demonstrated their capabilities. The tank's armor performed particularly well. Some tanks received 17-19 hits from 50mm armor-piercing shells, but none of the shells were able to penetrate the armor.

The 170th separate tank battalion lost 8 Matilda tanks (including 4 on mines) and four T-60s. Quiet running and powerful armor made the Matilda a tank of positional warfare.

Matilda tanks fought as part of the Western, Bryansk and North Caucasus fronts until the beginning of 1944. On December 13, 1943, the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 68th Army of the Western Front had 79 tanks

"Matilda", 138 "Valentine", as well as 94 BA-64 armored vehicles and Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers.

The 9th, 10th and 11th Tank Corps used British tanks alongside Soviet T-70 light tanks.

British infantry tanks Mk III "Valentine" also found their way to the Eastern Front. The 16-ton Valentine was only slightly inferior in armor, but was faster than the Matilda, and therefore received wider and longer use. The first Valentine tanks appeared on the Eastern Front in November 1941. Documents from the German 4th Panzer Group show the appearance of Valentine tanks in battle with the German 2nd Panzer Division on November 25, 1941. This is quite likely, since it is known that Valentine began to be used on the Eastern Front earlier than in North Africa (Operation Crusader).

In the German document we read: “For the first time, German soldiers were faced with the fact that the British were helping the Red Army, which Soviet propaganda had long been shouting about. British ganks are much worse than Soviet ones. The captured tank crews cursed British equipment and praised Soviet tanks. In addition, the interrogation of the prisoners showed that the crews had undergone a shortened training course, and the crews did not have sufficient qualifications to fully operate the tank.”

As part of the 5th Army, which covered the Mozhaisk direction, the first unit equipped with lend-lease equipment was the 136th separate tank battalion. It was formed on December 1, 1941. The battalion had 10 T-34, 10 T-60, 9 Valentine and three Matilda tanks. British tanks arrived from a warehouse in Gorky on November 10, 1941. Some of the training took place at the front. During the training, many tanks were damaged: two Matildas, five Valentines, two T-60s and a T-34. After repairing the tanks, the 136th battalion was assigned to the 329th Infantry Division, and later to the 20th Tank Brigade, within which the battalion participated in the counteroffensive near Moscow. On January 15, 1942, the battalion command compiled a “Brief report on the actions of Mk III tanks.” Apparently, this is the first document assessing the effectiveness of British tanks in front-line conditions.

“The experience of using Valentines has shown:

1. Cross-country ability of tanks winter conditions good, provides movement on soft snow 50-60 cm thick. Ground traction is good, but spurs are needed when there is icy conditions.

Armored personnel carriers "Universal Kzrier" from the reconnaissance unit of Captain Surzhnikov, the Battle of Kursk, July 1943.

2. The weapon worked flawlessly, but there were cases of the gun not firing enough (the first five or six shots), apparently due to thickening of the lubricant. Weapons are very demanding in terms of lubrication and maintenance.

3. Observation through instruments and slits is good.

4. The engine group and transmission worked well up to 150-200 hours, after which a decrease in engine power is observed.

5. Armor good quality. The crew personnel underwent special training and had satisfactory command of tanks. The command and technical staff of the tanks had little knowledge. A great inconvenience was created by the crews’ ignorance of the elements of preparing tanks for winter. As a result of the lack of necessary insulation. The cars had difficulty starting in the cold and therefore remained hot all the time, which led to high consumption of engine resources. In a battle with German tanks (December 20, 1941), three Valentines received the following damage: one had its turret jammed by a 37-mm shell, the gun of another was jammed, the third received five hits on the side from a distance of 200-250 meters. In this battle, the Valentines knocked out two medium German T-3 tanks.

In general, the Mk.Sh is a good combat vehicle with powerful weapons, good maneuverability, and capable of operating against enemy personnel, fortifications and tanks.

Negative sides:

1. Poor adhesion of the tracks to the ground.

2. Greater vulnerability of the suspension bogies - if one roller fails, the tank cannot move.

3. There are no high-explosive fragmentation shells for the gun.”

The latter circumstance forced the State Defense Committee to decide to re-equip the Valentine tanks with Soviet-made weapons: a 45 mm cannon and a DT machine gun. This task was assigned to plant No. 92, where Grabin’s design bureau worked. In December 1941, one tank was rearmed and given the designation ZIS-95. But no further work was carried out in this direction.

Many Valentine tanks took part in the battle for the Caucasus. On the North Caucasus Front in 1942-1943. the share of lend-lease tanks reached 70% of the total vehicle fleet. This was explained by the fact that tanks arrived here, delivered through Iran, as well as vehicles that arrived in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, and then transported down the Volga.

One of the most experienced units of the North Caucasus Front was the 5th Guards Tank Brigade. It began its operations on September 26, 1942, defending Grozny in the Balgobek area. The brigade consisted of 40 Valentine tanks, three T-34s and a BT-7. On September 29, the brigade attacked German units near Alkhan-Yurt. The crew of Captain Shemelkov (tank "Valentine") knocked out five tanks, a self-propelled gun, an enemy truck, and also destroyed 25 enemy soldiers. The fighting continued for several more days. In total, during the battles for Malgobek, the brigade knocked out 38 tanks (including burning 20), a self-propelled gun, 24 cannons, 6 mortars and one six-barreled Nebelwerfer.

The brigade's combat losses amounted to two T-34s and 33 Valentine tanks (including 8 that burned out). 268 soldiers of the brigade were killed or injured.

The archive preserves the protest of the brigade commander, Colonel P.K. Shuren-kov, dated early January 1943, sent to the command of the armored vehicles.

“Among the tank formations of the front, the 5th tank brigade, as a guards brigade, is the only one. During the fighting from September 26, 1942 to January 1, 1943, she honorably justified her title of Guards. Now the brigade has been withdrawn for reorganization, having handed over the remaining combat equipment to another tank brigade. For three months, the brigade fought on foreign-made Valentine and MZ light tanks, while the non-guard tank brigades 2 and 63 were equipped with T-34 and T-70 tanks.

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers of an unidentified reconnaissance unit, Belarus, February 1944.

Regarding the combat qualities of the MZ light tanks, I must say that this tank did not justify itself in battles: its thin armor and weak gun do not give the desired effect not only against heavy German tanks, but also against medium ones. Enemy tanks with more powerful guns fire from long distances, which are inaccessible to the MZ light cannon. As a result, the MZ light tank is defeated without causing damage to the enemy. Wonderful people are dying along with the tanks.

In connection with the above, I consider it advisable to equip guards units with domestic tanks, where tank crews are selected most carefully and are of particular value. On domestically produced tanks they could bring significantly more benefits and better results in defeating the enemy. Using foreign technology, these wonderful tankers often died aimlessly.

Now units of the brigade are being formed and are again receiving tanks of foreign brands.

I ask you to raise the issue with the relevant authorities about at least partially staffing the brigade with domestically produced T-34 and T-70 tanks.”

Returning to the combat use of Valentine tanks, it should be noted that most often they were used simultaneously with Soviet-made tanks. The first line used KB and Matilda II CS armed with three-inch 76.2 mm howitzers, the second line used Soviet T-34 medium tanks, and the third line used T-70 and Valentine tanks. This formation has proven itself well in battle. An example of such a use of Valentine tanks is the breakthrough of the so-called “Blue Line.” For the breakthrough, a strike group was created consisting of units of the 56th Army, including the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, which received 13 M4A2 tanks on August 1, 1943. Sherman", 24 "Valentines", 12 T-34 tanks, as well as the 4th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which consisted of 16 KB-1s tanks. The tank operations were supported by a battalion of the 417th Infantry Division.

On August 6, 1943, at 6:00 a.m., after a salvo of rocket artillery on the Gorno-Vesely village and artillery preparation, three KB and three Valentines, led by the guard by senior lieutenant G.P. Polosin, who describes this battle as follows: “Maneuvering among shell explosions (the thirty-minute artillery barrage, of course, did not fully suppress the enemy fire system), my “Valentine” suddenly found itself literally in front of the houses of the farm. What a success! But how are other tanks?..

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers of an unidentified reconnaissance unit of the 6th Panzer Army, Bucharest, August 1944.

I looked around through the viewing slits. I saw that two more “Englishmen” of my platoon - the cars of Poloznikov and Voronkov - were walking slightly behind. But heavy KBs are not visible. Maybe they fell behind or were taken to the side... The infantry, of course, had been cut off from the tanks even earlier...

Destroying enemy machine-gun emplacements and gun emplacements along the way, our platoon tanks entered the ravine. We stopped here. I gave the order:

Don't shoot without my order! Take care of the shells. It is still unknown how long it will take... And then we will have to fight our way to our own people...

The tank commanders answered briefly: they understood.

Then he tried to contact the guard company commander, Senior Lieutenant Maksimov. And I couldn't. The airwaves were filled to the limit with hysterical teams on German. Apparently, the Nazis were seriously concerned about the unexpected breakthrough of Russian tanks in this sector of their defense.

But our position was also unenviable. It just so happened that they were separated from the main group conducting reconnaissance in force, ammunition and fuel were running out, alone in the rear of the enemy, who, however, had not yet fully understood the situation, but this was a matter of time.

Having crushed a German anti-tank gun along the way, our tank jumped out of the ravine onto open space and saw a strange picture. There were Germans standing in Voronkov’s car, which was 30 to 40 meters to the right. They mistook the Valentines for their equipment, banged their butts on the armor and did not understand why the tankers did not get out. After waiting until there were up to a dozen Germans, I ordered a machine gun to hit them. Then, having fired smoke grenade launchers (this is where these weapons, which were only on British tanks, came in handy) and setting up a smoke screen, the vehicles returned through the same ravine to the location of their troops. The battle was still going on near Gorno-Vesely. KB tanks were knocked out. One of them stood without a tower. Another a little further from him buried his gun in the ground. Near its right, flattened track, two tankers were firing pistols at the advancing Germans. Having dispersed the enemy infantry with cannon and machine gun fire, we dragged both wounded men into our Valentine. It immediately became clear that, having failed to penetrate the KB armor with anti-tank artillery, the Germans used guided mines against them.” During this short raid behind enemy lines, a platoon of guard senior lieutenant G.P. Polosin destroyed five anti-tank guns, crushed five bunkers, 12 machine guns, and shot up to a hundred Nazis. But most importantly, with his unexpected attack from the rear he forced the enemy to fully open his fire system. Which, in fact, was what was needed.

It remains to add that all crew members of Polosin’s platoon were awarded government awards for this. Personally, Georgy Pavlovich Polosin received the Order of the Red Star.

The 196th Tank Brigade of the 30th Kalinin Front liberated Rzhev in August 1942. During the battles for Rzhev, Valentin tanks were equipped with additional linings on the tracks, which reduced the specific pressure per pound. The Germans also used a similar technical solution (Ost-Kette). Thanks to the larger support area of ​​the tracks, the tank felt more confident in the swamp and snow

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers from an unidentified reconnaissance unit of the 2nd Tank Army, Lublin, July 1944.

Valentine tanks were used in positional battles on the Western and Kalinin fronts until the beginning of 1944.

Mobile "Valentines" were often assigned to units of tank and cavalry corps. Until the end of the war, Valentine tanks IV, and later IX and X, were the main equipment of tank and cavalry units.

The tank's disadvantage was the lack of high-explosive fragmentation shells in its ammunition load. It was impossible to turn on the spot on the tank, as this would result in the loss of teeth on the drive wheel, damage to the tensioning mechanism and loss of the track. Despite these shortcomings, by the end of the war, the Valentine (and Sherman) remained the only types of tanks ordered by the Soviet Union in the West. An example is the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On July 22, 1944, it consisted of 39 Valentine tanks. The Valentines' combat journey ended in Japan. The 1st Far Eastern Front included 20 Valentine Bridgelayer tanks. As part of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, there were 40 “Valentines” III from the 267th Tank Regiment, and another 40 “Valentines” were in the ranks of the cavalry-mechanized group of the Trans-Baikal Front.

The motolayers assigned to the tank brigades of the 1st Far Eastern Front did not find any use, since tanks and self-propelled artillery crossed small rivers and streams without preparation; for large obstacles, the 8-meter bridge was useless.

Canadian Valentine VII tanks were also designated Mk III in the Red Army. Therefore, it is difficult to say definitively which unit was armed with British or Canadian-made vehicles. Canada supplied more than half of all Valentines received by the Soviet Union.

In the 19th Perekop Tank Corps, as part of the 91st separate motorcycle battalion, there were two Valentines, ten BA-64 armored vehicles and ten Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers.

An example of the successful use of Valentine VIII tanks can be seen in the battles carried out by the 139th Tank Regiment of the 68th Mechanized Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Corps during the siege of Devichye Pole in November 1943. The 139th Regiment had 20 T-34 tanks and 18 Valentine tanks.

On November 20, the regiment, interacting with the 5th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, equipped with T-34 and KB tanks, as well as infantry of the 110th guards division, began the attack. Initially, tanks with infantry troops on their armor and anti-tank guns in tow moved quickly. The enemy did not expect a massive tank attack, so he did not offer organized resistance. Having taken the first line of fortifications, the infantry unhooked the guns and took up defensive positions, awaiting a German counterattack. Units of the 110th Guards Infantry Division entered the breakthrough. But there was no enemy counterattack. Within 24 hours, the attackers penetrated 20 km deep into the enemy’s defenses and occupied Devichye Pole. The losses of the Soviet side amounted to only four tanks: KB, T-34 and two Valentine VII.

Tanks "Tetrarch I" of the 151st Tank Brigade, North Caucasus Front, March 1943. The English markings have been preserved on the frontal armor.

Light tank Mk VII "Tetrarch" I: only 20 vehicles of this type reached the Eastern Front. The first “Tetrarchs” (vehicles of the 9th Uhlan Regiment) in November 1942 entered the 151st Tank Brigade of the 45th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, stationed in the Armenian Leninakan. The unit's task was to defend the state border of the USSR and ensure supplies under Lend-Lease through Iran. The brigade had 24 T-26 tanks of the 1937 model and 19 Tetrarchs. On January 5, 1943, the brigade was transferred by sea to Tuapse, where it became part of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front. On March 19, 1943, 14 tanks (4 tanks were under repair) of the 151st Tank Brigade were included in the 563rd Separate Tank Battalion. The battalion had several types of tanks: two BT-7. two T-34s, two T-26s, two T-60s, one Valentine and one Stuart. This is exactly the composition described in combat order No. 06 of the 18th Airborne Army dated March 25, 1943. In March and April 1943, tanks fought in the Shantsune Bridge area, and at the end of May, seven serviceable Tetrarchs were transferred to the 131st Separate Tank Brigade. In July, the battalion commander reported a complete lack of spare parts for Vickers Mk VII tanks. On September 14, the 563rd battalion was included in the 5th Guards Tank Brigade. One Mk VII was lost in battle on September 29, 1943, and the second battalion was missing on October 1, 1943.

The last Mk VII (“20”) was sent to the Kubinka training ground, where the vehicle remains to this day in the collection of the tank museum.

To the request of the Red Army command for the supply of tanks heavier than the Matilda and Valentine, Great Britain responded by supplying the A22 Mk IV "Churchill" III/IV infantry tanks. The Churchill tank is often classified as heavy, although neither the armament nor the armor provide grounds for such a classification.

The first ten Churchill Mk III tanks arrived in the USSR in July 1942. From August 30 to September 5, 1942, one tank underwent a full cycle of tests at the Kubinka training ground. The final report stated that “The English heavy tank MK.IV Churchill, due to its armament, armor protection and maneuverability, can effectively fight tanks of the German army. In this form, the MK.IV tank is an unfinished vehicle, both in design and production terms. The chassis for a 40-ton vehicle is not strong enough... During service in the army, the Churchill tank will require frequent repairs with the replacement of individual parts and entire units. The MK.IV is inferior to the KB and KB-1s tanks in terms of cannon power, but surpasses them in armor protection. In terms of power reserve and average speeds, the KB and Churchill are equivalent.” All 253 delivered tanks were used to form separate guards breakthrough regiments (21 tanks per regiment). From the beginning of 1943, regiments began to be sent to the front.

On January 16, the 48th Separate Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with 21 Churchill tanks, arrived from Gorky on the Don Front to the area of ​​attack by the German army, which was trying to break through to the group encircled at Stalingrad. On January 19, 1943, the regiment arrived in Pitomnik, where it was included in the 21st Army. The Churchills supported the advance of units of the 51st Guards Rifle Division on the Gonchar farmstead. On January 24, the division stormed the village of Gumrak. On January 30, 4 tanks were allocated from the regiment, which took part in street battles in Stalingrad. Among other things, tanks fought on Kharkovskaya and Kommunisticheskaya streets. Later, the regiment was taken to the rear and subordinated to the 38th Army, with which the regiment took part in the battles for Kyiv on November 6, 1943.

On January 9, 1943, the famous 65th Army of General Chuikov included the 47th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which also consisted of 21 Churchill tanks. The regiment supported, together with the 91st Tank Brigade, the actions of the 67th Guards and 33rd Rifle Divisions. On January 20, 1943, three tanks of the 47th Regiment fought in the area of ​​the Barricades plant in the area where the headquarters of the German 6th Army was located.

Since April 1943, the 49th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, armed with 21 Churchill tanks and three Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers, has been fighting on the Leningrad Front since April 1943. Until the beginning of 1944, the regiment did not conduct active combat operations. In February 1944, the 36th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, formed in January 1944, arrived on the Leningrad Front. Both regiments as part of the 42nd Army fought to lift the blockade. On January 17, the 4th Separate Guards Tank Breakthrough Regiment fought near the village of Gorelovo, and later participated in the liberation of Tsarskoe Selo. During operation, the tankers became convinced that the Churchill was poorly suited to the conditions of the Russian winter. During the first days of fighting, the standard heaters had to be replaced with Soviet-designed heaters.

Churchill tanks were also part of units of the Volkhov Front. Since March 17, the 50th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, armed with 21 Churchill tanks, operated there.

On March 19, the 50th Regiment launched an attack on Cannon Hill, supporting the actions of the 374th Infantry Division. Of the 21 tanks of the regiment, 12 got stuck in the mud, lost speed on mines or were hit by German fire anti-tank artillery. The remaining 7 tanks reached the German positions, but the infantry did not support the tank attack. Having used up their ammunition, the tanks returned to the rear.

On March 22, 1943, 5 tanks of the 50th regiment under the command of Captain Belogub again attacked the enemy, this time from Lake Beloye. Once again the Churchills operated without infantry support. The tanks reached German positions and came under fire from a camouflaged anti-tank gun. As a result, the regiment lost 4 vehicles.

Within three next days The crews of the lost tanks fired at German positions. Ammunition was delivered to the tanks under cover of darkness. The infantry of the 374th Infantry Division did nothing to protect the tanks, but the Germans launched an operation to destroy stationary vehicles. The tankers desperately resisted. Having used up their cartridges and shells, the tankers fought off the enemy by throwing hand grenades through the side hatches (the roof hatches were jammed). Fortunately, two more Churchills and evacuation tractors arrived. The tractors towed Captain Belogubov's tank to the rear, the crews of the remaining vehicles retreated along with the infantry. Over the course of several days of fighting, the tankers did not lose a single person. None of them were even injured.

Churchill tanks also took part in the Battle of Kursk. As part of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Prokhorovka area, the 15th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which had 10 Churchill tanks, fought, as well as the 36th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which had a staff strength of 21 Churchill tanks. After the battle, the 15th Regiment received KB-1s tanks, and the 36th Regiment was transferred to the Leningrad Front.

In mid-July 1943, the 1st Guards Tank Army included the 10th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, consisting of 21 Churchills. On July 21, 1943, the regiment supported the actions of the 174th and 57th rifle divisions, and also interacted with the 91st Tank Brigade during the attack on German positions in the Andreevka-Petropol - Kopanki area. During the attack, the infantry did not support the tanks, so the 10th Regiment immediately lost 16 Churchills. Soon after this, the regiment was withdrawn and reorganized.

On July 13, 1943, the 34th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, formed in Gorky on March 21, 1943, arrived at the Bryansk Front. The regiment had 21 Churchill tanks. The regiment fought in the Orel area, supporting the actions of the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Don Tank Corps. On August 5, tanks of the 34th OGvCCI entered Orel. On September 1, the regiment was withdrawn to the rear and equipped with T-34 tanks.

During the Vyborg operation - from June 10, 1944 - the 36th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which had a regular number of Churchill tanks, fought in the 21st Army of the Leningrad Front. On June 18-20, the regiment fought in Finland for Vyborg (Viipuri). By the end of the fighting, only 6 British tanks and 32 KV tanks remained in the regiment.

Churchill tanks also entered service with other units. For example, the 39th separate Kiev regiment fought, having (as of March 2, 1944, three KB, two Matildas, two T-70 and two T-60, as well as 38 T-34 tanks. This surviving The regiment transferred the equipment to the 48th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment.

The 8th Army, which was part of the Leningrad Front, included the 82nd Tank Regiment, equipped with KB-lc (11 pieces) and Churchill (10 pieces) tanks. In September, the regiment fought in Estonia, including for Tallinn and the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. This was the last time Churchills were used on the Eastern Front.

Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers in the Soviet army received the designation Mk I "Universal". During the war, the Red Army received 2,008 armored personnel carriers of this type. Lendlease armored personnel carriers made up for the lack of their own armored personnel carriers in the Red Army. In addition to the “Universals,” the Soviet side used the American MZA1 wheeled armored personnel carrier, the M2-MZ half-track, as well as the German captured Sdkfz 250 and 251. In combat units, armored personnel carriers were equipped with domestic DT and DShK machine guns and anti-tank rifles.

“Station wagons” (it should be noted that in the service in the Red Army there were vehicles of both British and Canadian production) ended up in reconnaissance battalions of tank corps, motorcycle and motorized infantry units

At the end of 1943, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front defeated German units over the Molochnaya River and approached Perekop. Units of the 19th Tank Corps of the 51st Army defeated the German mountain rifle division. Lieutenant Galamov's reconnaissance group went on reconnaissance missions and monitored the movement of German units. The reconnaissance unit was equipped with Universal Carrier armored personnel carriers and Harley-Davidson WC 45 motorcycles with sidecars. Armored personnel carriers harassed the retreating Germans with fire. Such a hunt once made it possible to capture a vehicle containing the deputy division commander, the chief of staff and several other senior officers.

The issue of Lend-Lease, as one might expect, has become sharply ideological since the time of “perestroika”: they began to praise the West in general and Lend-Lease in particular; Articles appeared promoting ideas about the invaluable help of the Allies.

However, reality, if we look at historical facts, looks a little different. To be honest, just one fact is enough: although the USSR completed the main task, suffering gigantic losses, England received three times the amount of goods from the United States under Lend-Lease. Also, do not forget that at the same time as Lend-Lease, US companies also supplied supplies to the Reich, because business comes first! The distribution of supplies by year is also extremely important: in the most difficult years for the USSR, 1941 and 1942, deliveries were carried out only partially of the promised volume; they became regular only in 1943, when it became clear that the Union had turned the tide of the war.

The issue of Lend-Lease is voluminous and cannot be discussed in one article. Let's look at just one aspect: the supply of tanks, how useful were they for the Victory?

Yuri Nersesov, “Lend-Lease on two fronts”:

“...maybe, given the overall insignificance of the volume of overseas assistance, it played a decisive role precisely in 1941, when the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow? Well, let's look at the statistics on arms supplies for this year. From June 22 to December 31, the Red Army received... 648 tanks... Taking into account the weapons available on June 22, 1941... the percentage drops to completely insignificant figures (accordingly,... 2.32%...). It won’t be enough, especially considering that a fair portion of the equipment sent, such as 115 of 466 English-made tanks, never reached the front in the first year of the war

...the Americans promised to send 600 tanks in 1941... they sent... only 182... The same story continued in 1942. If the Soviet industry then produced ... 24.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns ... then under Lend-Lease in January-October these types of weapons were received ... 2,703 ... pieces. After which (at the height of the battles for Stalingrad and the Caucasus!) supplies were significantly reduced. After the defeat of the PQ-17 convoy, which we will discuss below, the Allies slowed down until September 2, then they creakingly sent the next PQ-18 convoy, and then closed the shop until December 15.”

Lend-Lease goods were delivered in such a way that the Soviet Union's own resources were maximally depleted, while delays in deliveries “accidentally coincided” with the moments when supplies were needed most. When the USSR, under the leadership of Stalin, began to win, supplies improved.

In Marshal Zhukov’s book “Memories and Reflections” there are the following words about Lend-Lease:

“Of the total number of weapons with which the Soviet people equipped their army during the war years, deliveries under Lend-Lease amounted to an average of 4 percent. Consequently, there is no need to talk about the decisive role of supplies. As for the tanks and aircraft that the British and American governments supplied us, let’s face it, they were not popular with our tank crews and pilots.”

Everything is clear with the quantity and timeliness of deliveries; let's look at the equipment that was supplied under Lend-Lease. The question, of course, is very broad, so we will only give a brief overview of armored vehicles as an example.

What technology was required? Let us briefly recall what we had.

Most of the Soviet tanks were light, equipped with 45 mm guns, which could hit medium German tanks only at distances of up to 300 meters, and they themselves had 10-13 mm bulletproof armor, which was clearly insufficient for combat operations. However, the BT-7, for example, with the indicated disadvantages, had a speed of up to 72 km/h, so you still had to hit it, and in the conditions of “tanks don’t fight tanks” its benefit was obvious.

The average three-turreted T-28 had a 76.2 mm cannon (and four machine guns); based on the experience of the Finnish War, they were additionally shielded with armor sheets, bringing the total armor to 50-60 mm. This, however, increased the mass and slightly reduced the speed, initially equal to 43 km/h. Unfortunately, these vehicles were lost in significant numbers in the first months of the war, mostly due to technical faults. Nevertheless, the tank could fight with all the tanks that the Germans had at the beginning of the war.

The USSR also had tanks that were ahead of world tank building: the heavy KV-1 and KV-2, and, of course, the famous medium T-34. True, the later modification of the T-34-85 was recognized as the best tank of World War II, which was equipped with an 85-mm ZIS-S-53 gun, which made it possible to shoot Tigers, Panthers and other menagerie, and were also eliminated design flaws identified during the operation of the first releases (problems with transmission, visibility, etc.). Of course, modern vehicles were not enough and they were dispersed, but they created problems for the occupiers.

Memoirs of Guderian, October 8, after the meeting of the 4th German Panzer Division with the Katukov armored brigade:

“Especially disappointing were the reports we received about the actions of Russian tanks, and most importantly, about their new tactics. Our anti-tank weapons of that time could operate successfully against T-34 tanks only under particularly favorable conditions. For example, our T-IV tank with its short-barreled 75-mm cannon was able to destroy the T-34 tank from the rear, hitting its engine through the shutters. This required great skill."

So, what did the USSR require in terms of armored vehicles? There were many light tanks of our own, and in the conditions of that war they had to have greater speed to be used effectively. There was an obvious need for medium and heavy tanks with good characteristics. What did we get under Lend-Lease?

Note: it is clear that the supplied tanks had many modifications, which will not be considered in the review material, which is this article. Accordingly, the photos may also be from a different modification.

The first delivery was 20 British tanks (the USA made deliveries under Lend-Lease to the UK, and they supplied us with their tanks - there is no logic from a military point of view, but this is business!).

The first model is "Matilda II". The so-called “infantry tank”: the 27-ton vehicle has 78 mm armor. That is, at the beginning of the war, the Germans could only penetrate such a tank with an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, but it crawled at a speed of up to 24 km/h. Is it clear why “infantry”? Because he does not overtake running infantry.

Armament: 40-mm cannon (which was not equipped with corresponding high-explosive fragmentation shells, which is typical). If the Matilda were as fast as the BT-7, then it would be normal. But this is clearly not about this tank. A total of 916 tanks arrived, the last serious combat use being in the summer of 1942.

It is significant: when the USSR refused to accept the Matildas in the spring of 1943, in Great Britain itself these tanks were no longer available in combat units because they were outdated.

The second tank is “Valentine”. Also “infantry”: 25 km/h, 40 mm gun (later, in 1943, the British developed a modification with a 75 mm gun) - and with the same problem with shells. At the same time, the Valentine was lighter, only 16 tons, which was due to thinner, although still respectable 60-65 mm armor.

Overall: of course, it's better than nothing; but nothing more.

Heavy tanks began to arrive from Great Britain only in the summer of 1942: Mk. IV "Churchill". Protected by solid 77-175 mm armor, the 40-ton tank had only a 57 mm gun and reached speeds of up to... 25 km/h.

Perhaps it’s better to go straight to American tanks without comment.

The MZ General Stewart light tank is the most popular light tank of World War II. On an American scale! Modifications of MZ and MZA1 were received under Lend-Lease. Weight - 13 tons, armor 25-45 mm, armament - 37 mm cannon, also equipped with three (or five depending on modification) 7.62 mm Browning machine guns. True, unlike the English ones, they drove at speeds of up to 50 km/h.

In total, the USSR received 1232 “Stewart Generals”. A fairly mobile tank that can quickly deliver its practically useless gun to the right place. There is no firepower, and our light tanks will be faster.

The MZ "Lee" medium tank, named after another general, although designed in 1941, was designed by a fan of multi-story tanks. Its mass is 29 tons, armor is 22-50 mm, armament is 75 mm and 37 mm guns, as well as three Browning machine guns. In this case (seen in the photo) the 75 mm gun is located in the sponson on the right side of the tank. Speed ​​- 40 km/h.

Soviet tank crews forced to use this masterpiece called it BM-6 (“mass grave for six”) or VG-7 (“certain death of seven”) - the crew could consist of 6 or 7 people. “Lee” was a very good product for specific conditions: in North Africa it showed itself very well: it slowly drove up to the prepared caponier and let’s shoot at the natives with the guns of their choice. A mobile pillbox, almost invulnerable to an enemy of this rank. But in the conditions of the Soviet-German front, in tank breakthroughs and counterattacks, when tanks often fight tanks, the sheds have a hard time.

A total of 976 vehicles were received. Despite all the oddities, the 75-mm gun is a useful thing in battle, and in 1942 the Lees were quite successful in dealing with German tanks. However, in 1942 the PzIV was modernized, Tigers and Panthers began to appear, and the combat value of the M3 Lee waned. It is significant that they stopped producing it at the end of the same year, 1942, which means that the Red Army was used as a tester and the tank was declared unsuitable for modern warfare.

The most popular foreign tank in the Red Army was the American M4 General Sherman. The first vehicles arrived at the end of 1942, but the main deliveries were made in 1944, which is significant.

The USSR supplied modifications M4A2 (with a 75-mm cannon) and M4A2 (76)W (with a 76-mm cannon), plus one heavy machine gun and two conventional ones. Weight: 31-33 tons, armor 38-51 mm, speed - up to 40 km/h.

In short, this is a pretty good tank for starting a war. If we compare it with the T-34 of the first modifications, the armor is slightly thicker, the speed is lower, the weapon power is almost the same, plus a useful heavy machine gun. However, over time, with the development of both anti-tank weapons and the German and Russian tanks themselves, the M4A2 quickly became obsolete. By the way, special mention should be made of the rubberized tracks of the first modifications. Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Tank Forces Alexander Mikhailovich Ovcharov said (quote from D. Ibragimov, “Confrontation”):

“I fought... on the English Matilda and Valentine, and the American M4A2. The first one fell on its side on any slope, the second one burned from being hit by even a 50-mm shell.

The American tank was somewhat better. It had almost the same data as the T-34. He also had good armor - tough. When hit by an enemy blank, the armor did not splinter and did not hit the crew. But this car was designed for fighting on paved roads. Rubber was pressed into its track tracks. On the march, the column of vehicles did not create much noise, and it was possible to get very close to the enemy unnoticed if the march was made on asphalt or paving stones. But as soon as you left the road and tried to climb a small hill, especially after rain, these Shermans became helpless, slid along the ground and skidded.

But our “thirty-four” could overcome any steep slope at an angle of even 45 degrees. It compared favorably with foreign cars of the same class. Our car left a good memory of itself for posterity.”

It is worth agreeing that the Shermans were the best tanks from those supplied under Lend-Lease. However, as already mentioned, delivery scheduling is a separate issue. Here are some handy pivot tables:

In 1942, as many as 36 units arrived, in 1943 - another 469. The rest, more than three thousand, - in 1944 and 1945, when they could have done without them, the industry in the Urals was already operating at full capacity. Tanks of the M4A2(76)W HVSS modification in the amount of 183 were delivered only in May-June 1945, and, of course, did not take any part in the hostilities in Europe. Likewise, the “second front” opened in earnest only when it became clear that if the Russians were not urgently helped, they would liberate all of Europe without anyone’s help.

The fact that more advanced modifications of the Sherman (M4A3E8 and Sherman Fairfly) were not supplied to the USSR is not surprising. But a very significant fact is that M4A2s were supplied under Lend-Lease to the UK, and in quantities greater than to Russia - 17,181 tanks. Despite the fact that the British didn’t really fight with the Reich with tanks, as you know. In return, the British crown graciously sent us, instead of the Shermans that were very much in demand at the beginning of the war, the Matildas and Valentines described above.

So, two conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the supply of tanks under Lend-Lease was useful to some extent. We used these tanks in addition to domestic ones. However, they did not make a significant contribution to the Victory, since they were mainly supplied with outdated models, in insufficient quantities and only when the urgent need had ceased.

Secondly, the purpose of deliveries under Lend-Lease was not to help the USSR in the fight against the occupiers, but an ordinary gesheft, which is clearly shown by the specifics of the delivery schedules. This is additionally proven by the fact that in England, the United States quickly wrote off a significant part of the Lend-Lease debt back in 1946, and when the USSR requested similar conditions, it was refused. Negotiations ended only in 1972 (payments were completed in 2006).

A note just in case: the article was written on the specific issue of “tanks and Lend-Lease”. This does not mean that the situation was similar for all types of goods. Of course, they also made money on them, but, let’s say, the supply of aluminum was really very important, and cars also played an important role. The stew under the soldier’s name “second front” also helped a lot, but this name indicates precisely that it would be better if the second front was opened in a military sense immediately, and not when the time came to cling to the Victory of the USSR and divide influence in Europe. So there is no need to engage in the campaign “without Lend-Lease we would not have won.” Now, by the way, Western propaganda has already formed the opinion in their countries that the main winner in World War II is the United States.

The myth about the super-importance of Lend-Lease (no one denies its usefulness, we are talking about “no way without it”) and a sincere desire to help - this is precisely enemy propaganda, we must not forget about it. It was on these supplies that the US economy overcame a protracted crisis - but that's another story.

View in full: http://politrussia.com/istoriya/naskolko-byli-polezny-569/

IN Soviet time assistance from the United States and Great Britain under Lend-Lease was either kept silent or significantly downplayed. And this despite the fact that the Soviet Union received from the Western allies over 20 thousand aircraft, over 20 thousand armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers), more than 300 thousand tons of non-ferrous metals, 2586 thousand tons of aviation gasoline, about 0. 5 million cars. Lend-Lease armored vehicles accounted for 20% of the entire fleet of armored forces of the USSR. Help from the USSR was provided at the most difficult moment; only in 1941, the armored units of the Red Army lost over 72% of all their armored vehicles, and the Wehrmacht divisions were rushing towards Moscow, and they had to be stopped. The arrival of lend-lease armored vehicles to the Soviet troops had many difficulties: long distances and threats to supply routes (especially in the Atlantic, where the German navy was rampant), training Soviet tank crews to drive models of equipment that were difficult to technically, many examples of Lendlease armored vehicles were not suitable for the war conditions on the Eastern Front. But Lendlease tanks, of which over 10 thousand units were delivered to the USSR, also had many advantages: armor that, when hit by a shell, did not produce fragments that could destroy the crew, simple design of the vehicle, reliability of the units, long service life of the tanks. And most importantly, Lendlease tanks provided comfortable conditions for the tank crew during the battle. “In our tanks, everything had to be done manually: turning the turret and aiming the gun, but in the Sherman everything was electric,” is a fragment of the memoirs of veteran tanker Vladimir Golovachev. “I confess, I loved him (“Valentine”). First of all, for reliability and safety. The armor protection of the “Valentine” was what was needed - the shell stuck like dough, without producing fragments. The tank was better than our T-60 and T-70,” tanker Ivan Litvinenko.

The Soviet Union received under Lend-Lease American light tanks M-3 Stuart, American medium tanks M4A2 and M4A2(76)W Sherman, M-3 Lee, British infantry tanks Mk II Matilda, Mk III "Valentine" and Mk IV "Churchill". The Red Army began to use lend-lease tanks in large quantities since 1942. Especially a lot of foreign equipment took part in the Battle of the Caucasus, where American and British tanks made up more than 60% of the entire armored fleet. Thus, as of February 1, 1943, on the North Caucasus Front, among the 275 combat-ready tanks there were 15 M-3 Lees, 123 Stuarts, 38 Valentines and 10 Shermans. Such a massive use of foreign armored vehicles in the Caucasus was due to the proximity of one of the supply routes for Lend-Lease equipment to the USSR, through Iran. Units equipped with Lendlease tanks caused serious damage to Wehrmacht divisions. Thus, the 5th Guards Tank Brigade operated on the North Caucasus Front, which consisted of 40 Valentines, 3 T-34s and one BT-7. During the fighting in the Malgobek area, which took place in September 1942, the brigade destroyed 38 German tanks and assault guns, 24 artillery pieces, 6 mortars and up to 1800 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers. On September 11, 1942, in the Malgobek area, 2 “Stuarts” under the command of Lieutenant Alexander Yakovlevich Pavkin, while in an ambush, entered into battle with 16 German tanks, destroying 11 of them without losses on their part. In the March battles of 1943, the 92nd Tank Brigade, which was armed with light Stuarts, distinguished itself. The brigade destroyed 14 tanks, 4 mortars, 5 anti-tank guns, and up to 400 German soldiers, losing 29 Stuarts. Foreign tanks were used by the Red Army in large numbers until the end of the war. So, in 1944, the 1st Red Guard Mechanized Corps (1st Belorussian Front) included, in addition to Soviet tanks, 136 Shermans, 49 Valentines, the 2nd Tank Army - 140 Shermans, 10 Valentines. , 5th Guards Tank Army - 64 Shermans, 39 Valetaynovs.

In the Red Army, among the tank aces who fought on domestic models of armored vehicles, there were also craftsmen who fought on foreign tanks. The crew of the M4A2 tank Colonel Leonid Mikhailovich Druzhinin (40th separate tank regiment) managed to destroy 16 German tanks, 11 anti-tank guns, and more than 200 enemy soldiers and officers in battles on the Eastern Front. "Sherman" under the command of Guard Sergeant Major Pavel Voronin (1st Guards Mechanized Corps) destroyed 10 German tanks and assault guns in battles in Hungary and Austria (January–April 1945). On January 21, 1945, in the battles for the village of Sesktneter, three tanks (including Voronin’s tank) repelled eight attacks by German tanks, destroying 5 enemy vehicles without losses on their own side. On January 22–23, 1945, in the battles for the village of Ferenc, Voronin’s tank destroyed a Panther, knocked out two German tanks and burned two armored personnel carriers. While fighting on the Matilda, Captain Naumov Kondraty Ivanovich (10th Tank Corps) distinguished himself. From August 14 to August 20, 1942, Naumov’s tank, as part of the group of captain I. Mishukov, defended the crossing of the river. Zhizdra near the village of Vosty. A group of 4 Matildas, reinforced with an anti-tank gun, destroyed 21 German tanks, two vehicles and up to two companies of enemy infantry. The list of Soviet tank aces also includes Lieutenant Valentin Dmitrievich Pashirov (71st Mechanized Brigade, 9th Mechanized Corps). In the battles for the village of Khotiv, Kiev-Svyatoshinsky district, Kiev region, on November 6, 1943, “Valentine” Pashirov, pursuing retreating German tanks, destroyed more than a platoon of enemy soldiers, 10 vehicles, 10 firing points, and two tanks. When Pashirov's tank was knocked out, the wounded tank commander continued the battle, using a machine gun and hand grenades. Pashirov died. The tank gun commander of the 50th Separate Guards Breakthrough Heavy Tank Regiment, Petr Sergeevich Polnadezhdin, fought on the Churchill heavy tank. Polunadezhdin distinguished himself in battles on Polish territory. On July 21, 1944, he destroyed a mortar battery, disabled an assault gun, and killed over 10 enemy fighters. In August 1944, near the town of Magnushev, Polonadezhdin knocked out three German tanks. On January 15, 1945, in the area of ​​Mühlhausen, Senior Sergeant Polunadezhdin’s tank knocked out 4 assault guns, a German tank and several vehicles. During the period from April 16 to April 25, 1945, Polonadezhdin's tank destroyed 4 guns, 2 bunkers, 4 tanks, 3 assault guns and an armored personnel carrier.

The Red Army lost most of the tanks supplied under Lend-Lease in the battles of 1941–1945. What did foreign tanks do to defeat Germany and its allies? Quite a bit of! Firstly, they saved thousands of lives of soldiers, covering them both on the offensive and in defense. Secondly, they ensured the rapid advancement of Red Army formations in offensive operations of 1943–1945. Thirdly, Lendlease tanks destroyed a large amount of German military equipment and manpower. Fourthly, Lend-Lease armored vehicles became “reserve power” in those sectors of the front where there was not enough domestic armored vehicles, and the enemy was advancing. Lend-Lease made it possible for the Soviet Union to survive in the most difficult times, to complete the bloody massacre in 1945, and not, say, in 1947 or 1949. But the main thing is fame Soviet soldiers who managed to quickly master imported equipment and skillfully use it against the enemy. First of all, the people won the war.

Deliveries of armored vehicles to the Soviet Union began in the fall of 1941. On September 3, Stalin sent a letter to Churchill, the contents of which the latter conveyed to President Roosevelt. Stalin's message spoke of a mortal threat looming over the Soviet Union, which could only be removed by opening a second front and urgently sending 30 thousand tons of aluminum to the USSR, as well as at least 400 aircraft and 500 tanks every month. In accordance with the First (Moscow) Protocol, the United States and Great Britain pledged to supply 4,500 tanks and 1,800 wedges within nine months. Under the latter, the British armored personnel carriers “Bren” and “Universal” often appeared in Soviet documents of those years.

Loading Matilda tanks destined for the USSR in one of the British ports. 1941

The first 20 British tanks were delivered to Arkhangelsk by ships of convoy PQ-1 on October 11, 1941. Already on October 28, these vehicles were delivered to Kazan. In total, by the end of the year, 466 tanks and 330 armored personnel carriers arrived in the Soviet Union from Great Britain. As for the USA, in 1941 they were able to send only 182 tanks to the USSR, which arrived at their destination already in 1942. The arrival of a significant amount of imported equipment required the creation of a military acceptance service and a personnel training system.

Initially, the acceptance and development of foreign tanks took place at the training center in Gorky, where the combat vehicles were sent immediately after unloading. However, already on January 20, 1942, the department for military acceptance of foreign equipment was organized directly in Arkhangelsk, and on April 4 - in Iran. At the same time, the department in Iran dealt only with cars, while the tanks were transported to Gorky, where they were received.

By mid-1942, the Arkhangelsk armored vehicle acceptance department included groups in Bakaritsa, Molotovsk and Ekonomiya. In addition to it, there was a tank acceptance department in Murmansk, and an acceptance department for cars and motorcycles in Gorky and Iran. In connection with the increase in supplies along the “Persian Corridor” and through the ports of the Far East, military acceptance departments for armored vehicles were organized in Baku (March 1943) and Vladivostok (September 1943). Finally, in February 1945, due to the collapse of the Baku unit, a military acceptance department was opened in Odessa.

MZL and Valentine tanks (in the background) from the 5th Guards Tank Brigade. North Caucasus Front, August 1942.

As for the training of crews for foreign tanks, it initially took place at the Kazan Tank Technical School. Already on October 15, 1941, 420 crews were sent from training tank regiments to Kazan for retraining on British tanks. However, it appears that the capacity of the school base was limited. Therefore, already in November, crews for the Matildas began to be trained at the 132nd and 136th separate tank battalions. Under the 10th reserve tank regiment, training was organized for another 100 crews (50 each for Matildas and Valentines). At the 2nd reserve auto regiment, 200 armored personnel carrier drivers were trained. They also took care of the repair of imported vehicles: the repair and restoration company of the 146th Tank Brigade arrived at Plant No. 112 in November 1941 to undergo training for the repair of Valentine tanks and armored personnel carriers.

This situation continued until the spring of 1942, that is, until the resumption of mass supplies of armored vehicles under Lend-Lease. Already in March 1942, the 23rd and 38th tank training regiments and the 20th tank regiment were transferred to train crews for foreign tanks. Soon, however, this turned out to be not enough. In June 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the 190th and 194th training tank brigades were formed to train crews of American and British tanks, respectively, and the 16th and 21st training tank regiments were transferred from training crews for the T-60 to training crews of British and American tanks. The staffing strength of training regiments and brigades made it possible to train monthly 645 crews for light tanks MZl, 245 for medium MZs, 300 crews of Matildas and 370 crews of Valentines.

To ferry tanks arriving along the Iranian route, the 191st Tank Brigade was formed. This formation received trained crews from the 21st training tank regiment, stationed in Yerevan. In February 1943, to train crews directly in Baku, on the basis of the 191st tank brigade, the 27th training tank regiment was formed, and the 21st regiment was transferred to the T-34.

In the winter of 1943, the 190th training tank brigade was transformed into the 5th, and the 194th training tank brigade into the 6th training tank brigade, which, together with the 16th training tank regiment, became part of the Armored Training Center in Gorky. However, the new brigades did not last long in their training capacity. The supply of armored vehicles under Lend-Lease began to decline, and already in October 1943 the 5th training tank brigade was disbanded, and the 6th training tank brigade was reorganized into an officer training brigade in June of the same year.

By the end of the war, the Red Army had three separate training tank regiments for training crews for Lend-Lease equipment: the 16th in Gorky and the 27th in Baku trained crews of M4A2 tanks, and the 20th in Ryazan trained crews of all types of armored personnel carriers.

Personnel for units and units armed with various types of self-propelled artillery systems were trained at the Self-Propelled Artillery Training Center in Klyazma near Moscow.

In 1942, the command and technical staff were trained by the Chkalovsk (for Matilda tanks) and Kazan (for the Valentine tanks) tank schools. At the end of the war, the Kazan Tank School trained platoon commanders of Sherman and Valentine tanks, the 3rd Saratov School of Armored Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers trained command and technical personnel for units armed with M2, Scout and Universal armored personnel carriers, and the Kiev The tank technical school trained technicians to service Sherman tanks.

In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, various training units trained 16,322 crews for imported armored vehicles.

MZl and MZs tanks from the 241st Tank Brigade during exercises before the battles. Stalingrad area, October 1942.

In connection with the entry into the Red Army of a large number of foreign tanks, a special staff of a separate tank battalion was developed, which made it possible to use Lend-Lease vehicles both as part of a battalion and as part of a brigade. At the same time, foreign materiel could be combined into divisions and units in various combinations, since there were at least seven separate tank brigades alone in 1941–1942. In 1943, separate tank regiments of army and front-line subordination began to form, also armed with Lend-Lease equipment. In addition, starting from 1943, M4A2 and Valentine tanks were often equipped with tank regiments of mechanized brigades in mechanized corps. At the same time, a tank brigade as part of a mechanized corps could be equipped with both imported and domestic tanks. As a result, the Red Army had separate tank and mechanized corps of three types of equipment: completely domestic tanks, completely foreign ones, and those with a mixed composition. As for army units, in addition to individual tank regiments, they could include SU-57 self-propelled artillery brigades, reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions and regiments. The latter were often armed with imported tanks and armored personnel carriers. Thus, the armored reconnaissance battalion was armed with up to 20 Scout armored personnel carriers and 12 BA-64 armored vehicles, and the motorcycle battalion was armed with up to 10 T-34 or Valentine tanks and 10 armored personnel carriers. The motorcycle regiment had the same number of tanks, but it had more armored personnel carriers.

Almost immediately after the start of operation of foreign armored vehicles in the Red Army, the question arose about organizing its repair. Already in December 1941, repair base No. 82 was formed in Moscow for this purpose. In 1942–1943, repair bases No. 12 in Baku (then in Saratov), ​​No. 66 in Kuibyshev (then in Tbilisi) and No. 97 in Gorky. The last one was the largest. During January - March 1943, it underwent major, medium and current repairs of 415 tanks of various types and 14 Universal armored personnel carriers. Repair base No. 2 in Moscow was mainly involved in the repair of armored personnel carriers.

During the war, 2,407 foreign-made tanks were overhauled through the efforts of repair bases.

It should be noted that from the end of 1943, repair shops of American and Canadian production on automobile chassis began to arrive in the Soviet Union. The full fleet of American workshops numbered up to 10 units and was actually a field tank repair plant. The American fleet included mechanical workshops M16A and M16B, metalworking and mechanical workshop M8A, forging and welding workshop Ml2, electrical repair shop M18, weapons repair shop M7, tool workshop and warehouse vehicles M14. All of them were based on the chassis of the Studebaker US6 three-axle off-road truck. The fleet of tank repair shops also included 10-ton M1 Ward LaFrance 1000 or (less commonly) Kenworth 570 truck cranes, as well as M31 (T2) armored repair and recovery vehicles.

The Canadian workshop fleet was smaller than the American one and consisted of mechanical workshops A3 and D3, an electromechanical workshop (all on the chassis of an American GMC 353 truck), a mobile charging station OFP-3 and an electric welding workshop KL-3 (on Canadian chassis Ford F60L and Ford F15A, respectively) . A forging and welding workshop on an American Chevrolet G7107 chassis or a Canadian-made Chevrolet (most likely 8441/SZO) was supplied directly to the repair units of tank units. In total, in 1944–1945, 1,590 automobile repair shops of all types were supplied to the USSR from Canada.

American and Canadian parks were used to staff mobile tank repair plants, separate repair and restoration battalions, etc., of army and front-line subordination. This made it possible to carry out not only medium, but also major repairs of armored vehicles, both imported and domestically produced. At the same time, mobile workshops of domestic production could only provide current repairs.

Finally, the turn of the quantitative aspect of tank Lend-Lease has come. In this regard, it should be noted that, as in the case of deliveries of other types of equipment and weapons, data on deliveries of tanks to the USSR, given in various sources, differ from each other. In the late 1980s, data from Western sources became the first to become available to domestic researchers. Thus, in the book Soviet Armor of the Great Patriotic War 1941–45, American researcher Stephen Zaloga provides fairly complete data on Lend-Lease supplies. According to Zalogi, 7,164 tanks of all types arrived from the USA to the Soviet Union, and 5,187 from Great Britain. Information is also reported on equipment lost during transportation: 860 American and 615 British tanks. Thus, a total of 12,351 tanks were delivered to the USSR and 1,475 tanks were lost. True, it is not entirely clear what we are talking about, about sent or arrived tanks. If we talk about those sent, then taking into account the losses, the number of tanks that arrived looks a little different - 6304 American and 4572 British and Canadian. And in total - 10,876.

Let's try to find out how accurate the Western data is. To do this, we use the figures given in M. Suprun’s book “Lend-Lease and Northern Convoys.”

Deliveries of tanks to the USSR

\	Liabilities	Sent to USSR
From USA	From Britain and Canada	Total
1st Protocol	4500	2254	2443	4697*
2nd Protocol	10 000	954	2072	3026**
3rd Protocol	1000	1901	1181	3082
4th Protocol	2229***	2076	80	2156
Total	17 729	7185	5776	12 961

* 470 tanks were lost along the route:

** the USSR refused 928 tanks from Great Britain and almost 6 thousand tanks from the USA, asking to compensate them with other supplies under the 3rd Protocol;

*** corrected application.

So, we are convinced that both domestic and foreign books provide almost identical data on tanks sent to the Soviet Union. As for losses, this number is quite consistent: according to M. Suprun, before November 1, 1942, 1,346 tanks were lost during convoys. Considering that this was the period of greatest opposition to the allied caravans from German submarines and aircraft, which entailed the greatest losses in ships and in the cargo transported on them, then the “missing” 129 tanks could well have been lost later. If we subtract the lost ones from the number of vehicles sent, we get 11,615 tanks, which is even slightly more than according to American data.

However, in order to understand how many tanks actually arrived in the USSR, it is necessary to attract additional sources. One of these sources, and the most reliable, is information from the selection committees of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU). According to them, in 1941–1945, 5,872 American and 4,523 British and Canadian tanks arrived from the United States to the Soviet Union (that is, arrived!). In total - 10,395 tanks.

This number, which should be accepted as the most correct, correlates well with the data of S. Pledges. However, the difference is 481 cars, which is generally natural. In most foreign sources, data exceeds Soviet data by 300–400 units. This can be explained either by incomplete accounting of losses during transportation, or by confusion with applications, shipping and receiving data. Very often, data from Soviet applications is presented as dispatch data.

All of the above is also true in relation to the supply of other types of armored vehicles. It no longer makes sense to conduct research here; we will use the data from the military acceptance of the GBTU as the most reliable from the point of view of counting the arriving combat vehicles. From 1941 to 1945, the USSR received 5,160 armored personnel carriers of all types. But this is only through GBTU. In addition, another 1,082 armored personnel carriers were transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army for use as artillery tractors. In addition, 1,802 self-propelled artillery units of various types and 127 armored repair and recovery vehicles (ARVs) arrived in the USSR.

To summarize, it turns out that 10,395 tanks, 6,242 armored personnel carriers, 1,802 self-propelled guns and 127 armored vehicles arrived in the USSR. And in total - 18,566 units of armored vehicles.

Let's try to compare these data with the data of S. Pledges. According to them, 10,876 tanks, 6,666 armored personnel carriers, 1,802 self-propelled guns, 115 armored vehicles and 25 tank bridge laying vehicles were delivered to the Soviet Union. Total - 19,484 armored vehicles. In general, these data correlate with information from Soviet military acceptance. At the same time, it is curious that they partially exceed, partially coincide, and partially are even less than Soviet data.

British cruiser tank "Cromwell" at the Kubinka training ground. 1945

Many domestic publications claim that the tanks supplied by the Allies accounted for only 10% of the 103 thousand tanks produced in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Such a comparison looks not only incorrect, but also illiterate. In the USSR, from the 2nd half of 1941 (from July 1) to June 1, 1945, 97,678 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced (according to other sources - 95,252), but military acceptance was accepted from industrial plants from July 1, 1941 by September 1, 1945, there were actually 103,170 tanks and self-propelled guns. As you can see, in both cases we are talking about tanks and self-propelled guns, and from the Lend-Lease side only tanks are taken into account. If we take into account that Lend-Lease equipment arrived in the USSR in the summer of 1945, then we need to take into account the number 78,356. That is how many tanks were accepted by military acceptance from Soviet factories during the specified period of time. The number of self-propelled guns received was 24,814 vehicles. As a result, it can be argued that Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 13% of Soviet production, self-propelled guns - 7%. As for armored personnel carriers, they were not produced at all in the USSR, which means that Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to 100%. If we make a comparison according to the criterion of “light armored vehicles” and compare it with the production of armored vehicles in the USSR (8944 units), we get 70%. It should also be noted that out of 1,800 Lend-Lease self-propelled guns, 1,100 were anti-aircraft guns, which we also practically never produced (75 ZSU-37, produced in 1945–1946, did not take part in combat operations). If we talk about armored vehicles in general, Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to about 16% of Soviet production.

However, this fact, as well as the fact that foreign supplies of armored vehicles were constantly declining, does not at all indicate any malicious intent of the Western allies, as was often noted in Soviet literature. Supplies were adjusted by the Soviet side, as evidenced by the following document from the Red Army State Technical University:

“About tanks for the armored forces of the Red Army for the summer campaign of 1943:

For tanks made in Britain and Canada:

1. The order for the Mk-3 “Valentine” light infantry tank with enhanced armament will be extended by an additional 2000 units.

2. Abandon the Mk-6 Tetrarch cruiser tank.

3. Add the Mk-2 “Matilda” medium infantry tank to the total quantity of 1000 units. according to the current protocol. The remaining tanks will be armed with 76 mm cannons. In the future, we will stop ordering this type of tank.

4. Receive the heavy infantry tank Mk-4 “Churchill” for heavy tank regiments in quantities according to the current protocol.

5. Receive at least 500 armored infantry and weapons transporter “Universal”. with a 13.5 mm Boys anti-tank rifle.

For US-made tanks:

1. American light tanks M-ZL “Stuart” to be added to the total number of 1200 units. current protocol. In the future, we will stop ordering tanks of this type.

2. American light tank M-5L. Refuse the order due to the lack of advantages over M-ZL.

3. Medium tanks M-ZS “Grant” will be received at the rate of 1000 units. current protocol. In 1943, consider replacing them with the supply of new M-4S medium tanks with a diesel engine and improved armor protection in an amount of at least 1000 units.

4. Include in the supply list the light anti-tank self-propelled gun SU-57 in an amount of at least 500 units.”

Until now, we have been talking about the supply of large quantities of armored vehicles. However, there were also minor, so-called trial deliveries, when the Soviet side requested certain samples from the allies and the allies provided them. Moreover, sometimes it was about the most modern, newest combat vehicles. As part of the familiarization deliveries from Great Britain to the USSR, six English Cromwell cruising tanks, three Sherman-Crab minesweeper tanks, five Churchill-Crocodile flamethrower tanks, one copy each of AES and Daimler armored vehicles, and a Wasp flamethrower armored personnel carrier arrived "("Wasp"), as well as six Canadian Bombardier snowmobiles. In 1943–1945, five M5 Stuart light tanks, two M24 Chaffee light tanks, the newest T26 General Pershing heavy tank and five T70 Witch self-propelled guns were delivered from the USA to the USSR for evaluation and testing. All these combat vehicles underwent a wide range of tests and were carefully studied by Soviet specialists.

American self-propelled gun - tank destroyer T70 "Witch", known in the US Army as the M18 "Hellkzt". Test site in Kubinka, 1945.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that such tests were not carried out out of simple curiosity to find out how imported tanks work there. Based on their results, a list of recommendations was compiled for borrowing certain components and assemblies, certain design solutions. At Valentine, for example, NIIBT Polygon specialists recognized the American GMC engine, hydraulic shock absorbers and synchronized gearbox as very valuable. Of particular interest to Soviet specialists was the connection of the gearbox with a “differential planetary rotation mechanism” installed on the “Churchill” and “Cromwell”, and on the “Matilda” - the hydraulic drive for turning the turret. All British tanks without exception liked the Mk IV periscope observation devices. They liked them so much that they were copied and, under the slightly modified designation MK-4, starting from the second half of 1943, installed on all Soviet tanks.

By the way, if we are talking about the MK-4 device, then we need to make a small “lyrical” digression. The fact is that this device is not an English invention. It was designed in the mid-1930s by the Polish engineer Gundlach. Soviet specialists were able to become familiar with the design of this device back in 1939, after studying captured Polish 7TP tanks and TKS wedges. Even then, recommendations were given for its borrowing, but this was not done, for which they had to pay in blood.

However, for various reasons, not all successful solutions migrated from Lend-Lease cars to Soviet ones. For example, based on the results of field tests of prototypes of heavy domestic tanks in the summer of 1943, proposals were made to improve the combat qualities of the IS tank. In terms of armament, among other things, it was recommended to develop and install by November 15, 1943 a hydraulic turret rotation mechanism similar to the American M4A2 tank and a turret anti-aircraft machine gun mount on the hatch of the commander's cupola (also not without the influence of the M4A2, which had a large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun). In the image and likeness of the Sherman, it was planned to place the loader on the left, and the gunner and commander to the right of the gun, to work out the installation of a hydraulic gun stabilizer and a 50-mm breech-loading mortar for self-defense and setting up smoke screens.

A train with M4A2 tanks in Romania. September 1944.

As you can see, the list of recommendations is very impressive. However, as far as is known, in addition to the anti-aircraft machine gun installation on the IS tank, none of the above was introduced. Technological difficulties played an important role in this.

The nomenclature of mass deliveries of armored vehicles to the USSR under Lend-Lease and the list of vehicles received for review leaves no stone unturned from the widespread opinion that the Allies allegedly specifically supplied us with bad military equipment. The British and Americans supplied us with the same vehicles that they used to fight. Another question is that they did not really correspond to our climatic conditions and operating principles. Well, the characteristics and reliability of these machines are best judged not by idle speculation, but by specific facts. The first to arrive in the USSR were the English “Matildas” and “Valentines”. Let's start with them.