Modern problems of science and education. Ontological, epistemological, sociocultural foundations of the diversity of sciences
Ontological foundations of the diversity of sciences
Variety of forms of motion and types of matter
The unity of scientific knowledge is sometimes justified by reference to the materialist position about the unity of the world. The world is united due to its materiality; every science studies the aspects and properties of moving matter, therefore scientific knowledge is unified in the sense that all of it is a reflection of the material world. This reasoning is absolutely correct, in the above sense, scientific knowledge is truly united, and for a consistent materialist there is no problem here: there are no sciences that study the phenomena of the “other” world. However, the question of the unity of scientific knowledge remains, and this indicates that its formulation is connected not so much with the struggle against spiritualism, mysticism, religion, but with the differentiation of sciences, and the recognition of the consequences is quite compatible with the thesis of the unity of the world.
To the statement about the material unity of the world, materialist philosophy also adds a statement about its inexhaustible qualitative diversity. This is the variety of forms of movement of matter, and the variety of its types and structural levels. When developing the classification of sciences, F. Engels, as is known, relied on the thesis about the existence of forms of motion of matter that are different from each other and irreducible to one another. “The classification of sciences,” he wrote, “each of which analyzes a separate form of movement or a series of forms of movement interconnected and transforming into each other, is at the same time a classification, an arrangement, according to the inherent sequence of these forms of movement themselves, and in this that is precisely its meaning.” If all previous classifications of sciences were based on the abilities of the human soul (memory, imagination, etc.), then the fundamental difference between the Marxist classification, noted B. M. Kedrov, lies precisely in the fact that it lays the “principle of objectivity” as the basis for the division of sciences ": differences between sciences are due to differences in the objects they study.
The material world, opposed to science as an object of study, is usually divided into three large areas: inanimate nature - the world of living organisms - social phenomena. The sciences of the first group study the forms of motion inherent in inanimate objects: the movements of elementary particles and fields - gravitational, weak, electromagnetic and strong interactions; underlying movements of atoms and molecules chemical reactions; movement of macroscopic bodies - heat, sound, crystallization processes, changes in states of aggregation, etc.; movement in cosmic systems of various orders - planets, stars, galaxies, etc. The sciences of the second group study life processes: in microorganisms, unicellular, multicellular, species, biocenoses, biosphere. Finally, social sciences study the processes of thinking, forms of human activity, processes characteristic of groups and states. Each of these forms of matter movement is studied by a special science.
Thus, ontological basis of the diversity of sciences is the objectively existing vast variety of different types of material objects, their structural levels, forms of movement. Each specific science differs from the others, first of all, in its specific object of study, and objective differences in the forms and structures of the material world determine the differences between the sciences that study them. Only if the world were a homogeneous, qualityless substance devoid of movement, would only one science be sufficient to study it. It follows, by the way, that the impatient apostles of the unity of scientific knowledge, in order to realize their ideal of a single (or one) science, simply need to wait for the onset of the notorious heat death of the Universe. Fortunately, the world still sparkles with thousands of different facets, and a reflection of this diversity is the diversity of sciences.
However, they will tell us, the indicated regions and subregions of the material world are not at all separated by Chinese walls. Materialist philosophy recognizes the splitting of the material world into a number of increasingly complex structural levels and forms of movement. But at the same time, she persistently emphasizes the interconnection of structural levels and the interconvertibility of forms of movement. Moreover, the relationships between structures and forms of movement are both genetic and functional in nature: higher forms of movement and more complex structural formations arise from less complex ones in the process of evolutionary development of matter; higher forms of motion include simpler forms inherent in less complex types of matter. All these are well-known and indisputable provisions, substantiated by enormous material from specific sciences. The fabric of the world is not torn into separate pieces, although it is painted in different colors.
From here the conclusion naturally follows that the sciences are interconnected, that the interconnection of the sciences should reflect the interconnection of the structures and forms of movement of matter. Although this conclusion is not entirely correct, since the objective relationship of phenomena does not at all determine the relationship of the sciences about these phenomena, we will not dispute it. More importantly, the interconnection of sciences is far from unity. The interrelation of forms of movement and structural levels does not at all deprive them of their qualitative originality and does not abolish their specific properties and laws. “Despite all the gradualness,” F. Engels noted this circumstance, “the transition from one form of movement to another always remains a leap, a decisive turn. This is the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to the mechanics of small masses on individual celestial bodies; the same is the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules, which covers the movements that constitute the subject of study of physics in the proper sense of the word: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In exactly the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms - to chemistry - is again accomplished through a decisive leap. This occurs to an even greater extent during the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemistry of proteins, which we call life.” Likewise, the interrelation of sciences does not in any way suit their differentiation, their qualitative originality. Knowledge of laws lower form movement tells us nothing about the laws of higher forms, and vice versa. Knowledge of the laws of mechanics is unlikely to help us understand the behavior of people in the subway, although the crowd gathered at the escalator is very reminiscent of a bunch of billiard balls being pushed towards a corner pocket. This is also true when we know that some form of movement or structural organization arose from a lower or simpler form or structure that we have studied. Even if you know someone's parents well young man and you know the process by which he was born, his business, moral, intellectual qualities require special study.
Epistemological foundations of the diversity of sciences
The inevitability of abstractions
The diversity of sciences is due not only to the qualitative diversity of reality itself, it also has roots in the specific way in which science understands the world around us. The picture drawn above is simple to the point of being crude: Reality is divided into a number of subject areas D1, D2,..., Dk, and each area is studied by one special science H1, N2,..., Nk. If this is partly true, then only in the very first approximation, when we are talking about three (or four) large areas of research: nature - society - thinking (and maybe technology). An attempt to continue this division and bring it to separate sciences, comparing each of them with a special object area, in general, does not succeed. Although there are, of course, sciences that study certain selected groups of material objects, for example, microbiology or numismatics, they do not at all strive and, in principle, are not able to contain all the knowledge about these objects. Some of their features remain outside the scope of research of these specific sciences. In particular, numismatics is interested in the history of coinage, their types, social functions, etc., but to determine the composition of the alloys from which coins were minted, it is forced to turn to chemistry. At the same time, the so-called fundamental sciences are in a sense the whole world. Therefore, there is no one-to-one correspondence between forms of motion, material structures and specific sciences: the same material object is usually studied by many different sciences, and the results of a single science are sometimes valid for a variety of objects. For example, the laws of ballistics are true for a stone fired from a sling, and for a cannonball, and for ballistic missile. The last circumstance is due to the fact that not a single science studies its object as a whole, in the totality of its properties. In the process of cognition, an ideal splitting of material objects into separate aspects and properties occurs, highlighting some aspects and abstracting from others. Scientific knowledge moves even further away from holistic reflection, highlighting individual sides and aspects in material objects and turning them into special - abstract - objects, which it makes the direct subject of study of specific sciences.
Analytical decomposition of the immediately given, abstraction and subsequent idealization forms the world of science - the world of ideal objects, to which the concepts and statements of the theories of individual sciences directly relate. The comparative simplicity, rigidity and certainty of ideal objects make it possible to use mathematical language to describe them and express the relationships between them in precise quantitative data. It was precisely the rejection of attempts to embrace material phenomena and processes in all their integrity and complexity, their analytical dissection, the isolation and study of their individual aspects in their pure form that served as the basis for the gigantic successes of modern science. Each specific science sees in the world around only its own subject, that is, one side, one aspect of the world, but it sees this aspect clearly and describes it deeply and accurately. The integrity of the material object is restored as a result of theoretical reconstruction, when its projections, studied by individual sciences, are combined in one representation. For example, for a mechanic a person is a set of simple mechanisms, for a chemist - a vessel of chemical reactions, for a zoologist - a higher animal, for a sociologist - a consumer or producer of some goods, etc. What is a person? Everything that science as a whole can say, and something beyond that. “The concrete is concrete,” wrote K. Marx, “because it is a synthesis of many definitions, therefore, the unity of the diverse. In thinking it therefore appears as a process of synthesis, as a result, and not as a starting point and, as a result, also the starting point of contemplation and representation. On the first path, the complete idea evaporates to the point of abstract definition; on the second path, abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete through thinking.”
What is described here, of course, is nothing more than the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete - that “universal method that actually characterizes developed scientific knowledge.” It is believed that every science that has reached a certain stage in its development uses this method. Some authors identify this method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete with the hypothetico-deductive method, emphasizing that “these are not two different methods, but the same method characterized differently.” It is known that the hypothetico-deductive method involves moving from the fundamental principles of the theory to their empirically verifiable consequences. Therefore, the identification of these two methods leads to the identification of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete with the “ascent” from the theoretical to the empirical and, as a consequence of this, to the implicit identification of the concrete with the empirical. Having reached this point, we begin to experience doubts: can the empirical object of a particular science be identified with a specific material object?
If you do not succumb to the stultifying influence of familiar phrases, then it is difficult to agree with all this. Modern ideas about the structure and functions of scientific theory lead to the conclusion that not a single specific science uses or can use the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete. The transition from the theoretical to the empirical, so characteristic of individual sciences, is not at all a transition from the abstract to the concrete. When we move from the fundamentals of the theory to the description of experimental empirical effects, we do not at all come to a theoretical reconstruction of a specific object in all its multifaceted complexity; we come to a description of only one side of it - that which is the proper subject of study of this science. The empiricism of concrete sciences remains inevitably abstract, because, we repeat, concrete science is not able to see in any object more than one aspect it studies. A mechanic can describe the distribution of forces in a woman's hand holding a peach to her lips, and this description can be verified empirically using various sensors, but the mechanic will not say anything more about the hand. In the same way, any other concrete science in its empirical statements gives a one-sided and, in this Hegelian sense, an abstract characteristic of objects and phenomena of the material world. When we talk about the synthesis of abstract definitions and the theoretical reconstruction of the concrete in all its diversity, it is clear that such a synthesis can only be achieved as a result of the unification of all abstract-empirical characteristics developed by the entirety of the concrete sciences. While the hypothetico-deductive method is used by individual specific sciences, the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete characterizes scientific knowledge as a whole and requires the involvement of all sciences.
The use of the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, expressing the specificity of scientific knowledge, shows epistemological necessity of diversity of sciences Before starting this ascent, it is necessary to form its basis: to decompose the world into separate aspects and sides, turn them into an independent subject of study, express them in abstract theoretical concepts and, with their help, through the hypothetical-deductive method, obtain abstract-empirical characteristics of real objects. Only after this can we begin to reconstruct the concrete. All this means that the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete requires a variety of sciences.
The semantic meanings of the fundamental concepts and laws of a particular science are determined by the properties and relationships of its idealized objects. Since the idealized objects of individual sciences are different, each science has its own specific language for displaying the selected aspect of reality. Even if a certain word is found in the languages of different sciences, this should not deceive us: it expresses different concepts. Therefore, when representatives of different sciences talk about one object, they are still talking about different things and in this sense are not able to understand each other.
Sociocultural foundations of the diversity of sciences
Social division of labor
Science is an element of the social structure, therefore its development reveals features characteristic of the development of human society as a whole. The activity of a scientist is a type of social labor, and it develops in accordance with those general sociological laws that govern any sphere of human activity. From the point of view of a materialistic understanding of history, the basis of social progress is the improvement of the means of production, which is accompanied by a corresponding division of labor and differentiation of various types of activities. In his work “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,” F. Engels explores in detail the enormous role in the development of human society from savagery to civilization played by the first major divisions of labor: the separation of cattle breeding from agriculture, the separation of crafts and the transformation of trade into a special field of activity. The division of labor contributed to a sharp increase in its productivity, the stratification of society into classes and social groups, the formation of the state, etc. In the end, science itself stands out as a separate sphere of social activity thanks to the division of labor.
During the period of the formation of the capitalist mode of production, the labor of a medieval artisan was divided into separate operations, the performance of which would not have been difficult to teach yesterday’s peasant or tramp. Large manufactories appeared, providing mass production of handicraft products. The division of the entire labor process into a number of individual operations and mass manufacturing prepared the way for the use of machines. The emergence and improvement of machines caused an even greater division of labor processes into smaller and smaller operations, led to an increasing specialization of workers, but ultimately sharply increased the productivity of social labor. This growth of differentiation and specialization in all spheres of social activity continues to this day. Nowadays there are practically no workers who would produce a certain product from start to finish. The production of any product of dissection into a number of small operations - metalworking, turning, milling, thermal, etc. - the mastery of which has turned into a special specialty. These operations themselves are divided into even smaller ones, which prepares the basis for their subsequent automation. The worker, any worker, has long ago turned into a “partial” worker. And this was due to the objective laws of the development of social production.
Scientific activity is no exception. The Middle Ages, as is known, knew seven “liberal arts” (the trivium - grammar, dialectics, rhetoric - and the quadrivium - arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). All these “arts” were closely related to each other and were united under the supremacy of theology. Every scientist of that era mastered almost all the “arts.” The Renaissance and the formation of modern Science quickly put an end to this cozy unity. Great geographical discoveries turned geography into a science; botany and zoology received a huge new material; the works of Copernicus, Tycho de Brahe, Kepler, Galileo turned astronomy into a rapidly developing field; mathematics, mechanics, and optics rapidly erected buildings of majestic theories. Unity has exploded and given way to progressive differentiation. The emerging concrete sciences, like galaxies, rapidly scattered in different directions, and no red shift was required in order to detect this process. A distinctive feature of the new science was that it did not try to understand the world in its synthetic unity, as was typical for the natural philosophical systems of antiquity and the theological concepts of the Middle Ages, but singled out individual aspects of the world and engaged in an in-depth study of these aspects. Accumulation scientific results quickly turned the study of one aspect of reality into a special science. The successes of science led to its further differentiation, and the latter, in turn, contributed to the obtaining of new, even more profound results.
In the 20th century the number of sciences has become immense, new sciences arise at the junctions of old, established disciplines - biochemistry, bionics, psycholinguistics, technical sciences, etc. Moreover, the division scientific work penetrated into the sciences and led to the division of scientists in one field of knowledge into theorists and experimenters; specialists in a particular period of history, region, country; scientists engaged in basic or applied research. Like the worker, the modern scientist is, as a rule, only a “partial” scientist - a narrow specialist. However, it was precisely these increasing differentiation and specialization that were, as the history of science shows, the basis of its rapid progressive development. At present, when about 80% of all ever living scientists work on Earth, narrow specialization allows even those who are not very capable to contribute to the development of science.
It is perhaps worth mentioning one more social factor, which not only consolidates the spontaneously emerging differentiation, but also contributes to its deepening. Modern science is institutionalized, that is, organized into certain forms, giving rise to a certain hierarchy and reward system. In a market society, the knowledge that a scientist possesses is the commodity that he brings to the public market for exchange. For his product, the scientist receives a certain share of public goods. The more society needs certain knowledge and the rarer the corresponding specialists are found, the more material benefits it provides to scientists working in this field. Therefore, scientists are to some extent interested in establishing a monopoly on one or another area of science, even if it is a very narrow one. This gives rise to competition between scientific schools and unconscious resistance to integration attempts that can devalue the knowledge of a particular area. Of course, such mercantile considerations are deeply alien to genuine scientists, but how many of them are genuine scientists?
The science as such, as a holistic developing formation, it includes a number of special sciences, which are in turn subdivided into many scientific disciplines. Revealing the structure of science in this aspect poses problem of classification of sciences – disclosure of their relationship on the basis of certain principles and criteria and expression of their connection in the form of a logically justified arrangement in a certain series (“structural section”).
One of the first attempts to systematize and classify accumulated knowledge belongs to Aristotle. He divided all knowledge - and in Antiquity it coincided with philosophy - depending on the scope of its application into three groups: theoretical, where knowledge is conducted for its own sake; practical, which provides guiding ideas for human behavior; creative, where cognition is carried out to achieve something beautiful. Theoretical knowledge Aristotle, in turn, divided (according to his subject) into three parts: a) first philosophy” (later “metaphysics” - the science of the highest principles and first causes of everything that exists, inaccessible to the senses and comprehended speculatively; b) mathematics; c) physics, which studies the various states of bodies in nature. Aristotle did not identify the formal logic he created with philosophy or its sections, but considered it an “organ” (tool) of all knowledge.
During the period of the emergence of science as an integral sociocultural phenomenon (XVI – XVII centuries), the “Great Restoration of the Sciences” was undertaken by F. Bacon. Depending on a person’s cognitive abilities (such as memory, reason and imagination), he divided sciences into three large groups: a) history as a description of facts, including natural and civil; b) theoretical sciences, or “philosophy” in the broad sense of the word; c) poetry, literature, art in general.
Hegel gave a classification of sciences on a dialectical-idealistic basis. Based on the principle of development, subordination (hierarchy) of forms of knowledge, he divided his philosophical system into three large sections corresponding to the stages of development of the Absolute Idea (“world spirit”): a) logic, which in Hegel coincides with dialectics and the theory of knowledge and includes three doctrines: about being, about essence, about concept; b) philosophy of nature; c) philosophy of spirit.
For all its schematism and artificiality, the Hegelian classification of sciences expressed the idea of the development of reality as an organic whole from its lower stages to the highest, right up to the generation of the thinking spirit.
The founder of positivism, O. Comte, proposed his classification of sciences. Rejecting Bacon's principle of dividing sciences according to the various abilities of the human mind, he believed that this principle should follow from the study of the classified objects themselves and be determined by the actual, natural connections that exist between them.
Implementing his plans regarding the classification (hierarchy) of sciences, the French philosopher proceeded from the fact that:
a) there are sciences related to the external world, on the one hand, and to man, on the other;
b) philosophy of nature (i.e., the totality of sciences about nature) should be divided into two branches: inorganic and organic (in accordance with their subjects of study);
c) natural philosophy consistently covers “three great branches of knowledge” - astronomy, chemistry and biology.
Comte argued that there is an internal connection between all types of knowledge. However, Comte's classification of sciences is mainly statistical in nature and underestimates the principle of development. In addition, he did not escape physicalism, relativism, agnosticism, interminism and some other shortcomings.
On a materialistic and at the same time dialectical basis, the problem of classification of sciences was proposed by F. Engels. Based on contemporary natural scientific discoveries, he took the forms of movement of matter in nature as the main criterion for dividing sciences.
With the concept “form of motion of matter”, common and uniform for all areas of nature, Engels covered: firstly, various processes in inanimate nature; secondly, life.
The classification of sciences given by Engels has not lost its relevance to this day, although, of course, it deepens, improves, becomes more specific, etc. as our knowledge about matter and the forms of its movement develops.
At the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. The most interesting and productive ideas on the problem of classification of social sciences were formulated by the German philosopher and cultural historian W. Dilthey, a representative of the “philosophy of life”, and the leaders of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism W. Windelband and G. Rickert.
V. Dilthey identified two aspects of the concept of “life”: the interaction of living beings - in relation to nature; interaction that exists between individuals in certain external conditions, comprehended regardless of changes in place and time - in relation to the human world. Understanding life (in the unity of these two aspects) underlies the division of sciences into two main classes. Some of them study the life of nature, others (“spiritual sciences”) – the life of people. Dilthey argued for the independence of the subject and method of the humanities in relation to the natural sciences.
If supporters of the philosophy of life proceeded from the fact that the cultural sciences differ from the natural sciences in their subject matter, then the neo-Kantians believed that these two groups of sciences differ primarily in the method they use.
The leaders of the Baden school of Eo-Kantianism, W. Windelband and G. Rickert, put forward the thesis that there are two classes of sciences: historical and natural. The first are ideographic, i.e. describing individual, unique events, situations and processes. The second are nomothetic: they record general, repeating, regular properties of the objects being studied, abstracting from unimportant individual properties.
In the middle of the 20th century. The original classification of sciences was proposed by V.I. Vernadsky. Depending on the nature of the objects being studied, he identified two kinds (types) of sciences: 1) sciences, the objects (and laws) of which cover all of reality - both our planet and its biosphere, and outer space. In other words, these are sciences whose objects correspond to the basic, general phenomena of reality; 2) sciences, the objects (and laws) of which are peculiar and characteristic only of our Earth.
As for the classification of modern sciences, they are carried out on a variety of grounds (criteria). By subject and method of cognition We can distinguish the sciences about nature - natural science, about society - social science (humanities, social sciences) and about knowledge itself, thinking (logic, epistemology, dialectics, epistemology, etc.). A separate group consists of technical sciences.
According to their “remoteness” from practice, science can be divided into two large types: fundamental, which clarify the basic laws and principles of the real world and where there is no direct orientation to practice, and applied, which is the direct application of the results of scientific knowledge to solve specific industrial and socio-practical problems. , relying on the laws established by fundamental sciences. At the same time, the boundaries between individual sciences and scientific disciplines are conditional and fluid.
To date, the classification of natural sciences has been most thoroughly developed, although there are many debatable and controversial issues here.
Classification of sciences
Science as an integral developing formation includes a number of special sciences, which in turn are divided into many scientific disciplines. Revealing the structure of science in this aspect poses the problem of classifying sciences - revealing their relationship on the basis of certain principles and criteria and expressing their connection in the form of a logically justified arrangement in a certain series. One of the first attempts to systematize and classify accumulated knowledge belongs to Aristotle. He divided all knowledge - and in antiquity it coincided with philosophy - depending on the scope of its application into three groups: theoretical, where knowledge is conducted for its own sake; practical, which gives guiding ideas for human behavior; creative, where cognition is carried out to achieve something beautiful. During the period of the emergence of science as an integral sociocultural phenomenon (XVI-XVII centuries), F. Bacon, depending on human cognitive abilities (such as memory, reason and imagination), divided the sciences into three large groups: a) history as a description of facts b) theoretical sciences, or “philosophy”; c) poetry, literature, art. Hegel gave a classification of sciences on a dialectical-idealistic basis. Based on the principle of development, subordination (hierarchy) of forms of knowledge, he divided his philosophical system into three large sections corresponding to the main stages of development of the Absolute Idea (“world spirit”): a) Logic, which in Hegel coincides with dialectics and the theory of knowledge and includes three teachings: about being, about essence, about concept; b) Philosophy of nature; c) Philosophy of spirit. The philosophy of nature was further divided into mechanics and organic physics, which consistently considers geological nature, plant nature and animal organism. Hegel divided the “philosophy of spirit” into three sections: subjective spirit, objective spirit, absolute spirit. The doctrine of “subjective spirit” is consistently revealed in such sciences as anthropology, phenomenology and psychology. The founder of positivism, O. Comte, proposed his classification of sciences. Realizing his plans regarding the classification (hierarchy) of sciences, the French philosopher proceeded from the fact that: a) there are sciences related to the external world, on the one hand, and to man, on the other; b) philosophy of nature (i.e. the totality of sciences about nature) should be divided into two branches: inorganic and organic (in accordance with their subjects of study); c) natural philosophy consistently covers “three great branches of knowledge” - astronomy, chemistry and biology. F. Engels solved the problem of classification of sciences on a materialistic and at the same time on a dialectical basis. He took the forms of motion of matter in nature as the main criterion for dividing sciences. With the concept “form of motion of matter”, common and uniform for all areas of nature, Engels covered: firstly, various processes in inanimate nature; secondly, life (biological form of movement). It followed that the sciences are located naturally into a single series - mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology - just as the very forms of motion of matter follow each other, transform into each other and develop from one another - the highest from the lowest, complex from simple. At the same time, Engels paid special attention to the need for a thorough study of complex and subtle transitions from one form of matter to another. In this regard, he predicted that it is at the intersections of the basic sciences (physics and chemistry, chemistry and biology, etc.) that the most important and fundamental discoveries. In the middle of the 20th century. The original classification of sciences was proposed by V.I. Vernadsky. Depending on the nature of the objects being studied, he distinguished two kinds (types) of sciences: 1) sciences, the objects (and laws) of which cover all of reality - both our planet and its biosphere, and outer space. In other words, these are sciences whose objects correspond to the basic, general phenomena of reality; 2) sciences, the objects (and laws) of which are peculiar and characteristic only of our Earth. In accordance with this understanding of the objects of different sciences, we can distinguish in the noosphere (sphere of the mind) sciences common to all reality (physics, astronomy, chemistry, mathematics) and earth sciences (biological, geological and humanities). Logic, according to the Russian scientist, occupies a special position, since, being inextricably linked with human thought, it equally covers all sciences - both the humanities and natural mathematics. All aspects of scientific knowledge form a single science, which is in rapid development, and the area covered by it is ever increasing. As for the classifications of modern sciences, they are carried out on a variety of grounds (criteria). According to the subject and method of cognition, one can distinguish the sciences about nature - natural science, about society - social science (humanities, social sciences) and about knowledge itself, thinking (logic, epistemology, dialectics, epistemology, etc.). Technical sciences leave a separate group. Modern mathematics is a very unique science. According to some scientists, it does not belong to the natural sciences, but is an essential element of their thinking. According to their “remoteness” from practice, science can be divided into two large types: fundamental, which clarify the basic laws and principles of the real world and where there is no direct orientation to practice, and applied - direct application of the results of scientific knowledge to solve specific industrial and socio-practical problems.
Question No. 28
Problems of the unity of sciences.
Science is like living nature. Life, in principle, in its essence cannot exist without its embodiment in many forms. So is science. Its polyformism is due not only to the real diversity of reality, but also to the different epistemological status of its entire toolkit, the effectiveness of which manifests itself differently in different cognitive situations.
The unity of science does not necessarily have to manifest itself in the increasing reduction of some forms of organization of scientific knowledge and methods of obtaining it to others. It is expressed in the ever more clearly emerging interrelations of various branches of science, which are revealed when their real capabilities in reflecting reality are established.
The diversity of sciences is due to ontological differentiation. The unity of sciences is the unity of the universe – the connection between different levels of the universe. The unity of the universe or world has several aspects:
Substrate unity. Substrate is the material from which elementary particles are made: atoms, molecules, physical fields. Since these systems are the subject of consideration of various sciences, their unity should be expressed in the unity of sciences. The unity of chemistry and physics to understand Chemical properties elements, you need to know the structure of atoms, and this is the subject of study of atomic physics. 1869 Mendeleev compiled a table purely empirically. He could not explain why inert gases are passive, he simply identified a pattern by placing them in a table by cell. In the 20th century, physicists based on quantum mechanics described the structure of electron shells and explained the periodic table. Unity of laws. Physical laws operate in both chemical and biological systems. The law of universal gravitation, the law of conservation of energy, etc. Genetic unity is the unity of the history of the universe; the universe is united by history, how the chemical, biological form of matter was formed, the unity of science is manifested in the desire to unite into a system of science. How biology and chemistry, economic theory and sociology, cultural studies and ethnography relate. This system of science will turn into a unified system. The unity of sciences is manifested in the desire to build the most general theories. A. Einstein sought to build a unified field theory. The unity of sciences is manifested in the fact that sciences exhibit common approaches:
1) System
2) Cybernetic
3) Synergistic
Common methods of application: observation, experiment, induction, deduction. Universal methods, such as: dialectical, metaphysical.
What can be said about the problem of the unity of scientific knowledge? Apparently, we need to start with the remark that authors writing about the unity of scientific knowledge often use the term “unity” in a very vague sense. This allows, of course, to express many interesting, sometimes subtle considerations about the unity of science, but most of them turn out to be meaningless. Therefore, conversations about the unity of scientific knowledge, about the possibilities and ways of achieving the desired unity should, apparently, begin with a clear indication of what they want to understand by “unity” when it comes to science.
How is this concept most often interpreted? As a very first approximation, we can distinguish at least three different interpretations of the unity of scientific knowledge, each of which views the modern differentiation of sciences as temporary or external. The most definite meaning is given to the concept of unity by those authors who talk about the replacement of currently existing sciences with one science, about the merging of subject areas of various sciences into one area, about the formation of one language, the development of a single method, about complete mutual understanding between scientists, etc. Unified science - this is one science. Such a science does not yet exist, but it will be created. What can be said about this understanding, which identifies the “unity” of science with its “uniqueness”? As long as science remains science, it will always be divided into many specific sciences, areas, languages, theories. If the currently diverse sciences ever merge into one science, with one language and one theory, then this will no longer be what we call science today. In this regard, we can recall feudalism with its fragmentation into many small estates, each of which had its own sovereign, army, closed economy, rules of legal proceedings, etc. Overcoming feudal fragmentation, the formation of centralized states, the formation of nations and a single national language is the end of feudalism as a special social structure. All discussions about overcoming the diversity of scientific knowledge are, in essence, discussions about the elimination of science as a special historical form of human knowledge and its replacement with another form.
Sometimes the unity of science is understood as something common that is inherent in each specific science, which, therefore, distinguishes science as a whole as a special form of social consciousness. Whatever field scientific knowledge belongs to, it must be, for example, consistent, empirically verifiable, substantiated, confirmed by facts, etc. It is these features, ensuring the unity of its various fields, that distinguish scientific knowledge from natural philosophical, religious and pseudoscientific concepts. Regarding this understanding, the following can be noted. Firstly, community is not yet unity. The moon and the head of Dutch cheese have similar features, however, it is difficult to talk about any unity between them. The existence of methodological norms and standards common to all specific sciences does not yet indicate their unity. Secondly, it is not difficult to notice that in this aspect the problem of the unity of scientific knowledge is implicitly transformed into the problem of demarcation: how does knowledge differ from faith, science from religion or myth? It is known that the boundary between science and non-science is very vague, even if by “science” we mean only natural science. When we also take into account the social sciences, this boundary disappears altogether. The unity of scientific knowledge, based on the demarcation between science and other forms of social consciousness, turns out to be as uncertain as the criteria for demarcation are uncertain.
The most cautious researchers of the problem of the unity of scientific knowledge talk about integrative and reduction processes in modern science. They see the unity of science in the predominance of integrative tendencies. “This desire for integration,” wrote, for example, N. F. Ovchinnikov, “can be considered as a manifestation of a tendency towards the unity of scientific knowledge.” In the 19th century, tendencies towards differentiation prevailed in science; The 20th century brought a desire for integration, for unity. We can agree that for certain areas of scientific knowledge, for example, physics, this statement is true. However, for science as a whole it seems doubtful. Here, a more attractive position is one that asserts the equality and interdependence of two opposing tendencies - towards integration and differentiation. This position was expressed with the greatest clarity and completeness by N. T. Abramova: “... Monism and polyformism (diversity), she notes, coexist in modern consciousness, and each of them represents an additional phenomenon for understanding the development of scientific knowledge as a whole.” Centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the development of science are intertwined as closely as chromosomes are intertwined in meiosis, and only this keeps science in the orbit of progress. The latter position seems immune to criticism.
However, this does not mean that one must agree with it. Integration processes are local and temporary. Attempts at integration, synthesis, and reduction, if they lead to success, are only in certain scientific fields and for a short time. Subsequent development brings with it a new, deeper and more subtle differentiation. Differentiation expresses the movement of science, therefore it is universal and absolute as the movement itself; integration, synthesis is a temporary stop, putting in order and reviewing the intellectual forces advancing in different directions. Eliminating or stopping differentiation means eliminating or stagnating science itself. The unity of human knowledge in different eras was ensured by myth, religion or philosophy. This unity has never been the unity of science. As soon as science in the proper sense of the word begins to develop, the unity of knowledge instantly disappears. And this once lost unity is just as impossible to restore as it is impossible to return lost innocence.
And is differentiation really as bad as it is sometimes said? Arguments that implicitly demonstrate the harm of differentiation are usually given in favor of integration and unity of scientific knowledge. However, the latter has its own advantages. There is no doubt that modern differentiation and division of labor in science allows many of those who have neither the ability nor the inclination for scientific activity to be called scientists. But if, say, two hundred years ago, a bird lover and connoisseur could only fruitlessly pour out his love on a pet canary, now he can satisfy his curiosity as an ornithologist and at the same time bring benefit to society. Differentiation makes it possible for an increasing number of people to demonstrate their cognitive abilities, for whom these abilities had previously faded away without finding expression. And this is why it is infinitely valuable for the development of human spiritual powers.
To summarize, we can repeat the wonderful words with which N. F. Ovchinnikov begins his article: “Modern scientific knowledge is a complex phenomenon and elusive in its unity.”
The creative nature of cognition
Cognition is not reduced simply to the perception and reproduction of objects of reality. Cognition is also a creative process. This circumstance reveals itself primarily in the following situations:
1) the most important aspect of cognition is the selection of information, which is then assigned the status of essential, significant in the construction of a particular picture of the world. Cognition never deals with all possible information, since such complete coverage of reality is practically unattainable. And this variability in the criteria for selecting essential information actually affects the creative nature of cognitive activity;
2) the creative nature of cognition manifests itself at the stage of generalizing significant information and at the stage of constructing abstract conclusions based on such generalizations. After all, we must not forget that any abstract intellectual construct has only an indirect relationship to reality. Actually, this mediation contains the potential for creative transformation of the world in accordance with the vision of the subject;
3) an integral part of the cognitive procedure is always the reconstruction of past states of reality and prediction of its future states. However, due to the fact that neither the past nor the future actually exists, it is necessary to state the creative nature of the above-mentioned operations.
All this gives us grounds to define the essence of knowledge as a construction based on the creative imagination of the subject. Moreover, in such a context, this imagination is analytical in nature. We are talking about the general ability of the mind of a cognizing person to remain in a certain state of pseudo-observation in relation to one’s own complex ideas, that is, in a state of constructive, constitutive and, at the same time, analyzing discretion and speculation. In other words, analytical creative imagination is an intellectual phantasia that allows you to “see” (“imagine”) various kinds of theoretical landscapes. In this regard, it will be useful to recall some statements of one of the greatest geometers of the 20th century. G. Weyl, who argued that a real mathematician always first “sees” this or that theorem and understands that it is “true”, and only then tries to “invent” a proof for it. In essence, Weil here implies the need for the cognizing subject to have a developed creative imagination, which would allow him to “invent” and “imagine” various theories.
As is clearly seen, logic and analysis do not exhaust the resources of human creative thinking. It is always necessary to remember the possibility of various kinds of intuitive insights, without which, in fact, not a single cognitive procedure can do.
Intuition is the ability of the mind to comprehend the truth by directly observing it without prior justification through evidence. In the act of intuition, the ability of the knowing subject to directly, “suddenly” find the truth is realized. The French thinker R. Descartes defined the essence of this phenomenon in the following way: “By intuition I mean not faith in the shaky evidence of the senses and not the deceptive judgment of a disordered imagination, but the concept of a clear and attentive mind, so simple and distinct that it leaves no doubt that what we think, or, what is the same thing, a strong concept of a clear and attentive mind, generated only by the natural light of reason and, thanks to its simplicity, more reliable than deduction itself.”
In the 20th century the role of intuition in understanding the world was fully described by representatives of the so-called intuitionistic mathematics (for example, L. Brouwer), who argued that in general all mathematical objects were initially constructed intuitively and that mathematics as a whole is a type of intuitive speculation. Moreover, since an intuitively constructed concept is always incomplete and is always in the process of development, according to intuitionists, the application in mathematics and logic, for example, of the concept of actual, completed infinity is impossible.
Of course, we should not forget that intuition is not carried out arbitrarily, that any intuitive insight is possible only in a space prepared for this. Every act of intuition is caused, on the one hand, by a certain intense tension of thought of the subject, striving to understand a certain cognitive difficulty, and on the other hand, by the presence of a necessary and sufficient amount of relevant information that allows the subject to be confident that his own mind is not deceiving him.
Thus, it can be argued that the process of cognition of the world as such should be considered as a set of acts of creativity in which the creative nature of the human mind is manifested.
Induction and deduction
The main direct, practical methods for constructing scientific hypotheses include the methods of induction and deduction.
Induction is a transition in the process of research from single, particular, individual aspects of a particular object to consideration of it in a general form, as well as the logical conclusion of any general pattern of development of a certain class of elements based on the knowledge obtained for individual objects of this class.
There is complete and incomplete induction. Complete is possible only if all elements of the class under study are checked, therefore in a number of situations it is fundamentally unfeasible: first of all, this applies to situations when the class under study is very large or infinite, as well as to situations where the study has a negative or destructive impact on class elements. In such cases, incomplete induction is used, which is based on extrapolation of knowledge about some elements to the entire class as a whole. It is as a result of incomplete induction that all the basic empirical scientific laws are obtained.
Types of incomplete induction characteristic of everyday thinking are popular induction (generalization based on simple enumeration) and induction from the past to the future (expectation of the occurrence of an event based on the identified connection between this event and some fixed circumstances that took place in the past).
In organized practice and in science, other types of incomplete induction are used:
1) induction through selection, i.e. a logical operation that includes, as auxiliary techniques, procedures for structuring a certain class of objects, identifying subclasses within it and studying a sample of elements presented in proportion to the ratio of these subclasses (an example of such induction is a sociological survey);
2) natural scientific induction, i.e. a logical procedure consisting in substantiating the connection between any generalizable feature and the specific properties of a certain class of elements (an example of this type of induction can be considered the study of the electrical conductivity of metals);
3) mathematical induction, i.e. a logical operation in which the presence of a generalizable feature is first established in the first element of some connected set, and then it is proved that its presence in each subsequent element follows from its presence in the previous one (an example of such induction is any study number sequences).
Typical mistakes Incomplete induction is an overly hasty generalization, as well as the desire to pass off the unique as natural.
To increase the reliability of incomplete induction, it makes sense to take the following measures.
First, you should work to expand the base of induction, that is, the total number of considered elements of the class under study.
Secondly, natural scientific induction can be legitimately used only for the study of objects grouped into real classes according to some essential characteristics, properties or purposes.
Third, it is sometimes useful to use different types of induction within the same study.
Deduction is transition in the process of research from a general vision of an object to a specific interpretation of its particular properties, as well as the logical conclusion of approximate consequences based on general premises.
Although the term itself eduction" was first used by Severinus Boethius, the concept deduction- as a proof of a proposition through a syllogism - appears already in Aristotle. In the philosophy and logic of the Middle Ages and the New Age, there were significant differences in views on the role of eduction among other methods for constructing scientific hypotheses. Thus, R. Descartes opposed d eduction intuition, through which, in his opinion, the human mind directly perceives the truth, while eduction provides the mind with only indirect, i.e., knowledge obtained through reasoning. F. Bacon, who rightly noted that in the conclusion obtained through d eduction, does not contain any information that is not contained (even if implicitly) in the premises, argued on this basis that for science eduction is a secondary method compared to the induction method.
In Kantian logic there is the idea of transcendental deduction, which expresses the way of relating a priori concepts to objects of actual experience.
WITH modern point view of the issue of mutual benefits eduction or induction has largely lost its meaning.
Sometimes the term "d" eduction"is used as a generic name for the general theory of constructing correct conclusions and conclusions. In accordance with this last usage, those sciences whose propositions are derived (at least predominantly) as consequences of some general basic laws, axioms, are usually called deductive (mathematics, theoretical mechanics and some branches of physics can serve as examples of deductive sciences), and the axiomatic method, through which produces conclusions of this kind of scientific proposals is often called axiomatic-deductive. This interpretation of the very concept of “deduction” is reflected in the so-called deduction theorem, which expresses the relationship between the logical connective of implication, formalizing the verbal expression “if..., then...”, and the relation of logical implication, deducibility. According to this theorem, if a certain corollary C is derived from the system of premises A and the premise B included in it, then the implication “if B, then C” is provable, that is, it is deducible without any other premises, from the axioms of system A alone.
Others related to the concept of d are of a similar nature. eduction logical terms. Thus, sentences that can be derived from each other are called deductively equivalent. The deductive completeness of a system with respect to any property consists in the fact that all expressions of this system with this property are provable in it.
Thus, within the framework of modern science, hypotheses are formulated through the use of logical procedures of induction and deduction. Moreover, it can be clearly stated that deductive inference is most productive when working with various kinds of fundamental, philosophical, mathematical and other systems, and induction is very effective when considering this or that factual material. In a metaphysical context, we can say that induction is appropriate when studying objects, the content of which is fully reflected in the totality of their manifestations, and deduction is meaningful in a situation where the essence of the objects being studied is not identical to an arbitrarily complete set of their specific properties.
Traditional method of analogy
In addition to the methods of induction and deduction, it is necessary to separately consider the method of traduction.
Traduction is a logical conclusion in which the premises and conclusion are judgments of the same level of generality. Russian logician L.V. Rutkovsky characterized tradition as a conclusion in which some definition is attributed to an object due to the fact that the same definition belongs to another object.
A type of tradition is analogy. This term itself means “the similarity of objects in some characteristics,” and analogy as a method of reasoning is a conclusion about the properties of an object based on its similarity with another, previously studied object.
The analogy has different applications. In science, it is used to construct hypotheses, for experimental work (after all, any scientific model is based on analogy) and as a method of argumentation. The analogy is also widely represented in technical creativity (many outstanding inventions were the result of the transfer of some technical solution from one area to another).
There are different types of analogies.
1) Analogy of properties. We are talking about the probability of assuming the presence of some common characteristics in objects for which certain common properties have already been identified (for example, since both the Earth and Mars are planets, the assumption of the action on Mars, by analogy with the Earth, of certain physical forces is scientific justified).
2) Analogy of relationships. This implies the possibility of transferring the logic of connections between some objects to the connections of objects that are somewhat similar to them (for example, since areas geometric shapes, related by the relation of similarity, are in a certain proportional relationship to each other, insofar as there is reason to assume that the volumes of bodies related by this relationship will also demonstrate the presence of such a relationship). A complex case of analogy of relations is structural analogy, or analogy through isomorphism, in which something common is established in the organization of various systems (an example is the planetary model of the atom).
3) Analogy of inferences. We are talking about the possibility of constructing, in cases where it is justified, mutually similar discourses (for example, since in empirical sciences it is extremely productive to conduct various kinds of practical experiments, there are grounds for modeling thought experiments in deductive sciences).
One should also distinguish between a simple (from the similarity of two objects in some characteristics they conclude about their similarity in other characteristics) and widespread (from the similarity of phenomena to the similarity of their causes) analogy. It is equally necessary to differentiate between strict (reasoning proceeds from the similarity of two objects in one characteristic to their similarity in another characteristic, which, however, depends on the first) and non-strict (the conclusion from the similarity of two objects in known characteristics to their similarity in such a new characteristic, about which is unknown whether it is dependent on the former or not) analogy. And, finally, it is necessary to isolate conditional (the situation when the connection between the common features of the compared objects is not clearly established and the feature that is assigned to the object under study by analogy with an already known object) and unconditional (the situation when the above-mentioned connection is clearly established , definitely and specifically) analogy.
Typical mistakes when constructing an analogy are excessive simplification and vulgarization of the study, when objects begin to be compared not by essential characteristics, but only by external similarity.
Ways to increase the reliability of analogies in science can be:
1) an increase in the number of basic characteristics on which the analogy is actually carried out;
2) establishing the essential nature of the common characteristics of the compared objects;
3) establishing the heterogeneity and specificity of the general characteristics of the compared objects;
4) fixing the dependence of a feature transferred from one object to another on their common properties;
5) strict consideration of all differences between compared objects that impede analogy.
It must always be remembered that conclusions by analogy are only probabilistic in nature and, as a result, their true or false status can only be established after some time has passed.
At the same time, the probabilistic nature of conclusions by analogy should not be absolutized. After all, in general, probability in science still characterizes some objectively existing connection between things, and any probabilistic judgment that scientists express concerns objectively possible events.
In addition, we should not forget that, unlike popular analogies used in everyday practice, many scientific conclusions based on analogies are close in nature to reliable knowledge. For example, everyone knows that the functioning of such monumental structures as a bridge or a dam is initially studied using models. The model in this case acts as an analogue of the corresponding object. Modeling allows, using a reduced (or in some cases enlarged) model, to conduct a qualitative and quantitative study of the processes occurring in an object that is inaccessible for detailed study. The results of a single experiment are then generalized and transferred to a whole group of objects similar to the one being studied. The modeling method is therefore based on the principle of analogy, which provides a rationale for transferring the patterns examined in the model directly to the actual object itself. At the same time, the final conclusions are more likely to be reliable than probabilistic, since the judgments “the dam will probably withstand the pressure of water” and “the bridge will probably not collapse” cannot be considered sufficient.
Thus, the importance of the traditional method of analogy for constructing scientific hypotheses cannot be overestimated.
The role of interpretation in science
Interpretation, as a special method with fixed rules for translating formal symbols and concepts into the language of meaningful knowledge, is very widely used by modern science (including for constructing scientific hypotheses themselves).
In general terms, interpretation can be defined as the establishment of a system of objects that make up the subject area of meaning of the terms of some theory. It acts as a logical procedure for identifying the denotations of abstract terms and their actual meaning. One of the common cases of using the interpretation method is a meaningful presentation of the original abstract theory through the subject area of another more concrete theory, the empirical meanings of the concepts of which have already been established. Interpretation occupies a central place primarily in the deductive sciences.
In the humanities, interpretation is a fundamental method of working with texts as sign systems. Text as a form of discourse and an integral functional structure is open to the variety of meanings that exist in the system of social communications. The text always appears in the unity of explicit and implicit, non-verbalized meanings.
In modern philosophy and methodology of science, there is an idea that humanitarian knowledge (as a space for working with texts) can be considered as a sphere of application of the organizing principle, called the principle of deconstruction by the French postmodernist philosopher J. Derrida. This principle can be formulated as follows: every explicit meaning is a product of the analytics of signifiers devoid of invariant content. By and large, the essence is that any transformation of humanitarian knowledge, any expansion of its volume is now conceived as being carried out by shifting the usual meanings of signifiers (in the interpretation procedure), which have become the object of analytics within the framework of a particular study. This constantly implies, on the one hand, the tendency of any such displacement to turn into a self-sufficient, i.e., self-absolutizing procedure, and, on the other hand, the impossibility of shifting certain values (meaning the impossibility within the framework of one or another specific attempt at displacement) no conscious effort. Therefore, any humanitarian research now actually begins with reflection on the foundations and circumstances of the displacement being made. Thus, it should be concluded that humanitarian knowledge in general is knowledge that explicates through interpretation the economy of shifting meanings.
In the natural and mathematical sciences, interpretation has the meaning of demonstrating the meaningfulness of scientific expressions, since the meaning of each such expression is assumed to be known from the very beginning. So, for example, one of the basic concepts of differential calculus - the concept of the derivative of a function - can be interpreted as the rate of the process described by this function. Moreover, the very concept of process speed receives full clarity only after the introduction of the concept of derivative. Moreover, the point of view according to which the concept of speed is interpreted and conceptualized using the concept of derivative is quite legitimate.
At the same time, one must understand that the concepts (and proposals) of any scientific theory are interpreted through references to images of human consciousness (in the sense that appealing to objects as such in their pure form is generally impossible), therefore it is necessary to constantly ensure that any the interpretation was isomorphic to its subject.
In addition, the same theory, in principle, can have different interpretations (both isomorphic and non-isomorphic). In such cases, one of these interpretations is usually the area for which the theory in question arose to study. This interpretation is usually called the natural interpretation of the theory.
Finally, the same interpretation of substantially different theories is possible. For example, the range of phenomena considered by optics received a satisfactory interpretation in both the wave and corpuscular theories of light, and additional experimental data and theoretical assumptions were required to reconcile these points of view.
An important circumstance is also that as the logical means of science develop and the level of complexity of its abstractions increases, the interpretability of its concepts with the help of ideas drawn directly from the contemplation of the external world becomes less and less obvious. Thus, the concepts of such branches of modern mathematics as algebra or topology are interpreted, as a rule, not directly in terms of reality, but in terms of other areas of mathematics. As an example, we can recall the construction of an interpretation of the concepts of Lobachevsky’s geometry through the terms of Euclid’s geometry, carried out by mathematicians A. Poincaré and F. Klein (thereby showing the consistency of Lobachevsky’s geometry relative to Euclid’s geometry).
The relation of interpretability is transitive, i.e., the interpretation of the interpretation of a theory makes it possible to indicate the direct interpretation of this theory.
The interpretation procedure plays a particularly significant role in logic, since it is thanks to one or another similar procedure that logical calculi become formalized languages (after all, before the interpretation procedure is carried out, the expressions of logical calculus do not mean anything at all, i.e., before interpretation, these calculi can only be considered as formed by certain rules for the combination of special material objects). Different systems of propositional logic and predicate logic correspond to different interpretations of the logical operators used in them.
Thus, the role of interpretation in scientific knowledge in general and in the construction of scientific hypotheses in particular is enormous.
Topic 9. THE PROBLEM OF PROOF AND REFUTATION
Acceptable methods of polemics
In real scientific practice, evidence or refutation of certain scientific hypotheses is very often formulated in the course of scientific polemics, discussions in which each participant seeks to confirm his point of view by refuting others. Polemical argumentation is very diverse, since in any dispute (including scientific) the goal is not only to establish the truth of a certain thesis, but also to substantiate its significance, feasibility, relevance and effectiveness. As a result of this circumstance, polemics use not only strictly logical, but also rhetorical and emotional methods of influencing the interlocutor.
In the most general form, three types of polemics can be distinguished.
Firstly, we should talk about cognitive polemics, which are one way or another aimed at achieving agreement regarding true knowledge about its subject (scientific polemics themselves are one of the varieties of this type of polemics).
Secondly, there is a business controversy aimed at achieving and fixing some specific socially significant result, which can be a contract, minutes of a meeting, an agreement, a verdict, etc. It is important to understand that the goal of a business controversy is a mutually acceptable settlement that suits all parties involved .
Thirdly, a gaming type of controversy is distinguished. It is characterized by highlighting the motives of personal interest. Such polemics are similar to a sports match, where the achievement of subjective goals is more important than truth and agreement.
There is an idea of the principles and acceptable methods of polemics (and the limits of this admissibility include all its types).
1) First of all, you should always clearly define the subject of discussion, since there are things that are unproductive to argue about (for example, about tastes, about unverifiable subjective feelings, about trifles, etc.).
2) The positions of the parties participating in the debate must have common ground and at the same time must include significant differences, since, on the one hand, a discussion between representatives of completely disparate views always inevitably turns into absurdity, and on the other hand, generally enter into serious a dispute makes sense only if there are some fundamental disagreements.
3) The participants in the debate must have a comparable level of knowledge regarding its subject, otherwise a full-fledged discussion is generally impossible.
4) Participants in a debate should always agree in advance on its rules and the limits of the significance of its results.
5) Polemics generally make sense in their quality only if each of its participants is, in principle, ready to listen to the other and adjust their position.
Practical polemical techniques are divided into completely acceptable (for example, displaying creative initiative, concentrating actions around the defense of the main concept, using the effect of surprise, anticipating the arguments of the opposite side, etc.) and techniques that are on the verge of acceptable (for example, raising the “stakes” on some point). at the stage of discussion, instilling consent by force of persuasion, etc.).
The main principles of the actual cognitive (including scientific) polemics are the following.
1) The principle of cognition, according to which the competitive side of the controversy should be completely ignored. At the same time, you need to clearly understand that for the sake of the triumph of truth in a dispute, you can retreat, since a tactical retreat is not a defeat. The purpose of educational polemics is not the moral satisfaction of victory and not the receipt of practical benefits, but only to achieve completeness of knowledge. As a result, cognitive polemics (if carried out correctly) are never completely fruitless: even a failed step towards the truth is part of the movement towards it.
2) The principle of logic, according to which in any cognitive discussion its actual topic must be clearly formulated, the appropriate terminology must be used correctly, only reliable arguments and arguments must be used, and all reasoning must comply with the laws of formal logic.
It is unacceptable to confuse your opponent with the help of various kinds of tricks and sophisms, and one should adhere to the principle of logic even if the parties involved have different goals.
The principle of collegiality, according to which the parties entering into a cognitive debate are not enemies and rivals, but act as co-authors in a single and common creative process of learning the truths, therefore they should be characterized by extreme correctness and the desire for mutual understanding. At the same time, the application of this principle is not universal, since the very possibility of its use is limited by the nuances of each specific discussion.
The principle of certainty, according to which contradictions between participants in cognitive debates must be clearly identified from the very beginning. Human thought, by its nature, tends to infinity, and our mind is capable of deploying any even somewhat significant chain of reasoning in a huge number of directions. However, no reasoning (no matter how fundamental) can cover all the richness of manifestations of factual reality, so it is necessary to realize that the first step to competently speaking about the truth is to unambiguously define the boundaries of the sphere about which nothing will be said. Only by forbidding yourself to talk about things that are not related to the actual subject of the discussion can you ensure the integrity and meaningfulness of the discussion.
However, when entering into controversy in order to prove or refute one or another intellectual concept, one must keep in mind that there are a number of problems that have arisen around the study of the very idea of the possibility of final justification. First of all, two similar problems should be mentioned.
First, the proof always goes back ultimately to the axioms. The truth of any statement must be substantiated, for which other statements are involved whose truth status has already been verified. Therefore, there must be some ultimate statements whose truth cannot be logically proven. However, the question arises on what is the basis for our confidence in the truth of these ultimate statements, axioms, and whether they are not simple conventions, that is, conditional agreements that could be different. And doesn’t it follow from this that our knowledge as a whole is conventional?
Secondly, exhaustive empirical confirmation (verification) of any hypothesis is generally impossible, since the affirmative mode from the consequence of a conditional categorical syllogism is a probabilistic conclusion (in other words, any affirmative thesis is conditional in nature). Only the negative mode of consequence has coercive force, i.e., the empirical refutation (falsification) of a certain hypothesis, since its prediction regarding experience is not realized (in other words, only denying theses are unconditional). Doesn't this mean that we can be sure of falsity, but we can never be completely sure of the truth of any proposition?
Thus, for the development and improvement of true knowledge about the world, it is extremely important to be able to competently debate about this knowledge and correctly build systems of arguments.
Ontological foundations of knowledge
The term "knowledge" has many meanings. When trying to comprehend it philosophically, the need to consider this concept in the following semantic contexts is highlighted:
1) knowledge is always associated with an attempt to establish the true existence of things. The very claim to knowledge of something contains an indication of the possession of more or less complete, exhaustive information about the nature and structure of the object of knowledge, as well as about its place in the implied series of other similar objects;
2) knowledge is always addressed to a kind of “wrong side” of things; it appeals to what is hidden in the depths of the world. Genuine knowledge is an abstraction from the immediate given; it marks the transition from visible existence to the universal laws hidden behind it;
3) knowledge is focused on the creation of sign systems that represent reality; it finds its ultimate embodiment in the terminological apparatus of various sciences, in thesauri of certain discursive practices, in the transformation of words of natural language. Thus, on the basis of knowledge, special artificial realities are modeled, which imitate the patterns of the real world, allowing a person, using the example of these models, to understand the principles of the functioning of the universe;
4) knowledge contains the intention to transform the world in a direction that meets human ideas about what should be. After all, among other things, “to know” means “to distribute the world”, “to establish internal connections of the world.” Knowledge is always associated with subsequent purposeful action.
If we talk directly about scientific knowledge, about its specific characteristics, then we can conclude that, firstly, scientific knowledge is always “detached” from its subject. This detachment should be understood either as a desire for objectivity of the information “in work”, or as the focus of the scientist working with it on impartiality. In turn, such impartiality can appear both as a claim to the “purity” of the research, and as a declaration of conscientiousness and selflessness.
Secondly, scientific knowledge is systemic and discursive; it is formulated in accordance with a certain set of recipes for obtaining truth, which also results in its inevitable rigorism.
Thirdly, in scientific knowledge as a semantic form there is an intention towards universality and universality. Knowledge implicitly implies an orientation towards limitless expansion of its scope.
Fourthly, scientific knowledge, by definition, cannot be complete, since it presupposes mandatory systematization and schematization of reality. Science, therefore, always sacrifices particular facts for the sake of general laws.
Finally, fifthly, in modern conditions, scientific knowledge is increasingly viewed not only as an ideal of knowledge, but also as something valuable in itself, valuable formally. However, we must not forget that such an idea about the immediate value of scientificity as such is not a scientific truth.
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the very appeal to the phenomenon of knowledge presupposes its consideration in the unity of ideas not only about its content and form, but also about knowledge as a special state of human thinking, about knowledge as an essential event in the process of knowing the world.
It is necessary, therefore, to take into account how exactly the knower knows, what is the essence of the moment the knower realizes that he has knowledge, the moment when questioning turns into conviction, confidence, the moment from which knowledge becomes an object of faith, since it is not subject to revaluation every time, re-checking, it becomes simply a background for further development of thought. Thus, “to know” also means “to have faith.” Faith here is taken as a psychological state of self-authenticity, the internal integrity of a person. In a certain sense, faith places a person in reality, since from now on it certifies any ontological series. The tightness of the world of knowledge is sealed by the accompanying psychological state of confidence in it, therefore, in fact, every thing in this world has its own place.
In modern Russian epistemology, the concepts of “faith” - faith and “belief” - faith are considered to clarify the relationship between faith and knowledge in general, where faith - faith is the spiritual attraction of the soul to the ultimate basis
Variants of relations between the concepts of “epistemology”, “epistemology”, “theory of knowledge”. Subject, structure, goals, objectives, key problems, disciplinary connections, conceptual framework of epistemology. Normative and descriptive epistemology. Directions of modern epistemology: evolutionary, genetic, naturalistic, analytical, computer, social. The problem of defining the concepts “knowledge” and “cognition”. Combinative classification of knowledge. Knowledge and faith. Cognition as a reflection of reality and spiritual production. Constants of knowledge. Scientific cognition sphere as a subject of epistemology. Essential features of scientific knowledge. Epistemological definitions of science. Classification of science. The structure of science. Levels of scientific knowledge. Question about the foundations of science. Directions of self-determination of sciences in historical dynamics. Scientific research concept. Epistemological definitions of the philosophy of science. Truth as an ideal of knowledge and a category of culture. The problem of criteria of truth. Historical and typological aspects of the concept of “truth”. Truth in theology, philosophy, science. Basic theories of truth.
Topic 3. Ontological problems of modern philosophy and science
The concept of "first philosophy". The question of the relationship between ontology and epistemology. Ontology: subject, problems, conceptual and categorical apparatus. Metaphysics. The problem of demarcation of science and metaphysics. The question of the metaphysical basis scientific theories. Ontological foundations of cognitive programs. The concept of “being” in the history of philosophy. Typologies of being. Technology as being of “second nature”. The concept of "substance". Types of substantialism. The concept of matter in the history of philosophy and science. Cosmogony and cosmology. Time and space as philosophical and scientific categories. Movement and development. Ontological implications quantum physics. Modern philosophy of consciousness. The concept of “qualia” and the “hard problem of consciousness”. Ontology and language frameworks. Ontology as a semantic convention. Polysemy of the concept of “reality”. Varieties of realism. W. Quine's theory of ontological relativity. Possibilism. The concept of “possible world” as an ontological assumption and epistemological metaphor, the specifics of its scientific adaptation. Typology of possible worlds. Epistemological potential and limitations of possibilism.
Topic 4. The evolution of science in the historical and philosophical context
Science as a dynamic system. History of science “internal” and “external”. Internalism and externalism. Patterns of development of science. Protoscience and technology of ancient civilizations. From myth to Logos: the emergence of philosophy and theoretical scientific knowledge during the “Axial Age”. Ancient science and philosophy. Cosmocentrism of the Presocratics. Formation of mathematics. Socratic method. Atomism of Democritus. Epistemology of Plato. Aristotle's metaphysics. Foundations of Aristotelian physics. Natural science in the Hellenistic period. Ptolemaic system. Features of the medieval picture of the world. Nominalism and realism. Ontology and epistemology of Thomas Aquinas. I. Duns Scotus, W. Occam, R. Bacon.
Historical and cultural characteristics of the Renaissance. Discoveries in the field of science and technology. Development of mathematics. At the origins of modern astronomy. Heleocentrism. N. Copernicus. T. Brahe, I. Kepler. G. Galileo. Naturalism and pantheism. Revival of ancient atomism. J. Bruno. Philosophy of the New Age: the problem of the method of cognition. Empiricism and rationalism. F. Bacon and R. Descartes. Scientific discoveries and development of technology in the 17th – 18th centuries. I. Newton. G. Leibniz. The formation of modern science. Natural science and natural philosophy. D. Hume, “Critique of Pure Reason” by I. Kant and a revolution in philosophy. At the origins modern chemistry. Beginnings of biology. Formation of an evolutionary type of thinking. XIX century: differentiation of sciences, development and anomalies of classical physics, improvement of technology. Genesis of social sciences and humanities. Features of modern Western philosophy. The formation of the philosophy of science. W. Whewell. First positivism: O. Comte, J. S. Mill, G. Spencer. Conventionalism A. Poincaré.
Scientific discoveries and development of technology at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. The genesis of a new worldview concept. Empirio-criticism. E. Mach. Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. The birth of quantum physics. Particular and general theory of relativity. The concept of the expanding universe and the Big Bang. The evolution of quantum mechanics. A. Einstein and N. Bohr: dispute about the nature of reality. Neopositivism. Formation and transformation of analytical philosophy. B. Russell. “Logical-Philosophical Treatise” by L. Wittgenstein. Vienna circle. Development of mathematics, genetics, biophysics, logic, linguistics, psychology. Proliferation of methodological programs. The emergence of cybernetics. Trends in the development of natural, social and human sciences and philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century – beginning of XXI V. Space exploration. Modern cosmology. Molecular and physicochemical biology, genetic and cellular engineering. Internet and new format of virtual reality. Postpositivism. “Big Four”: K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend. "Anarchist Methodology". Structuralism. Synergetics. Cognitive approach in philosophy of science. Postmodernism and scientism. Modern scientific picture of the world.
Problems of the structural organization of existence in the context of modern science.
In modern science, the idea has become established that the world is an endless and inexhaustible multitude systemic entities, a special integrity, which is characterized by the presence of elements and connections between them.
The systemic-structural level of organization of matter is understood as a set of different types of reality, within which they are united by the dominant type of connections and interactions.
The world as a system includes three global system-structural levels of organization: inorganic nature, organic nature and social nature.
Inorganic nature.
In inorganic nature, the following levels of organization of existence are distinguished: vacuum - submicroelementary - microelementary - nuclear - atomic - molecular - level of macroscopic bodies - planets - star-planetary complexes - galaxies - metagalaxies.
The most fundamental level of organization physical reality is a vacuum. In a vacuum, complex processes constantly occur, associated with the continuous appearance and disappearance of so-called “virtual particles”. Some researchers consider vacuum to be potentially the richest form of existence.
From a philosophical perspective modern research vacuum intensified the study of the traditions of understanding the category of “non-existence” in ancient Eastern philosophy. The ancient Eastern concept of non-existence (nothing) in a number of significant points resembles the modern scientific concept of vacuum as the substantial-genetic basis of the astronomical Universe.
Organic nature.
In organic nature, the following systemic and structural levels of organization are distinguished: level of biomacromolecules (DNA, RNA, proteins) - cellular - microorganism - organs and tissues - organism as a whole - population - biocenosis - biosphere.
Important properties of living systems include:
* the ability to create order from the chaotic thermal movement of molecules;
* living systems are characterized by a much higher level of order and asymmetry in space and time;
* ability to exchange with environment matter, energy and information;
* ability for excessive self-reproduction.
Social nature.
Social reality includes the following systemic and structural levels of organization: individual (personality) - family - collective - social group - (class) - nation - state - society as a whole.
Between the systemic-structural levels of the organization of being and within each of the levels there are relationships of subordination: a higher form arises on the basis of a lower one as a result of the emergence of new systemic properties. At the same time, the patterns of higher levels have a certain specificity and are not reducible to the patterns of the levels on the basis of which they arose.
Reductionism. Efficiency and limitations
reductionist programs in science
Reductionism is a methodological position. In classical science, the prevailing idea was the possibility of reducing the entire diversity of the world to a single fundamental structural level - to elementary entities, describing and explaining the qualitative certainty of complex material formations as a result of various combinations of these elementary entities. This methodological position is called reductionism.
The reduction process as a methodological technique for solving a certain scientific problem is an integral part of scientific knowledge, along with idealization and modeling.
But in those cases when reduction is absolutized, when it is assumed that all the diversity of the world can be completely reduced to certain elementary levels, this technique becomes the basis of mechanism (physicalism, biologism, social Darwinism).
In the 20th century, dreams of reducing all sciences to physics were embodied in the methodological concept of a “single science” (R. Carnap). Carnap characterizes physicalism as the requirement for an adequate translation of the sentences of all sciences into sentences consisting exclusively of terms that are used in physics.
Neopositivists (Schlick, Carnap, Frank, Reichenbach, Neurath) considered the truth of any proposition of any science depending on the possibility of its translation into the language of physics.
In the second half of the twentieth century. there is disappointment with the program of physicalism, a departure from the principle of radical reductionism. One of the reasons for the crisis of physicalism and reductionism was the realization of the impossibility of building “omnipotent” formal structures (Gödel’s incompleteness theorem).
Physicalism in solving the problem of the unity of scientific knowledge by itself did not achieve the goal, but it stimulated interest in creating the prerequisites for the emergence of cybernetics, computer logic, and cognitive science.
The crisis of elementalist programs in the science of the twentieth century.
Becoming modern concept holism.
Classical science was dominated by the understanding of the world as a collection of initially separated elements, and in cognition - the desire to divide objects into component parts that have universal features and build on their basis the entire variety of natural phenomena. Its ontological basis is the understanding of the world as a collection of clearly limited and individualized objects (“atoms”), which are only externally connected with each other.
The limitations of such an understanding begin to be realized simultaneously with the crisis of the mechanistic picture of the world at the end of the 19th century. However, the crisis of the concept of elementarism and multiple understanding of the world manifested itself more clearly in the twentieth century. influenced by the development of modern science.
The development of research in the field of quantum physics has called into question the universality of multiple understandings of the world. This leads to the need to form a concept of worldview, an alternative to the atomistic tradition of classical natural science, to the formation of a modern concept of integrity (holism).
The basis for modern philosophical and methodological developments of alternative concepts of integrity was the awareness of the fact that the concepts of “element” and “set of elements” in the description of physical reality are not universal and relativity.
A new methodological approach is being formed, aimed at an understanding of integrity that is more adequate to the object of modern science. This attitude orients the researcher to consciously take into account the phenomenon of indivisibility and indivisibility of the world, self-developing systems into sets of actually and initially existing elements.
A holistic approach based on the understanding of the whole as non-multiple helps to more adequately explore the features of the infinite world, its differences from the world of finite things.
Spatio-temporal structure of existence.
Space and time are philosophical categories by which the forms of existence of things and phenomena are designated.
In the history of philosophy and science, two concepts of space and time have been formed - substantial and relational.
According to the substantial concept, space and time exist independently of nature, of objects (classical Newtonian mechanics).
The relational concept of space and time states that all spatial and temporal characteristics are relationships, the nature of which is determined by the nature of the interaction of objects (general and special theories of relativity by A. Einstein). Within its framework, it was proven that the spatial characteristics of objects change depending on mass and the dependence of temporal characteristics on the speed of movement of objects.
At the beginning of the 20th century. physics has revealed a deep connection between space and time. It turned out that time is the fourth dimension of the world (formula 3+1).
In the last decades of the twentieth century. It was hypothesized that the properties of space and time are unique for each structural level of existence.
Social time is a form of existence of society that expresses the duration of historical processes, their changes that arise in the course of human activity. Social time is characterized not only by uneven flow, but also by a multi-level structure.
The problem of determinism in modern science and philosophy.
Determinism is the doctrine of the universal natural connection and interdependence of all phenomena. In philosophy, deterministic concepts are described using the categories cause and effect, necessity and chance, possibility and reality. The ideas of determinism appear already in ancient philosophy(Democritus). Determinism received further development and justification in natural science and philosophy of the New Age (Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Laplace, Spinoza).
The concept of Laplacean determinism and its limitations for constructing a modern picture of the world.
Classical philosophy and science represented all processes occurring in the world as reversible in time, predictable for unlimited periods of time. This idea of determinism was most clearly formulated by the famous French physicist and mathematician Pierre Laplace in his works “An Experience in the Philosophy of Probability Theory” and “Analytical Theory of Probability” and was called Laplace determinism. The value of the coordinates and momenta of all particles in the Universe in this moment time, from his point of view, completely unambiguously determines its state at any past or future moment. There is no place for chance as an objective phenomenon. Only the limitations of our cognitive abilities force us to consider individual events as random.
Determinism is reflected in the concept of dynamic patterns, which express the strictly unambiguous conditionality of changes in some elements by others, in which a given state of the system unambiguously determines its subsequent state, and describe them absolutely accurately in the form of a connection between well-defined physical quantities.
In the mechanistic deterministic concept, it was assumed that for the behavior of each particle, each element, there is only one necessarily realized possibility. Determinism understood in this way leads to fatalism, takes on a mystical character and actually merges with belief in divine predestination.
Statistical patterns express such connections when a given state of the system determines all its subsequent states not unambiguously, but only with a certain probability, which is an objective measure of the possibility of realizing the trends of change inherent in the past.
Possibilities and boundaries of the probabilistic picture of the world.
Awareness of the limitations of the causal type of explanations at the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. led to the formation of philosophical and natural science indeterminism. Indeterminism completely or partially denies the existence of cause-and-effect relationships and the possibility of their deterministic explanation.
A significant contribution to the development of new ideas about determinism was made by quantum mechanics - the establishment by W. Heisenberg (1927) of the uncertainty relation: the less uncertainty in the coordinate of a particle, the greater the uncertainty in its momentum and vice versa. Awareness of this leads to the formation of a probabilistic picture of the world, which is characterized by the introduction of statistical laws.
Modern science believes that any sufficiently complex development process is subject to statistical laws, since dynamic laws are only an approximate expression of the individual stages of this process.
Before the advent of quantum mechanics, it was believed that the behavior of individual objects always obeys dynamic laws, and the behavior of a collection of objects always obeys statistical laws.
In recent years, new impetus for discussions of the problem of determinism has been given by the problem of mathematical modeling of dissipative systems, in which negligibly small fluctuations, indistinguishable for us and not taken into account, lead to a sharp change in the evolution of the system.
Unlike classical science, which sought to reduce everything to the simple and predictable, modern science deals with the unpredictable, uncertain, imprecise and complex, makes extensive use of probabilistic methods and recognizes the important role of the random and unpredictable. In the near future, apparently, science expects an expansion and rethinking of many classical concepts.
Teleological concepts in modern science. The anthropic principle and its philosophical interpretations.
One type of determination is goal determination; the principle of “final causes,” according to which the final result has an objective impact on the course of the process, takes different forms in different teleological concepts.
Aristotle was the first to introduce the idea of goal determination. According to him, every object of nature has a goal, which is the source of “aspirations” that are realized in the process of development of the object (immanent teleology).
The ideas of immanent teleology in modern times were developed by Leibniz in the doctrine of pre-established harmony, Schelling in the doctrine of the world soul.
Objective idealism, Hegel, neo-Thomism, neo-vitalism, neo-finalism, philosophical concepts proceed from the presence in the world of objective non-human goals and expediency (World Mind, God).
In modern science, a target approach has been formed, the essence of which is that Scientific research refers to the result of the process as its goal, starting from which the causes are analytically established by their consequences.
In connection with a number of new discoveries in physics and cosmology, a unique “teleological problem” arose in science. It consists in the need to explain the extremely high and subtle interconnection of a number of fundamental properties and characteristics of our Universe. Moreover, the slightest change in these properties can lead to a catastrophe for the entire world. Moreover, many properties of our Universe are extremely favorable for the existence of life and intelligence.
Based on this, in the 70s of the twentieth century. The anthropic principle was formulated, establishing the dependence of human existence on the physical parameters of the Universe. Physical calculations show that if the
at least one of the existing fundamental constants, then the existence of certain physical objects - nuclei, atoms - would become impossible.
B. Carter formulated the anthropic principle as follows: the Universe has such properties that at a certain stage life and consciousness (observer) could necessarily arise in it.
The anthropic cosmological principle carries a certain philosophical load - it evokes different worldview interpretations - materialistic and idealistic. In terms of worldview, the anthropic principle embodies the idea of the relationship between man and the universe, expressed in antiquity (Protagoras, Anaximander) and developed in the Renaissance (G. Bruno) and in the 20th century. (K. Tsiolkovsky, Teilhard de Chardin, F. Crick, F. Hoyle, F. Dyson).
Global evolutionism and synergetics: in search of a new worldview.
Until the end of the twentieth century. the principle of evolution was not dominant in natural science. This was largely due to the fact that the leading scientific discipline was physics, which for a long time did not include the principle of development among its postulates.
Science of the second half of the twentieth century. eliminated the opposition between biology and physics in the understanding of evolution. The idea of development and evolution is acquiring global cosmic significance. This led to the formation of the concept of global evolutionism, as a system of ideas about the universal process of development of nature in all its diverse natural historical forms: social and biological evolution, evolution of the Earth, solar system, Universe. In this Universe, a person is not just an active internal observer, but an active element of the system.
Essential for the development of the concept of global evolutionism was the study of the mechanisms of spontaneous emergence of ordered structures in open nonlinear systems, which led to the formation of a new scientific direction - synergetics.
The problem field of synergetics is centered around the concepts of “instability”, “instability”, “disequilibrium”, “chaos”, “randomness”. One of the important ideas that synergetics brings to modern science and the picture of the world is the idea of irreversibility and nonlinearity.
It reveals unusual aspects of the world: its instability, nonlinearity and openness. It makes it possible to take a broader look at the processes of development and global evolution and formulate the basic principles of the modern concept of self-organization.
On the basis of these studies, a new image of the world is now being formed, which is not a world that has become, but a world that is becoming, not just an existing, but a continuously emerging world. The concepts of “being” and “becoming” are combined into one conceptual framework; the idea of evolution organically enters not only the sciences of living things, but also physics and cosmology. The world is full of unexpected turns associated with the choice of paths for further development.
In the real picture of existence there is randomness and instability. Modern science thus rediscovers chance as an essential element of the world.
Synergetics creates the prerequisites for revealing the constructive role of randomness in the processes of self-organization, explores the conditions under which randomness can lead to the emergence of order from chaos.
The dominant role in the world around us is played not by order, stability and balance, but by instability and imbalance. Stability and balance are dead ends of evolution.
The concept of global evolutionism, emerging in modern science and philosophy:
* characterizes the interconnection of self-organizing systems and explains the genesis of new structures in them;
* considers social, living and inanimate matter in a dialectical relationship;
* creates the basis for considering man as an object of cosmic evolution;
* is the basis for the synthesis of knowledge in modern post-non-classical science;
* serves as the most important principle for the study of new types of objects - self-developing, integral systems.
1The article discusses one of the most important problems of ontology - the problem of the ontological method of cognition. As part of the generalization of methods of cognition used in ontology, the author identifies classical methods of cognition that reveal various aspects of thinking as a single process - metaphysics, logic, dialectics and negative dialectics. The article reveals the relationship between these logics both as certain stages of cognition and as different ways of thinking. A meaningful relationship between logics of different orders can be represented as a system that includes the following levels: metaphysics - logic - dialectics - negative dialectics, or as a logic of 1st - 2nd - 3rd - 4th order. These logics represent cross-sections of levels of thinking as a single process, and therefore communicate with each other both as certain stages in cognition and as various ways functioning of unified thinking.
negative dialectic
Dialectics
metaphysics
1. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Works in four volumes. T. 1 / ed. V.F. Asmus. - M.: Mysl, 1976. – 550 p.
3. Aristotle. Physics. Works in 4 volumes. T. 3 / trans.; entry article and notes I.D. Rozhansky. – M.: Mysl, 1981. – 613 p.
4. Windelband V. History of new philosophy in its connection with general culture and individual sciences / trans. from the second German ed. E.I. Maksimova, V.M. Nevzhina and N.N. Platonova; under. ed. prof. St. Petersburg University of A.I. Vvedensky. - St. Petersburg. : Type. V. Bezobrazova and Co., 1905. – T. 2. From Kant to Nietzsche. - 423 p.
5. Derrida J. On grammatology / trans. from French and entry Art. N. Avtonomova. – M.: Ad Marginem, 2000. – 511 p.
6. Criticism of non-Marxist concepts of dialectics of the 20th century. Dialectics and the problem of the irrational / ed. Yu.N. Davydova. – M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1988. – 478 p.
7. Nagarajuna. Mula-madhyamaka-karika. Nagarajuna's teaching about the Middleness / research. and lane from Sanskrit “Root Verses on the Middleness” (Mula-madhyamaka-karika); lane from Tib. “Interpretations of the Root Verses about the Middleness, [called] Fearless [refutation of dogmatic views]” (“Mula-madhyamaka-vritti Akutobhaya”) / Androsov V.P.; Institute of Oriental Studies RAS. – M.: Vost. lit., 2006. – P. 228.
8. Nikolai Kuzansky. About learned ignorance. Works in 2 volumes. T. 1 / lane; total ed. and will enter. article by Z.A. Tazhurizina. – M.: Mysl, 1979. – 488 p.
9. Soloviev V.S. Philosophical principles of integral knowledge. Essays in 2 volumes. T. 2 / total. ed. and comp. A.V. Gulygi, A.F. Loseva; note S.L. Kravets and others - M.: Mysl, 1988. - 822 p.
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Of particular relevance in the theory of knowledge is the systematization of methods for substantiating knowledge. In connection with this the problem of the ontological method of cognition or method in ontology, as summing up the ontological basis of knowledge, also of particular interest in the philosophical community. The history of ontological thought clearly confirms that the development of ontology and various ontological teachings is associated with the discoveries of new methods of cognition in philosophy. Is there a special ontological method of cognition, or what are the features of using cognition methodologies for ontology? This question requires detailed research, but for now we will limit ourselves to a general possible plan for developing an answer to it.
Of particular relevance in understanding the problem of method in ontology is the identification of processes and procedures of thinking. In the ontological method of cognition, it is possible to distinguish classical methods of thinking that reveal various aspects of thinking as a single process - metaphysics, logic, dialectics and negative dialectics. The relationship between logics of different orders that we have understood can be represented as a system that includes the following levels: metaphysics - logic - dialectics - negative dialectics, or as logics of 1st - 2nd - 3rd - 4th order. The logic outputs of each order are shifted by one order, i.e. serve as a prerequisite for the development of subsequent logics, therefore the conclusions of metaphysics develop formal logic, which, in turn, develops dialectics, etc. Thus, thinking at each of its levels of comprehension acts post factum, after being, after what is present.
1. Metaphysics, the birth of the metaphysical project. Metaphysics as the science of supersensible principles and principles of being, trying to explain the ultimate foundations in the structure of nature and society, establishes the prerequisites, the foundations of thinking and thereby makes it possible for the mind to analyze and divide the world in half. By metaphysics, Aristotle understood “first philosophy” or “the science of divinity.” According to Aristotle, in Plato, who recognized ideas as truly existing, there was a doubling of reality, and as a consequence, a denial of the essential reality of the world of things. On this occasion, Aristotle writes in Metaphysics: “... it should apparently be considered impossible for the essence and that of which it is the essence to exist separately from each other; how can ideas, if they are the essence of things, exist separately from them? .
In metaphysics, Aristotle gave the first distinction between philosophy and natural science, which put forward the basis for the emergence of specific scientific knowledge. The first essences in Aristotle are individual things, the expression of the essence of which is given not in their unique individuality, but in concepts studied by the sciences. This aspect “...refers to the doctrine of nature (physics), i.e. to the second philosophy". On the other hand, criticizing Plato for the theory of ideas and the “doubling” of the world of entities, Aristotle reconsiders the ontological meaning of concepts and their role in creating a theory of ideas, while relying on natural scientific knowledge. On this occasion, Aristotle writes that “...Plato, unlike the Pythagoreans, considered the unity and numbers to exist apart from things, and that he introduced eidos, this has its basis in the fact that he was concerned with definitions...”. In fact, the real “doubling” in the world of existence was made by Aristotle. In his philosophy, concepts and individual things received their connection from natural scientific practice, and therefore additionally needed a common principle connecting them. This principle was the universal law of the development of nature towards a single form, which was expressed in the Aristotelian concept of “entelechy”, or “first mover”. Physics studies individual things, materially formed, “and as for the beginning in relation to form, whether it is one or many, and what kind or what they are - a detailed consideration of [these questions] is a matter of first philosophy...”.
Thus, the formation of metaphysics as a holistic doctrine occurred in Aristotle in connection with the departure from Plato’s position, the need to overcome the concept of the world of ideas and consider the essence of a thing, its design together with its unique individuality, materiality. This ontological reorientation from the existence of the world of ideas to reality made it possible to develop the natural sciences. The revelation of the essence of a thing should have been facilitated by the correct use of categories and concepts in statements, the truth of which was established by the laws of logic.
2. Logic, development of the metaphysical project. If metaphysics is the establishment of prerequisites, the foundations of correct thinking, then logic is the establishment of the laws and operations of correct thinking. At this point, thinking already functions on the basis of binary oppositions. Thinking operates with a pure logical form, regardless of the specific content and statements. As you know, modern logic is based on the teachings created by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. He was the first to separate the logical form of speech from its content.
In Aristotle's philosophy, logic has a propaedeutic function in relation to other sciences. The first part of the Organon, a collection of Aristotle’s logical works, contains treatises under the general title “Categories”. This work provides a description of the most general predicates, categories that can be expressed about any object: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, suffering. The main distinction given in the “Categories” is the opposition between being in itself and being relative. If “being in itself” for Plato was “ideas”, then for Aristotle it was “essence”, and “being in relation” became the starting point for the creation of the doctrine of categories: “...Each means either essence, or “how much ", or "which", or "in relation to something", or "where", or "when", or "is in some position", or "possess", or "act", or "endure “...Each listed does not in itself contain any statement; affirmation or negation is obtained by combining them: after all, every affirmation or negation must be assumed to be either true or false; and of what has been said without any connection, nothing is true or false...”
Aristotle introduces the laws of formal logic. The first formally logical law is the law of identity, formulated in Metaphysics as follows: “...to have more than one meaning means not to have a single meaning; if words do not have (definite) meanings, then all possibility of reasoning with each other, and in reality with oneself, is lost; for it is impossible to think anything if you do not think (every time) one thing.” At the heart of Aristotle's classical metaphysics is the principle of teleology, or actuality. In this metaphysical model, a specific formed thing has existential status. The formal laws of thinking are the fundamental laws of expression in the language of this ontological reality. The emergence of the foundations of non-classical metaphysics is associated with the rise of individual consciousness during the Renaissance. This phenomenon was clearly expressed in the teachings of N. Kuzansky, in the reorientation of existential status from a thing that has become formalized to the emerging content of individual consciousness. Instead of Aristotle's law of identity, the law of coincidence of opposites is introduced, which assigns an existential status to the content of human thinking.
Nicholas of Cusa created the logic of paradox to express the Gnostic-pantheistic worldview of the Renaissance. Starting from Neoplatonism, he, however, does not define the One through its opposition to something else - the infinite: The One (absolute minimum) is identical to its opposite - the infinite (absolute maximum): “Maximality coincides with unity, which is also being.”
Hence the pantheistic thesis of Nicholas of Cusa: The One is everything. According to Nicholas of Cusa, man is endowed with a divine mind, which contains in a compressed form the entire existence of the world. Therefore, he abolishes the law of identity as a principle of finite (rational) thinking and puts in its place the law of the coincidence of opposites. Thus, the boundary between the divine existence, incomprehensible to man, and the created world of finite things is eliminated; the latter loses its certainty, which the law of identity provided it with. Along with the law of identity, Aristotelian ontology is also abolished, which presupposes the distinction between essence (as an unchangeable principle in a thing) and accidents as its changeable properties. The ontological status of essence and accidents is equalized, and the relationship turns out to be more primary than the essence; the being of a being is constituted through its relation to another, an infinite number of “others.”
3. Dialectics, problems of metaphysical projects. The previous work of thought done can no longer refer to the unity of direct “mythological” perception; in the work of thinking there is a constant dialectic of opposites. At this level and stage of thinking, dialectics arises where a metaphysical project comes into contact with a specific problem, where a universal principle comes into contact with a life situation that is unique in its singularity. Related to this are the problems of metaphysical projects as a connection between rational and irrational levels of knowledge.
On this occasion, the domestic researcher of dialectics Yu.N. Davydov writes: “...Irrationalism from the very beginning turns out to be a radical contradiction: the need to think the unthinkable, to comprehend with reason the non- (or “super”-) rational. This contradiction is the source of the (conscious or unconscious) attraction of irrationalism towards dialectics, but dialectics of a special kind - the dialectic of the rational and the irrational.”
“Limit concepts” that open the level of problems of metaphysical projects and the connection between the rational and irrational levels of knowledge are characterized by V. Windelband as “the remainder before which knowledge from reason fails.” “The thing in itself” in the critical rationalism of I. Kant, according to V. Windelband, this ultimate concept is the starting point of new European irrationalism, which is based on the opposition of “reason” and “sensibility”. All subsequent German classical philosophy and the dialectical method it developed can be considered as overcoming this problem of the metaphysical project as a connection between the rational and irrational levels of knowledge.
The problem of the ontology project of early Fichte moves into the epistemological plane. In his philosophical system, there is a deduction from the “pure Self” not only of the categories of reason, but also of sensation and “impression” - all that content, the origin of which was previously attributed to the affective influence of the “thing in itself”. To overcome this contradiction, the very concept of “pure self” was rethought. The content of the activity of the “pure Self”, “pure consciousness” in the work “Teaching of Science” turns out to be the “unconscious” generation of ideas. “Unconscious consciousness” is postulated as the starting point. Fichte called this ability of “pure consciousness” to unconsciously and causelessly freely produce its own content “the productive ability of the imagination.” Thus, the creative power of the “productive ability of the imagination was attributed to the generation of the content of the world, which was previously introduced from the affective influence of the “thing in itself,” i.e. it became the force that creates the existential content of objectivity. “The place of Kantian dualism was replaced by a new and very peculiar dualism: the gap between the truth of the irrational-creative infinite awareness (“pure self”), on the one hand, and the illusory nature of the rationally comprehending finite consciousness (“empirical self” ) - with another" .
On this occasion, Fichte spoke as follows about the need to replace the consciousness of an object with the consciousness of consciousness itself: “The highest interest, the basis of all other interests, is ours.” interest in ourselves. So does the philosopher. Not to lose one’s selfhood (Salbst) in reasoning, but to preserve it and affirm it - this is the interest that imperceptibly guides all his thinking... Some, who have not yet risen to the fullness of a sense of their own freedom and absolute independence, find themselves only in the representations of things; they have only this scattered self-awareness, attached to objects and subtracted from their diversity. Only through things, as from some kind of mirror, is their image reflected to them; if you deprive them of things, their own self is lost along with them; For their own sake, they cannot renounce the belief in the independence of things, for they themselves exist only with them.”
In Schelling's philosophy of identity, the ultimate concept that reveals the problem of the metaphysical project is the “absolute identity” of subject and object, with the help of which the entire diversity of the world is derived; the problem is related to the logical development of this “absolute identity”, i.e. way of describing it. Freedom of self-consciousness in its search for the ethical basis of Fichte’s activity is interpreted by Schelling as a pattern manifested externally, i.e. the internal work of the spirit is replaced by external, regular forms of its manifestation, everything internal (the activity of the “pure Self”) becomes external. Schelling writes: ““Nature” (“not-I”) receives a kind of “right to self-determination” as part of human knowledge as a result of the thesis about the “parallelism of nature and intelligence,” as a result of which the same potencies of contemplation that are contained in the I can be traced to a certain limit in nature."
A way to solve the problem of the ontology project by Hegel and Schelling was proposed in the resolution problems of deducing differences from identity. According to V. Windelband, “the very question that Hegel later wanted to solve in a purely philosophical way, understanding the Absolute as an idea in necessary development, or as “absolute spirit”.” As for Schelling, he “planned to solve the issue of merging religion and philosophy, i.e. through Theosophy. But by this he left the path of rationalism and entered the road of irrationalism.” In Schelling’s “Philosophy and Religion,” says V. Windelband, “the system of identity makes a leap,” because the origin of the finite from the Absolute appears ultimately as the result of the irrational act of “the falling away of ideas from God” - “a primary fact that cannot be deduced from the Absolute”; it lies in the desire of the idea itself to become the Absolute and carries within itself all the features of the Fall.” In Hegel’s philosophical system, characterized by Windelband as “uncritical” rationalism, the ultimate concept that reveals the problem of his metaphysical project is the problem of connecting the dialectics of the development of ideas with the explanation of chance in nature. Hegel “began the dialectical development of the “transformation” of the idea into natural reality” and “met in nature something alien to the idea, a negation that meant not only the absence of an ideal moment, but, on the contrary, the force of reality opposing it” - this is “the accident of nature.”
The problem of the ontology project V.S. Solovyov reveals the relationship between organic logic and law identities(“theology” and “philosophy”, or dialectics). The resolution of this contradiction leads to the emergence of an idealistic system of “free theosophy,” while Solovyov’s mystical realism turns out to be in conflict with his rationalistic method of philosophizing. This contradiction can be directly noticed in his statements about the true method of cognition: “Since mental contemplation or direct cognition of ideas,” he writes, “is not a normal state for a person and at the same time doesn't depend at all from his will, for not everyone and not always is given the food of the gods, then the question is, what active cause leads a person to the opportunity to contemplate his existing ideas... If indeed our knowledge of external phenomena depends on the action of external beings or things on us, then also actual knowledge or mental contemplation transcendental ideas must depend on the internal action of ideal or transcendent beings on us.”
4. Negative dialectic. Deconstruction of the metaphysical project. Nagarajuna is an ancient Indian thinker of the 2nd-3rd centuries, the founder of the Madhyamika school of philosophy and a leading figure in Mahayana Buddhism as a whole. Nagarajuna called his own philosophical system Madhyamika (Tib. dbu ma, lit. - “middle”). This system denies the extremes of categorical oppositions: constancy and discontinuity, existence and non-existence, etc.
This tradition introduces the method of negative dialectics, antitetralemma, through which all four logically possible predications are denied. The antitetralemma defines a special type of philosophizing through the destruction of metaphysical meanings. In his main work, “Mula-madhyamaka-karika” (“Root Verses on the Middleness”), he introduces the principle of rejecting the four possibilities of the origin of things, revealing a certain way of thinking and building an ontology on this, based on the study of the conditions of causality: “It is not true that ever , anywhere and any existences can arise from themselves, from another [existence], from both [existences], or without a cause.”
Thus, Nagarajuna's teaching on the "middle" proposed a method for deconstructing metaphysical projects. Since ultimately all ideas, their denials and affirmations are not truly true, they therefore consider the concepts of other schools and criticize them, revealing their internal inconsistency and absurdity, based only on the ideas of their opponents, and not on their own. The antitetralemma method shows the fundamental incompleteness of the logical constructions of dialectics, returning any method to the initial premises of thinking. The German existentialist philosopher K. Jaspers gave the following characteristics to the teachings of Nagarjuna: “He (Nagarjuna) is valuable to us as a representative of the extreme degree of possibility of abolishing metaphysics through metaphysics.”
This is the possibility of reversing the dialectical method to the critical question of one’s existence, where the question of a person’s moral choice, his existence, is again raised. Negative dialectics, in its reverse course of unfolding thinking procedures to the first answer to a critical philosophical question, brings thinking closer to those institutions and principles that indicated the starting point for the beginning of reasoning. For example, Parmenides claims that Being exists, but Non-Being does not. Heraclitus affirms the existence of becoming. Plato builds his philosophical system based on his concept of the world of ideas. Aristotle proceeds from the formality of matter and the materiality of form, building metaphysics, introducing the concept of “form of all forms,” establishing the laws of correct thinking and logic. Removing the question and starting the argument, i.e. the initial premise leads us to the eternal and unchanging potency for establishing the initial prerequisites for thinking, which reveals the unity of the world and the cognitive process, the unity of philosophy as a spiritual phenomenon, in which the closure of the infinite potency of thought and the infinite reality that gives rise to thoughts occurs.
Negative dialectics, developed by the representative of the Frankfurt school T.V. Adorno, relies on avant-garde dialectics. The Frankfurt school resorts to an aesthetic and artistic comprehension of the world and social reality, the standard of which is considered to be avant-garde art. In his model of negative dialectics, Adorno proceeds from the pansociological destruction of the concepts and categories of German classical idealism, and above all Hegelian dialectics.
Aesthetic theory, the prototype of which is avant-garde art, expressing the method of negative dialectics, is endowed by Adorno with the following features: the autonomous status of theory in general, the self-destructive anxiety of negative dialectics, which allows one to reveal the diversity of connections in the world of existence and formulate the laws of their functioning in the general geometry of social existence. Social existence, embodied in culture and society, presupposes a plurality of development and interpretation of social, life situations. Therefore, negative dialectics, based on the pansociological destruction of the concepts and categories of Hegelian dialectics, turns to the origins of the beginning of dialectics, to the final question in order to derive from it a variety of answers for social reality.
Regarding the reorientation from the unified to the diverse reading of development scenarios, Adorno speaks as follows: “Even the Eleatic concept of the One, which should be unique, becomes understandable only in relation to the many, which it denies... True, the spirit does not yet call this many identical to it or capable of being reduced to it. But this much is already becoming like him.” And one more thing: “Much” turns out to be a “mediator” between “logical consciousness as unity and chaos, into which the world turns at the moment when consciousness opposes itself to it... But if many things in themselves already contain unity as an element, without which there can be no talk of many, then the one, for its part, requires the idea of calculus and multitude...”
Summarizing Adorno’s project of negative dialectics, domestic researcher Yu.N. Davydov gives her the following characteristics: “Thus, from positive-dialectical, as, say, Hegelian thinking was, it becomes negative-dialectical: thinking at war with itself, concerned only with getting rid of his own - logical-conceptual - element. Just as in avant-garde-modernist art, beauty is concerned with “emancipating itself” from itself.
Such a task can only be set by thinking for which the logical “element of the concept” is not the sphere where the truth of reality is revealed to the human mind, but a place where where it occurs" is coming true" lie, molded into diverse forms and images of “reification” and “alienation.” For Adorno, the presentation of aesthetics is identical to the presentation of negative dialectics. Reversing the original question and removing it.
The project of deconstruction in postmodernism can also be considered as one of the models of negative dialectics. Modern philosophers, representatives of postmodernism, assert the fundamental impossibility and danger of constructing an all-encompassing ontological model. The meaninglessness of constructing ontology as an all-encompassing system can be judged by the statement of J. Derrida in his study of grammatology and the program of deconstruction. The philosopher comes to the conclusion that writing, acting as the creation of meanings, is independent in nature and constantly changes ontological perspectives. Therefore, it is impossible to establish ontology in constant change, and becoming itself is not subject to ontologization, i.e. fixation in the final form.
Derrida proceeded from the premise that the status of the rational in culture is not self-reproducing on its own material, but is supported by a constant effort to oust from its sphere elements that turn out to be non-thought, unthinkable. This installation is based Western European culture Derrida designated logocentrism, the refutation of which forms the strategy-program of deconstruction: “The movement of deconstruction does not require turning to external structures... Deconstruction is necessarily carried out from within; it structurally (that is, without dividing into individual elements and atoms) borrows from the previous structure all the strategic and economic means of overthrow and is carried away by its work to the point of self-oblivion.”
In general, as has already been shown above, in the ontological method of cognition it is possible to distinguish classical methods of cognition that reveal various aspects of thinking as a single process - metaphysics, logic, dialectics and negative dialectics. These logics represent cross-sections of levels of thinking as a single process, and therefore communicate with each other both as certain stages in cognition and as different ways of functioning of one thinking. Any type of cognitive activity has its starting point in establishing general prerequisites for the beginning of thinking. In general terms, it can be characterized as posing a critical question about the ultimate basis of the fact of one’s existence - formulation of the problem of being. In its completed, classical form, this stage of the cognitive process took shape in metaphysics as a doctrine. Its frozen character, however, serves as an indispensable condition for the formulation of any ontological project, regardless of its relationship to metaphysics itself and its way of thinking.
Raising a critical question and resolving it involves high level awareness, self-awareness and the possibility of personal expression of will. All possible solutions and choice of cognitive strategy and action are ultimately divided into two possible choices between moral and immoral, i.e. suggesting positive and negative outcomes. This binary opposition between truth and falsehood forms its complete structure in formal logic.
The variability of life situations and non-standard ways of thinking, the desire for irrational openness in comprehending the world and thinking that are outside the established norms and rules, brings thinking itself to the dialectical method of cognition. Also related to this is the formation of problems of metaphysical projects as a lack of their own internal resources in the deployment and development of philosophical systems. The fragility and impermanence of the human being and his thinking are expressed not only in his inability to endure the uncertainty of his own existence, but also in the constancy of his becoming as a uniform process of thought and life. The panlogism of Hegelian dialectics gave rise to a whole range of possible ways of deconstructing the dialectical way of thinking. All of them can be united under the general name of negative dialectics.
Negative dialectics, in its reverse course of unfolding thinking procedures to the first answer to a critical philosophical question, brings thinking closer to those institutions and principles that indicated the starting point for the beginning of reasoning. The cessation of the ceaseless formation of dialectical development, moving from non-existence to being in their possible syntheses, brings thinking to the original critical question and to the original answer to it. This fundamentally new methodological installation, developed by all previous stages of the thought process, opens up the possibility of understanding the inexhaustibility of thinking and the world. Subsequently, the cognizing person begins to clearly realize that the subject of knowledge, the world and man, does not presuppose a single initial question. Removing the question reveals the hidden potential inherent in the gap between nature and thought, between nature giving birth to thought and thought burdened by its nature. Consequently, all scenarios for the development of cognitive strategies and related actions are contained in a collapsed form in the understanding of the “infinity” of options for the original question.
This phenomenon is directly related to the problem of defining existence, which must be captured in the concept of “superbeing” and transcendental reality. One should ask the question: what new does this cognitive attitude provide for the methodology of cognition? Firstly, understanding the fundamental incompleteness of any cognitive process. Secondly, it reveals the potential for knowledge development inherent in cognitive capabilities. And, thirdly, it allows you to correctly formulate and use cognitive strategies.
Reviewers:
Azamatov D.M., Doctor of Philology, Professor, Head of the Department of Philosophy and Social and Humanitarian Disciplines of the Bashkir State Medical University, Ufa.
Ivanova O.I., Doctor of Philosophy, Professor of the Department of Philosophy of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Ufa State University economy and service", Ufa.
Bibliographic link
Kaliev A.Yu. THE PROBLEM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL METHOD OF COGNITION // Modern problems of science and education. – 2014. – No. 2.;URL: http://science-education.ru/ru/article/view?id=12845 (access date: 02/01/2020). We bring to your attention magazines published by the publishing house "Academy of Natural Sciences"
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