Organization and tactics of the infantry. Tactical properties and basic tactics of coastal troops Infantry combat

Infantry defensive tactics

In defense, the possibilities can be used to the fullest. small arms, since the fire, as a rule, is fired from prepared positions from stable positions. The lines of opening fire are outlined in advance and the ranges to landmarks and local objects are determined, corrections are calculated in the initial settings of sighting devices for firing conditions, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are aimed at, areas of fire and sectors of fire are specified on the ground and tasks for machine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launchers and all crew commanders other fire weapons. Strongholds are being equipped in terms of engineering, the main and temporary (reserve) positions for firing are being prepared; cartridge belts and stores are equipped with cartridges with the necessary types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at the maximum range of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire of motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, as well as to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

Prior to the start of the enemy offensive, platoons are assigned fire weapons on duty, whose personnel are in constant readiness to open fire. During the day, duty assets occupy temporary or reserve positions. From them, individual enemy groups trying to conduct reconnaissance or engineering work are hit by small arms fire. Snipers destroy officers, observers, snipers of the enemy at his location.

Two thirds at night personnel of each squad of motorized rifle platoons are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, ribbons and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and tracer bullets in a ratio of 4: 1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the lines of opening fire for each type of weapon are outlined, areas of concentrated fire of subunits are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy manpower. All personnel of the subunits must know on the ground in their lanes and sectors of fire the line of 400 m in front of the forward edge: frontal, flank and cross fire is being prepared in the zone of this line.

With the transition of the enemy to the attack on armored vehicles without dismounting, his armored targets are destroyed by the fire of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Small-arms fire hits infantry and crews leaving wrecked vehicles. If enemy armored vehicles approach at a distance of up to 200 m, small arms fire can be fired at their viewing devices. When attacking the enemy on foot with fire from machine guns and machine guns, the enemy infantry is cut off from the tanks and destroyed together with the flamethrowers attached to the unit and other means. From the line of 400 m from the front line of defense, grenades are used to hit the advancing infantry from submachine guns with underbarrel grenade launchers at the command of squad commanders. As the enemy approaches the forward edge, the fire of all types of weapons is brought to the highest voltage.

An enemy who breaks into a stronghold is destroyed by point-blank fire, grenades and in hand-to-hand combat with a bayonet and butt, fire from pistols. At all stages of the battle, commanders direct the fire of their subunits, setting fire missions, giving commands and established signals for the concentration and transfer of fire. In this case, the ability of a soldier to independently select the most important targets and open fire on them from a range that ensures their reliable defeat, as well as skillfully adjust the fire, is of paramount importance. Subunit commanders must apply fire maneuvers in time, concentrating most of the firepower to engage the enemy in a threatened sector, or dispersing fire on several important targets. During air raids, part of the means of motorized rifle platoons from less threatened areas can conduct concentrated fire on helicopters and aircraft at ranges of up to 500 m, and on helicopters in a hovering position of up to 900 m. Note that for the successful use of small arms in defense, as in others types of combat importance has timely replenishment of ammunition, equipment with cartridges for machine gun belts and magazines for machine guns and light machine guns.

In the offensive, the features of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot in battle formation. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Of great importance here are not only fire skills, but also the ability of personnel to get in and out of vehicles, take up and change positions in the shortest possible time, that is, make full use of the maneuverability of weapons. On the offensive, you often have to operate on unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving in cars; the questions of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and correction of fire are becoming more complicated.

Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring subunits, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Consider the question of the combat use of small arms in the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the starting position of the unit, and combat vehicles- next to their squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During the fire preparation of the attack, when our artillery fire is transferred to the depth, the fire of machine guns and machine guns hits the enemy’s firepower and manpower in the direction of the platoons’ advance. Subunit commanders control the fire of subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When attacking on the move, motorized rifles during the period of fire preparation of attacks advance to the line of transition to the attack in columns on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). With the approach to the line of transition to the attack, the platoons, at the command of the company commander, deploy in battle formation. From that moment on, small arms fire through loopholes and over hatches hit targets on the front line of enemy defenses. When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put the weapon on the safety lock, take it out of the loopholes and prepare for dismounting. After it, motorized rifle platoons deploy in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, acting in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit's object of attack.

For the convenience of firing and better application to the terrain, soldiers in a chain can move somewhat forward or to the side without violating the general direction of the subunit's offensive. When overcoming the obstacle in front of the front line of the enemy’s defense, the personnel of motorized rifle subunits, following the commands of platoon commanders, put their weapons on the safety lock and, in columns in twos (threes), following the tanks along their ruts, run along the aisles in mine-explosive barriers.

Having overcome them, motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and swiftly attack the enemy. Soldiers conduct fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of ​​​​the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Approaching the enemy's trench at 25-40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, pistols and continue the attack without stopping in the indicated direction.

When attacking on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind tanks at a distance of 100-200 m. Machine gunners and submachine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of enemy defense in the gap between their tanks. The range of effective fire of small arms from short stops is 400 m, from the move 200 m. Cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets (in a ratio of three to one) are used for firing, especially for destroying fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles break into the front line of the enemy's defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

When fighting in the depths of the enemy's defenses, the advance of subunits occurs unevenly, so small arms fire usually has to be fired at intervals and from behind the flanks of one's own subunits. At the same time, it is necessary to follow the rules of shooting, which ensure the safety of their troops. So, the obligatory rule of firing from behind the flanks are two conditions.

First, the smallest angle between the directions on the target and the nearest flank of friendly troops should be 50 thousandths, in order to exclude direct hits of bullets on friendly troops due to errors in aiming and lateral dispersion. Secondly, when removing friendly troops ahead of firing up to 200 m, the target must be selected at a distance of at least 500 m. This is necessary to prevent bullets from hitting friendly troops in the event of possible ricochets. Shooting from behind the flanks is allowed only from a place.

In an offensive on hard-to-reach areas of the terrain where motorized rifles operate ahead of tanks, anti-tank grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and other close combat anti-tank weapons should be hit first of all with small arms. Directed fire from machine guns and machine guns should be fired at bushes and various masks, behind which one can assume the presence of fire weapons.

During an enemy counterattack, small arms fire is conducted in cooperation with the fire of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Submachine gunners and machine gunners destroy groups of infantry and crews of fire weapons, starting from a range of 800 m (with concentrated fire from squads). Snipers hit officers, ATGM crews and other important targets. Then the defeat of the enemy ends with an attack. At the same time, small arms fire is carried out on the move at its lying down and retreating groups.

When pursuing, motorized riflemen usually take up positions in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and fire from their weapons through loopholes (over hatches) at groups of infantry and anti-tank weapons on the move and from short stops.

In the last period of hostilities on the Eastern Front (1943-1945), both belligerents had such a sharp disproportion in the forces of infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation that not all the experience of that time can be used in determining infantry tactics in the future. In addition, the German troops were insufficiently trained and equipped, and also did not have a full-fledged leadership. On the other hand, using the combat experience of the infantry of the armies of the Western victorious countries can easily lead to false conclusions. The experience of these armies refers mainly to the final period of the war, when the German troops were already badly battered or were fighting on a very stretched front in the face of overwhelming material superiority of the enemy. For example, one regiment, defending in Normandy in the direction of the main attack of the Anglo-American troops north of Saint-Lô, was forced to hold a sector of defense on a 24 km front. It would not be surprising if, based on such experience in the West, they conclude that in the future infantry tactics will resemble "police actions."

Therefore, further research, along with the experience of the German army, should primarily be based on the views prevailing in Russia, the second major land power that actively participated in the last war.

In the future, the offensive, as the most effective form of combat, will continue to play the decisive role, just as before. In this case, the outcome of the infantry battle will be decided by the attack. In light of this, it is important to determine what factors in modern conditions influence the conduct of offensive combat by infantry. After the Second World War, no new weapons are known, other than napalm and radar, that would have a significant impact on the tactics of infantry fighting in direct contact with the enemy. Direct contact with the enemy, at least for the time being, is some protection against atomic weapons and long-range missiles. However, compared with the past, the number of infantry weapons involved in combat, and their rate of fire, has increased immeasurably. The firepower of a modern infantry battalion with 50 machine guns and 500 automatic rifles is theoretically about 5,000 rounds per second, while an infantry battalion in 1945 could fire about 1,000 rounds per second. An increase in the number of mortars and their caliber, as well as an improvement in the ammunition load, provide an increase in the firepower of a battalion's heavy weapons in approximately the same proportion. Increasing the firepower of the infantry is beneficial primarily to the defender, since the fire system is the basis of defense. The attacker, on the contrary, must first of all use the element of mobility to his advantage.

What are the new opportunities in comparison with 1945? gives in this respect modern technology?

Motorization. Motorization allows you to deliver infantry to the battlefield on off-road vehicles. Thanks to this, the infantry gets the opportunity to enter the battle fresh and full of energy.

Tanks. Not a single infantry attack should be carried out without sufficient support from tanks and assault guns! The necessary prerequisites for this create the possibilities of the modern tank industry.

Armament and equipment of the fighter. Conditions modern combat require that the infantryman be lightly armed and prepared for independent, initiative actions. He must skillfully adapt to the terrain. An infantryman should not be overloaded, as an overloaded infantryman quickly gets tired and loses combat effectiveness. Unlike the previous calculation weighing 30 kg, in our time, not a single soldier of a rifle company should carry more than 10 kg of weapons, equipment and food. And this requirement must be met, despite the huge increase in infantry firepower. Nylon protective vests, which proved themselves well during the Korean War, are designed to save the attacking soldier from feeling defenseless against enemy fire and significantly reduce infantry losses.

Delivery of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded. Lightly armored all-terrain tracked vehicles must deliver ammunition to the infantry to a line that provides camouflage from enemy ground surveillance. On the way back, they are required to evacuate the wounded. Both of these points are of great psychological and practical importance.

The fulfillment of all the above conditions is an indispensable requirement for modern infantry and an elementary prerequisite for requiring infantry to conduct offensive combat under modern conditions.

What can a tactician say about the new situation that has taken shape in connection with the further development of technology?

In modern conditions, there can be three methods of conducting an offensive with the participation of infantry.

"Police Action". Before the start of an offensive, aviation, tanks, artillery, including self-propelled artillery, mortars and other means, suppress the enemy with intense concentrated fire in a fairly wide zone for the entire depth of defense.

The infantry, advancing from line to line behind a barrage of fire, which often alternates with its throws for a whole day, clears the captured areas of the terrain from the remnants of the defending enemy units, or reaches the goal of the offensive without a fight at all. This is undoubtedly the ideal method of warfare. However, against a strong, selfless and well-prepared enemy for defense, he, at least initial stage war, not applicable.

"Leakage". If there are no adequate means of support to organize an offensive, and the enemy must be misled about his own intentions, or if it is necessary to create starting positions for a subsequent breakthrough, then "leakage" can often be the best way to achieve such goals. The essence of "infiltration" is that small groups of the attacker penetrate into the depths of the enemy's defenses, consolidate there, and, with the start of the offensive, attack firing positions, command posts, or even entire sectors of the defense. Individual fighters or pairs of shooters can gradually approach the enemy in short throws at intervals of several minutes, until, after several hours, and sometimes even after several days, entire subunits or even units accumulate at the line of attack. In this case, first of all, the possibilities of shelter are taken into account, and then the possibilities of firing.

Night, fog, difficult terrain or snow are favorable for the implementation of such actions, which require great perseverance, considerable time and excellent training of troops. This approach gives good results. However, if we consider these results on the scale of the operation, they are too small. Therefore, "leakage" should be regarded only as an auxiliary method of conducting an offensive battle.

Defense breakthrough. During the last war, the German infantry often broke through the prepared enemy defenses in the following way.

The starting position for the offensive was occupied either in the trenches created during the previous defensive battles, or directly behind them. The removal of the starting position from the forward edge of the enemy's defense, as a rule, did not exceed several hundred meters.

Artillery carried out covert sighting for several days before the offensive. Immediately before the start of the offensive, usually at dawn, a short artillery preparation lasting 15–30 minutes was carried out in the form of a short fire attack with all available artillery. The fire was conducted mainly on the first trenches of the enemy. Then the infantry went on the attack. She was tasked with breaking through the enemy defenses to the full depth. Such a breakthrough method fully justified itself in 1941 and even in 1942.

Modern conditions require certain adjustments to be made to it, which we will try to do in the future.

At present, two points are of decisive importance. First, artillery preparation in the form of a short fire raid with modern weapons and the effectiveness of the defender's fire in many cases may be insufficient. The need for ammunition for artillery preparation will increase by at least two times. Its main task will be to create favorable conditions for subsequent close combat. However, artillery preparation cannot be expected to completely defeat the enemy, providing the possibility of conducting "police operations". Secondly, in the conditions of modern combat, only in very rare cases will it be possible to destroy or suppress the firepower of the defender to such an extent that the infantry has the opportunity, under the observed enemy fire, to approach him from a distance of 1000 m to an attack distance equal to approximately 100–200 m.

Based on this, an attack at night or in conditions of limited visibility becomes of decisive importance for the infantry. A daytime attack must be supported by the installation of smoke screens, which for several hours could create visibility conditions close to nighttime in a section of sufficient width and depth.

Thus, the procedure for preparing and conducting an attack can be formulated as follows:

a) on the eve of the attack, all types of weapons fight enemy artillery and destroy its defensive structures on the front line;

b) on the night before the attack, the infantry, with continuous support of fire weapons, goes to the line of attack, digs in and prepares for the attack;

c) at dawn, the infantry, trying not to open fire, seeks to reach the line of attack as quickly as possible. After reaching this milestone, an attack immediately begins, accompanied by rifle and machine-gun fire.

It goes without saying that the third method of attack - breaking through the defenses - cannot be taken as a template and used in any situation. On different directions and different stages of the offensive, alternation of "leakage" and breakthrough of the defense can be practiced, or a new method of conducting offensive combat intermediate between them can be used. Both of these methods are described separately only in order to sharply emphasize the difference between them.

When breaking through the enemy's defense in depth, the infantry must be concentrated on a narrow sector and have a battle formation in depth. It may often be necessary to break through the defenses by sequentially committing one company after another into battle, supported by the massed fire of the battalion's heavy weapons.

Based on the foregoing, it is also possible to determine the order of attack on the move against the enemy, who hastily went over to the defensive. This type of offensive combat can also be used today, especially by motorized infantry after a successful breakthrough, when delivering strikes on the flank or rear, and also in the course of destroying the encircled enemy. Offensive on the move has always been strong point German infantry. It should especially clearly manifest the efficiency of management, high level combat training and offensive impulse of troops.

The defense is mainly a firefight of artillery and heavy weapons of the infantry. The defender's fire must cause the enemy's attack to choke in front of the forward edge or between the strongholds of the first position, and in any case no further than on the line of strongpoints covering the area of ​​artillery firing positions. Therefore, infantry defending centers of resistance or strong points open fire from automatic weapons only at the range of actual fire.

The firing points and individual riflemen in the trenches must support each other with fire in such a way as to create a continuous fire zone that is insurmountable for the attacking enemy.

Well entrenched and camouflaged skirmishers can fire from cover or from ambush. In this case, they are difficult to detect. It is necessary to strive to force the enemy to disperse his forces and force him to conduct a series of separate battles for each firing point. In this case, the enemy comes under flank fire and fire from the rear.

In such a battle, when one-on-one infantry faces enemy infantry, success depends on the endurance and perseverance of each shooter.

Each defensive structure must be equipped for all-round defense so that in the event of an encirclement it is possible to engage in combat with an enemy attacking from any direction.

An enemy who has broken through must be immediately and decisively counterattacked by even the smallest subunits with the task of using all available means to destroy him even before he has time to gain a foothold. With the beginning of the battle, platoons and companies allocate forces and resources for immediate counterattacks. The subunits allocated for counterattacks, acting with the support of tanks and assault guns, must push back the enemy that has penetrated and restore the situation. Prolonged preparations and indecisiveness in carrying out counterattacks lead to a dangerous loss of time. In this case, every minute counts.

If the enemy attacks with tanks, then the infantry fire is concentrated primarily on the enemy infantry. If the enemy infantry has been cut off from the tanks and suppressed, all efforts are concentrated on fighting the tanks. Each defensive structure must be provided with a sufficient number of close combat anti-tank weapons. When fighting tanks, it must be remembered that they mutually cover each other. In this case, every opportunity should be used to destroy tanks from the side or rear. For this purpose, trench bends, communication passages and anti-tank ditches can best be used. Enemy tanks that have retained the ability to move must be destroyed by concentrated fire from all directions.

If the subunits defending individual centers of resistance received an order to withdraw, fire from the strongholds covering the withdrawal should be directed primarily at the flanks and rear of the advancing enemy. The withdrawal of infantry without the use of shelters dooms it to destruction.

Alexey OLEYNIKOV

The Manual for infantry operations in battle reflects the tactics of the infantry of the Russian army at the beginning of the First World War. In this document, the question of the interaction of fire, maneuver and strike of this type of troops is resolved as follows: "The strength of the infantry in battle lies in rifle and machine-gun fire with a decisive forward movement and in a bayonet strike."

Speaking about infantry combat tactics, the regulations and instructions noted that "the best defeat of the enemy is achieved by combining frontal fire on each target being fired with flank or at least oblique fire in order to take the target under crossfire."

Having shot the enemy from close distances with rifle and machine-gun fire, the infantry rushes into bayonets and (or) throws hand grenades.

Artillery fire is an important support in infantry operations.

If the enemy could not be knocked down with the first blow, it was considered necessary to resume attacks until success was achieved. After an unsuccessful attack, the infantry must consolidate as close as possible to the enemy, while the artillery fires and holds the enemy in the event of an attack, and the cavalry also prevents the enemy from developing a pursuit.

The manual for infantry actions had a special section "Infantry maneuvering in combat", which began with the definition of the objectives of the maneuver. It stated that "the task of any maneuver is to put the infantry unit in the most advantageous position for achieving the specified goal." This task was achieved by the appropriate direction of movement, its speed and secrecy, the use of formation depending on enemy fire and terrain, and skillful use of the time of day and weather.

Questions of infantry maneuvering in battle were resolved more correctly by the Manual than by the regulations of foreign armies. It did not have an excessive enthusiasm for only flank forms of maneuver (as in the German army), but a reasonable combination of frontal movement with coverage of the enemy's flanks was required. Coverage is beneficial in that it contributes to indirect, and sometimes even longitudinal shelling of the enemy; in addition, the unit that has engulfed the enemy can attack him with bayonets in the most dangerous direction for him.

The attack should begin when, based on the purpose of the action, the situation, or the results achieved, the moment has come to rush to strike with bayonets, or when the moral strength of the attacked side is noticeably shaken. But "one should rush into the attack not only on a weakened enemy, but also on an enemy ready to fight back, if this is required by achieving the goal of the battle and gaining one's own."

The instruction demanded that the attack be "quick, decisive, spontaneous, like a hurricane." We must strive to combine a frontal attack with a blow to the flank and even to the rear of the enemy.

We emphasize once again that Russian tactical thought was ahead of the foreign one. In particular, only in the Russian army, even before the start of the First World War, the use of heavy machine guns was envisaged to support the attack.

The instruction requires not to displace, but to destroy the enemy: “The attack must be ended with an energetic pursuit and securing what has been taken away. The purpose of the pursuit is to finish off the enemy, preventing him from settling down for a new rebuff.

Infantry in battle was ordered to use combat formations and methods of movement in relation to the terrain on which they had to operate, as well as in accordance with enemy fire. Combat formations must satisfy many conditions arising from combat requirements. Among the most important of them, the Instruction includes: 1) the least vulnerability to enemy fire; 2) convenience for actions with weapons; 3) ease of management; 4) ease of application to the terrain; and 5) mobility and agility. These requirements in the field of enemy rifle fire were met by a loose formation (shooting chain).

In the rifle chain, the infantrymen were located in one line at a distance of two to 10 steps, depending on the combat situation. Such a system made it possible to apply well to the terrain, it was convenient for firing. The mobility of the chain was great and almost equal to the mobility of an individual fighter. When advancing, the rifle chain conducted a firefight. Supports, applied to the terrain, followed the chain and, pouring into it before the attack, strengthened its impact force.

The negative side of this battle order is the difficult management of people, which required special qualifications for officers and non-commissioned officers. So, a platoon, scattered in a chain, took 100 or more steps along the front. The development of initiative and consciousness in each soldier in battle could make it easier for the commander to control such a formation. The rifle chain, convenient for firing, was of little use for melee weapons - after all, the bayonet strike is the stronger, the more united the army mass. In addition, when moving, people huddled in groups, breaking the chain and forming large intervals. Those following the chain of support were often swept away by enemy artillery fire or, due to fire impact, could not move. As a result, the shooting chains, having reached the enemy, were so exhausted by the losses incurred that they lost their impact force. Battalion and regimental reserves were expended during the offensive only to replenish the loss in the advancing chain, and not to build up the strength of the strike.

Nevertheless, the rifle chain was the best form of infantry combat formation in the conditions of the First World War. Significant (several steps) intervals between the fighters made her the least vulnerable to enemy fire. Although in foreign armies, under the influence of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, the presence of rifle chains in the area of ​​​​action of the enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire was also prescribed, but the intervals between people were allowed to be insignificant (no more than one step) - and this did not correspond to the new battle conditions.

The front-line soldier described the picture of the attack of the Russian guards infantry in 1914 in the following way: “The sudden cry of the captain Misharev: “Gentlemen, chains are coming into the clearing” made us instantly gather at the pipe ... Even earlier, the clearing attracted our attention with its bright green color, before our eyes began to be covered with long, thick chains. The chains quickly moved across the clearing to the forest occupied by the enemy. Behind the first, more and more new chains appeared, under the rays of the sun, they stood out sharply against the bright green of the meadow. Moving in riffles, they, like sea waves, rolled closer and closer to the enemy forest. This picture was so beautiful and captured us so much that we literally forgot about everything else and, not looking up from the binoculars, followed the chains that soon covered the entire clearing. I was filled with an incredible feeling of pride and happiness when Colonel Rylsky in a cheerful, loud voice reported to General Bezobrazov and the head of the division standing near him: "These are huntsmen."

Field service regulations dictated that firing lines should move from one firing position to another while reserves moved from one shelter ("close") to another. It was pointed out that under real enemy fire, accumulation should be used at new shooting positions and in shelters.

For infantry under real enemy fire, the Russian charter allowed for dashes - up to 100 steps across open areas.

Other types of formation: deployed, platoon, open, single-rank - were practiced for reserves.

The charters noted that the infantry, at a distance of up to a half-way from their forward units, carried out reconnaissance independently. When infantry reconnaissance was removed more than 4-5 km from their units towards the enemy, it was instructed to advance small infantry units (platoons, semi-companies, companies), which it was desirable to attach scooters or horsemen.

At the same time, pre-war charters and manuals also contained erroneous provisions. So, they said that the infantry with its firepower, that is, without the participation of artillery, can prepare an attack. This showed an underestimation of the importance of artillery and an overestimation of the independence of the infantry. But these shortcomings were characteristic of almost all, without exception, the armies of 1914.

The shortcomings of Russian pre-war charters and instructions, in addition to the lack of artillery preparation before an attack by an enemy who had taken up field defenses, was an underestimation of the role of self-digging in an offensive battle. But even in this matter, Russian tactical thought was superior to European. Thus, it was noted that "during the offensive, the shovel should by no means hold back the impulse forward" and "as soon as it is possible to move on, the trenches should be immediately abandoned, since their purpose is to give rest to the advancing units." But at the same time, it was established that with rapid non-stop movement in the realm of enemy fire, heavy losses could undermine the moral energy of the fighters, and the attack would “bog down”. In these cases, the shovel is in capable hands and should come to the rescue. Accordingly, self-digging was recognized as an important means of reducing losses in offensive combat, contributing to the effectiveness of the attack.

In addition, the reserves and supports were ordered to occupy the trenches left by the troops who had gone forward, and gradually improve them for the units approaching from behind.

Shortcomings of pre-war tactical provisions had to be corrected during the course of the war.

The construction of the battle order of the advancing infantry in 1914-1915. into one echelon in the form of one chain, into which the forward companies scattered, due to the above reasons, it was necessary to reorganize. The power of the enemy defense increased, and the shallow battle formation of the attackers did not have the necessary strike force and often could not overcome even a hastily organized defense. Therefore, in 1916, a battle order was introduced, consisting of a number of chains advancing one after another (waves of chains), the number of which in a regiment usually reached four, and in some cases more. Waves of chains were at a distance of 30-40 m from each other.

In a defensive battle, the construction of trenches and field fortifications was envisaged.

There were different trenches for prone shooting, for standing shooting and for shooting from the knee. Single and continuous trenches were envisaged, there was a detailed regulation of the construction of trenches, their camouflage, etc. general rule the trench should be deep, with steep slopes (if the soil is holding - vertical) and brought to the firing profile while standing at the bottom of the ditch - only then will complete shelter from shrapnel be obtained.

Already the first battles showed the skill of the Russian infantry in the construction of field fortifications. So, in the battle near Gumbinnen on August 7, 1914, the infantrymen of two Russian divisions built rifle trenches so quickly and competently that two German infantry divisions, advancing in thick chains, came under massive fire from the defending Russians, who in most cases remained invisible. Moreover, the German infantry lay down, but did not dig in - and again suffered severe losses from the fire of Russian fighters.

The combat order of the Russian infantry at the beginning of the war consisted of two parts: for fire fighting and for striking with cold weapons. The part of the battle order, intended for fire preparation of the battle and bringing it to hand-to-hand combat, was called the combat unit. The other part, maneuvering and engaging in battle with the aim of delivering a bayonet strike, was called a reserve.

Accordingly, the infantry battle order consisted of a combat unit and a reserve.

The field service charter established that the battle order was to include: combat sectors, a general reserve (a reserve of a senior commander to assist the troops delivering the main blow) and private reserves (serve to reinforce combat sectors and to counter coverage and breakthrough).

The battle order of the company consisted of platoon sections of the rifle chain and the company reserve. The combat order of the battalion is from company combat sectors and the battalion reserve. The battle order of the regiment is from battalion combat areas and regimental reserve. The battle formation of a brigade consisted of combat sectors and a brigade reserve (moreover, both regiments and battalions could be assigned to combat sectors). The battle order of a division consisted of the combat sections of brigades, regiments, and sometimes even battalions, and a divisional reserve.

The instruction for infantry action in battle required that each combat sector, in solving its combat mission, act in such a way as to facilitate the achievement of the unit's or formation's common goal of combat.

In accordance with pre-war tactical views, the width of the combat sector of a battalion was 500 meters, a regiment - 1 km, a brigade - 2 km, a division - 3 km, a corps - 5-6 km.

During the war, the parameters of the battle formations of infantry units and formations increased. On average for the corps, the width of the battle order increased from 15 to 25 km, the depth - from 5 to 10 km; for a division - from 6 to 10 km in width and from 3 to 8 km in depth; for the regiment - from 2 to 4 km and from 1 to 3 km, respectively.

This improved the protection of troops and firepower and increased the effectiveness of their use.

The strength of the infantry is in the legs. The Russian army had a statutory step of 120 steps per minute, but this pace was used only during a ceremonial march or during drills. But the rifle units of the Russian army in Peaceful time trained at much faster paces (up to 124-128 and even 132 steps per minute).

When the infantry took on "full gear", the speed decreased - and the infantry passed 4 miles per hour.

On the endurance of the Russian infantry, the calculation of the command was built during many military operations. So, during the Vilna operation of 1915, the commander of the Western Front A.E. Evert, in a short time, regrouped at first four, and then six more army corps and five cavalry divisions, removed from the front and advanced mainly in marching order for hundreds of kilometers along the front towards the enemy's breakthrough. In conditions of unreliable (and weak) infrastructure, he correctly calculated the parameters of the march maneuver, taking into account the specifics of the terrain and the development of the operational situation - and was far ahead of the Germans. Russian infantry traveled 30 km per day (while the German infantry 15 km per day). The marches of the Russian troops were carried out clearly, without stragglers. Some Russian corps traveled 200 km.

The so-called quadruple system of organizing Russian infantry (a division - four regiments, a regiment - four battalions, a battalion - four companies, a company - four platoons, a platoon - four squads) is outdated. When allocating a reserve, constituting one third of all forces, it was necessary to violate the organizational integrity of formations, units and subunits, since they could easily be divided into two or four parts, but not into three. Combat practice has put forward the need to move to a triple system of organizing a military unit in the infantry (division - three regiments, regiment - three battalions, battalion - three companies, company - three platoons, platoon - three squads). With this infantry structure, more flexibility on the battlefield could be achieved. Such structural unit could quickly adapt to various tactical requirements, more effectively dismembered to solve combat missions into smaller, independent units without violating common organization parts or connections. Divisions and regiments were reduced in number by one third and became more maneuverable and easier to manage. But the transition to such a system took place after the First World War.

At the beginning of the war, the importance of new military equipment (mounted machine guns, hand grenades, mortars, light and heavy rapid-fire artillery, field light and heavy howitzers) was underestimated, and the strength of the army was seen primarily in the infantry. But during the war great importance for the development of tactics had the improvement of technical means of warfare. Thus, the application of infantry to the terrain and the short dashes of soldiers in the offensive from cover to cover made the infantry less vulnerable to rifle fire and caused a desire to develop a more advanced, self-loading, automatic rifle. According to its tactical and technical data, the Fedorov automatic rifle turned out to be the best of all similar systems developed during the war. The easel machine gun was also significantly improved.

The basis of the combat activity of the Russian infantry was offensive operations, in which the independence and initiative of the soldier in battle played an important role. The structure of the battle order, the interaction of the combat arms, and issues of maneuvering were progressive. The loose formation in the form of a rifle chain, depending on the situation, could be transformed into a denser formation. The coverage of the enemy battle formation, flank strikes were used. The infantry, depending on the situation, conducts bayonet fighting, rifle and machine-gun fire, and uses hand grenades.

Another tactic was required by the Russian infantry during the period of trench warfare - from the end of 1915. The instruction to the troops of the Southwestern Front before the offensive of 1916 required that the infantry attack be continuous and non-stop, and commanders of all levels take the initiative to achieve this task, boldly advancing with forward with their units and subunits, without looking back at their lagging neighbors.

It was required to attack in successive waves of chains, which had intervals of two to five steps between the fighters and distances of 150-200 steps from one another. In the direction of the main attack, such waves were ordered to form at least 3-4, having reserves behind them - to develop success or repeat the attack if the latter failed.

Each of the chains received a specific task. The first chain, having mastered the enemy trench, was supposed to move forward as much as possible.

The second wave made up for the losses of the first, the third was the support of the first two, and the fourth was the reserve of the commanders of the advanced regiments. Further development of success was assigned to the divisional and corps reserves. These reserves advance behind the front four waves, ready to continue the attack, support the forward units, secure the positions taken, or counter the enemy's flanking attacks.

The soldiers of the first two waves were supplied with grenades and devices for destroying wire obstacles. In the second and third waves, the fighters were carrying machine guns. Much of the assault tactics of the infantry was laid down precisely in these instructions. The infantry attack was to follow directly the artillery preparation. Having broken into the front line of the enemy, the first infantry wave does not stop, but hurries to capture the second line of enemy trenches and gain a foothold in it. Considering that the enemy based the main force of his defense on the second line of trenches, a long delay on the first line exposed the troops to his concentrated fire.

For reliable shelter of the troops concentrated for a breakthrough from enemy artillery fire and the maximum approach of their fortifications to enemy trenches, each infantry regiment created an initial bridgehead for an attack.

A feature of the offensive in various sectors of the breakthrough of enemy positions opposing the Southwestern Front was that the Russian infantry, as a rule, did not linger in the first line of enemy trenches, but boldly moved forward, entrusting the task of clearing the trenches from the enemy to special groups of the so-called " trench cleaners" available in each battalion. This made it possible to penetrate deeply and quickly into the enemy's defense system and force him to turn off the defense even where his infantry still held its positions.

Russian infantry learned to overcome the positional defense of the enemy. So, in December 1916, during the Mitava operation, the 1st and 2nd Latvian rifle brigades, as well as the 56th and 57th Siberian rifle regiments, operating in tactically difficult conditions, broke through the front of the Germans. The actions of the 7th Bauska regiment of the 2nd Latvian brigade were characterized as follows: “The approach of the regiment to the wire along the previously studied approach was discovered by the Germans, who opened fire. During the movement, the wire cutters all strayed to the right flank. The moment was critical. The rushing mass of people broke through the wire with axes and scissors and in one fell swoop jumped over the parapet fence that was here, capturing two machine guns in the nests.

The realities of positional warfare revealed the need for the formation of special assault units, specially designed to break through the enemy's echeloned defenses.

Order of the commander of the 5th army, cavalry general P.A. Plehve No. 231 of October 4, 1915 ordered the formation of teams of bombers in companies, arming each of their fighters with ten grenades, an ax, a shovel and hand-held scissors for cutting wire. At the end of the year, assault platoons (“grenadier platoons”) appeared in all infantry and grenadier regiments. The attack aircraft were armed with carbines, revolvers (command staff), bebut daggers, 7-8 grenades each and wire shears - unlike the infantry, each fighter should have had them. Each grenadier received a steel helmet, a steel shield relied on two fighters, and there were two bombers per platoon.

According to the results of the Mitavskaya offensive operation of the Russian army on December 23-29, 1916, it was considered expedient to form special breakthrough units that are indispensable in breaking through the fortified sectors of the front. According to the Manual for shock troops, each infantry division should form an assault battalion consisting of three rifle companies and a technical team consisting of five squads: machine gun (four machine gun platoons and two light machine guns), mortar, bombing, demolition (subversive and rocket platoons ) and telephone (six telephone and four listening stations).

Taking into account the experience of unsuccessful offensives during the period of positional warfare, the Instruction proclaimed that “the formation of separate shock units is primarily aimed at ensuring our success in those military operations that are based on the features of positional warfare. The shock parts are intended only for active actions.

The main form of combat of shock units is combat with hand grenades. They had the following major tasks:

When breaking through the fortified positions of the enemy - storming especially important and heavily fortified areas, supporting the attack by the infantry of the front line of the enemy and eliminating the enemy delaying the advance of the infantry;

In defense - a fight to improve one's position, searches to capture prisoners and destroy defensive structures, counterattacks.

The strike units were ordered to be placed in the rear and put forward in positions only to carry out combat missions - it was forbidden to occupy areas of defensive positions with them. The battle was to be fought exclusively in trenches, open battle on the surface of the earth was considered as an exception.

The attack is carried out either after artillery preparation, or after the explosion of the forge ( powerful remedy mine war), or a surprise attack is carried out, which is preceded by the silent destruction of artificial obstacles of the enemy.

A group order of battle was used, or a battle order in the form of waves. Thus, the Russian infantry in tactical terms did not lag behind the enemy: the Germans in 1917-1918. both in attack and defense, group tactics are also formed.

Artillery prepared the attack with fire, conducted barrage fire on the attacked enemy sector. Trench artillery participated in artillery preparation and carried out the task of direct infantry escort.

On the offensive in the first line, there were fighters making passages in the enemy’s barbed wire, followed by trench cleaners, then specialists (signalmen, telephone operators, artillery observers), then machine gunners and special purpose and reserve grenadiers. If the grenadier units operated as part of an infantry unit, then the grenadiers and scouts moved ahead of the rifle waves. The form of battle order for trench combat is a snake.

The cutters made passages in the wire, and at the moment the infantry took over the line for the attack, the attack aircraft moved forward, crawled to the distance of throwing a grenade and threw them into the trenches and defensive obstacles of the enemy. If the use of grenades was successful, the grenadiers broke into the enemy's trenches and spread along the trench to the left and right, knocking out with grenades the enemy soldiers who had settled in the breaks of the trenches, communications or behind the traverses. Machine gunners, bombers, trench artillery consolidated the success and contributed to the further advance or covered the retreat.

The "finest hour" of the assault platoons was the Brusilovsky breakthrough in 1916. Success in these battles was achieved largely due to the exemplary behavior of the grenadier units moving as part of the advancing infantry waves. A.A. Brusilov wrote about the capture of the enemy’s advanced positions: “Many shelters were not destroyed, but the parts of the garrison sitting there had to lay down their weapons and surrender, because as soon as at least one grenadier with a bomb in his hands stood at the exit, there was no longer any salvation, because in case of refusal to surrender, a grenade was thrown inside the shelter, and those hiding inevitably died uselessly; it is extremely difficult to get out of the shelters in time and it is impossible to guess the time. Thus, the number of prisoners that invariably fell into our hands is quite understandable.

If by the end of the war on the French front in the German, French and English armies the infantry had lost the ability to maneuver and moved evenly along the entire front, aligned with the lagging units according to the “artillery destroys, and the infantry occupies” scheme, then the Russian infantry, on the contrary, maneuvered on the field fight. She did not linger in front of the defense sectors that continued to resist, but boldly rushed forward, bypassing these sectors from the flanks and by deep intrusion into the enemy's defenses facilitated the task of suppressing the remaining centers of resistance. Up to the moment of the revolutionary collapse of the front, the Russian infantry did not lose the ability to attack fortified positions - even if the enemy’s fire defense system was not suppressed (and sometimes not weakened in due measure). The infantry of Russia's allies forgot how to attack and was only able to occupy enemy positions destroyed by artillery.

There is no better recognition than the recognition of the enemy, in particular, noting that "in all the battles, the Russian infantry showed enviable dexterity in overcoming difficult terrain, which we for the most part considered impassable."

The share of Russian infantry in the armed forces during the war decreased from 75 to 60%, and yet it retained the role of the main branch of the armed forces until the end of the war, being a true "queen of the fields."

The armament of the infantry has become more diverse. The infantryman received hand and rifle grenades. The infantry had its own artillery in the form of 310 trench guns (mortars, bombers and small-caliber guns). Equipment with machine guns doubled (from two to four per battalion). Russian infantry received anti-chemical protection - gas masks.

At the same time, the infantry ceased to be homogeneous. Only two-thirds of the personnel of infantry divisions and regiments were riflemen, that is, they acted in battle with a rifle with a bayonet. A third of the infantry units and formations consisted of specialists - machine gunners, grenade launchers, signalmen, etc.

As a result of a significant increase in infantry firepower (2-2.5 times), its combat capabilities increased significantly by the end of the war.

Aleksey Vladimirovich OLEINIKOV - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Member of the Association of Historians of the First World War, Professor of the Department of Russian History, Astrakhan State University

I am quite sure that no one should hesitate for a moment to resort to arms to protect the priceless gift of freedom, on which all good and evil in life depend, but weapons, I dare add, are the last resort.

George Washington

An interesting article about the "Martial Arts Program of the United States Marine Corps" - the predecessor of the modern one (Marine Training Program for Martial Arts) published in the eighth issue of the magazine "Foreign military review» for 2008. That is, by and large it turns out that the program MCMAP - Marine Corps Martial Arts Program- this is not some kind (or invention) of American military hand-to-hand combat specialists, but rather simply the next stage in the evolutionary development of an applied hand-to-hand combat system for special units.

United States Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

B. Bogdan, candidate of technical sciences

Combat training program for marines, including those just called up for military service recruits, traditionally included in the last century and currently provides for training in bayonet and hand-to-hand combat. She was given great importance in terms of educating the necessary fighting qualities of a fighter: endurance, fearlessness, aggressiveness, reaction, dexterity, etc. Over time, this was not enough, and the command of the MP came to the conclusion that it was necessary to further develop and expand this program.

In 1999, the commandant of the US Marine Corps, General D. Jones, ordered the development, and in 2001, to introduce the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) into the recruitment training process. The commandant of the MP borrowed the idea of ​​creating such a program from the Korean marines, with whom he fought together in Vietnam as a lieutenant. He saw their behavior in the fight and their training after the fight. All Asian martial arts, except for the arsenal of fighting techniques, are based on certain philosophical knowledge and moral foundations, which also need to be mastered in order to move to a higher level of skill.

The US Marine Corps martial arts program consists of three disciplines: intellectual training, education of fighting qualities, and direct physical training for combat. The system of colored belts, which determines and stimulates the skill of a warrior, was also borrowed from oriental martial arts.

Unlike the Oriental arts, where archaic weapons are used, the physical readiness of the Marines involves mastering techniques with a knife, improvised objects, a rubber club, a rifle with a bayonet and bare hands. All these techniques are accompanied by psycho-emotional, tactical and combat training. Fire training, like many military disciplines, is also considered a martial art, but was not included in the PBMP.

The US Marine Corps has taken advantage of the huge popularity of Eastern martial arts among young people who cannot master them due to lack of free time or financial situation. PBIMP allows you to serve in prestigious landing troops, be financially secure and learn the modern martial arts system, which is a necessity and guarantees promotion.

The implementation of this program began in 2001. In advance, on the basis of the MP Quantico (Virginia), a center for improving the martial arts of the MP was organized. He prepared all the guidance and methodological literature, as well as martial arts instructors from MP sergeants who mastered the techniques of karate, judo, sambo, aikido, freestyle wrestling and other martial arts. By 2001, the center had equipped 150 training sites and trained 700 certified instructors, and in 2002 their number doubled accordingly.

A training place is a platform equipped with all the equipment necessary for training a platoon. The inventory includes: boxing bags, gloves, paws, mouth guards, shells, weapons models, as well as a wrestling pit with a diameter of at least 10 m with sawdust or sand, lined with sandbags along the parapet. The regular MP platoon consists of 45 people, and in the training center there are more than 70 people in the platoon.

Intellectual preparation includes two subjects: tactical training and professional military self-education. Tactical training involves the study of the history of military art, techniques and methods of action in combat units corresponding to the rank and position of the trained soldier, the development of skills to take command, make decisions in stressful situations in a combat situation, as well as during leisure and recreation. PBIMP covers military personnel from private to colonel, and the slogan "Every corporal is a strategist" operates in the US MP. Self-education comes down to the study of military professional literature, memoirs, life stories of prominent military personnel of the US Armed Forces and other countries, fiction according to the lists compiled by the command of the MP.

Discipline "Education of the character of a warrior-defender" also includes two sections: the core moral and spiritual values ​​of the US MP; development of a team leader. It is aimed at shaping the moral character of the Marine, creating a self-disciplined and self-confident warrior-defender, faithful to the precepts of the US Marine Corps: honor, courage, reliability.

Together with intellectual preparation, this discipline contributes to making the right decisions both in combat and in peacetime (for example, when on vacation).

The command of the MP proceeds from the fact that any private, after several months of service, will find himself in a situation where he will be appointed junior commander of less experienced military personnel. The program "Education of a leader" involves the study of the basic principles of team management, and first of all, such - "do as I do, not as I say."

Discipline "Physical readiness" includes three components: attack and self-defense techniques, combat physical training, combat types sports. Techniques of attack and self-defense, in turn, are divided into four topics: bayonet fighting, possession of a knife, the use of improvised objects, combat without weapons.

All three disciplines are divided into blocks, and they are studied at the corresponding level of the color belt. But in the arsenal of any belt there are tricks from all four themes.

Color belt system includes five levels: initial - yellow-brown, then go gray, green, brown and black. A black belt has six degrees. The colors of the belts differ from those adopted in traditional martial arts and are determined by the requirements of the field uniform camouflage manual. The belt itself has a black buckle with the emblem of the US MP and is worn as a trouser belt of a combat field uniform.

Recruits begin training in PBMP at the training center, and they will be able to leave it as Marines when they pass the exams for the right to receive tan belt. Under the guidance of a martial arts instructor, recruits must learn the appropriate program, consisting of basics and 32 techniques, in 27.5 hours and devote another 7 hours to consolidating the acquired skills.

The main requirements at this stage come down to the ability to show a boxing stance and movements, demonstrate their striking surfaces on the arms and legs, indicate the points of defeat on the opponent’s body, demonstrate stretching exercises, as well as exercises to strengthen the muscles of the body (exchange of blows to the chest, stomach, arms and legs with a partner).

The yellow-brown belt complex includes: all boxing-style punches; falls and somersaults; all blows with a bayonet and butt; participation in bayonet fights with a boxing stick imitating a rifle with a bayonet, one on one, one against two, two against two; karate-style palm, fist and elbow strikes; kicks and knees, strangulation techniques; tripping throw; protection: from kicks and hand strikes, from suffocation from behind, from capturing the head or over the hands, from capturing a rifle when a fighter is in a cordon; pain holds on the arm and hand; knife strikes, the use of improvised items in combat.

This is followed by 14 topics on which theoretical classes are conducted. The list of topics includes: "Recognizing and preventing suicide of a colleague", "Fundamentals of management science", "Prevention and consequences of sexual harassment" (immediate dismissal from the military, the same in civilian work), "Combating drug use", "MP for equal opportunities for all”, “Personal combat readiness and Combat Readiness of Family Members”, “Brotherly Relationships Between Soldiers”, “Sexual Responsibility”. Candidates for the yellow-brown belt have an indulgence: there is no discipline "Intellectual training" - it is replaced by communication with drill sergeants.

gray belt(29 + 14 hours) Marines must receive during training a military registration specialty (VUS) in training battalions. This will require 29 hours plus 14 hours to repeat the techniques of the tan belt and improve. For aviation specialists and representatives of rear services (musicians, cooks, etc.), such a belt is enough. But no one will forbid a marine to continue to improve in PBIMP further, since the presence of a high-rank belt contributes to career advancement.

Green Belt(30 + 21 hours) is necessary for tankers, artillerymen, signalmen, sappers - everyone except infantrymen. He ensures the rank of lance corporal in the rear units.

brown belt(35 + 28 hours) is the minimum required in infantry and reconnaissance. The command of the MP believes that the scout is not always obliged to engage in close combat with the enemy, and the infantryman "must get close to the enemy and destroy him in hand-to-hand combat." In other branches of the military, except for the infantry, such a belt is the basis for obtaining the rank of corporal.

Owner black belt 1st degree (34.5 + 35 hours) can apply for the rank of sergeant. All black belt holders must take part in martial arts competitions held by civilian athletes. The 2nd degree can be obtained in a year, the 3rd and 4th in three, and the 5th and 6th in five years. The rank of lieutenant corresponds to a black belt of the 2nd degree, captain - of the 3rd degree, major - of the 4th degree, lieutenant colonel and above - of the 5th and 6th degrees. Accordingly, the ranks of the sergeants are distributed. In addition, to obtain the 5th and 6th degrees, one must have a rank in karate, judo, sambo, aikido or other throwing and shock sports.

Training is carried out mainly in combat uniform, including: a helmet, body armor, unloading belts, two flasks in covers, two pouches for six magazines for the M16A2 rifle or for magazines for the M9 pistol, a cover with a dressing bag. Protective equipment (caps, shells, goggles, shields) must be worn.

Weekly physical training is allotted from 3 hours in rear units to 5 hours in combat units, and 2 hours for PBIMP classes. 16.00 for everyone who is not in dress - in their free time) and on weekends. Trainings are conducted under the guidance of martial arts instructors. They can be junior commanders, starting with a junior corporal, who have a green belt. It is accepted that the holder of a belt of a higher degree can be an instructor for those military personnel who have a belt of a lower degree. Instructors become after 40 hours of training and receive a certificate that is considered valid for three years. The minimum number of hours of training per year that an instructor must conduct is 30. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his license. Black belts can be certified as martial arts instructors.

Conducting classes on PBIMP is regulated by several instructions. The most difficult task is to overcome the combat course, the length of which is 12 km. Two teams enter the course, which compete with each other in who is faster will pass the trail and get fewer penalty points. Each team has its own obstacle course. The combat course begins with an accelerated descent from the tower along the rope. After that, half of the team puts on paws, other gloves and performs 10 all types of strikes with each hand. Then the team members switch roles.

Having finished the exercise, the group moves at an accelerated pace to the next training place. On the way, on the instructions of the instructor, she performs rebuilding, overcomes wire obstacles by crawling on all fours. Open areas of terrain, roads intersect, as in a combat situation. Thus, all movements between training places are carried out.

The next exercise is cleaning the house with the use of combat grenades. The house (several rooms without a roof) is made of old car tires. Blank cartridges are used for shelling the premises.

A new training place is a bayonet fighting zone. Each team has its own track, where targets are set up - old tires with a stick fixed on a movable hinge, imitating a weapon that must be beaten off, and then an attack is performed. After running the strip, the Marine returns to the start. After all team members pass the strip, all together they do it again with "frog" jumps.

At the new place, the team again performs 10 punches of all types with their hands. This is followed by an obstacle course, between which there are minefields with mines of pressure and tension action. At the same time, tension mines must be bypassed, and mines buried in the ground should be detected using improvised probes. If the training mine works, then the team is awarded penalty points, and the “wounded” must be dragged to the end of the obstacle course. Pillboxes are installed between the obstacles, which must be detected and tactically competently attacked using blank cartridges and training grenades. At the end of the obstacle course, fighting pits are equipped. Here everyone needs to perform all types of throws (there are three of them) 10 times, after which the team must take the log and take it to the next training place.

Next comes the crossing of a river, pond or lake on improvised swimming facilities. After leaving the water, a fight with a member of the opposite team is planned for 1 minute, and then crossing the river along one rope using the “top” method. After its completion, the weapons are placed in the goats, the marines receive boxes of food and canisters of water, which must be delivered to the "refugees". On the way, "hungry refugees" attack in order to take away food and drink. The team needs to use non-injury techniques to prevent food from being captured and deliver it to the site. Then one more crossing has to be overcome, but already on two ropes, after which each infantryman performs six times the methods of release from suffocating holds.

A team crawls to a new training site, and then competes with another team in a bayonet fight. Further, each participant jumps on a vertical rope hanging over the ditch and must, by the force of inertia, be transferred through the ditch, climb onto the ship's cargo net and go down the drainpipe. Here the team receives a "wounded" who must be processed and carried on a stretcher to the "sanitary" unit. Having moved to a new training site, the teams will have to meet in a bayonet fight in a trench. Then it is necessary to overcome an underground tunnel filled with water without weapons. When overcoming the tunnel, the cadet uses the guide rope. Upon exiting it, a fight with a member of the opposite team is planned for 1 minute. The task is to knock the enemy to the ground without using blows. Next, the teams crawl through the enemy defenses, attacking pillboxes and other fortified points using training grenades and blank cartridges. Wearing protective equipment, team members, armed with improvised weapons, face each other in hand-to-hand combat. From here, by tactical movement, the teams, overcoming obstacles, are sent to a new training place, where they will have one-on-one training fights with bayonet-knives.

The next training place is called "Kosovo". This is a three-rope bridge over a water barrier. Before crossing it, team members put on safety belts and receive a zinc can of cartridges to be delivered to the other side. On the other side, the cadet is met by several "Serbs" who want to cross over to the "Albanian" side. It is necessary, using techniques with and without weapons, to stop them. Then each team member receives a pair of trays with 81mm mines to be delivered to a new training site. Once there, they put on protective equipment and engage in hand-to-hand combat with representatives of the other team, using "boxing" sticks.

Then the cadets will again have to go down the rope from high tower, after which - a wrestling bout for 1 min. Further, overcoming obstacles, they move to a training place called "Ku-Chi". This is a system of underground tunnels and rooms that must be overcome in turn by each member of the team. Historically, the MP faced these obstacles in the 60s and 70s in South Vietnam. Specifically, the tunnel "Ku-Chi" was laid under the headquarters of the 25th Infantry Division. Mines, traps come across in the tunnel, gas and smoke screens are placed, noises are created. Part of the path must be overcome in a gas mask. Upon exiting the tunnel, each cadet meets with an instructor in a boxing match with the task of holding out for 1 minute.

Having finished the boxing fights, the members of the team are tied with a rope and run to the helipad. Here they are released from the rope and perform 10 falls forward, backward and sideways. The space in front of the drop zone is pollinated with pepper gas, which forces the cadet to make a jump before falling. Then the teams are equipped with protective equipment and meet one on one in the "octagon" (a wooden shed with two gates and a horizontal slot around the perimeter), where hand-to-hand fights are held with boxing sticks that mimic rifles with a bayonet. Despite the protective equipment, in the absence of clear control with a boxing stick, you can knock out an opponent. Repeated blows during an unstopped fight can be fatal.

The last training place is the shooting range. The teams take off the devices for firing blanks, receive live ammunition and advance to the firing line. After completing the exercise, weapons are checked and unused cartridges are handed over.

Testing. In order to receive the next belt, the applicant must:
know 90 percent all theoretical disciplines;
- master 70 percent. fighting techniques next belt;
- attend all theoretical classes and discussions necessary to obtain the desired belt;
-completely complete a self-education program;
- spend the number of hours specified by order in order to master and consolidate new techniques and improve old ones.

Each applicant receives a personal record of the time spent on learning and mastering new ones, as well as on practicing previously learned techniques. The martial arts instructor personally writes on the card the number of the session or topic and the number of hours spent on his/her study or mastery. He confirms his entry by indicating his rank and surname, securing the entry with his signature. This allows you to study according to the program while on business trips, etc. The applicant presents his list, the recommendation of his commander, a certificate stating that he has read the required books and discussed their content to the qualification commission. All this is necessary for admission to the exam. The exam begins with the fact that, at the choice of the commission, the applicant must perfectly perform five tricks from the arsenal of his belts. So, when surrendering to a gray belt, you need to demonstrate five tricks, and when surrendering to a brown one, 15. If the technique is performed technically incorrectly, there is no speed, no effort, then the applicant is not allowed to qualify. If this stage is passed, he must perform all the moves required to obtain the desired belt.

This is followed by theoretical exams. Here, the applicant must not only give definitions, but also be able to prove that the policy of the Marine Corps on this issue is the only true, fair and proven practice over the years. After successful delivery of all disciplines, he is awarded the earned belt and the designation of his VUS is changed. If a cadet received a yellow-brown belt, then three letters are added to the designation of his VUS - MMV, when he receives a gray belt, the designation will be MMS, etc. In addition, he may be assigned the following military rank after receiving the belt corresponding to this rank.

Undoubtedly, any of such martial arts as judo, karate, wushu and sambo contains a much richer and more complex arsenal of throwing and striking techniques than PBIMP, but they fight in sportswear. Classes under this program are accompanied by carrying the wounded, ammunition, overcoming obstacles, repeated repetitions of techniques. Some methods of preparing for hand-to-hand combat are clearly borrowed from the practice of the Airborne Forces.

PBIMP has been operating for more than seven years. During this time, it has been repeatedly changed and improved in order to achieve optimal results. The program combined the elements of psychological preparation for combat into a single block, raised the moral and ethical level of the marines, and improved combat and physical training. The Navy has also adopted a similar program for its medical officers, who traditionally provide medical care Marines at the landing site. The command of the MP believes that he managed to develop a training program for modern, namely martial arts, which is a reliable tool in the education and training of the Marine Corps.

Foreign military review No. 8 2008 P. 62-67