Generals of the USSR Engineering Troops. We are friends with troops

From June 21 to 28, a joint gathering of engineering units of the armed forces of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan was held on the basis of the 2nd engineering regiment of the armed forces of Belarus, which is stationed in Minsk.

Initiative
No, it’s not for nothing that the engineering troops are called pioneers, that is, the first. Always go in the vanguard at some distance from the rest, pave the way for yourself and those following, take the first step where no one dared to step before you - this is the mission of the engineering troops units. And it is not surprising that it was the sappers of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus who conceived and brought to life the idea of ​​holding a joint gathering of engineering units.
Six years ago, at a meeting with colleagues from Ukraine and Belarus, the head of the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Nikolai Serdtsev, proposed radically changing the format of such meetings. His idea was to reinforce the business communication of the three Slavic leaders with the opportunity to communicate with soldiers, sergeants, and young officers of the three armies who did not serve in the Soviet Army and therefore have almost no idea about each other. Moreover, to provide the personnel of units of fraternal countries with the opportunity not only to talk about life over a cup of evening tea, but also, during a full-fledged training camp, to exchange practical experience, show their skills in engineering and see what heights professional excellence reached colleagues. The idea of ​​Colonel General Serdtsev was approved by the leaders of the armed forces of Ukraine and Belarus.
First, Russia hosted the guests - the first gathering of engineering units took place in Nakhabino, near Moscow. The following year the training camp was held in the Belarusian city of Grodno, and the year before last in the Ukrainian city of Brovary. In 2006, a fourth participant appeared at the gathering, which was held in the ancient Russian city of Murom, a unit from Kazakhstan (a report from last year’s gathering was published in Krasnaya Zvezda on August 10, 2006). This year, Belarus was the hospitable host of the gathering - representatives from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were hosted by the 2nd Engineer Regiment, stationed on the outskirts of Minsk.
Dear guests
Traditionally, the event was competitive. Since the leadership of the engineering troops of the participating countries agreed on this in advance, naturally, some of the best specialists came to Minsk as part of the teams.
For example, privates and sergeants of the Ukrainian team serve in the 91st engineering regiment in Akhtyrka, Sumy region. In Soviet times, an engineering brigade was stationed in its place, whose personnel had the opportunity to solve many serious problems not only during major exercises and tests of new equipment, but also in the combat situation of Afghanistan, during the liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, during a peacekeeping mission in Angola ... At the current level of training of personnel of the 91st Engineering Regiment, the glorious traditions of the predecessor brigade seem to have a strong impact: according to the results of the 2006 academic year, the regiment took first place among the engineering units of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. Of course, the leadership is also explained by the fact that the regiment is 90% staffed by contract soldiers.
The team from Russia consisted almost entirely of military personnel serving in two engineering units stationed in Nakhabino: a separate engineer brigade under the command of Guard Colonel Valery Kiper and a training center for training junior specialists of the engineering troops, where the head of the Guard was Colonel Mikhail Cherny. The team was headed by a senior officer of the department of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel Vitaly Kushnir.
Naturally, there were no inexperienced youth in the Kazakh team. It was headed by the senior officer of the engineering troops of Kazakhstan, Lieutenant Colonel Rakhmet Artekov. And all the other officers and sergeants - there were no privates - serve in the engineering brigade, which is stationed in Kopchegay.
Each team had 14 people, including three officers. The privates and sergeants of the Belarusian team were conscripts; only contract soldiers arrived among the guests.
The main thing is participation
In sports, everyone needs victory above all. At the gathering of engineering units of the armed forces of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the exchange of experience was much more important.
In sports of great achievements, rivals, as a rule, know each other very well. Participants in the gathering from four countries at the level of soldiers, sergeants and military officers knew nothing about each other before it began. Therefore, one of the objectives of the event for each team was to get to know colleagues from other countries - both in the course of performing professional tasks, and during leisure time on sports grounds, during amateur performances, and on excursions around the Belarusian capital. After all, only by getting to know each other closely can you further strengthen the military brotherhood of the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of friendly states with your personal participation.
During the special training competition, everyone had to fulfill four standards.
In the installation of an anti-tank minefield, the crew of the GMZ-3 tracked minelayer had no equal to the sappers from Belarus. The Ukrainians came second, our team showed the third result, and the Kazakh team showed fourth.
The reconnaissance of the minefield in front of the enemy's front line of defense was most successfully carried out by a squad of our sappers. In fulfilling this standard, second place was taken by the Kazakhs, third and fourth by Belarusians and Ukrainians, respectively.
Sappers from Kazakhstan were more successful than others in crossing an anti-tank minefield using the UR-77 mine clearance system. The Ukrainian team was only slightly behind them, the Russians were third, the hosts took fourth place.
The latest standard was the preparation of a pit for a shelter using PZM-2. Driver-mechanic PZM-2 from the training center stationed in Nakhabino, Guard Private Vladimir Mokhnashchekov ensured the victory for the team from Russia. The team from Kazakhstan took second place, the team from Belarus took third, and the team from Ukraine took fourth.
If Ukrainian sergeants failed to become leaders in special training, then the officers, on the contrary, were lucky. Ukrainian officers took first place in the field training competition. A little, but still the Russians lost to them, and as a result found themselves in second position.
Like last time, the gathering was full of purely sports competitions. The teams competed in several sports: volleyball, football, kettlebell lifting and tug-of-war.
Belarusians excelled in volleyball, Ukrainians in football. There were no equals to the kettlebell lifters from Russia, and in the individual competition all three prizes were taken by the Russians. Guard Major Dmitry Titov (pictured below) won first place, Guard Sergeants Roman Chernega and Alexander Rogachev – second and third, respectively. With the help of a rope, the Ukrainian team pulled everyone over to its side; it was the best in amateur performances.
“All participants demonstrated high professionalism, and we can say with confidence that, by and large, there were no losers in the competition, that friendship really won,” noted Lieutenant General Stepan Matus, who led the Russian delegation at the gathering. – These summer days, thanks to the excellent organization of the event by the Belarusian side, its cordiality and hospitality on the outskirts of Minsk, the armies of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan came even closer together. In the engineering, or sapper, so to speak, direction...
Next year, a gathering of engineering units is planned to be held in Ukraine. It is possible that the number of participating countries will increase.
Photos provided by the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Russian Armed Forces.

Chapter two.
Growing up (1921-1941)

Having repelled the attack of the imperialists on our country, ending the civil war, the Soviet people moved on to peaceful construction.

At the same time, it was necessary to transfer the army to a peaceful position and reorganize it. The party was guided by the instructions of V.I. Lenin that, having reduced the army, preserve such a core of it, which would allow, in case of need, to deploy the necessary armed forces (53).

The question of the nature of the construction of the Red Army and Red Fleet was discussed at the X, XI and XIII Party Congresses, which made decisions aimed at further strengthening the Armed Forces. These issues were also discussed more than once at the Plenums of the Party Central Committee.

The first event in the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces after the end of the civil war was the demobilization of the Red Army and its transition to a peaceful situation, which was carried out in 1921-1924. Simultaneously with demobilization, the army was reorganized. The order for demobilization was given on December 11, 1920, and by October 1, 1924, the Red Army, which had 5.5 million people at the beginning of demobilization, was brought to a peacetime staff with a strength of 562 thousand people (54).

After the end of the civil war, a significant part of the personnel in the engineering troops was also demobilized and the engineering units were transferred to a peaceful position. On October 1, 1924, the number of engineering troops and military engineering service bodies (excluding military construction units and military sappers) amounted to 10,014 people (55), or about 2 percent of the total number of the Red Army.

Military field construction with the transition of the army to a peaceful position remained in the system of the military department, but was switched mainly to restoration National economy.

The reorganization of the engineering troops began from below, from brigade and divisional units. By January 1, 1921, the engineering battalions of the rifle divisions were disbanded; instead of them, separate engineering companies were created - sapper and road-bridge companies, and in a division there were, as a rule, two of them, not counting the separate brigade sapper companies.

By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic No. 424/61 of February 18, 1921, the Military Engineering Department was reorganized. This order provided;

“Concentrate the management of all issues of military engineering under the jurisdiction of the Main Military Engineering Directorate, subordinating it on operational and combat issues directly to the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic, and on the issue of supply - to the chief supply officer” (56).

In connection with this, the Inspectorate of Engineers was disbanded.

By April 1, in the Main Military Engineering Directorate and by April 15 in the field, the reorganization in accordance with the order of the RVSR was completed.

In military districts, military engineering issues were in charge of the chief of engineers, to whom a special department was subordinated. This department consisted of departments: fortification and construction, which was in charge of the engineering preparation of the district for defense (this department did not exist in the internal districts); combatant, in charge of combat training of engineering and technical troops; apartment, engineering and technical supplies. The chief of engineers reported to the commander of the district troops and worked closely with the Office of the district supply chief on engineering supply issues.

The staff of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army (GVIU) was put into effect on August 1, 1921 by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic No. 1529 of July 16, 1921. Somewhat earlier, on June 2, 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E. Sklyansky approved the regulations on the GVIU, according to which it consisted of fourteen departments, a financial part and an engineering committee. In addition, senior inspectors and the secretariat were at the direct disposal of the head of the department.

The regulations determined that all issues of military engineering and military-technical affairs of the RSFSR are subject to the jurisdiction of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, namely issues of defense of the Republic in engineering, operational combat, inspection, organizational and technical, scientific, educational , economic and procurement units of the military department in all branches of military engineering and military-technical affairs, special education of troops, supplying the army with military engineering and technical equipment and providing it with all types of housing allowances.

The Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was led by the head of the department, who is also the head of the engineering and technical forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

I. E. Korostashevsky was appointed head and military commissar of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army (GVIUKA) on March 26, 1923, assistants to the head of GVIUKA were N. F. Popov and G. G. Nevsky, and A. was appointed chairman of the engineering committee of GVIUKA. K. Ovchinnikov and his deputy - A. P. Shoshin (57).

One of the central tasks of the Main Military Engineering Directorate and the military engineering departments of the fronts and districts in connection with the transition of the army to a peaceful situation was the training of engineering and technical troops and the creation of the necessary personnel for this purpose. For better organization of combat training, it was considered advisable to have engineering battalions in the districts, which at the time of mobilization could deploy into the appropriate number of separate companies.

During 1921, the staffs were again developed and a firm numerical composition of all engineering and technical military units and subunits was established.

The number of engineering units of the Red Army as of September 1, 1923, indicating the number of personnel in them, is given in Table 2.

table 2

Name of engineering parts	Number of parts	Number of people per state in one in all parts
Sapper battalions	18	373	6714
Separate sapper companies of rifle divisions	39	158	6162
Separate sapper squadrons of cavalry divisions	10	148	1480
Separate sapper half-squadrons of cavalry brigades	9	103	927
Etc.			15283
Fortress sapper companies	5	166	830
Kronstadt sapper company	1	173	173
Engineering and technical battalion of the Petrograd UR	1	325	325
Total			1328
Pontoon battalions	5	312	1560
Transport motor-pontoon units	5	68	340
Training pontoon-mine division	1	482	482
Fortress mine squads	3	72	216
Mine Squad	1	224	224
Total			2822
Electrical battalions	2	355	710
Electrical training battalion	1	372	372
Separate special purpose searchlight company	1	114	114
Total			1196
Individual combat masks	2	103	206
Training combat mask	1	232	232
Total			438
Trucking teams	27	78	2106
Petrograd Motor Transport Battalion (four detachments)	1	444	444
Training motorized brigade	1	425	425
Automobile detachments of rifle divisions	39	39	1521
Total			4496
Engineering site	1	142	142
Total(58)			25705

Thus, as of September 1, 1923, in relation to the total strength of the Red Army, established at Peaceful time, the staffing strength of the engineering troops, including regimental sappers, was about 5 percent, and excluding military sappers - 2.2 percent.

The task of training command personnel for engineering units and institutions with the transition of the army to a peaceful situation continued to remain one of the main ones in strengthening and further improving the engineering troops of the Red Army.

Training of command personnel was carried out in the system of higher and secondary military educational institutions, as well as in various specialized schools and short-term courses. The main military educational institution The Military Engineering Academy, which trained 107 military engineers during the period from 1921 to 1924, was intended for training command staff of engineering troops with higher education (59). To train platoon commanders, the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions had four engineering schools (Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev and Kazan) with a training period of four years, including one preparatory year. Each school had a staff of 400 cadets and a corresponding number of permanent command and teaching staff. In addition, there was one electrical engineering school (Petrograd) with a duration of study of five years, including one preparatory year.

Under the jurisdiction of the Main Military Engineering Directorate there was a secondary school for secondary command personnel in the electrical training battalion (Petrograd) with a training period of nine months. In the district secondary schools there were engineering classes, in which one person from each engineering and technical company studied for six months. In addition, there was an engineering department at the Petrograd International School for 30 cadets, as well as a Higher Camouflage School.

Supply of the Red Army various types engineering resources were very uneven. Thus, on January 1, 1921, the army's supply of entrenching tools and positional equipment (barbed wire, excavation bags, etc.) reached 100 percent, and for searchlights, mine-ship and demolition equipment - up to 60 percent of the total requirement.

As for workshop tools, saws and accessories for electromechanical equipment, as well as metals, the army felt an extreme need for them. There was also an acute issue with the supply of vehicles to the troops.

For the reception, storage and delivery of engineering property, as of January 1, 1921, there were 33 main, district and base warehouses, including 12 explosives warehouses. Of the 21 warehouses for engineering equipment, 7 were main, 9 district and 5 basic (60).

Already in the first years after the Civil War, in addition to measures to concentrate, repair and store existing engineering property, measures were taken to create new models of engineering equipment and improve existing ones.

These tasks were assigned to the engineering committee, which carried out its activities in cooperation with the Military Engineering Academy in accordance with the regulations approved on June 2, 1921. The military engineering training ground, established in 1920, served as the base for conducting experimental work and testing new models of engineering equipment. and subsequently expanded into the Research Engineering Institute.

Despite the insufficient scientific, experimental and production base of the test site, already at that time some new samples of military engineering equipment began to be manufactured there, and various kinds of inventive and rationalization proposals were being finalized. For example, new standard transport means were manufactured, in particular A-2 inflatable rubber boats.

During this period, great importance was also attached to the organization of combat and political training of engineering troops. These issues received significant attention in the decisions of the All-Russian Conference of the Chiefs of Engineering and Technical Forces of the Red Army, held on November 2-8, 1921.

Political work in engineering units, as well as throughout the Red Army, was carried out in accordance with the decisions of the XI All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) (December 19-22, 1921) and the XI Congress of the RCP (b) (March 27 - April 2, 1922). ). These decisions required that political work be organized in such a way that after two years of service the Red Army soldier would leave the barracks not only well prepared militarily, but also with political knowledge equal to that of the cadets of the provincial party school.

The organization of combat and political training experienced serious difficulties during these years. Until 1924, the Red Army and its engineering troops had to carry out combat and political training in conditions of protracted reorganization of the army, high turnover of personnel, overload of units and formations with a number of tasks not directly related to combat and political training, as well as a lack of material supplies army, lack of junior command (instructor) staff, lack of new regulations and instructions.

Further strengthening of the engineering troops (1924-1928)

An important stage in the construction and further strengthening of the engineering troops of the Red Army, as well as all Soviet Armed Forces, was military reform 1924-1925, carried out by decision and under the leadership Communist Party.

To summarize the experience of building engineering troops after the Civil War and organizing combat training, as well as to determine ways to improve this work in accordance with the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, an All-Union meeting of the chiefs of engineers of the Red Army was held from January 15 to January 21, 1924. At the meeting, issues of organizing engineering troops and their territorial and police development were discussed.

The decisions adopted by the meeting specified the tasks of engineering units and subunits, drawing attention to the need to thoroughly introduce engineering knowledge into the troops, increase the number of sappers in the rifle regiment, and the need to establish order in the organization of combat training in territorial engineering units and subunits.

In rifle regiments it was proposed to create special sapper teams with a strength equal to a platoon of a sapper company. These teams were supposed to provide engineering training for the riflemen, supervise the sapper work carried out by the riflemen, and also independently carry out special engineering work. Special training for sappers of a regimental sapper team must be universal.

Considering modern meaning ferrying facilities, the meeting confirmed the need for the existence of pontoon units and decided to ask the State Military Inspectorate to pay special attention to the speedy development of a perfect type of pontoon equipment and providing existing pontoon battalions with the necessary ferrying equipment and horse transport.

In the decision on the issue of territorial police construction of engineering troops, detailed recommendations were given on the organization of pre-conscription training, as well as the organization of territorial units. The need was noted to staff territorial engineering units and units from residents of industrial areas and cities; it was recognized that the terms of training in territorial units (with a total duration of eight months over five years) for the engineering troops are insufficient, and therefore it was recommended, while maintaining the same service life, to increase the duration training fees up to twelve and a half months.

At the same time, it was recommended to provide the territorial units with the necessary teaching aids and materials; staff them with command personnel who have graduated from normal military engineering schools and have practical experience of at least one year; ensure the training of the missing junior command personnel for territorial engineering units in personnel units or by organizing special schools outside the territorial divisions.

Thus, the meeting outlined the main activities for carrying out military reform in the engineering troops. The decisions made determined the basis for the construction and content of combat training of the engineering troops in subsequent years. Based on them, corresponding programs were developed.

Practically during the period of military reform and in the first years after it, the following measures were carried out in the engineering troops.

Simultaneously with the reorganization of the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, the leadership of the technical troops of the Red Army was also reorganized. The Main Military Engineering Directorate, which was in charge of the engineering troops, as well as the supply of engineering equipment to the troops, was reorganized. It was freed from combat functions, was supposed to be in charge only of supplying troops with engineering equipment and was subordinate to the chief of supply of the Red Army. Control of the engineering troops was transferred to headquarters. Management of combat training of engineering troops was concentrated in the military engineering inspection under the Main Directorate of the Red Army.

The independent military engineering departments in the districts that existed before the reorganization were freed from combat functions and included as departments in the Office of the District Supply Chief. The military engineering training of the district troops was to be supervised by an inspector of engineers, subordinate directly to the commander of the district troops (this position soon became known as the chief of engineers).

In connection with the introduction in 1924-1925. In the new organizational structure of the Red Army (formation of rifle corps, liquidation of rifle brigades, etc.), much attention was paid to improving the organization and general condition of the engineering and technical troops. In accordance with the new states, the corps of engineering troops included a sapper battalion (two sapper companies and an engineer park), the division - a separate sapper company (61) and an engineer park, and the rifle regiment - a camouflage engineer platoon. In the cavalry, engineering troops consisted of cavalry sapper squadrons in divisions and sapper demolition platoons in regiments. The corps engineer battalions almost all remained personnel, but the positions of corps engineer and battalion commander were combined. The division engineer was also the company commander. This situation existed for one year, after which these positions were again separated. All special and technical troops were also personnel.

As part of the engineering troops, the militia-territorial ones were mainly sapper companies of territorial divisions and sapper-camouflage platoons of rifle regiments of these divisions. Territorial Sapper Company rifle division had a staff of slightly more than twenty people. The permanent composition of the sapper-camouflage platoon included three people.

The number of engineering troops and institutions on October 1, 1925 was 11,415 people, or 2.1 percent of the total number of the Red Army (62). Organizational measures taken in the engineering troops in 1924-1925. were caused and justified by the prevailing situation at that time, but later it became clear that the available number of engineering troops in the Red Army was not enough.

Along with the implementation of organizational measures, there was a further improvement in the system of training command personnel for engineering units and subunits. The need for this was determined by the fact that the level of military education of the command staff was not high enough. Thus, in 1925, in the engineering troops, only 30 percent of the command staff had a normal military education, and 17 percent had no military education at all. The situation with junior command personnel during 1924-1925. remained unfavorable. As of June 1, 1924, the shortage in the engineering and technical troops was 32.3 percent.

To train junior command personnel, regimental schools were created at the end of 1924 - beginning of 1925. Junior command staff and relevant specialists from units that did not have regular schools were trained in special classes that were formed during the training period at the relevant units and formations.

The training and improvement of middle and senior command personnel was carried out in three types of military educational institutions: in normal military schools, which trained new cadres of middle command personnel; at advanced training courses and at higher schools that deepened the knowledge of commanders; in military academies that trained commanding officers of the senior and highest categories.

The experience of building and establishing a military school (including engineering) was summarized in the “Regulations on military schools of the Red Army”, which was put into effect by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated November 30, 1925. This provision, in particular, determined that for the preparation of command military engineering schools are being created within the engineering troops. The military engineering school was a combat unit within a three-company battalion, and educationally it was divided into four classes: preparatory, junior, middle and senior. There were two such schools at that time.

To retrain the middle command staff of the engineering troops, advanced training courses for command staff were created at the Leningrad Engineering School back in 1924.

The systematic training of reserve command personnel began in 1924 with the organization of teams of one-year students at the corps engineer battalions. In addition to the battalion staff, these teams included young people of military age who had completed secondary education, as well as young engineers who received a deferment until they graduated from a higher educational institution. Those who completed training in the team were required to pass exams for the position of platoon commander, after which they were transferred to the reserve. Those who did not pass the exams remained to serve on a general basis.

By the time of the reform, by March 1924, the Red Army had a Military Engineering Academy to train military engineers. In addition, civilian universities were brought in to train some groups of military specialists for the Red Army. So in 1924, a geodetic department was created at the Land Survey Institute. In 1925, a military communications department was created at the Leningrad Institute of Railways, and a military electrical engineering department was created at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute. In this regard, the faculties of geodetic, military communications and electrical engineering that existed at the Military Engineering Academy were closed, and the Military Engineering Academy itself at the beginning of 1925 was merged with the artillery and reorganized into the Military Technical Academy, which received the name F in 1926 E. Dzerzhinsky. During the period from 1925 to 1928, the academy trained 113 military engineers.

The work carried out to strengthen the organizational structure of the Red Army made it possible to organize normal combat and political training in its units and formations. M. V. Frunze on November 17, 1924, in a report at a meeting of leading political workers, said:

“The general improvement in the living and working conditions of the army has opened up the possibility of putting its education and training on solid ground. In essence, only now can we really take up our studies. In previous years, with their turnover of personnel, difficult material conditions of existence, lack of a solid procedure for serving, etc., we were actually deprived of any opportunity to build an army as a real fighting force” (63).

Combat and political training was also organized in the engineering troops. In September 1924, the Red Army inspectorate sent out a combat training plan to the troops for the first year of training, which was approved by the plenum of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council in December 1924. Based on this plan, winter training was organized in the engineering units of the Red Army in 1924-1925. In terms of combat training of engineering troops and engineering training of all types of troops, the recommendations of the All-Union Conference of Chiefs of Engineers of the Red Army were mainly taken into account.

In 1925, a normal training plan was put into effect in all personnel and territorial units and formations of the Red Army, including the engineering troops. The training period for personnel units was set at two years. Each year was divided into winter and summer periods of study. In the first year of training, the Red Army soldier was supposed to become a trained specialist fighter with technical knowledge of the material part of the platoon's arsenal. By the end of the second year of training, he should have acquired such knowledge that would allow him to go into the reserve as a squad commander.

Red Army soldiers who studied at the school for junior commanders (regimental or corresponding) received complete training as a squad commander during the first year, and in the second year they were prepared to perform the functions of an assistant reserve platoon commander.

Simultaneously with the combat training plan, a normal political training plan was developed and put into effect. The two-year program of political training and education developed by the PUR was aimed at preparing a conscious, combat-ready defender of Soviet power, clearly understanding that its strengthening is possible on the basis of a strong alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the Communist Party. Approved by the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), this program was put into effect in the 1925/26 academic year.

The need to organize combat training of engineering units sometimes required in some districts to temporarily gather sappers in one place for the period of summer practical training. This was achieved by assigning sapper units in general camps to an engineering group, headed by the deputy camp assembly for engineering troops. This was the case, for example, in 1923 and subsequent years in the Chuguev camp (southeast of Kharkov), where the engineering group consisted of the 7th and 8th corps battalions and the 23rd divisional engineer company. Sometimes it was necessary to organize special engineering camps. Such were, for example, the pontoon camp of the Kyiv garrison on Trukhanov Island in 1923-1941; in the same years - a camp of engineering units of the Kharkov Military District on the Northern Donets River near the city of Zmiev (14th corps, 29th divisional engineer battalions, engineer companies of the 25th and 73rd rifle divisions).

Having a purely educational value, the camps operated no more than three to four months a year. By the time of general training, regular exercises and maneuvers, the camps ceased to exist, and the engineering units joined their formations.

The development and implementation of new military regulations, manuals, manuals, instructions and other guidance materials were important for improving the training and education of army personnel.

In addition to the fact that the issues of engineering support for combat and the combat use of engineering troops were reflected in the combat manuals of the Red Army, issued in these years, a number of manuals and instructions on military engineering were issued, which made it possible to organize special training in the troops more purposefully and with high quality.

So, for example, in the period 1924-1928. instructions were published on the military engineering of the Red Army, military camouflage, engineering and technical affairs of the command staff of all branches of the army, special education of the engineering troops of the Red Army (Bridges and crossings, part 1; Demolition work; Underground mine engineering), military engineering for infantry, etc.

Military magazines that were published played a major role in generalizing the experience of combat and political training of units and formations of the Red Army and its further improvement. They also raised and, to one degree or another, resolved issues of Soviet military engineering, combat training and combat use of engineering troops. Such magazines in the period under review were “Army and Revolution”, “Military Thought and Revolution”, “Military Bulletin”, “War and Revolution”, “Technique and Supply of the Red Army”, etc.

During these years, military-scientific work was carried out on a large scale both throughout the Red Army and in its engineering troops. The following works published at this time deserve attention: N. Shelavin - “Divisional and Corps Engineers”, 1924; A. V. Prigorovsky - “Engineering and technical means of combat and tactical use of engineering troops,” 1924; G. Serchevsky - “Basic principles of the tactical use of sappers and the system of divisional management of them,” 1924; K. Schildbach - “Tactics of Engineering Troops”, 1927; G. Potapov - “Combat use and use of engineering troops”, 1928; M. Spiering, D. Ushakov, K. Schildbach - “Application of military engineering in the combat service of troops,” 1927; K. A. Rose - “River crossing based on the experience of the civil war of 1918-1920,” 1928; a number of works by D. M. Karbyshev, G. G. Nevsky and others.

In general, by the end of 1928, engineering units and subunits had already accumulated practical experience in organizing and conducting combat and political training. During this period, the sending of engineering units to various types of construction work was widely used to consolidate theoretical knowledge and develop practical skills in organizing work and its production (for example, the construction of the Orsha - Lepel railway, road and bridge work in a forested and swampy area in the upper reaches of the Berezina River west of Lepel and in the border zone of the Belarusian SSR, construction of the Oster - Chernigov road, etc.). In particular, for the construction of the Chernigov-Ovruch railway in 1927, a railway corps was formed, which included sapper corps battalions (2, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 17), united in training terms into a brigade, headed by the deputy commander of the 17th Rifle Corps for engineering troops, corps engineer A. S. Tsigurov. Corps engineer battalions in the summer of 1927 and 1928. they went to camps on the railway route and, in parallel with the implementation of the special and combat training plan, carried out work on the construction of the railway, including the construction of bridges on pile supports. During the same period, the command staff of the engineering troops and engineering units participated in ongoing exercises, field trips, reconnaissance and war games.

In the organization of combat training and its management, a large role was played by inspectors of engineers at the Main Directorate of the Red Army and inspectors of district engineers, who provided assistance to the troops, generalized and disseminated best practices, revealed shortcomings, identified the causes and, through the chiefs of engineers, sought to eliminate them.

A large group of engineering units and units, as well as soldiers of the engineering troops, were awarded orders, personalized weapons and valuable gifts for their participation in the fight against the Basmachism, for success in combat training and restoration of the national economy. Thus, by a resolution of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR dated July 13, 1927, for distinction in the battle against the Basmachi on September 12, 1925 in the area of ​​the Yakshi-Keldy fortress, the commander of a separate sapper half-squadron of the 8th Turkestan Cavalry Brigade B. I. Wetzel, assistant platoon commander of the same squadron N. M. Grigorenko, squad commander I. R. Wegner, Red Army soldiers Y. A. Stukalov, P. I. Prikhodko, I. D. Slashchini "N, T. S. Matveenko, G. M. Zharinov, K.K. Savoteev, D.N. Kofakov(64).

In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the Red Army, those who particularly distinguished themselves on the battle fronts and in peacetime work, by order of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council on personnel No. 102 of February 23, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner throughout the Red Army - 1066 people, including G. K. Dmitriev - former divisional engineer of the 10th Infantry Division, G. K. Usupov - former head of the sapper team of the 6th Khabarovsk Infantry Regiment and I. I. Khodunov - former head of the demolition team of the 81st Infantry Regiment of the 91st Infantry Division. The same order awarded 1,745 people with personal weapons and valuable gifts, among them 48 people from the engineering troops, including 17 people with personal weapons, valuable gifts and certificates of honor - 31 people (65).

In the same years, separate engineer battalions of the 8th, 10th, 13th and 17th Rifle Corps, the 21st separate engineer battalion and the 1st company of the 9th separate engineer battalion (66) were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

During this period, such a form of education for Red Army soldiers was also practiced, such as the election of the most honored people of the army and the country at meetings of unit personnel as honorary Red Army soldiers. The decision on election was announced by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In engineering units and subunits, ten people were approved as honorary Red Army soldiers, including the commander of the 17th Rifle Corps, J. F. Fabritsius, the commander of the Turkestan Front, K. A. Avksentyevsky, a worker at the cement plant of the Kiev Okrug Municipal Economy, S. V. Lysenko, and the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Georgia F.I. Makharadze et al.

During the period of technical re-equipment of the Red Army

The period of pre-war five-year plans for the Armed Forces Soviet Union was a period of their technical re-equipment and further increase in combat power. At the same time, the technical equipment and re-equipment of the engineering troops took place.

In 1928, the “Engineering Weapons System” of the Red Army was developed and approved in 1930 by the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, which provided the entire range of technical means necessary to carry out military engineering combat missions. The system determined the basic tactical and technical data of engineering assets and established the procedure for their development and introduction into supply. On the basis of this document, which was revised several times with the introduction of some changes, the engineering troops were equipped with new equipment until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War.

In accordance with the adopted system, during the years of the first five-year plans, along with the technical re-equipment of the entire army, there was an intensive development of military engineering equipment, which was equipped with the engineering troops.

The further development - both quantitatively and qualitatively - of crossing and bridge facilities was particularly intensive. The ferry-bridge fleet on inflatable boats A-2, which was adopted in 1926, was replaced in 1927 by a fleet on A-3 boats, which was modernized in subsequent years and by 1936 had a carrying capacity of 12-14 tons, and its transportation the material part was already carried out on cars.

In 1934, the heavy N2P fleet (with open metal pontoons) and the light NLP fleet (with folding pontoons made of bakelized plywood) began to enter service, replacing the Tomilovsky pontoon park that had been transferred from the old Russian army, which lasted 70 years (67).

It should be noted that at the beginning of the Second World War, the N2P fleet turned out to be the only one of the pontoon-bridge parks of all the armies that fought that was quite suitable for assembling and erecting bridges with a carrying capacity of up to 60 tons. The carrying capacity of the NLP fleet was 16 tons.

To transport ferry from regular water crossings in the pre-war years, the BMK-70 towing motor boat, the NKL-27 semi-glider and the SZ-10 and SZ-20 ship outboard units were created.

In 1939, a special pontoon park SP-19 was put into service, intended for the construction of bridges and ferry crossings on wide rivers with high flow speeds.

Simultaneously with heavy, medium and light ferry fleets, a number of light ferry vehicles also entered service in the same years: assault difficult-to-flood equipment (TZI), a small inflatable boat, a swimming suit. Later, an inflatable boat carried on packs and a folding boat made of plywood were designed for mountain units. Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, collapsible metal bridges RMM-2 and RMM-4 were developed, and the latter was put into service during the war and was the basis for the creation of collapsible metal bridges in our army.

Much attention was paid to the development of means of mechanization and electrification of military engineering work. Already in 1934-1935. Many new equipment were introduced into service, which dramatically increased the capabilities of the engineering troops.

So, for example, for logging work, the engineering troops received movable sawmill frames, sawmills, gas-powered saws, a set of accessories for tractor skidding of logs, and a set of suspended monorail tracks. The presence of these means made it possible to mechanize basically the entire process of logging work.

To mechanize bridge work, a metal collapsible pile driver with a steam-air hammer was adopted in 1935. Subsequently, Soviet designers created more advanced and productive piling tools - diesel pile hammers and others. The mobile compressor station, which entered service by 1936, could be successfully used not only for the mechanization of bridge work, but also in other work requiring the use of pneumatic tools.

Before the appearance of tractors in the engineering troops, road vehicles developed in accordance with the possibilities of using horse-drawn traction. Among the first road equipment were various types of uprooters, plows, drag shovels and even horse-drawn ditch diggers. By 1934-1935, as tractor-drawn road vehicles were being created, various machine samples were selected for engineering units after special tests. In 1937-1938 Based on the experience of using road vehicles, the troops adopted the most advanced machines used with the S-60 and S-65 tractors, namely: the modernized heavy GTM grader and the BG-M bulldozer, SP and ST-5 scrapers, KV-2 double-blade ditch diggers and KV-3, a heavy collapsible ripper, as well as a powerful special LNG grader and a wheeled motor grader with a picker.

The first mobile power station, mounted on a 1.5-ton vehicle in 1930 and put into service by 1934, was a charging and lighting station with a capacity of 3 kW (AES-1). In 1935, an automobile power plant with a capacity of 15 kW (NPP-3) was included in the report card of the engineering troops. The new power plant had a set of electrified tools and lighting fixtures. During these same years, the first samples of high-voltage mobile power stations, intended for electrifying wire fences, entered service.

Much work has been done in the field of creating and improving mine-explosive equipment and weapons. Thus, in 1934, blasting machines PM-1, PM-2, a large number of various electrical measuring instruments, special fuses and contactors entered service. The first anti-tank mine TM-35 appeared, later - AKS, TM-39, TMD-40, PMZ-40. The last of these samples were developed based on combat experience in the use of anti-tank mines in 1939-1940. Based on the same experience, anti-personnel mines MPK-40, PMK-6, etc. were created. Work was also carried out to study the effect of a shaped charge, especially on armor. New means of controlling landmines at a distance, via radio, were developed.

Wire obstacles (WOBs) were developed as other means of barriers. Much attention was paid to the construction of water barriers.

Work was carried out in the field of development of barriers. However, by 1935, only sets of means for reconnaissance and overcoming electrified barriers entered service. The first mine detectors appeared only in the period 1939-1940. To overcome anti-tank ditches with tanks, ST-26 sapper tanks were designed on the basis of the T-26 tank, equipped with a metal bridge that was moved onto the obstacle by the tank driver directly from the vehicle.

During the period of technical re-equipment of the army, there was significant work. was also carried out to create standard means of camouflaging troops and military equipment, as well as to develop methods for using these means. Various mask suits, mask nets, materials, and paints were put into service.

For the field water supply of troops, means of reconnaissance, extraction and purification of water in the field, as well as its transportation and storage, were designed and put into service.

The successes of industrialization of the USSR made it possible to ensure the production of various and complex engineering equipment at the factories of our country and not to be dependent on imports.

Studying the issue of the growth of mechanization equipment that entered the engineering armament during the years of the first five-year plan, D. M. Karbyshev noted that the capacity of the machine park that entered service with the engineering troops of the Red Army was: in 1932 - 5 thousand, in 1933 . - 25 thousand, in 1934 - 95 thousand l. With.; the growth of mechanization and motorization means per soldier was: in pontoon battalions in 1932 - 0.6, in 1933 - 3.0, in 1934 - 6.0; in engineering battalions in 1932 - 0.3, in 1933 - 1.6, in 1934 - 2.1; in sapper battalions in 1932 - 0.3, in 1933 - 1.02, in 1934 - 1.75 liters. p.(68) .

It should be noted that some engineering vehicles, in terms of their tactical and technical data, no longer fully meet the increased requirements, and the pace of development and introduction of new models lagged behind in comparison with other types modern weapons, which was noted by the People's Commissar of Defense at the review of engineering equipment in December 1940.

For the development, operation and combat use of new equipment, specially trained personnel were needed. For this purpose, technical companies were formed in corps engineer and pontoon battalions, and technical platoons were formed in divisional engineer battalions. The Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev (recreated in 1932) began to train specialists in engineering weapons.

Despite the general difficulties of growth in the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet government devoted pre-war years a large demand for equipping the engineering troops with new equipment. This can be seen from the fact that during the period from 1935 to 1941 the number of engineering vehicles and ferry fleets increased in the following sizes:

Parkov N2P.. ... 3.5 times

Sawmill frames and machines... ...3 times

Power plants of all types.. ... 4 times

Collapsible metal pile drivers.. ... 4 times

Compressor stations.. ........... 5 times

During this period, there was a quantitative and qualitative growth of the engineering troops of the Red Army, as well as a number of organizational changes in them. In particular, two-company combat engineer battalions were formed in the rifle divisions.

The engineering troops of the Red Army were headed during these years (from May 1930 to May 1937) by an active participant in the civil war, one of the most talented military leaders, N. N. Petin.

Both during the period of economic recovery of the country and in 1929-1939. engineering units and divisions, as well as scientists from the Military Engineering Academy, provided great assistance in the further development of the national economy. They built roads, bridges, crossings and other objects. Soldiers from engineering units also provided great assistance in the fight against natural disasters. Characteristic in this regard is the feat of the sapper company of the 9th sapper battalion of the North Caucasus Military District, whose commander at that time was V. A. Kopylov (now retired major general of the engineering troops). In the spring of 1931, sappers from this company took part in extinguishing a fire that engulfed oil fields in the Maykop region. These works were supervised by the corps engineer of the 9th Rifle Corps K. S. Kalugin (later major general of the engineering troops, died in 1945). Skillfully using explosives, sappers extinguished the fire. For this feat, the most distinguished sappers were awarded the Order of Lenin. They were among the first servicemen of our army to receive the highest government award. Among those awarded were corps engineer K. S. Kalugin, company commander V. A. Kopylov, squad commander V. M. Emelyanov and Red Army demolition soldiers Artemov, Burgaster, Kiprov and Evsikov (69).

Engineering troops in the combat operations of the Red Army in 1929-1940.

After the end of the civil war, the Red Army did not conduct large-scale military operations for a long period. Numerous border conflicts and incidents organized by the imperialists, the fight against large Basmachi gangs and even the defeat of the Chinese militarists during the conflict in the China East railway due to the nature of the actions and their limited scope, they could not serve as the basis for broad conclusions and generalizations in the field of military art. However, even in these hostilities, the personnel of the engineering units, as well as the entire Red Army, showed courage, heroism and a high consciousness of patriotic duty, defending Soviet power - the power of workers and peasants.

For distinction in military operations to eliminate the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, S. M. Shumilov, a Red Army soldier of the engineer squadron of the 5th separate Kuban Cavalry Brigade, and N. P. Cherepanov were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Red Army soldier (trained) of a separate sapper squadron of the 9th separate Far Eastern Cavalry Brigade, I. P. Bedrov - commander of this squadron, M. Vagin and S. Astafiev - sappers of the 13th separate sapper battalion, I. A. Levin - platoon commander, L Syrov is a foreman, M. Bubnov and A. Shaidurov are commanders of sections of this battalion, etc. - sixteen people in total (70).

Volunteers - sappers and military engineers - advisers selflessly and courageously fulfilled their international duty in Spain during the years of struggle against the Francoist rebels and fascist interventionists. Construction and maintenance of crossings, fortification equipment of borders, construction of barriers and destruction zones during retreat and behind enemy lines, transfer of knowledge and experience to sappers of the Republican Army - this is not a complete list of tasks that our volunteers solved in Spain. Many of them were awarded orders and medals. The Order of the Red Banner was awarded on November 11, 1937 to V.P. Shurygin (now retired Major General of the Engineering Troops), who at that time was an adviser on engineering issues at the headquarters of the Northern and then the Central Fronts.

Larger military events in these years, the experience of which had a certain significance in the development of the theory and practice of combat use of engineering troops of the Red Army, were fighting near Lake Khasan (July 29 - August 11, 1938), on the Khalkhin Gol River (May - August 1939) and the Soviet-Finnish conflict (1939-1940). Let us briefly consider the participation of engineering troops in these hostilities.

At the end of July 1938, Japanese militarists in the area of ​​Lake Khasan (130 km from Vladivostok) invaded Soviet territory and captured the tactically advantageous Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya hills.

The task of defeating the invading Japanese forces was assigned to the 40th and 32nd Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade of the 39th Rifle Corps.

The main tasks of the engineering troops were the preparation and maintenance of roads and column tracks for troops both during the period of their concentration in the combat area and during the battle; securing in engineering terms the hills recaptured from the enemy in order to provide the Soviet troops who occupied the hills with the opportunity to prevent a repetition of the enemy’s provocative attacks in this area.

The 39th Rifle Corps (corps engineer Major A.I. Goldovich) initially had only regular engineering forces and means, but they were not enough. The roads along which the corps troops followed to the deployment area and along which all types of supplies were supplied became completely impassable by August 5, and even tanks got stuck on them.

On August 5, the command of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA) ordered the allocation of 5 construction battalions, 2 sapper battalions (26th and 43rd) and 20 tractors to provide troops with routes.

Despite the difficult conditions in which the fighting took place, the personnel of the units and formations of the Soviet troops who participated in the battles and supported them showed high moral qualities and selfless devotion to the socialist Motherland. By August 11, the task of defeating the Japanese troops who had invaded Soviet soil was completed and the border was restored again.

For military merits shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, many Red Army soldiers and commanders of engineering troops were awarded orders and medals. Among them, captain A. A. Paderin, senior lieutenant M. L. Rabinovich, captain E. G. Dyldin, captain V. D. Kirpichnikov were awarded the Order of the Red Banner; Order of the Red Star - Captain N. A. Rossal; medal "For Courage" - Major A. I. Goldovich; Medal "For Military Merit" - Captain I. S. Telesh and others.

The fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River was more widespread than at Lake Khasan. They began in May 1939 with the invasion of large forces of Japanese troops into the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. From May to August 1939, the Soviet-Mongolian troops fought mainly defensive battles and prepared for the offensive operation, which was planned in August. The task of defeating the Japanese troops was entrusted to the Soviet-Mongolian formations and units united in the 1st Army Group.

The engineering forces and assets of the army group included three divisional separate engineer battalions (36, 82 and 24th), two separate companies tank brigades (11th and 32nd), a separate engineer company (70th), one pontoon battalion (17th) and one company of the 15th pontoon battalion, two hydraulic engineering companies (11th and 14th) . Of the transport facilities, 2 1/3 of the N2P fleet and 2 1/2 of the A-3 fleet of boats were concentrated.

The main tasks of the engineering troops in the preparation and conduct of the operation were to ensure the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, to conduct engineering reconnaissance of the Khalkhin Gol River in the zone of the upcoming offensive, to arrange and maintain crossings across the Khalkhin Gol River, to provide the attacking troops with water, to ensure the advance of the advancing troops during the operation.

During the period of preparation for the offensive, engineering units and subunits provided camouflage for the concentration of troops and military equipment, and also skillfully led the simulation of preparations for a long-term defense.

Sapper and pontoon units and units, while conducting reconnaissance and reconnaissance of the Khalkhin Gol River, discovered several fords and identified bridge crossing points. A total of 12 pontoon bridges were built, including 3 bridges built back in June. Over 20 linear lines were equipped to the crossing areas. km of access roads, and a curfew service is organized at the crossings.

The engineering units did a great job of equipping structures for command and observation posts of formation commanders and for the command of the army group. To provide the troops with water, 49 shaft and 8 shallow-tube wells were equipped.

Soviet-Mongolian troops launched an offensive on August 20 and completed the encirclement of the Japanese group on August 23. The encircled group of Japanese troops was dismembered and liquidated by August 31.

During the operation, the engineering troops ensured the advancement of our infantry, cavalry, tanks and artillery, their fight on the internal and external fronts of the encirclement, and also maintained supply and evacuation routes and crossings across the Khalkhin Gol River.

The combat experience gained showed the increased importance of engineering troops and engineering support in modern offensive operations; the great role of operational camouflage and the ability to achieve operational surprise in difficult desert conditions; the need to timely provide the attacking troops with an appropriate number of standard transport means, especially in treeless areas.

The Soviet-Mongolian troops participating in the operation on the Khalkhin Gol River showed high moral and combat qualities, initiative in solving assigned combat missions, while demonstrating massive heroism and courage, for which hundreds of soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, and 70 the participants in the battles were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among the soldiers of the engineering troops awarded orders and medals were D. D. Abashin, A. F. Zhuchkov, N. F. Kotikov, N. I. Nesterov, P. I. Patushko. N. G. Ufimtsev, G. N. Yakovlev, K. V. Yakovlev and others. The 70th separate sapper company was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On November 17, 1939, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the creation of the 1st Cavalry Army, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded a large group of formations and units the Order of the Red Banner, including a separate sapper company of the Order of Lenin tank brigade named after M.P. Yakovlev, separate sapper companies of the 6th and 32nd tank brigades (71).

Engineering units and units took part in the campaigns of the Red Army to liberate the western regions of Belarus, Ukraine, as well as Bessarabia and Bukovina.

The Soviet troops did not conduct large-scale and prolonged military operations at that time, but the issues of engineering support for the movement of troops (in their readiness to fight) had to be resolved.

During the liberation campaigns, most of the engineering units ensured the crossing of troops across rivers (reinforced existing bridges, equipped fords, built new bridges), repaired roads, cleared airfield sites, set up overpasses for unloading trains, etc. The engineering troops fulfilled the tasks assigned to them .

In November 1939, the Finnish military, fueled by the reactionary forces of the imperialist states, organized a series of military provocations on the Soviet-Finnish border. On November 30, Soviet troops were forced to begin military operations against the Finnish army.

They took place from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The main events took place on the Karelian Isthmus, on a front of 100-110 km, where the main forces of the parties were concentrated and the most important operations took place.

What are characteristics theater of military operations and the state of enemy defense, which determined the main tasks of the engineering troops?

Firstly, the fighting took place in an area 12 percent of which was covered with lakes and rivers, 70 percent with impenetrable forests. Numerous rapids, waterfalls, rocky ridges and ice-free swamps created serious obstacles for the advancing troops and facilitated defense.

Secondly, the fighting took place in winter, with severe frosts reaching 40°, and in the presence of deep snow. Heavy snow, frequent fogs, the polar night on the northern sector of the front and very short days in the Karelian Isthmus area created additional difficulties for the advancing troops and facilitated the actions of the defenders.

Thirdly, on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main military events unfolded, a powerful long-term defense system was built, known as the Mannerheim Line, with a total depth of 100-120 km. Its construction took place under the guidance of the best military specialists Western Europe. The advancing Soviet troops had to break through this line, which was considered insurmountable by Western European experts.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the fighting was carried out by the 7th Army, consisting of nine rifle divisions and three tank brigades, and on the eastern borders of Finland on a front of about 1500 km - the 8th, 9th and 14th armies. At the end of December, another army, the 13th, advanced to the Karelian Isthmus, and on January 7, 1940, the North-Western Front was created to lead these armies. In February 1940, the 15th Army was deployed on the eastern borders of Finland. Colonel K. S. Nazarov (now a retired colonel general of the engineering troops) was appointed head of the front engineering troops.

By the beginning of hostilities, the 7th Army had from the engineering troops: one engineer battalion of a fortified area, the 125th engineer battalion, the 5th, 6th and 7th pontoon battalions. The head of the army engineering troops was Colonel A.F. Khrenov (now a retired colonel general of the engineering troops).

A broad generalization of the experience of combat use of engineering troops and engineering support for combat operations during the Soviet-Finnish conflict - area special research. Here we note only some of the results of their use.

Combat operations have shown the increasingly increasing role of engineering troops in modern combat and operations, not only in the field of providing infantry, artillery and tanks, but also in their direct action on the battlefield, especially when breaking through heavily fortified enemy defenses.

During the war, extensive experience was gained in breaking through powerful modern defenses in the extremely difficult conditions of the theater of operations in winter; organizing and conducting in a new way engineering reconnaissance related to the need to penetrate the enemy’s defense system to great depths (using aerial photography for this purpose); detecting mines and other explosive obstacles and equipping scouts with the necessary means in this regard; organizing clearing and making passages in enemy minefields and mined forest rubble, as well as consolidating captured lines; more precise establishment of road services.

The pre-war engineering equipment of the Red Army was also subjected to significant testing. Experience has shown that not all of our engineering equipment turned out to be suitable in those conditions, in particular, road and earth-moving machines did not meet the necessary requirements, the unsuitability of winter camouflage robes was also revealed, and they were replaced by others during the operation.

Gaps were also discovered in the combat training of the engineering troops, the lack of military equipment for some engineering units at the beginning of the war, and poor knowledge of the theater of military operations.

Despite the extremely difficult natural conditions in which the struggle was waged, and individual shortcomings in the combat training of troops and their technical equipment, the Red Army troops broke through the enemy’s long-term fortified zone, accomplishing a feat unprecedented in history.

For the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command and the valor and courage demonstrated by the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council USSR Over 9 thousand combat participants were awarded. More than 400 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In addition, about 70 units and formations were awarded orders of the USSR (72).

Of the engineering troops, the Order of the Red Banner was awarded to the 57th and 227th separate sapper battalions and the 6th separate pontoon-bridge battalion.

The high title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to sappers Lieutenant N. I. Rumyantsev and Junior Lieutenant F. Ya. Kucherov; junior commanders B. L. Kuznetsov, P. S. Fedorchuk and A. R. Krutogolov; privates A.I. Byakov and N.N. Nikitin; pontooners junior lieutenant P.V. Usov, private V.K. Artyukh, as well as colonel A.F. Khrenov. A large group of engineering troops was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Among them are N. P. Artamonov, B. V. Bychevsky, I. F. Danilov, M. F. Ioffe, G. A. Kutsulin, I. P. Kusakin, I. I. Markov, I. E. Nagorny, V. O. Nool, M. A. Ponomarev, V. I. Skrynnikov, F. A. Stanchin, V. D. Starostin, G. P. Tomashevsky, S. F. Chmutov, N. A. Shitov, I. B. Shoikhet et al.

Further organizational strengthening and technical equipment of engineering troops

The experience of military operations at Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Karelian Isthmus, the liberation campaigns of the Red Army in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, and the outbreak of the Second World War required serious measures to be taken in the Soviet Armed Forces to bring them into line with modern requirements.

In 1939-1941. a number of measures were taken for organizational improvement, further technical equipment of the Red Army and Navy, restructuring of management bodies, as well as personnel training. A corresponding series of events was carried out in the engineering troops.

As already noted, in the pre-war years, the Red Army and its engineering troops received a certain amount of engineering equipment from industry and, on January 1, 1941, had up to 265 ferry parks of all types (N2P, NLP, MDPA-3), including 45 heavy ones ( N2P), more than 1060 mobile power plants, over 680 sawmill frames and machines and many other means. However, in terms of technical equipment, the engineering troops lagged somewhat behind the level of requirements put forward by the general development of military affairs. New engineering equipment has just begun to enter the troops.

The management of engineering activities in the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was carried out by the State Military Institution, which was in charge of military engineering training of all branches of the military, organized combat and special training of engineering troops, supervised defensive construction and the supply of engineering equipment to the Red Army. The heads of the GVIUKA were: from May 1937 to October 1939 - division commander I. P. Mikhailin, from October 1939 to July 1940 - Colonel I. A. Petrov, from July 1940 to March 12, 1941 - brigade commander A. F. Khrenov, and from March 20, 1941 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L. Z. Kotlyar.

Under the Main Inspectorate of the Red Army there was a military engineering inspection headed by the Inspector General of the Engineering Troops. Its task was to check the combat training of engineering troops and the engineering training of other branches of the military. Since July 1940, the Inspector General of the Engineering Troops was Major General of the Engineering Troops M.P. Vorobyov.

In the People's Commissariat of Defense, the leadership of the Main Military Engineering Directorate and the Directorate for the Construction of Fortified Areas was carried out at that time by the Deputy People's Commissar, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov.

In military districts and armies, the management of engineering activities in the troops and defensive construction was carried out by engineering departments and departments, headed by the corresponding commanders. In corps, divisions and regiments, this work was performed by corps and division engineers and chiefs of regimental engineering services.

The engineering units of the army and district subordination were reorganized in the first half of 1941. In order to improve combat training and create a base for the deployment of engineering units in case of war, individual district engineering battalions were consolidated into engineering regiments of about 1 thousand people each. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, instead of 22 separate engineer battalions and 21 separate pontoon battalions, 18 engineer (73) and 16 pontoon (74) regiments were formed.

In addition to these units, they are part of the engineering troops of the RGK. there were separate camouflage-engineering and pontoon-bridge battalions, a separate hydraulic engineering company and a separate hydraulic engineering station. By this time, in the combined arms armies, in addition to military engineering units and subunits, there were a total of eighteen separate engineering, motorized engineering and sapper battalions.

According to the approved states of formations and units of the Red Army, it was envisaged to have from the engineering troops: in the rifle corps - a separate corps sapper battalion, in a rifle division - a separate sapper battalion of a rifle division, in a rifle regiment - a sapper company. The cavalry corps had a sapper squadron, a cavalry division had a sapper squadron and a ferry park, and a cavalry regiment had a sapper platoon. The mechanized corps included a separate motorized engineering battalion. IN tank division a motorized pontoon-bridge battalion was envisaged, armed with the N2P park. The motorized division included a light engineering battalion. Tank brigades and regiments had separate sapper companies, and motorized brigades and mechanized regiments had an sapper platoon. In the high-power artillery regiment, the howitzer artillery regiment of the RVGK and the corps heavy artillery regiment, the headquarters batteries each had one sapper platoon. The engineering troops of the Red Army belonged to the special troops and were obliged to provide engineering support for the combat operations of combined arms, tank and other units and formations. In the temporary field regulations of the Red Army of 1936, Article 7 states:

“The use of all the maneuverability of the modern Armed Forces is possible only subject to the proactive and precise work of special forces, and first of all engineering, communications and transport (railway and road).”

This charter defines the importance of engineering support for offensive combat and its tasks. The basic principles of engineering support for defensive combat were also developed. In 1939, the Engineering Manual for the Red Army infantry was put into effect. The manual provided basic guidelines for conducting military engineering work on the ground, taking into account the use of new engineering equipment (75).

In 1939, in connection with the transfer of our western border, the construction of new fortified areas began. In addition to military construction units, all the engineering and sapper battalions of the border districts and forty battalions from the internal districts were involved in this work. The separation of engineering units from their formations and formations had a very negative impact on the combat and special training of personnel, the cohesion and preparedness of the engineering troops for actions in a combat situation. In passing, it should be noted that we failed to complete the construction of the SD by the beginning of the war.

The training of officer cadres of engineering troops before the war was carried out in five military engineering schools (Moscow, Leningrad, Borisov, Chernigov and Michurinsk, the latter was created in 1941), the V.V. Kuibyshev Military Engineering Academy and three courses for improving command composition. The training of reserve officers was carried out at some civilian higher educational institutions and at periodic gatherings of reserve officers.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 7, 1940, the ranks of general and admiral were established for the senior command staff of the army and navy. On June 4, 1940, the Council of People's Commissars, by its resolution, awarded the rank of general to a large group of officers, including 23 officers of the engineering troops (76).

On November 2, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR established new military ranks for privates and junior commanding officers.

An important factor in the further strengthening of the engineering troops was the activities of political agencies and party organizations, strengthening their role and influence on the life of units and units. As in all Armed Forces, in the engineering units, special importance was attached to the organizational strengthening of party and Komsomol organizations, the growth in the number of communists and Komsomol members primarily due to soldiers of leading professions, as well as the expansion and strengthening of the party and Komsomol core of command and control personnel.

The theoretical position about the role and place of engineering troops in the system of the Armed Forces as a whole and the direction of their development before the Great Patriotic War corresponded general development methods of armed struggle. The meetings of engineering chiefs held in December 1940 were especially important in developing a unity of views on the engineering support of the operation.

In the pre-war years, a number of teaching aids and textbooks on engineering support for combat operations of troops and the combat use of engineering units and subunits. These include the training manual “Engineering support for combat operations of a rifle division” by E. V. Aleksandrov, 1937, and his work “The work of a corps engineer battalion in combat conditions.” 1938. textbook “Engineering support for combat operations of rifle formations (sd and sk)” by D. M. Karbyshev, published in 1939 (part 1) and in 1940 (part 2), and a number of others. At the same time, D. M. Karbyshev was the author of a large number scientific works on a number of military engineering issues.

Measures taken under the leadership of the Communist Party both in the entire Red Army and in its engineering troops to transfer them to a peaceful position in 1921-1923, military reform in 1924-1925, as well as the technical re-equipment of units and formations based on the industrialization of the country and the successful implementation of the plans of the pre-war five-year plans made it possible to organizationally strengthen the engineering troops, restructure command and control bodies, train command personnel, organize and consistently improve the combat and political training of troops, ensure the supply of an ever-increasing amount of new military equipment, including vehicles and engineering weapons, mastering this technique, etc.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had a scientific generalization of the theory and practice of engineering support for combat and operations and, in particular, the combat use of engineering troops. The main provisions of Soviet military theory on these issues corresponded to the general development of forms and methods of armed struggle.

But in general, all this made it possible to train the engineering troops to a sufficient extent, and they turned out to be capable of solving complex problems in difficult conditions in providing engineering support for the combat operations of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

(I) K: Educational institutions founded in 1932

Military Institute (engineer troops) of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation- a structural unit of the OVA of the Russian Armed Forces. IN Soviet time Military Engineering Order of Lenin, Red Banner Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev. Currently, it is the main training and methodological center for the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

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Engineering Academy in St. Petersburg

Both the Military Engineering and Technical University in St. Petersburg and the Military Institute of Engineering Troops in Moscow (formerly the Kuibyshev Academy) are claiming succession to the Nikolaev Engineering Academy. Petersburgers refer to the fact that on June 10, 1939, a decree of the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was signed, and an order was issued by the People's Commissar of the Navy on the formation in Leningrad of the Higher Naval Civil Engineering School of the RKKVMF, where the naval engineering faculty of the academy was returned and a separate part was attached - Leningrad Institute of Industrial Construction Engineers.

Academy named after Kuibyshev

The Military Engineering Academy was created by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated March 21, 1932, on the basis of the academy's engineering faculty, which moved to Moscow, and using the base of the Higher Civil Engineering School. Three years later, the academy was named after V.V. Kuibyshev.

The academy occupied the old house of the Durasovs on Pokrovsky Boulevard. In 1932, a new building was built for the Military Engineering Academy on the site of the right wing of the estate on the corner of Vorontsovo Pole Street (architect A. Kruglov). From November 1941 to December 1943, the academy was evacuated to the city of Frunze.

For many years the chairman of the state commission for the defense of diploma projects Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev was a graduate of the Nikolaev School D.M. Karbyshev. Prominent scientists taught at the academy: Hero of Socialist Labor I. M. Rabinovich, professors M. M. Filonenko-Borodich, V. K. Dmokhovsky, V. M. Keldysh, A. F. Loleit.

After joining the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Armed Forces Military Institute (engineering troops) remained the main training and methodological center of the engineering troops. It trains officers for the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Service of the FSB, as well as for a number of foreign armies.

IN institute There are faculties: command engineering, command of the Internal Troops, command of the Border Service, geodetic, retraining and advanced training, civil defense. There is a correspondence education department. There are 17 departments, including tactics of engineering troops, control of engineering troops, fortification and camouflage, engineering barriers, road vehicles and crossings, etc.

IN institute There is a research center, the main areas of research of which are combat engineering, tactics of engineering troops, fortification equipment of the area, the use and overcoming of obstacles, the preparation and maintenance of troop movement routes and crossings, camouflage of troops, etc.

Since 1998, in accordance with the resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev(Moscow) transformed into Military Engineering University with three branches: St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and Tyumen.

Chief institute was appointed deputy head of the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Armed Forces, Major General (2004, since 2008, Lieutenant General) Yu. P. Balkhovitin (born in 1958), since August 1, 2008 - head of the engineering troops of the Ground Forces. Fired from military service November 24, 2009 in connection with a major fire at the 31st arsenal of the Russian Defense Ministry in Ulyanovsk on November 13, 2009.

Famous teachers

• D. M. Karbyshev, Hero of the Soviet Union
• I. M. Rabinovich, Hero of Socialist Labor
• M. M. Filonenko-Borodich, professor, Honored Worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR
• V. K. Dmokhovsky, professor
• V. M. Keldysh, professor
• G. G. Carlsen, professor
• A. F. Loleit, professor
• A. A. Zubkov, senior lecturer
• A. S. Fisenko, professor, head of the department of industrial structures
• B. F. Zarako-Zarakovsky, Soviet and Polish military leader, lieutenant general of the Soviet Army and division general of the Polish Army

Graduates

Prominent military leaders of the engineering troops were students of the St. Petersburg and Moscow academies:

• Chief of the Red Army Engineering Troops in 1941-1942, Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar;
• Chief of the Red Army Engineering Troops since 1942, First Marshal of the Engineering Troops M.P. Vorobyov;
• Head of the Engineering Department of the People's Commissariat of the Navy during the war, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops P. I. Sudbin;
• Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army B.V. Blagoslavov
• Chief of Staff of the Red Army Engineering Troops, Colonel General of the Engineering Troops K. S. Nazarov;
• Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov.

The heads of the engineering troops of the fronts during the war were graduates of the academy N.P. Baranov, B.V. Blagoslavov, Yu. V. Bordzilovsky, B. V. Bychevsky, I. P. Galitsky, V. F. Zotov, N. F. Kirchevsky, Z. I. Kolesnikov, V. V. Kosarev, G. G. Nevsky, I. A. Petrov, N. M. Pilipets, A. I. Proshlyakov, A. I. Smirnov-Nesvitsky, A. F. Khrenov, A. D. Tsirlin, V. F. Shestakov.

Among the graduates of the academy are outstanding military engineers and scientists E.V. Alexandrov, G.G. Azgaldov, M.G. Barkhin, S.A. Ilyasevich, N.S. Kasperovich, N.L. Kirpichev, A.R. Shulyachenko , G. M. Salamakhin, B. G. Skramtaev, Art. teacher V.M. Zaitsev (candidate of technical sciences) and others.

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Notes

Literature

• Under the general editorship of A. D. Tsirlin, Red Banner Military Engineering Academy named after V. V. Kuibyshev, Brief historical sketch. - Moscow (M.), VIA, 1966.
• Military Engineering Academy named after. Kuibyshev 150 years old, M.: Voenizdat, 1969.
• 150 years of the Military Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev., M., Factory named after. Dunaeva, 1969.
• Tsirlin A.D., Biryukov P.I., Istomin V.P., Fedoseev E.N. Engineer troops in the battles for the Soviet Motherland. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1970.
• Shevchuk A. B. et al. Military Engineering University is 180 years old. - M.: VIU, 1999.
• Military encyclopedic Dictionary engineering troops. - M.: VIA, 2004.
• Zelensky V. E. Monuments of military engineering art: historical memory modern society and new objects of cultural heritage of Russia

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An excerpt characterizing the Military Institute (engineering troops) of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The totality of causes of phenomena is inaccessible to the human mind. But the need to find reasons is embedded in the human soul. And the human mind, without delving into the innumerability and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, each of which separately can be represented as a cause, grabs the first, most understandable convergence and says: this is the cause. In historical events (where the object of observation is the actions of people), the most primitive convergence seems to be the will of the gods, then the will of those people who stand in the most prominent historical place - historical heroes. But one has only to delve into the essence of each historical event, that is, into the activities of the entire mass of people who participated in the event, to be convinced that the will of the historical hero not only does not guide the actions of the masses, but is itself constantly guided. It would seem that it is all the same to understand the significance of the historical event one way or another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West went to the East because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference that existed between the people who argued that the earth stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those who said that they do not know what the earth rests on, but they know that there are laws governing the movement of it and other planets. There are no and cannot be reasons for a historical event, except for the only cause of all reasons. But there are laws that govern events, partly unknown, partly groped by us. The discovery of these laws is possible only when we completely renounce the search for causes in the will of one person, just as the discovery of the laws of planetary motion became possible only when people renounced the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe affirmation of the earth.

After the Battle of Borodino, the enemy’s occupation of Moscow and its burning, historians recognize the most important episode of the War of 1812 as the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp - the so-called flank march behind Krasnaya Pakhra. Historians attribute the glory of this ingenious feat to various individuals and argue about who, in fact, it belongs to. Even foreign, even French historians recognize the genius of the Russian commanders when speaking about this flank march. But why military writers, and everyone after them, believe that this flank march is a very thoughtful invention of some one person, which saved Russia and destroyed Napoleon, is very difficult to understand. In the first place, it is difficult to understand wherein lies the profundity and genius of this movement; for in order to guess that the best position of the army (when it is not attacked) is where there is more food, it does not require much mental effort. And everyone, even a stupid thirteen-year-old boy, could easily guess that in 1812 the most advantageous position of the army, after the retreat from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So, it is impossible to understand, firstly, by what conclusions historians reach the point of seeing something profound in this maneuver. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand exactly what historians see as the salvation of this maneuver for the Russians and its detrimental nature for the French; for this flank march, under other preceding, accompanying and subsequent circumstances, could have been disastrous for the Russians and salutary for the French army. If from the time this movement took place, the position of the Russian army began to improve, then it does not follow from this that this movement was the reason for this.
This flank march not only could not have brought any benefits, but could have destroyed the Russian army if other conditions had not coincided. What would have happened if Moscow had not burned down? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not been inactive? What if the Russian army, on the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, had given battle at Krasnaya Pakhra? What would have happened if the French had attacked the Russians when they were going after Pakhra? What would have happened if Napoleon had subsequently approached Tarutin and attacked the Russians with at least one tenth of the energy with which he attacked in Smolensk? What would have happened if the French had marched on St. Petersburg?.. With all these assumptions, the salvation of a flank march could turn into destruction.
Thirdly, and the most incomprehensible, is that people who study history deliberately do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to any one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this maneuver, just like the retreat in Filyakh, in the present, was never presented to anyone in its entirety, but step by step, event by event, moment by moment, flowed from a countless number of very diverse conditions, and only then was presented in all its entirety, when it was completed and became the past.
At the council in Fili, the dominant thought among the Russian authorities was a self-evident retreat in a direct direction back, that is, along the Nizhny Novgorod road. Evidence of this is that the majority of votes at the council were cast in this sense, and, most importantly, the well-known conversation after the council of the commander-in-chief with Lansky, who was in charge of the provisions department. Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that food for the army was collected mainly along the Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the event of a retreat to Nizhny, food supplies would be separated from the army by the large Oka River, through which transportation in the first winter was impossible. This was the first sign of the need to deviate from what had previously seemed the most natural direct direction to Nizhny. The army stayed further south, along the Ryazan road, and closer to the reserves. Subsequently, the inaction of the French, who even lost sight of the Russian army, concerns about protecting the Tula plant and, most importantly, the benefits of getting closer to their reserves, forced the army to deviate even further south, onto the Tula road. Having crossed in a desperate movement beyond Pakhra to the Tula road, the military leaders of the Russian army thought to remain near Podolsk, and there was no thought about the Tarutino position; but countless circumstances and the appearance again of French troops, who had previously lost sight of the Russians, and battle plans, and, most importantly, the abundance of provisions in Kaluga, forced our army to deviate even more to the south and move to the middle of the routes for their food supplies, from the Tula to the Kaluga road, to Tarutin. Just as it is impossible to answer the question of when Moscow was abandoned, it is also impossible to answer when exactly and by whom it was decided to go to Tarutin. Only when the troops had already arrived at Tarutin as a result of countless differential forces, then people began to assure themselves that they had wanted this and had long foreseen it.

The famous flank march consisted only in the fact that the Russian army, retreating straight back in the opposite direction of advance, after the French offensive had ceased, deviated from the direct direction initially adopted and, not seeing pursuit behind itself, naturally moved in the direction where it attracted by an abundance of food.
If we were to imagine not brilliant commanders at the head of the Russian army, but simply one army without leaders, then this army could not do anything other than move back to Moscow, describing an arc from the side on which there was more food and the edge was more abundantly.
This movement from the Nizhny Novgorod to the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran away in this very direction and that in this very direction it was required from St. Petersburg that Kutuzov move his army. In Tarutino, Kutuzov almost received a reprimand from the sovereign for withdrawing the army to the Ryazan road, and he was pointed out the same situation against Kaluga in which he was already at the time he received the sovereign’s letter.
Rolling back in the direction of the push given to it during the entire campaign and in the Battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, having destroyed the force of the push and not receiving new shocks, took the position that was natural to it.
Kutuzov's merit did not lie in some brilliant, as they call it, strategic maneuver, but in the fact that he alone understood the significance of the event that was taking place. He alone understood even then the meaning of the inaction of the French army, he alone continued to assert that the Battle of Borodino was a victory; he alone - the one who, it would seem, due to his position as commander-in-chief, should have been called to the offensive - he alone used all his strength to keep the Russian army from useless battles.
The killed animal near Borodino lay somewhere where the hunter who ran away had left it; but whether he was alive, whether he was strong, or whether he was just hiding, the hunter did not know. Suddenly the groan of this beast was heard.
The groan of this wounded beast, the French army, which exposed its destruction, was the sending of Lauriston to Kutuzov’s camp with a request for peace.
Napoleon, with his confidence that it is not only good that is good, but what came into his head that is good, wrote to Kutuzov the words that first came to his mind and had no meaning. He wrote:

“Monsieur le prince Koutouzov,” he wrote, “j"envoie pres de vous un de mes aides de camps generaux pour vous entretenir de plusieurs objets interessants. Je desire que Votre Altesse ajoute foi a ce qu"il lui dira, surtout lorsqu" il exprimera les sentiments d"estime et de particuliere consideration que j"ai depuis longtemps pour sa personne... Cette lettre n"etant a autre fin, je prie Dieu, Monsieur le prince Koutouzov, qu"il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde ,
Moscou, le 3 Octobre, 1812. Signe:
Napoleon."
[Prince Kutuzov, I am sending you one of my general adjutants to negotiate with you on many important subjects. I ask Your Lordship to believe everything that he tells you, especially when he begins to express to you the feelings of respect and special reverence that I have had for you for a long time. Therefore, I pray to God to keep you under his sacred roof.
Moscow, October 3, 1812.
Napoleon. ]

“Je serais maudit par la posterite si l"on me regardait comme le premier moteur d"un accommodation quelconque. Tel est l "esprit actuel de ma nation", [I would be damned if they looked at me as the first instigator of any deal; such is the will of our people.] - answered Kutuzov and continued to use all his strength for that to keep troops from advancing.
In the month of the robbery of the French army in Moscow and the quiet stop of the Russian army near Tarutin, a change occurred in the strength of both troops (spirit and number), as a result of which the advantage of strength was on the side of the Russians. Despite the fact that the position of the French army and its strength were unknown to the Russians, how soon the attitude changed, the need for an offensive was immediately expressed in countless signs. These signs were: the sending of Lauriston, and the abundance of provisions in Tarutino, and information coming from all sides about the inaction and disorder of the French, and the recruitment of our regiments with recruits, and good weather, and the long rest of the Russian soldiers, and the impatience that usually arises in the troops as a result of rest to carry out the task for which everyone was assembled, and curiosity about what was happening in the French army, so long lost from sight, and the courage with which the Russian outposts were now snooping around near the French standing in Tarutino, and news of easy victories over the French by peasants and partisans, and the envy aroused by this, and the feeling of revenge that lay in the soul of every person as long as the French were in Moscow, and (most importantly) the unclear, but arising in the soul of every soldier is the consciousness that the relationship of power has now changed and the advantage is on our side. The essential balance of forces changed, and an offensive became necessary. And immediately, just as surely as the chimes begin to strike and play in a clock, when the hand has made a full circle, in the higher spheres, in accordance with a significant change in forces, the increased movement, hissing and play of the chimes was reflected.

The Russian army was controlled by Kutuzov with his headquarters and the sovereign from St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, even before receiving news of the abandonment of Moscow, a detailed plan throughout the war and sent to Kutuzov for leadership. Despite the fact that this plan was drawn up on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by headquarters and accepted for execution. Kutuzov only wrote that long-range sabotage is always difficult to carry out. And to resolve the difficulties encountered, new instructions and persons were sent who were supposed to monitor his actions and report on them.
In addition, now the entire headquarters in the Russian army has been transformed. The places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay were replaced. They thought very seriously about what would be better: to place A. in B.’s place, and B. in D.’s place, or, on the contrary, D. in A.’s place, etc., as if anything other than the pleasure of A. and B., it could depend on this.
At the army headquarters, on the occasion of Kutuzov’s hostility with his chief of staff, Bennigsen, and the presence of the sovereign’s trusted representatives and these movements, a more than usual complex game of parties was going on: A. undermined B., D. under S., etc. ., in all possible movements and combinations. With all these undermining, the subject of intrigue was mostly the military matter that all these people thought to lead; but this military matter went on independently of them, exactly as it should have gone, that is, never coinciding with what people came up with, but flowing from the essence of the attitude of the masses. All these inventions, crossing and intertwining, represented in the higher spheres only a true reflection of what was about to happen.
“Prince Mikhail Ilarionovich! – the sovereign wrote on October 2 in a letter received after the Battle of Tarutino. – Since September 2, Moscow has been in enemy hands. Your last reports are from the 20th; and during this entire time, not only has nothing been done to act against the enemy and liberate the capital, but even, according to your latest reports, you have retreated back. Serpukhov is already occupied by an enemy detachment, and Tula, with its famous and so necessary for the army factory, is in danger. From reports from General Wintzingerode, I see that the enemy 10,000th Corps is moving along the St. Petersburg road. Another, in several thousand, is also being submitted to Dmitrov. The third moved forward along the Vladimir road. The fourth, quite significant, stands between Ruza and Mozhaisk. Napoleon himself was in Moscow on the 25th. According to all this information, when the enemy fragmented his forces with strong detachments, when Napoleon himself was still in Moscow, with his guards, is it possible that the enemy forces in front of you were significant and did not allow you to act offensively? With probability, on the contrary, it must be assumed that he is pursuing you with detachments, or at least a corps, much weaker than the army entrusted to you. It seemed that, taking advantage of these circumstances, you could profitably attack an enemy weaker than you and destroy him or, at least, forcing him to retreat, retain in our hands a noble part of the provinces now occupied by the enemy, and thereby avert the danger from Tula and our other inner cities. It will remain your responsibility if the enemy is able to send a significant corps to St. Petersburg to threaten this capital, in which there could not be many troops left, for with the army entrusted to you, acting with determination and activity, you have all the means to avert this new misfortune. Remember that you still owe a response to the offended fatherland for the loss of Moscow. You have experienced my readiness to reward you. This readiness will not weaken in me, but I and Russia have the right to expect on your part all the zeal, firmness and success that your intelligence, your military talents and the courage of the troops led by you foretell to us.”

A new page in the history of the domestic engineering troops began in the early 90s. in connection with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of the Russian Army on the basis of the Soviet Armed Forces and the implementation of military reforms in the Russian Federation that meet the requirements of the emerging military-political situation.

Reforming the organizational structure

In the context of the destruction of the single military-strategic space of the countries of the socialist camp, the cessation of the activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the emergence sovereign states in the post-Soviet space, which began the construction of national armed forces, which included more than 90 formations, units and institutions of the engineering troops of the Soviet Army, the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the head of the engineering troops of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation faced the need to solve extremely complex problems: the reconstruction of the engineering troops as part of the RF Armed Forces, determining their rational organizational structure, increasing their technical equipment. The main goal in solving these problems was to create such engineering troops that could ensure the functioning of the defensive system of the Russian state with a sharp reduction in military spending, which, in the views of the military-political leadership of the state, was possible only through the creation of a powerful mobile reserve within the group of engineering troops .

The most important feature of the creation of a new group of engineering troops was that in the early 90s. from the territories of states of Eastern Europe and former republics of the USSR, 64 formations and units were withdrawn with the simultaneous disbandment, about

11,200 units engineering equipment, more than 12,800 wagons of engineering ammunition and property. After the withdrawal, all formations and units were settled at the existing bases of engineering troops of the army, district and central subordination. Most of the withdrawn units were located in the Leningrad, Moscow, Volga, North Caucasus and Ural military districts.

The reorganization of the engineering troops was carried out with a significant reduction in them, which required the development of such an organizational structure in which units and formations would have not only high mobilization and combat readiness, but also the ability to carry out combat and national economic tasks with available forces and means.

The solution to this problem was carried out as follows: firstly, combat units were deployed in the regular peacetime organization, capable of performing priority tasks of engineering support for covering the state border, troop actions in “hot spots” during peacekeeping operations, as well as during combat training and in the daily activities of military districts; secondly, a system was developed for the guaranteed deployment of formations and units of engineering troops in wartime and engineering support for the strategic deployment of the RF Armed Forces.

At the same time, one of the main requirements for the engineering troops was that they had to maintain the ability to carry out the tasks assigned to them state tasks peacetime.

When improving the organizational and staffing structure of the engineering troops, the main attention was paid to the transition to a brigade system (battalions and cadres of brigades and regiments were reorganized into reduced strength engineer brigades, whose organizational and staffing structure was as close as possible to the wartime structure.), the formation of storage bases military equipment (BHVT), intended for mobilization work, maintenance, storage of engineering weapons and material reserves, as well as issues of control and communications, organization of mine-search service, significant strengthening of military engineering units and equipping them with armored means.

Taking into account the experience of combat operations of troops in the Chechen campaigns, an engineering and sapper brigade was formed in the North Caucasus Military District, consisting of separate battalions capable of independently performing engineering support tasks, and, first of all, demining areas and objects. In addition, a centrally subordinate engineering and sapper brigade is deployed to carry out unexpected tasks. The experience of its use in ensuring the entry and deployment of peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict confirmed the correctness of this decision.

To eliminate the consequences of major man-made accidents and natural disasters, several separate engineering brigades were additionally deployed within the engineering troops, the presence of which made it possible in peacetime to significantly reduce possible damage to the country's economic facilities and population, to train and accumulate personnel trained to perform engineering support tasks in extreme conditions and in peacetime.

Along with carrying out these activities, the timesheets for the personnel of formations and units of engineering troops were clarified in accordance with military-geographical and climatic conditions places of their deployment: for example, equipment that found limited use in the conditions of the Arctic was excluded from the staff of formations and parts of the northern regions. At the same time, the engineering troops received equipment that made it possible to increase the efficiency of performing engineering support tasks while reducing their numbers and transitioning to a personnel manning system.

The measures taken in terms of reorganizing the engineering troops were complex and often contradictory. By the end of the 90s. the staffing strength of the engineering troops was reduced by 36%, their total number was 35 thousand military personnel, including about 16 thousand in the Ground Forces, 11 were disbanded, 13 formations and units were reorganized, All units were maintained at a reduced staff ( about 6.5% of wartime needs).

The reorganization of the engineering troops was carried out under the leadership of the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the RF Ministry of Defense, Colonel General V.P. Kuznetsova (1991-1999). In April 1999, Major General N.I. was appointed to the post of Chief of Engineering Troops of the RF Ministry of Defense. Hearts. His appointment coincided with the next stage of the reorganization of the engineering troops, as a result of which at the beginning of 2000 they were left with 135 formations, units, institutions and military educational institutions, including: four brigades, 18 regiments, two special units, separate battalions - 33, military equipment - 12, mobilization depots - five, military educational institutions - three, training centers - four, research institutions - four, engineering and technical service units - 57. However, quite serious sets of engineering units continued to exist troops of the branches of the RF Armed Forces: the engineering troops of the Strategic Missile Forces consisted of 19 separate engineer battalions and one training center; Air Force and Air Defense engineering troops - five engineer battalions and four technical support units; Navy engineering troops - one separate road and seven separate naval engineering battalions, five mobilization depots and eight support units; Airborne Engineering Troops - five engineering units and divisions.

The basis of the peacetime engineering troops were engineer-sapper and pontoon-bridge brigades, reduced-strength units and BHVI. The reduction in the number of personnel led to a transition from a brigade to a regimental organization of engineering troops of district and army subordination.

Improving engineering weapons

During the period under review, significant attention was paid to the development of engineering weapons. The most complex and knowledge-intensive tasks for the development of new types of engineering equipment and weapons were solved by the 15th Central Research Institute named after. D.M. Karbyshev, which was headed by Major Generals K.E. Kochetkov and A.M. Averchenko. The efforts of the institute’s scientists were focused on solving problems in three main areas: modernization existing funds; creation of special, qualitatively new engineering means; development of dual-use equipment and selection for the army of equipment produced for the needs of the national economy and meeting the requirements of the troops. The solution to the most complex and voluminous problems was carried out jointly with scientists from the Military Engineering University.

The modernization of engineering weapons was carried out to increase their technical capabilities by replacing basic machines and modifying working equipment. An example of such modernization was a universal tracked minelayer for installing all types of cluster mines based on the chassis of the GMZ-3 minelayer and the working equipment of the UMZ minelayer. Additional equipment for existing engineering vehicles was also developed.

Thus, additional equipment to the standard IMR-2M manipulator increased its functionality - it became possible to collect unexploded ammunition on the ground and load it onto transport for transportation to destruction sites.

When developing engineering ammunition, priority was given to anti-tank mines - remotely launched and anti-aircraft mines. The development of new anti-personnel mines was carried out taking into account the requirements of the Protocol of the new edition (1996) of the Geneva Convention to reduce civilian casualties in areas mass application anti-personnel mine-explosive barriers. In connection with the possible accession of the Russian Federation to the Ottawa Convention on the Complete Prohibition of the Production and Use of Anti-Personnel Mines, problems arose in creating alternative weapons that can replace them in a combat situation, organizing their production and accumulating the minimum required reserves.

The means of engineering reconnaissance, construction and overcoming mine-explosive barriers (MVD), military fortification, camouflage and imitation were further developed.

For reconnaissance of the cost zone, portable mine detectors of the IMP-2 type began to be used, providing a search for any ammunition containing a minimum amount of metal. In order to ensure that armored military equipment can independently overcome the cost zone, the engineering troops received tracked roller-knife trawls of the KMT-7KN type, capable of sweeping mines with non-contact magnetic fuses. To clear mine routes for troops, an armored mine clearing vehicle BMR-3 was developed on a tank chassis, which was successfully used during Chechen campaigns. To make continuous passages, extended mine clearance charges and means of their transportation were improved. A sapper protective kit was also developed, including a suit made of Kevlar fabric, reinforced with armor plates, and special shoes that protect against damage from anti-personnel high-explosive mines.

To carry out tasks in conditions of radioactive contamination, a robot-2 clearing machine, a bulldozer based on the T-10.32-8 tractor, an EOV-4422KZ excavator, a DZ-171.1KZ bulldozer, and a KC-35766K3 truck crane were created.

To mechanize excavation work, the BTM-4 trench machine was created, capable of performing work in frozen soils.

Much attention was paid to the creation of new designs of fortifications: a hidden-type universal firing structure (UOS) was developed for firing from machine guns, grenade launchers and man-portable anti-tank missile systems; a set of frame-fabric unified military fortification structures was created to equip the positions of motorized rifle, tank and artillery units; modular container-type fortifications for equipping the main elements of control posts and medical posts; The issues of using advanced materials in the construction of fortifications were developed.

To camouflage military equipment from optical reconnaissance equipment on snowy and green plant backgrounds, the following were developed: a universal camouflage station for making models of military equipment from polyurethane foam, texture and camouflage painting of equipment and fortifications in the field; pneumatic models of weapons and equipment; thermal catalytic emitter for imparting thermal unmasking characteristics to false objects; camouflage kits MKT-2S and MKT-ZL, masks for camouflaging weapons and military equipment from optical, radar reconnaissance equipment and guidance systems for high-precision weapons on plant backgrounds.

The most important direction in the development of engineering weapons was the creation of dual-use equipment, which included road vehicles, pontoon parks, landing craft, bridge-building installations, excavation and trench machines, excavators, drilling rigs, means of extraction, purification and storage of water, mobile power plants , repair, lifting, sawmills, etc. For example, the EA-17 single-bucket excavator, which was tested under military conditions, was modified and put into service. The solution to the problems of water supply for troops was carried out in the direction of creating universal complexes based on reagent-free technology - the SKO-10/4-1A integrated water purification and desalination station. To ensure the electrification of engineering work, an engineering power station ED-16 with a capacity of 16 kW was developed.

Along with the development of engineering weapons since the early 2000s. Comprehensive work began to be carried out to improve the technical equipment of the engineering troops - equipment with a shelf life of more than 25 years was removed from units, the re-equipment of engineering formations began from trailed minelayers to tracked minelayers, track-layers to engineering barrier vehicles, road mine detectors to engineering reconnaissance vehicles.

Central command and control bodies of engineering troops

With the beginning of the Russian period of the engineering troops, their central control bodies underwent reorganization: the scientific and technical committee was removed from the staff of the directorate of the chief of the engineering troops, the combat training directorate was transformed into the apparatus of the control of combat training and military educational institutions with a reduction of 60% of its number; The position of first deputy chief of engineering troops was eliminated.

At the beginning of 1992, the positions of the leadership of the UNIV of the RF Ministry of Defense were filled by: Colonel General V.P. Kuznetsov – Chief of the Engineering Troops of the RF Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General V.A. Vasiliev – Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops, First Deputy NIV of the RF Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General

N.G. Topilin – Deputy NIV of the RF Ministry of Defense for armaments, Colonel I.G. Oleinik – Deputy NIV of the RF Ministry of Defense for theater preparation, Major General V.V. Kelpsh - Head of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Engineering Troops, Major General M.S. Nefedov – Head of the Armament and Supply Department, Colonel V.P. Menyailov is the head of the department for operation and repair of engineering equipment. In July 1992, Major General Yu.V. was appointed to the post of Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops - First Deputy NIV of the RF Ministry of Defense. Krasnikov. Confirmation of UNIV management positions took place in February-March 1993.

In the first half of the 90s. UNIV was entrusted with the following tasks: organizing and carrying out measures to prepare the territory of Russia in engineering terms to repel possible aggression, design and construction of fortified areas, control posts and other objects of defense significance in the western regions of Russia; control over the withdrawal of formations and units of engineering troops from the territories of former socialist countries and union republics, their arrangement in new locations; engineering support for localizing and blocking areas of armed conflicts, participation in peacekeeping operations on the territory of near and far abroad countries; ensuring the readiness of units of the engineering troops to carry out work to eliminate the consequences of accidents and man-made accidents and natural disasters.

The main units of UNIV have generally retained their appearance and structural features, inherited from the Soviet Army, which indicated the continuity of the principles of building the central command and control bodies of the engineering troops in new historical conditions. The main one among these principles can be considered the correspondence of the organizational and staffing structure to the level of tasks being solved in the management of subordinate troops. Therefore, even in the conditions of the inevitable decrease in the number of UNIV, which was determined by the general reduction of the RF Armed Forces, the command of the engineering troops managed to maintain a workable management structure. For example, the headquarters of the engineering troops for quantitative composition almost unchanged compared to the staff of 1987, however, it included a department for theater preparation, control posts and capital construction with a staff of 10 people.

Optimization of the structure of the headquarters of the engineering troops was expressed in a significant reduction in the number of support services, which made it possible, in conditions of reduction, to maintain the staff of the main departments of the headquarters - operational-intelligence and organizational-mobilization for the successful performance of its main functions of leading and monitoring the combat and mobilization training of engineering troops, developing strategies for their combat use, improving the organization of engineering troops at a new historical stage.

Changes in the organizational and staffing structure and the numerical composition of other units of the UNIV were relatively small: the apparatus of the combat training management and the military training school was reduced by three people and received a new name - the apparatus of the combat training management, the groups within it were abolished; management of editorial and publishing work in the troops was transferred to the headquarters of the engineering troops.

The greatest changes occurred in the structure of the weapons department: instead of five departments, the new staff remained three - planning and supply, engineering weapons and the engineering ammunition department. The departments of electrical equipment and special equipment, material funds and spare parts were abolished. The reduction in management staff amounted to 18 people. (from 52 to 34) by reducing the number of civilian personnel.

The transfer of functions of disbanded departments to the remaining ones became an increasingly common phenomenon in management practice in the context of the ongoing reduction of the RF Armed Forces. In this case, there was not a consolidation of departments, but a combination of tasks to control the production of one or another type of armed forces within one structural unit, which placed higher demands on the professional training of weapons department officers - they had to be well versed in the entire range of armed forces and be able to establish working contacts with industrial enterprises that were going through difficult times due to the economic crisis of the 90s.

The repair and operation department has fully retained its numerical strength (34 people) and structure, consisting of three departments and the energy supervision inspection, however, the name and nature of the activities of the third department have changed: instead of the department for providing military-technical assistance to foreign countries (for obvious reasons - termination activities of the Department of Internal Affairs), a logistics department of the same size appeared. The military-technical property sales group, created in 1990 to resolve issues related to the withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe and the former republics of the USSR, continued to remain part of the repair and operation department.

In the organization of daily activities in the 90s. The command of the engineering troops of the RF Ministry of Defense was guided by the “Regulations on directorates and independent departments of the Directorate

NIV Ministry of Defense of the USSR", approved by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR dated April 20, 1991, in general, valid until February 1993. Since the beginning of the 90s. The process of automation of managerial work in the engineering troops has been developed. The main governing body for the introduction of new information technologies in the management of subordinate troops became the headquarters of the engineering troops, which was entrusted with: organizing and conducting operational support and coordination of work on the creation of engineering subsystems of automated control systems and ensuring control over the creation of material support for the developed automated control systems; implementation of technical automation equipment in daily activities troops. To solve these problems, in accordance with changing source data, the Engineering Troops Computing Center was created, subordinate to the NIV of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In the future it was planned to combine

The VC with the command post of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was under construction at the end of 1989, into a single complex for command and control of engineering troops - the command post of the Chief of Engineering Troops.

Thus, the command of the engineering troops, when organizing the daily work of leading the troops, tried to meet the requirements of introducing new information technologies into management practice. Gradually, the process of managing units, institutions and enterprises of the engineering troops acquired the character of an automated exchange of information, in which formalized documents processed by computer played a predominant role.

Combat use and use in emergency response

The construction of Russian engineering troops was carried out in conditions of their performing various and complex combat and national economic tasks, which indicated an increase in their role in the system of the RF Armed Forces: engineering support for localizing and blocking areas of armed conflicts, suppressing armed clashes and separating warring parties not only on the territory Russia, but also carried out through the UN Security Council or in accordance with international obligations RF; engineering preparation of Russian territory to repel possible aggression, including the design of control posts and other defense facilities.

Great efforts of the engineering troops were required to carry out work to eliminate man-made accidents and natural disasters, demining areas and objects; considerable attention was paid to protecting bridges and hydraulic structures during periods of ice drift and floods, and providing assistance to the population during floods.

New political realities have set the Russian military-political leadership tasks not only to eliminate military conflicts and attempts to destroy the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but also to protect the borders of other CIS states.

The soldiers of the engineering troops showed high professionalism and courage during the events on the Tajik-Afghan border in July-August 1993, fulfilling the Decree of the President of Russia and the order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on border defense: in the shortest possible time they installed mine-explosive barriers in probable directions actions of bandit formations, fortification equipment of border outpost areas was produced, and tasks to provide troops with water were completed. In total, more than 200 thousand mines were installed to cover the border. Simultaneously with the solution of these tasks, the training of relevant military specialists began, including for the Armed Forces of Tajikistan. For their courage and heroism, 52 engineering officers were awarded state awards, including 26 of them - the Order for Personal Courage. This work was carried out mainly by volunteer sappers, students of the Military Engineering Academy who served in Afghanistan: Lieutenant General Yu.V. Krasnikov, S.A. Tertyshnikov, Colonels E.A. Sokolov, Yu.V. Cherenshchikov, M.V. Firsov, A.K. Kovtun, Major Yu.P. Chernenko and others.

In 1994, the engineering troops ensured the deployment, deployment and operations of peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz military conflict. They were assigned the following tasks: reconnaissance of the terrain, routes of movement, areas of location and positions of troops for the presence of minefields; demining of roads, helipads, and locations of peacekeeping forces; search and destruction of explosive objects: restoration of the destroyed section of the road during the operation to clean up the Kodori Gorge; fortification equipment, areas occupied by troops, positions, checkpoints and posts. In the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, more than 12,000 explosive objects were discovered and destroyed, a large number of various fortifications were equipped, and more than 650 hectares of the area were checked for the presence of explosive objects. In carrying out these tasks, the newly formed sapper battalion of the engineer-sapper brigade of central subordination received a baptism of fire, which, within just one day, was transferred by military transport aircraft to the city of Gudauta located in the north of Abkhazia, and then in a short time made a 120 km march to the designated area Gali region of Abkhazia.

For successful demining of the area while ensuring the entry and deployment of peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, many officers, sergeants and soldiers of the engineering troops were awarded high state awards. So, senior lieutenant R.G. Bersenev was awarded the high title of Hero of Russia (posthumously), the Order of Courage was awarded to the colonel

A.V. Nizhalovsky, lieutenant colonels V.A. Dyachenko, N.T. Salamahin, Major Yu.A. Yamanov, senior lieutenants S.M. Vasilevsky, R.I. Zayuka.

One of the main tasks for the engineering troops since the mid-90s. was the engineering support for the actions of troops in the Chechen Republic. Since December 1994, the engineering troops were entrusted with the tasks of ensuring the organized entry of troops into the territory of the republic, blocking and storming the city of Grozny and other populated areas. To ensure the advance of troop groups to Grozny, taking into account the experience of Afghanistan, six reinforced movement support detachments were created, each of which included reconnaissance, security and support groups. During the conduct of hostilities, the engineering troops carried out tasks of reconnaissance and neutralization of enemy mines and land mines, as well as the destruction of road objects, the construction of barriers to cover their troops, the fortification of the area, the extraction and purification of water.

The task of clearing mines from explosive objects was one of the most difficult for the engineering troops. Despite the fact that the battles of the last war ended long ago, in the vast space where the battles raged, many mines, bombs, and shells remained, from which people and especially children died. The number of explosive objects neutralized and destroyed by sappers in the post-war years amounted to tens of millions.

In the last decade, about 100 thousand such items were destroyed annually, for which over one and a half thousand specialists from the engineering troops were involved.

At the turn of the new millennium, as before, one of the main tasks for the engineering troops remains readiness to ensure the actions of the Armed Forces to protect the state integrity of the country. Since 1999, the most important task for the engineering troops has been to support the counter-terrorist operation of the Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus region. During the ongoing counter-terrorism operation, the engineering troops were assigned the following tasks.

At the first stage (from August 28 to October 1, 1999) - engineering support for the defeat of militants in Dagestan, the liberation of captured settlements, and the implementation of counter-terrorism measures throughout the territory bordering Chechnya. During the second stage (from October 2 to November 25, 1999), they solved the problems of engineering support for the liberation of the plains and the creation of security zones on the territory of Chechnya. At the third stage, the implementation of engineering tasks and activities acquired a specific character. This was due to the fact that the engineering troops were forced to perform tasks unusual for them - to ensure: the security of the functioning of authorities in the liberated territory; return of internally displaced persons to their places of permanent residence; blocking routes and preventing the exit of illegal armed groups from the territory of Chechnya to adjacent areas; completion of the destruction of large militant strongholds and bases; establishing control over all regions of the Chechen Republic.

The specifics of engineering support for the counter-terrorism operation necessitated the creation of a group of engineering troops, the basis of which was

14 engineering battalions of the RF Ministry of Defense, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The number of engineering troops personnel did not exceed 4% of the total strength of the Joint Group of Forces. Despite this, the engineering troops carried out significant amounts of work: they installed 200 km of minefields, in which up to 800 militants were destroyed, discovered and neutralized more than 300 thousand explosive objects, checked about 500 objects for the presence of mines, and cleared mines.

400 hectares of farmland, destroyed 200 militant fortifications; built 98 km of mountain road; built two floating bridges and restored two capital bridges; dug and equipped about 9 thousand trenches and shelters with a total volume of excavated soil of more than

2.2 million cubic meters; extracted and purified 200 thousand tons of drinking water.

The Motherland appreciated the contribution of the engineering troops to the defeat of the gangs. A significant part of the military personnel have been awarded and nominated for high government awards. Only in the UNIV of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, four military personnel were awarded the Order of Courage, and nine were awarded the Order of Military Merit. Major General A.S. Krasnikov, Lieutenant Colonels V.A. Rostovshchikov, S.V. Zhuikov (posthumously), majors O.V. Kryukov,

A.I. Kobin (posthumously), captain A.Yu. Zhuravlev (posthumously), senior lieutenants

V.L. Marienko (posthumously), A.M. Kolgatin (posthumously) and private E.G. Borisov was awarded the title of Hero of Russia. In terms of the number of Heroes of Russia per thousand people in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the engineering troops have the highest indicator, which confirms their commitment to the glorious traditions of our army.

The successful execution of combat missions by engineering troops in various “hot spots” largely depended on their skillful leadership by the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops. Suffice it to say that only the head of the engineering troops of the RF Ministry of Defense, Colonel General

N.I. Serdtsev traveled for direct supervision and assistance to the troops of the United Group in the North Caucasus region more than 10 times. Units of engineering troops under the leadership of the Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops of the Russian Defense Ministry completed their tasks in a timely and high-quality manner to cover the Russian-Georgian border

Lieutenant General A.S. Shustov, and the construction of an 87 km long road in mountainous conditions, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Engineering Troops of the RF Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General N.G. Antonenko, has no analogues.

Military engineering preparation of the country's territory

Despite the difficult political, economic, and social situation in Russia in the 90s.

XX century, at the organizational level, certain steps were taken in the field of engineering equipment of the country's territory. As part of the headquarters of the engineering troops, a department for theater preparation, control posts and capital construction was created, numbering 10 people, which solved the problem of creating a management body designed to manage the engineering equipment of the territory of the Russian Federation within the newly defined strategic and operational directions, which from the beginning of the 90s x years began to replace the usual theater of operations. Considering the large volume of upcoming events, the theater preparation department immediately began to solve the problem of determining the scope of research work and establishing close relationships with other branches of the military and civilian organizations in order to create a unified system of military infrastructure on the territory of the military districts that had become border ones.

Simultaneously with the improvement of the organizational and staffing structure in the Department

The NIV of the RF Ministry of Defense justified the creation of groupings of engineering troops to cover new strategic and operational directions, especially in areas of potential military conflicts, and specified the composition and equipment of the units and subunits included in them. Due to the fact that the command did not have the opportunity to proportionally distribute forces in directions, the main attention in creating a unified group of engineering troops for operations during the threatened period was given to strengthening the border districts, primarily Leningrad, North Caucasus and Moscow. The basis for this was, as military analysts noted, the fact that “Russia’s land borders are 300 kilometers longer than the borders of the former USSR. Their conflict potential is much higher.” In some other military districts, for example in the Volga and Far Eastern districts, the deployment of most of the pontoon-bridge units was envisaged.

Military engineering education

The leading educational and scientific center, as before, remained the Military Engineering Academy, headed by Lieutenant General V.A. Vasiliev, Yu.V. Krasnikov and A.B. Shevchuk.

In 1998, in accordance with the concept of reforming military education, the academy merged the engineering and fortification faculty with the command faculty into a common command and engineering faculty, the correspondence education department was transformed into a correspondence education department, retraining courses for officers were abolished, with their tasks assigned to the retraining faculty and advanced training, a special faculty is being established on the basis of a special department for training foreign military personnel.

1998 The Military Engineering Academy is renamed the Military Engineering University, with the inclusion of the Nizhny Novgorod Higher Military Engineering Command School (formerly Kaliningrad), the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School and the St. Petersburg Higher Military Topographical Command School as branches school, renamed institutes.

Until 2006, the Military Engineering University was a multidisciplinary higher military educational institution that trained command and engineering officers for all types of the Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense, Navy), specialists for the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Topographical Service , Internal and Border Troops of Russia and the armies of other states.

The Tyumen branch of the university specialized in training officers with higher military-special education for the Air Force, the Central Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, the Central Road Administration, and other ministries and departments that require specific educational facilities and teaching methods.

The Nizhny Novgorod branch of the university, located in the city of Kstovo on the Volga, for a long time remained the basic educational institution for training engineering personnel for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Military topographers and surveyors were trained in St. Petersburg. Such a network and capacity of military educational institutions met the needs of the Armed Forces, other ministries and departments for engineering specialists, and made it possible to recruit cadets in the Central and Eastern regions of Russia.

As a result of the reorganization, the Military Engineering University became a unified educational, methodological and scientific center of the engineering troops, which made it possible to quickly decide scientific problems and issues of methodological support educational process, training of scientific and pedagogical personnel, provide practical orientation in the training of students and cadets. In the early 2000s. At the university, officer training was carried out at eight faculties, a correspondence education department, 33 departments (11 eleven university-wide and 22 faculty), and three branches that had sufficient scientific and pedagogical potential.

In total, 40 doctors and more than 260 candidates of military, technical and other sciences worked at the university. Of these, 45 had the academic title of professor, more than 200 - associate professor and senior researcher. Eleven university scientists had the honorary title “Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation”, and three – “Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation”. The organization of educational and methodological work at the university was carried out in accordance with established requirements and provided training for students in 16 specialties and five specializations, including cadets in four science-intensive engineering specialties. A new phenomenon in the training of students is that some of them are sent for internships in combat areas, in particular, in the North Caucasus Military District, to gain practical skills.

One of the most important areas of activity of the academy (university) in these years was scientific work. In the context of a significant reduction in funding for science, the main efforts in scientific work were aimed at solving the problems of reforming engineering troops, summarizing the experience of engineering support for combat operations in armed conflicts and local wars, and developing the theory of engineering equipment of the country's territory. Academy (university) scientists took an active part in the development of fundamental statutory documents of the engineering troops. The materials of the conducted research became the basis for the preparation of dissertations, monographs, development of new textbooks, teaching aids and lectures on the profile of departments and faculties of the university.

The system of training junior specialists of the engineering troops has undergone significant changes. By the beginning of the 2000s. their training was carried out on the basis of four interspecific regional (6, 187, 399, 47 training centers) and district training centers in

27 specialties.

Engineering support

The most difficult problem for the NIV Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet period can rightfully be considered the technical equipment of engineering troops - the development and adoption of new engineering weapons, placing orders for their production in industry, organizing maintenance, repair and storage of engineering equipment, supply spare parts, etc. The lack of funding has had a particularly acute impact on the entire production cycle of engineering equipment - from scientific research and development of technical documentation to military and field testing of finished samples, organization of serial production of promising military equipment, including dual-use equipment. With the transition to market relations, the established system of supplying troops with engineering equipment began to show noticeable failures.

One of the first steps taken by the NIV Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to rectify the current situation was setting the task for commanders and headquarters to remove the NZ equipment from storage and equip it with active units and units of the engineering troops based on the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Of course, this was a forced step that did not completely solve the problem, since as a result of such measures, the mobilization reserve of engineering weapons that had been created over many years was reduced. And in general in the 90s. There was a very tense situation in providing the engineering troops with modern equipment. The situation was aggravated by the fact that a significant part of the engineering equipment and weapons in the troops was gradually exhausting its service life and becoming obsolete. Organization of competent operation, timely maintenance and repair of engineering weapons in conditions of a significant shortage of personnel, especially in military repair bodies, unsatisfactory supply of engineering troops with spare parts, tools and consumables was a serious problem for the practical activities of the operation and repair department within the UNIV Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The technical equipment of troops with engineering equipment was negatively affected by the loss of a significant part of the production base for the production of engineering weapons after the collapse of the USSR. The most noticeable loss was the cessation of supplies to the troops of heavy-duty KrAZ vehicles, which were the main base wheeled vehicle for engineering equipment, since the Kremenchug automobile plant, which produces these machines, ended up on the territory of Ukraine, which refused military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation. This situation made it impossible for further mass production of many types of engineering equipment produced on the basis of the powerful, cross-country vehicle KrAZ, which had long been mastered by the engineering troops. It was necessary to use other vehicles for similar purposes, for example the Ural, which, in turn, were not so powerful and passable. Similar problems existed during the development of other classes of engineering equipment.

G Alitsky Ivan Pavlovich - Deputy Commander of the Troops - Chief of the Engineering Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Colonel General of the Engineering Troops.

Born on February 9, 1897 in the village of Zimnitsa, Kuibyshevsky district, Kaluga region, into a working-class family. Russian.

In 1918 he was drafted into the Red Army. Participated in Civil War: assistant platoon commander of the Oboyansky reserve regiment, acting as commander of the engineer company, platoon commander, commander of the engineering park. In 1919 he graduated from the 2nd Ekaterinoslav engineering courses, in 1926 - the Leningrad courses for improving the command staff of engineering troops, in 1931 - courses at the Military Technical Academy of the Red Army named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

From 1921 he commanded a section of a sanitary company on the Western Front, then commander of a sanitary company. From November 1922 - assistant commander of the medical battalion of the 5th Rifle Corps. From April 1924 - divisional engineer of the 5-1st Rifle Division, from April 1925 - assistant corps engineer of the 16th Rifle Corps. From 1929 he was again a divisional engineer.

Since December 1932 - head of the Scientific Testing Engineering and Technical Test Site of the Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. Since March 1935 - assistant to the head of the engineering troops department of the Moscow Military District for combat training. Since April 1938 - head of the engineering troops department of the Moscow Military District.

By Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 4, 1940 No. 945, Galitsky I.P. awarded the military rank of "Major General of Engineering Troops".

From July 1940 - Deputy Head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army (in March - early July 1941, he served as Head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate). Member of the CPSU(b)/CPSU since 1940.

Participant in the liberation campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in 1939. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War since 1941.

During the Great Patriotic War I.P. Galitsky held the positions of deputy chief of the Main Military Engineering Directorate (until November 1941) and chief of staff of the engineering troops of the Red Army (November 1941 - April 1942), at the same time - head of the operational engineering group on the Western Front (November - December 1941 ), in the Primorsky Army of the Southern Front (December 1941 - January 1942) and on the Crimean Front (January - April 1942); deputy commander - chief of engineering troops of the Western (April 1942 - February 1944) and 1st Ukrainian (from February 1944 to the end of the war) fronts.

In January 1942, an operational group of engineering barriers led by the chief of staff of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General Galitsky I.P., created by Headquarters when the enemy was on the outskirts of Moscow, provided Sevastopol with great assistance in engineering defense equipment.

As soon as our units, having defended the capital, went on the offensive, the task force under the leadership of Major General Galitsky I.P. was sent to Sevastopol. The train was loaded with 20 thousand anti-tank and 25 thousand anti-personnel mines, 200 tons of explosives. In Novorossiysk, all this was transported to the cruiser and early in the morning of January 1, 1942, New Year's gift arrived in Sevastopol.

The work was carried out every night, often under enemy fire, by army sappers. The team leaders were very busy; at night - with sappers on the front line, during the day - there on reconnaissance or while working on the map. At the same time I.P. Galitsky, A.F. Khrenov and their assistants were preparing a plan for engineering and barrier measures of the second and third stages.

It provided for the creation of dense minefields in all tank-hazardous directions and covering the entire front edge with anti-personnel obstacles, except for areas that nature itself protected with steep rock slopes. It was also planned to place explosive barriers in front of key positions in the depths of the defense - on the Inkerman Heights, near Sapun Mountain.

This expanded plan, however, was no longer supported by existing mines and other engineering means and depended on their further supply from the mainland or an increase in local production.

By Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated February 14, 1943 No. 176, Major General of the Engineering Troops Galitsky I.P. awarded the military rank of "Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops".

Much earlier than everything planned could be implemented, a group led by Lieutenant General I.P. Galitsky left Sevastopol - the front headquarters achieved her transfer to the Kerch Peninsula to strengthen the Ak-Monai positions.

In mid-February 1944, literally the day before departure, I.P. Galitsky received a letter from his father. In which he reported that before the retreat, the Nazis shot his elderly mother, Alexandra Petrovna, and older sister Maria Pavlovna. They were shot for their connections with the partisans and for belonging to the family of a Red Army general.

Chief of the Engineering Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops I.P. Galitsky skillfully led the engineering troops in the Berlin and Prague operations. He showed himself to be a true master of his craft. He worked with inspiration and truly innovative courage.

At the Sandomierz bridgehead under the leadership of I.P. Galitsky, one and a half thousand kilometers of trenches and communication passages were opened; 1,160 command and observation posts were built; 11 thousand artillery and mortar positions, 10 thousand dugouts and various types of shelters for troops were prepared; More than 2 thousand kilometers of highways were re-laid and put in order, with the expectation that by the start of the offensive each division and each tank brigade would have two roads. This allowed us to avoid traffic jams.

In addition, the engineering troops built 13 bridges across the Vistula and organized three large-capacity ferries. It is worth adding to this that for the camouflage maneuver we envisaged, the engineering troops produced 400 tank models, 500 vehicle models and 1000 gun models.

By Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 20, 1945 No. 813, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops Galitsky I.P. awarded the military rank of Colonel General of the Engineering Troops.

U by the Kazakh Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 29, 1945, for the skillful leadership of the engineering troops and the personal courage and heroism shown, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops Ivan Pavlovich Galitsky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 6570) .

After the war I.P. Galitsky held a number of responsible positions in the troops. In 1951-57, he was the head of the Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibysheva. Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor.

In the second half of the 50s, when Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the military prosecutor's office investigated a typical case. In 1938, the chief of the engineering troops of the Moscow Military District, brigade engineer S. Aslanov, was arrested, tried and executed. His wife was sent into exile, where she went crazy and died, his children were sent to an orphanage...

When checking this criminal case in 1957, it turned out that the only basis for reprisals was the denunciation of Major I.P. Galitsky, who took the place of the executed Aslanov.

When the military prosecutor's office began reviewing this criminal case, Galitsky was a prosperous colonel general of the engineering troops. He in every possible way denied his involvement in the heinous crime, but was convicted by a handwritten denunciation preserved in the archives.

The prosecutor's office informed the Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov about this shameful fact in the biography of General Galitsky. By order of G.K. Zhukov Galitsky was removed from the post of head of the Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibysheva. According to the proposal of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 784-366 of July 4, 1957, Galitsky was deprived of the military rank of “Colonel General”. And the party organization expelled him from the party ranks.

Harsh but fair retribution!

When did G.K. Zhukov was removed from his post by the USSR defense ministers, then Galitsky rushed to the highest party authorities with complaints about the “retribution.” The Chief Military Prosecutor A. Gorny and the prosecutor Lieutenant General of Justice B.A. Viktorov, who led the group for reviewing cases of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, were dissatisfied with the CPSU Central Committee: “Why did you slip this fact to Zhukov? Don’t you know what kind of character Zhukov has – to cut from the shoulder?”

Galitsky I.P. He practically escaped with a slight fright, and very soon another decree was issued regarding him (without publication), in which the previous one was changed - not to deprive him, but to demote him in rank to lieutenant general and transfer him to the reserve. And in the party, ultimately, I.P. Galitsky also stayed. “It shouldn’t have been surprising. The concept of “advantageous” and “disadvantageous” truth has already been adopted..."

Since 1957, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops Galitsky I.P. - in reserve. Lived in the hero city of Moscow. Died on March 8, 1987. He was buried in Moscow at the Kuntsevo cemetery (section 9-2).

Karpov V.V. Commander. M., 1985. Command and command staff of the Red Army in 1940-1941. M., St. Petersburg, 2005.