Selected works on the methodology of science. Feyerabend P
In his work "Selected Works on the Methodology of Science" Paul Feyerabend, a prominent American specialist in the field of history and methodology of science, to a certain extent supports the views of I. Lakatos, but vigorously criticizes T. Kuhn and K. Popper. Especially T.Kun.
It seems to me, writes P. Feyerabend, that Kuhn's ideology “ensures the prosperity of the most vain and narrow-minded specialization. It seeks to hold back progressively developed knowledge and is associated with the growth of anti-humanistic tendencies that have become such a disturbing feature of the already pre-Newtonian science. P. Feyerabend rejects T. Kuhn's conclusion about the "paradigm" as a recipe for improving and developing science. Scientists, having chosen a paradigm, must work hard to solve puzzles, seeking to increase the similarity between theory and reality, for "nature is too complex to be explored at random." Ultimately, Feyerabend believes, T. Kuhn defends "maniacal adherence to a single point of view", a single theory. And only when "efforts to capture nature in its categories fail" will scientists turn to the search for something else.
P. Feyerabend argues that what Kuhn calls "normal science" is not a historical fact. According to P. Feyerabend, in the second third of the 19th century there was not one, but at least three different paradigms:
1. mechanical concept, which has found its expression in astronomy, in various models of electrodynamics, in biology, in medicine;
2. the concept associated with the invention of an independent and phenomenological theory of heat, which in the end turned out to be incompatible with mechanics;
3. a concept implicitly contained in the electrodynamics of Faraday and Maxwell, which was developed and released from mechanical elements by Hertz.
The active interaction and competition of these paradigms, and not internal anomalies, prepared the collapse of classical physics. The doubts that led to the creation of special relativity could not have arisen without the conflict that existed between Maxwell's theory and Newton's mechanics. Similarly, it was impossible to use the phenomenon of Brownian motion to directly refute the second law of phenomenological theory. This required a kinetic theory.
P. Feyerabend does not accept T. Kuhn's interpretation of the paradigm change as a "Gestalt switch"; in this case, one cannot definitely say that this revolution leads to the better (precisely because the revolutionary and post-revolutionary paradigms turn out to be incommensurable).
Kuhn "forgot" the purpose of science! Feyerabend declares uncompromisingly. Kuhn's purpose is to describe some important historical events and institutions. No more. In his opinion, science is separated from other types of human activity de facto only by the existence of traditions for solving certain puzzles.
But organized crime is also a puzzle-solving par excellence, P. Feyerabend writes with obvious sarcasm. The real progress in science is ensured not by those scientists who are busy solving their "insignificant puzzles", but by the activity of a minority engaged in proliferation, search and substantiation of new theories ...
As for P. Feyerabend's own concept, its main provisions are as follows:
A critical study of science must answer two questions:
1. what is science - how does it work, what are its results?
2. What is the value of science? Is it really better than, for example, the doctrine of the Tao or the philosophy of Aristotle? Or is science one of many myths?
P. Feyerabend argues that science is essentially an anarchist enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humane and progressive than its alternatives based on law and order.
The only principle that does not hinder progress is the principle: everything is permissible.
We can even use hypotheses that are contrary to well-supported theories supported by experimental results. We may well develop science by acting counterinductively.
The condition of logical compatibility of the old and the new theory is unreasonable, since it preserves the older, not the better, theory. Therefore, the multiplication of theories is beneficial for science, while their uniformity weakens their critical power, and hence the power of science. Moreover, uniformity jeopardizes the free development of the individual, both scientist and citizen.
There is no idea, no matter how outdated and absurd, that cannot improve our knowledge. Even political influence cannot be rejected.
At the same time, no theory is ever consistent with all the known facts in its field, but it should not always be blamed for this. Facts are formed by the old ideology, and the collision of theory with facts can be an indicator and the first attempt to discover the causes implicitly contained in the usual concepts of observation, P. Feyerabend states.
P. Feyerabend is right: a fact is always associated with a certain theoretical interpretation, which means that in most cases the actual knowledge is relatively true. A necessary condition for the truth of facts is the truth of the corresponding theory (ideology). So, for example, the coup d'état of Louis Bonaparte is described by V. Hugo, J. Proudhon and K. Marx. Here is what K. Marx writes in this connection: “Victor Hugo confines himself to caustic and witty attacks against the responsible publisher of the coup d'état. The event itself is depicted by him as a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only an act of violence on the part of an individual. He does not notice that he portrays this person as great instead of small, attributing to her an unparalleled world history the power of personal initiative. Proudhon, for his part, seeks to present the coup d'état as the result of a previous historical development. But the historical construction of the coup d'état imperceptibly turns into a historical apologia for the hero of this coup. He thus falls into the error of our so-called objective historians. On the contrary, I show how the class struggle in France created the conditions and circumstances that made it possible for a commonplace and ridiculous personality to play the role of a hero.
Rejecting the universality of reason, P. Feyerabend argues that it is impossible to exclude unreason from the sphere of human behavior. It is this characteristic of life, he emphasizes, that calls for an anarchist epistemology. In essence, science is much closer to myth than the philosophy of science is willing to admit. Science is just one of the many forms of thinking humans have developed, and not necessarily the best. Since the acceptance or non-acceptance of this or that ideology should be left to the individual himself, it follows that the separation of the state from the church must be supplemented by the separation of the state from science - this most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation is our only chance to achieve the humanism that we are capable of, but which we have never achieved before, P. Feyerabend believes.
It is noteworthy that, defending methodological anarchism, P. Feyerabend appeals to V. I. Lenin; "History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more versatile, more lively, more cunning than the best parties, the most conscious vanguards, the most advanced classes imagine." And although Lenin in this case refers to the revolutionary vanguards, P. Feyerabend considers this appeal to be instructive for both scientists and methodologists. Can methodologists relying on very naive and shaky “rules” capture the entire complex “web” of interactions in the field of science? Is it not obvious that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for an extreme opportunist who is not bound by any particular philosophy and who uses whatever method suits the occasion?
Any method that maintains uniformity is a method of deception: it supports ignorant conformity, leads to damage to spiritual abilities, destroys the most valuable gift of youth - the enormous power of imagination, says P. Feyerabend. The church, tyrants, their weak-willed and voluntary followers need unity of opinion.
Objective knowledge requires a variety of opinions. And the method that encourages such diversity is the only one compatible with the humanist position.
The alternatives needed to sustain discussions can also be borrowed from the past. From everywhere: from ancient myths and medieval alchemy, as well as from modern prejudices and morbid fantasies. The elements of our knowledge - theories, observations, principles of reasoning - are by no means some kind of timeless entities, P. Feyerabend believes. Such a position overlooks the fact that science is a complex and heterogeneous historical process, containing very vague and inconsistent anticipations of future ideologies along with refined theoretical systems and ancient, petrified forms of thought. It is noteworthy that such judgments are expressed by the above-mentioned K. Huebner from the University of Kiel, who criticized the "abstract" nature of modern methodological concepts; “The source of scientific progress lies not in the abstract rules of falsification, not in inductive conclusions, etc., but in the spiritual and concrete-historical situation in which the scientist finds himself. It is from this situation that he draws his assumptions and the activity of the scientist is directed to it. K. Huebner argues that “the main weakness of the modern philosophy of science lies precisely in the fact that it still remains unhistorical. It tries to solve all its main problems concerning the nature of the scientific methods used and the justification of the statements obtained with the help of these methods only through reflection, in which the researcher is left alone with himself and his own experience.
Paul Feyerabend, as already noted, criticizes not only T. Kuhn, but also K. Popper, although he himself developed as a scientist under the influence of his ideas. According to Popper, research begins with a problem. As you know, a problem is the result of a collision between expectation and observation, which, in turn, is shaped by expectation. Popper believes that this conclusion is different from inductivism, in which objective facts enter into passive thinking and leave their traces in it.
The problem needs a solution. Solving a problem means inventing a theory that must be relevant, falsifiable. Successful testing and criticism eliminates the existing theory once and for all and creates new problem, for which a new theory is needed. So, according to Popper, only one can move forward, that is, by means of assumptions and refutations, from less general to more general theories and thereby expand the content of human knowledge.
However, such a procedure, according to P. Feyerabend, can only satisfy a philosopher-doctriner. If we consider the interests of a person, and above all the question of his freedom, then such a course of action will turn out to be the worst. Why?
First, the real development of institutions, ideas, practical actions, etc. often begins not with a problem, but with some insignificant activity, for example, with a game, leading as a side effect to a result that can later be interpreted as a solution to unconscious problems.
Secondly, the strict principle of falsification, or "naive falsificationism" as Lakatos calls it, would destroy the science known to us and would never allow it to begin (instead of science there would be ruins of hypotheses and theories).
Third, the content growth requirements are also unfeasible. The theories that bring about the overthrow of the previous conception and subsequently take its place are initially limited to a very narrow field of facts, a certain set of paradigmatic phenomena that support them and spread very slowly to other areas.
P. Feyerabend emphasizes: “The principles of critical rationalism (taking falsification seriously; demanding content growth, avoiding ad hoc hypotheses; “being honest”, whatever that means, etc.) and, accordingly, the principles of logical empiricism (being accurate ; to base our theories on measurements; to avoid unstable and vague ideas, etc.) give an inadequate understanding of science, because science is much more "vague" and "irrational" than its methodological depictions.
Therefore, the idea of methodologists that science can and should develop according to fixed and universal rules is unrealistic and harmful, P. Feyerabend emphasizes again and again. It makes our science less flexible and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with certain cosmological assumptions, so when we use the rules we take it for granted that the corresponding assumptions are correct. Naive falsificationism is sure that the laws of nature lie on the surface, and are not hidden under the thickness of various obstacles. The mistake of the empiricists, continues P. Feyerabend, lies in the fact that they consider it beyond doubt that sensory experience provides a much better representation of the world than pure thinking. P. Feyerabend admits that logical evidence, inventions of the mind give more significant results than the game of passions. Such assumptions are quite admissible and, perhaps, even true. However, in any case, it is impossible to attach universal significance to any rules. All methodological prescriptions have their limits, and the only "rule" that remains is the rule "everything is permitted," emphasizes P. Feyerabend.
What, from the point of view of methodology, are considered errors and deviations are actually a prerequisite for scientific progress. After all, science is an intellectual adventure that knows no limits and does not recognize any rules. Without "chaos" there is no knowledge, without the rejection of Reason (abstract, formal-logical reason) there is no progress.
Rejection of Reason, anarchism is necessary not only for the internal development of science, but also for the development of culture as a whole, P. Feyerabend believes. Without anarchism, it is impossible to understand the interactions between science and "unscientific" worldviews, for example, between science and myth.
Meanwhile, P. Feyerabend argues, analysis shows that science and myth intersect in many respects, that the differences we see are often local phenomena that can always turn into similarities, and that really fundamental differences are most often due to differences in goals, not methods. achieving the same "rational" outcome (eg, "progress", increase in content, or "growth").
In this regard, P. Feyerabend argues with R. Gorton, who states the fundamental difference between science and myth. According to Gorton, the central ideas of the myth are considered sacred, and their safety is taken care of. "There is almost never an admission that one does not know something", and events "which pose a serious challenge to the recognized classification" are "taboo". Fundamental beliefs are protected by this reaction, as well as by the mechanism of "secondary refinements," which are a series of ad hoc hypotheses. Science is characterized by "substantial skepticism"; “when failures become numerous and constant, the defense of theories inevitably turns into an attack on them. This is possible due to the “openness” of scientific activity, due to the pluralism of ideas that exists in it, and also due to the fact that “everything that violates a reasonable categorical system or does not fit into it does not horrify, is not isolated and is not discarded. On the contrary, it is an intriguing "phenomenon", a starting point and stimulus for the invention of new classifications and new theories. It is easy to see, P. Feyerabend ironically remarks, that Gorton read Popper attentively.
Of course, P. Feyerabend thinks otherwise. He acknowledges that individual scientists may act in the manner described above. However, the vast majority behave quite differently: skepticism is reduced to a minimum. It is directed against the opinions of opponents and against minor developments of one's own ideas, but never against the most fundamental ideas. Attacks on fundamental ideas evoke the same "taboo" reaction as "taboos" in so-called primitive societies.
Almost everything that is not covered by the existing categorical system, or is considered incompatible with it, is either considered as something completely unacceptable, or - more often - is simply declared non-existent. Thus, emphasizes P. Feyerabend, the similarity between modern science and myth is striking. Dogmatism in science, the scientist continues, is not just a fact, it performs a certain function. Without him modern science would be impossible. In essence, notes P. Feyerabend, "primitive" thinkers discover a much deeper insight into the nature of knowledge than their "enlightened" philosophical rivals. It should not be forgotten that Western science, Western rationalism was a tool for the enslavement of many peoples of other continents, imposing Western standards and rules of science on the peoples they enslaved, Western invaders tore these peoples from their roots, which, of course, helped them turn them into slavery.
The "priests" of science today use its power to impose their power. Therefore, the separation of the church from the state should be supplemented by the separation of science from the state, P. Feyerabend emphasizes again and again.
It should not be feared that such a separation will lead to the destruction of equipment. There will always be people who choose the career of a scientist and who willingly submit to easy (spiritual and organizational) slavery, provided they are well paid. The Greeks developed based on the labor of forced slaves. We will develop and progress with the help of numerous volunteer slaves from universities and laboratories who supply us with medicines, gas, electricity, atomic bombs, frozen meals, and sometimes interesting fairy tales. We will treat these slaves well, but we will not allow them to impose their ideologies on our children under the guise of "progressive" learning theories. We will not allow them to pass off the fantasies of science as the only possible factual judgments - pathetically, ironically and, of course, defiantly, exclaims P. Feyerabend. Unfortunately, while science triumphs. Illegitimate disciplines like the philosophy of science, which never made a single discovery, benefit from the scientific boom. Even human relationships are considered scientifically...
Almost all areas of science are compulsory subjects in our schools... Physics, astronomy, history must be studied. They cannot be replaced by magic, astrology, or the study of legends. At the same time, the school is not content with just a historical exposition of physical and so on. facts and principles. Scientists do not say: “Some people believed that the Earth revolves around the Sun, while others considered it to be some kind of hollow sphere containing the Sun, planets and fixed stars, but proclaim: “The Earth revolves around the Sun, everything else is nonsense.”
P. Feyerabend insistently emphasizes that abstract, formal-logical rationality is only one of the many traditions of cognitive activity, and by no means the standard with which all other traditions should conform.
Substantiating methodological anarchism, P. Feyerabend refers to the works, to the ideas of I. Lakatos. He believes that I. Lakatos in many ways expresses views that coincide with his ideas.
Thus, Lakatos writes: “If you look at the history of science and try to see how some of the most famous falsifications occurred, you can come to the conclusion that either some of them are completely irrational, or they rely on principles of rationality that are different from those that we discuss".
I. Lakatos, emphasizes P. Feyerabend, is one of the thinkers who "noticed a huge gulf separating different images of science and the "real state of things"".
I agree, P. Feyerabend continues, with the following two propositions, which form an essential part of Lakatos's theory of science. The first is that the methodology should provide a breathing space for the ideas we want to develop. Nor flashy internal contradictions, neither the apparent lack of empirical content, nor the conflict with experimental results, should make us abandon the development of a concept that we like. Our methodological assessments take into account the evolution of the theory over a long period of time, and not its state at some particular moment.
Second, Lakatos argues that methodological standards are not beyond criticism. They can be checked, and the check should not be abstract, but use historical data. This second proposition separates Lakatos and me from those logicians who regard the appeal to history as "very little effective method and consider building formal systems the only legitimate way to understand change in the sciences, Feyerabend emphasizes. He notes that the methodology of research programs, while providing standards to help the scientist assess the historical situation in which he makes his decisions, does not contain any rules that tell him what to do. Thus, the scientist believes, the methodology of research programs is radically different from inductivism, falsificationism and other rational methodologies, because inductivism requires the elimination of theories that lack empirical support; falsificationism requires the elimination of theories that do not have additional empirical content compared to their predecessors. From the point of view of the methodology of research programs, any conclusion of a scientist is rational if it takes into account the historical substance. P. Feyerabend emphasizes: “The methodology of the Lakatos research programs and the epistemological anarchism that I advocate accept all methodologies, they do not accept only methodological coercion. At the same time, he notes, both in the political and scientific spheres, violence, struggle are necessary and beneficial for the individual, as they give an outlet to his energy and allow him to realize his own strengths.
My disagreements with Lakatos, according to P. Feyerabend, concern only his assessment of perfect science (in comparison, say, with myth or Aristotle science), his statements that he acts “rationally” ... And yet, comparing the concepts of P. Feyerabend, T .Kuhn and I.Lakatos as a whole, we can rather talk about the proximity of the positions of P. Feyerabend and T. Kuhn, rather than the proximity of the positions of P. Feyerabend and I. Lakatos.
Lakatos certainly was inherent in rationalism, and he always sought to "fit" rationality within the boundaries of "scientific reason".
T. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend - both - proceed from the thesis of "incommensurability" scientific theories, replacing each other in the process of development of scientific knowledge. According to T. Kuhn, the scope of claims of rational methodology is limited only to "normal science". The transition to alternative theories is not made for logical reasons, since the “old” and “new” theories use completely different concepts and therefore cannot even logically contradict one another. Naturally, this circumstance speaks against any attempts to "rational reconstruction of such transitions, especially when it comes to the so-called "scientific revolutions", that is, the change of fundamental theories."
The principles of methodological anarchism P. Feyerabend seeks to apply to the assessment of socio-political reality. He believes that the current state of science undermines the faith of enlightened political anarchism in the "natural reason of mankind" and in science itself.
This belief is endangered by the development of two processes, he notes.
The first is the emergence of new types of scientific institutions. In contrast to the previous era, the science of the twentieth century cast aside all philosophical pretensions and became a powerful business that shapes the thinking of its participants. Good rewards, good relationships with the boss and colleagues in their "cell" - these are the main goals of those "human ants" who excel in solving tiny problems, but are not able to give meaning to everything that is beyond their competence. Humanistic motives are reduced to a minimum. Scientific achievements are used to fool and subdue people.
The second process concerns the perceived credibility of the products of this ever-changing enterprise. It was once believed that a scientist, discovering facts and laws, constantly increases the amount of reliable and undoubted knowledge. But today we have seen that scientific laws can be revised; there are revolutions that leave no stone unturned from the past. Today, science has ceased to be an ally of the anarchist. How should he deal with her? The answer to this question is provided by epistemological anarchism. It harmonizes with the remaining principles of anarchism, but removes their hardened elements.
Epistemological anarchism differs both from skepticism and from political (religious) anarchism. Whereas the skeptic either regards all concepts as equally good or equally bad, or rejects such assessments altogether, the epistemological anarchist is able to defend the most hackneyed or the most provocative claims without remorse. While a political or religious anarchist seeks to eliminate a certain form of life, an epistemological anarchist may feel the desire to protect it, because. he has neither eternal love nor eternal hatred for any institution or any ideology.
Like the didaist, whom he resembles even more than the political anarchist, he "not only has no program, 'he' is against all programs", although he will sometimes be the most vociferous defender of the status quo or, on the contrary, its opponent: "To be true to be a Didaist means to be also an anti-Didaist.” There is no concept, no matter how "absurd" or "immoral" it may seem, that he refuses to consider or use, and there is no method that he considers unacceptable. The only thing he openly and definitely opposes are universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas such as "Truth", "Reason", "Justice", "Love", "God", etc. and the behavior they prescribe, although he does not deny that it is often useful to act as if such laws (standards, ideas) existed and as if he believed in them.
In any case, the solution of fundamental questions public life cannot be left to the experts. Especially in a democratic society. Democracy is a collection of mature people, not a collection of fools led by a small group of smart people. But maturity is the result of work, education and self-education. It is acquired when a person assumes responsibility for all events taking place in the life of the country. Maturity is more important than special knowledge, since it is it that decides the scope of such knowledge. In addition, when discussing important issues, experts themselves often come to different opinions. But the unanimous opinion of experts is no less problematic, because the opposite opinion may appear literally the next day.
That is why the decision should be in the hands of interested citizens, ordinary people with common sense.
In social life, common sense is often more important than special knowledge, emphasizes P. Feyerabend. A specialist is constrained by adherence to “his” paradigm, a sane person judges boldly, without prejudice. Specialists are mistaken in believing that their knowledge is inaccessible to ordinary people. In fact, if necessary, every ordinary person within a few weeks is able to acquire the knowledge necessary to understand certain scientific propositions. P. Feyerabend draws a certain analogy between the jury and society. Juries, as a rule, ordinary sane citizens (not specialists), following the competition of specialists from the side of prosecution and defense, pass their verdict, guided by common sense. Mistakes are possible here as well. And yet, the authority of a democratic decision is higher than the authority of even the most the best specialists, emphasizes P. Feyerabend.
P. Feyerabend is a supporter of both ideological and value pluralism in social life. He distinguishes two different ways of collectively solving a problem: the way of forced interaction and the essence of free interaction. In the first case, the debate is conducted rationally, based on clear rules. Such a society is not entirely free; all people should play the games of intellectuals. As D.S. Mill noted, the doctrine of pluralism of ideas and institutions “is intended only for those people whose abilities have reached their peak” (“On Freedom”). Within the framework of free interaction, there are no initially accepted rules of discussion. They are developed in the process of interaction of participants on the basis of mutual respect, mutual concessions, movement of participants towards each other. In a free society, all traditions are given equal rights and the same opportunity to influence education and other prerogatives of power.
A free society cannot rely on a single, private creed; for example, it cannot rely solely on rationalism or humanism.
Free societies arise only where people, solving private problems in a spirit of cooperation, gradually establish such protective structures as civil initiative on one level, cooperation between peoples on another.
In a free society, science will be equal to all other traditions. Of course, our deluded pragmatic contemporaries tend to indulge in outbursts of elation over events such as the moon landings, the discovery of the DNA double helix, or thermodynamic disequilibrium.
However, when viewed from a different point of view, all this is ridiculous and fruitless. It takes millions of dollars, thousands of highly trained professionals, years of hard work and hard work to enable a few tongue-tied and rather limited contemporaries to make an awkward leap where no person in their right mind would want to go - in an empty, an airless world of burning stones. However, mystics, using only their consciousness, traveled through the celestial spheres and contemplated God in his entire sphere, which gave them strength for life and for the enlightenment of their supporters. Only the ignorance of the general public and its strict educators, the intellectuals, the astounding paucity of their imagination makes such comparisons unceremoniously rejected. A free society does not protest against such a position, but it will not allow it to become a basic ideology either.
Let us finally free society “from the suffocating power of ideologically petrified science, just as our ancestors freed us from the suffocating power of the One True Religion!” - calls P. Feyerabend. Myths, magic, he argues, are much better than rationalists think about them.
So, the essential feature of P. Feyerabend's methodology is unconditional subjectivism, unconditional relativism. All determine the personal and collective preferences of scientists. Reckless persistence in defending the accepted theory is acceptable, unlimited proliferation (multiplication) of competing theories is acceptable. In this case, only a convention (agreement) of scientists will help to avoid an unbridled conflict of theories, and even then up to certain limits. Proclaiming the principle "everything is permissible", "everything flows, everything changes", P. Feyerabend affirms the commensurability of science, religion, myth, magic. At the same time, he refers to the studies of the ethnographer J. Fraser. But Frazer just showed that all of these are shamanism, witchcraft, and so on. would have disappeared long ago if shamans, sorcerers, etc. would not speculate on the achievements of science, would not include certain scientific knowledge in their predictions.
M. Polanyi. "Personal knowledge on the way to post-critical philosophy"
M. Polanyi (1891-1976) is the founder of the so-called historical direction in the Anglo-American philosophy of science. He resolutely abandoned the positivist ideal of scientific impartiality, rejected the positivist notion of logic scientific discovery, their conclusion about the need to exclude from science all concepts that do not have actual confirmation. If in the exact sciences positivist constructions do not bring much harm, then in the humanities their influence turns out to be destructive, distorting our entire worldview.
M.Polani believes that in the history of knowledge the gap between theory and practical experience gradually increased. With Descartes, mathematics has become a symbol of rational, certainly true knowledge. Reality itself was reduced to random events. By the end of the 19th century, the so-called first positivism (O. Comte, G. Spencer, D.S. Mill) was formed, whose adherents denied any claims of the theory to rationality. Such claims were declared by them to be metaphysics and mysticism.
At the beginning of the 19th century, a second positivism entered the arena of scientific life. Its founder E. Mach argued in his book "Mechanics" that a scientific theory is just a kind of summation of "experience" for the sake of "convenience", for the sake of "economy of thinking" in the process of fixing observations.
In this regard, E. Mach rejected, in particular, the Newtonian concept of space and time as meaningless, since it is not based on experience. But the fact is that, taking into account the propagation and speed of light, Newton's ideas about space and time can be fully verified empirically, notes M. Polanyi. And Einstein did it and proved that the Newtonian concepts of space and time are not meaningless, but false. Unlike K. Popper, who, characterizing the development of science, focuses on the internal logic of science, abstracting from sociocultural factors or, in any case, underestimating them, Polanyi emphasizes the importance of the human factor, the sociocultural conditions in which the process of cognition unfolds.
“For me, knowledge is not impersonal,” emphasizes Polanyi; it is an active comprehension of knowable things, requiring special art. The act of knowing is carried out by ordering a series of objects that are used as tools or landmarks, and is formed into a skillful result, theoretical or practical. Our awareness of these objects in this case will be "peripheral" in relation to the main "focus of awareness" of the integrity that we achieve as a result. Landmarks and tools are an artificial extension of our body. This is what determines the personal participation of the cognizing person in the acts of cognition.
How the process of formation of "peripheral" or "implicit knowledge" takes place, Polanyi reveals on the example of driving a nail with a hammer. When we hammer a nail, we look at the hammer and at the nail. But at the same time, we experience certain sensations that arise in the hand and fingers. They also help us direct blows. But these sensations in the hand, unlike the nail, are not objects, but instruments of attention. Focus of consciousness fixed on a nail, sensations in the hand are peripheral consciousness, determined by the focus of consciousness. Focus and periphery of consciousness are mutually exclusive. If, for example, a pianist shifts his attention from playing a piece to moving his fingers, he gets confused and interrupts his playing. This happens whenever we shift our attention to details that were previously on the periphery of consciousness. Our attention has only one focus at a time, and therefore it is impossible to perceive the same details as focal and peripheral at the same time, Polanyi argues. But in any case, peripheral consciousness is an important aspect of holistic cognition. Justifying personal approach in the process of cognition, the scientist believes that the personal moment does not make our understanding subjective. It is objective, because it allows you to establish contact with the hidden reality, to foresee the true essence. Of course, Polanyi admits, there is some subjective risk in the process of cognition. A sign of objectivity, in his opinion, is the creation of a theory based on the testimony of the senses. Theory is already something different from me. Mathematical theory is the pinnacle of the embodiment of complete objectivity and perfection.
A theory is a kind of map extended in space and time. The theory, even created by me, already exists impersonally, regardless of my momentary desires and moods, says Polanyi. In creating theories, we abandon the crude anthropocentrism of our feelings, in favor of the anthropocentrism of our mind. A more rational and theoretically broader theory is also more objective. For example, the movement of knowledge along the line: the theory of Ptolemy - the theory of Copernicus - the theory of Newton - the theory of Einstein - embodies the movement towards a more objective theory. Polanyi, arguing with the positivists, argues that there are no objects in nature that are themselves "givens"; they become so when scientists, observing these objects, recognize them as such.
In this situation, much depends on the talent of the scientist, his skills, his convictions, which should be considered in a purely psychological sense. In the same way, the scientist applies to those hypotheses and theories that function in the scientific environment. There are too many of them, not enough life to check them all. The scientist chooses those hypotheses and theories that seem more true to him. Of course, intellectual passion, backed by conviction, can lead to errors, but in any case, without passion, it is impossible to achieve great discoveries.
At the same time, Polanyi emphasizes the important methodological significance of doubt for the progress of science, for testing the truth of a hypothesis. Doubt is not only the touchstone of truth, but also the guardian of tolerance, says Polanyi. The belief that philosophical doubt appeases religious fanaticism and entails universal tolerance goes back to D. Locke. B. Russell was also a supporter of this idea: “Large stretches of time over the next 1600 years are filled with futile struggles between Arnans and Catholics, crusaders and Muslims, Protestants and adherents of the pope ... Meanwhile, how a small dose of philosophy would show both who participated in each of these disputes parties that none of them have solid grounds to consider themselves right. Dogmatism in our era, as in past times, is the greatest of the intellectual obstacles to human happiness.
Doubt prompts the scientist to take care of past experience, of tradition. For when tradition is interrupted, the skill of the researcher is often lost. Due to the loss of tradition, "no one can and nothing helps to reproduce the Stradivarius violin he made 200 years ago."
Polanyi strongly opposes the so-called public control of science. IN modern conditions the scientist can no longer work individually, cannot comprehend the secrets of the world for the sake of his own spiritual perfection. Science, scientific activity has turned into a large enterprise, bringing together a large number of scientific workers; the results of their work, as a rule, are beyond their own control.
As D. Bernal wrote in 1939 in his book “The Social Function of Science”, “Science has ceased to be the occupation of people simply thirsty for knowledge or brilliant minds supported by wealthy patrons, and has become an industry financed by large industrial monopolies and the state. Little by little, this changed the nature of science - from an individual it turned into a collective one and increased the importance of the administrative apparatus. Undoubtedly recognizing originality and spontaneity as vital for science, D. Bernal, at the same time, emphasized that it should be useful to society, applicable to the problems of production and welfare. Polanyi protests against this state of affairs, against "Bernalism". Scientific activity cannot be regulated "The expression" "public control over science" is meaningless. Science exists only to the extent that the search for truth is not subject to social control. This is precisely the freedom of science… It forms part of those freedoms for which those who have a concept of truth and appreciate the dignity of their souls have fought from the very beginning of the emergence of society.”
Of course, knowledge is personal. Polanyi is right in criticizing the methodology of logical positivism, which rejects its objective reality and reduces the world to a set of facts, that is, in the essence of sense data. But after all, he himself essentially rejects objective reality and objective methods of its study. A scientist or scientists choose a theory, believe in its validity. Yes, faith and knowledge is a real problem. We trust the indications of our sense organs, trust the instruments we use, and hope that in this way we penetrate more and more deeply into the essence of objective reality. However, we are gradually striving to test our assumptions, our assumptions, by practice; what is confirmed, we accept, what is not confirmed, we reject. Practice allows us to overcome the risk of semantic uncertainty, which is very characteristic of personal knowledge. But, it is obvious that the movement of knowledge towards absolute truth is carried out through relative truths, in which the moment of subjective faith, probability, hypothetical assumptions, of course, is present. But the whole point is that Polanyi attaches too much to the moment of faith. great importance. Truth is objective in its content and does not depend on man; it is subjective only in the form of expression. Polanyi, while criticizing subjectivism and relativism, nevertheless remains on their positions. He underestimates critical reflection, exaggerating the role of subjective experiences "A man knows more than he can say."
Philosophy of Science. Reader Team of authors
PAUL CARL FEYERABEND. (1924-1994)
PC. Feyerabend (Feyerabend)- American philosopher and methodologist of science, a representative of the philosophy of postpositivism, who put forward the concept of "epistemological anarchism". Her starting point was the thesis about the "theoretical loading" of facts, from which he concludes that the apparent superiority of one theory can only be caused by the language familiar to us, and by no means its objective merits. Theories are "incommensurable" among themselves, and the empirical method cannot provide an independent basis for choice. Rational choice between theories is a fairy tale invented by scientists. In fact, everything depends on such factors as the social status of the scientist, his worldview, passions, interests. Absoluteizing both the moment of dependence of facts on theory and the importance of sociocultural factors for the development of science, Feyerabend argues that there is not and cannot be a universal method of cognition, and the dominance of one, most often old, theory is dogmatism, harmful to science and society as a whole. The only principle that ensures the development of science is "proliferation", those. multiplication of mutually incompatible theories, or, in other words, the principle "everything is permissible."
Another consequence of the "incommensurability" of theories, according to Feyerabend, is the impossibility of assessing qualitative changes in science. Defending the anti-cumulative concept of scientific knowledge, he proves that there is no scientific progress, and knowledge is not a movement towards the truth, it is only "an ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives." The next logical step that Feyerabend took was the blurring of the line between myth, religion, science, and art. Since any hypothesis is good for something, then science is not a universal cognitive tool and cannot claim an exclusive place in culture. Ultimately, Science, Truth, Reason, Justice for Feyerabend turn out to be synonymous with instruments of domination, and pluralism and anarchism in knowledge are identified with intellectual freedom.
M.V. Sakharov
The passage cited is taken from Feyerabend's principal theoretical work Against Methodological Coercion. The text is quoted from the book:
Feyerabend P. Selected works on the methodology of science. M., 1986.
Against methodological coercion
Counterinduction
For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-supported theories or sound experimental results. It is possible to develop science by acting counterinductively A detailed analysis of this principle means considering the consequences of those "counter-rules" that oppose certain known rules of scientific activity. For example, consider the rule that it is "experience", "facts", or "experimental results" that measure the success of our theories, that agreement between theory and "data" favors theory (or leaves the situation unchanged), and divergence between them exposes theory to danger and may even force us to discard it. This rule is important element all theories of confirmation (confirmation) and reinforcement (corroboration) and expresses the essence of empiricism. The corresponding "counter-rule" encourages us to introduce and develop hypotheses that are inconsistent with well-founded theories or facts. It advises us to act counterinductively.
The counterinductive procedure raises the following questions: is counterinduction more reasonable than induction? Are there circumstances that favor its use? What are the arguments in its favor? What are the arguments against it? Is it always possible to prefer induction over counterinduction? etc.
These questions will be answered in two stages. First, I will analyze the "counter-rule" that encourages us to develop a hypothesis that is inconsistent with accepted and highly confirmed theories and then I will consider a counter-rule that encourages us to develop hypotheses that are inconsistent with well-founded facts. The results of these considerations can be preliminary summarized as follows.
In the first case, it turns out that evidence to disprove a theory can often only be obtained through an alternative that is incompatible with that theory: the recommendation (dating back to Newton and still very popular today) to use alternatives only after the refutation has already been discredited the orthodox theory, puts, so to speak, the cart before the horse. Some of the most important formal properties of the theory are also revealed through contrast rather than analysis. Therefore, a scientist who wants to maximize the empirical content of his concepts and understand them as deeply as possible must introduce other concepts, i.e. apply pluralistic methodology. He should compare ideas with other ideas, not with "experience" and try to improve on concepts that have failed in the competition, rather than discard them. In doing so, he will retain the concepts of man and the cosmos contained in the book of Genesis or Poimander and use them to evaluate the progress of the theory of evolution and other "recent" concepts. In doing so, he may find that the theory of evolution is not at all as good as is generally believed, and that it should be supplemented or completely replaced by an improved version of the book of Genesis. Knowledge understood in this way is not a series of consistent theories approaching some ideal concept. It is not a gradual approximation to the truth, but rather an increasing an ocean of mutually incompatible (perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, in which each separate theory, fairy tale or myth is part of one totality, prompting each other to more careful development; through this process of competition, they all contribute to the development of our consciousness. In this all-encompassing process, nothing is permanently established and nothing is omitted. Not Dirac or von Neumann, but Plutarch or Diogenes Laertius provide images of knowledge of this kind, in which story science becomes an integral part of science itself. History is important for the future development science, and to give content those theories that science includes at any given moment. Specialists and non-specialists, professionals and amateurs, champions of the truth and liars - all participate in this competition and contribute to the enrichment of our culture. Therefore, the task of the scientist is not to "seek the truth" or "praise God", "systematize observations" or "improve predictions". All these are side effects of the activity to which his attention should be mainly directed, and which consists in "make the weak stronger" as the sophists said, and thereby keeping the whole in motion.
The second "counter-rule" recommending developing hypotheses that are incompatible with observations, facts and experimental results, does not need special protection, since there is not one more or less interesting theory that is consistent with all known facts. Therefore, the question is not whether admit into the science of counterinductive theories, but rather whether existing Will the discrepancies between theory and facts increase, decrease, or will something else happen?
To answer this question, it suffices to recall that reports of observations, experimental results, "factual" proposals, or contain in themselves theoretical proposals, or claim their very way of using it. Thus, our habit of saying "this board is brown" when we see it under normal conditions and our senses are not disturbed, and saying "this board looks brown" when there is little light or we doubt our ability to observe, expresses a belief that that there are certain circumstances under which our senses are capable of perceiving the world as it "really is," and other equally familiar circumstances under which the senses deceive us. This habit expresses the belief that some of our sense impressions are true and others are not. We are also sure that the material medium between the object and our eye does not have a destructive effect and that the physical entity through which contact is made - light - provides us with a true picture. All these are abstract and highly questionable assumptions that shape our vision of the world, but are not open to direct criticism. Ordinarily, we are not even aware of their influence until we are faced with a completely different cosmology: prejudices are revealed through contrast, not analysis. Material available scientist including his most magnificent theories and most sophisticated techniques, has exactly the same structure. It contains principles that are unknown to the scientist, and if they are known, they are extremely difficult to verify. (As a result, the theory may come into conflict with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is flawed.)
So, how can you test something that is used all the time? How can we analyze the terms in which we are accustomed to expressing our simplest and most direct observations, how can we discover their premises? How can we open the world that is supposed in our actions? The answer is clear: we can't open it from within. We need external standard of criticism, many alternative assumptions, or - since these assumptions will be the most general and fundamental - we need a completely different world - dream world. With its help, we will discover the characteristics of the real world in which we think we live.(and which in reality can only be another world of dreams). Therefore, the first step in our critique of well-known concepts and procedures, the first step in our critique of "facts," must be to try to break this circle. We must create a new conceptual system that eliminates or collides with the most carefully substantiated observations, violates the most plausible theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot become part of the existing perceptual world. This step is again counterinductive. Therefore, counterinduction is always reasonable and has a chance of success.
In the next seven chapters this conclusion will be developed in more detail and confirmed by examples from history. One might get the impression that I am recommending some new methodology that replaces induction with counterinduction and uses a plurality of theories, metaphysical concepts and fairy tales instead of the usual theory-observation pair. Of course, this impression is completely wrong. It is not my intention at all to replace one set general rules others; rather, I want to convince the reader that any methodology - even the most obvious - has its limits. The best way to show this is to show the limits and even the irrationality of some of the rules that this or that author considers fundamental. In the case of induction (including induction by falsification), this means demonstrating how well a counterinductive procedure can be supported by reasoning. It should always be remembered that these demonstrations and my rhetorical exercises do not express any "deep convictions". They only show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like a secret agent who plays games of reason in order to undermine the authority of reason itself (Truth, Honesty, Justice, etc.). (S. 160-165.)
From the book Dictionary of Modern Quotes authorABULADZE Tengiz Evgenievich (1924-1994), Georgian film director 1 Tunnel from Bombay to London. Film "Repentance" (1987), scenes. and post. Abuladze One of the characters in the film about the reason for his arrest: “I had to dig a tunnel from Bombay to
From the book The Newest Philosophical Dictionary author Gritsanov Alexander AlekseevichBAKHNOV Vladlen Efimovich (1924-1994), poet-satirist 53 A student can be cheerful / From session to session A session only twice a year! "In the first minutes ..." (July 1945), to the motive of "Correspondent's Table" (=>
From the book Philosophy of Science. Reader author Team of authorsBAKHNOV, Vladlen Efimovich (1924-1994); GAYDAI Leonid Iovich (1923-1993) 54 Immured, demons! Film "Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession" (1973) based on M. Bulgakov's play "Ivan Vasilyevich" (1935), scenes. Bakhnov and Gaidai, dir.
From the book Big Dictionary of Quotations and popular expressions author Dushenko Konstantin VasilievichBAKHNOV Vladlen Efimovich (1924-1994); KOSTIUKOVSKY Yakov Aronovich (b. 1921) 64 And the deer are better! "The Reindeer Breeder's Song" (late 1950s), music. M.
From the author's bookZASTROZHNY Vladimir Kirillovich (1924-1994), songwriter 25 Once in a lifetime there are eighteen years. "Eighteen Years" (1959), music. ABOUT.
From the author's bookCHRISTY Sergei Mikhailovich (1923-1986); OKHRIMENKO Alexey Petrovich (1923-1994); SHREIBERG Vladimir Fedorovich (1924-1975) 226 I was a battalion intelligence officer, / And he was a staff clerk. I was a defendant for Russia, / And he slept with my wife.
From the author's book From the author's bookFeyerabend, Paul (1924-1994), Austro-American philosopher, science scholar 31 Anything goes. // Anything goes. "Against the Method" (1975) This slogan of "epistemological anarchism" goes back to the title of the musical (1934; lyrics and music by Col Porter, libretto by Guy Bolton and
From the author's bookSCHILLER Karl (Schiller, Karl, 1911-1994), Minister of Economy and Finance of Germany 64 Currency corridor. Literally: "snake in the tunnel" (English "snake in the tunnel"). The expression was introduced by Schiller ca. 1970 at meetings of expert economists of the EEC in
From the author's bookPopper (Popper) Carl Raimund (1902-1994) - British philosopher, logician and sociologist. Until 1937 he worked in Vienna, from 1946 until the mid-70s - professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The author and representative of the school of "critical rationalism" - attempts at a constructive theoretical
From the author's bookFeyerabend Paul (Paul) Carl (1924-1994) was an American philosopher and methodologist of science. He began his scientific career in 1951, working in England, since 1958 - in a number of North American universities and university centers Western Europe. Main works: "Against the method. Essay
From the author's bookKARL RAYMUND POPPER. (1902-1994) K. Popper (Popper) - one of the largest Western philosophers and sociologists of the XX century, whose ideas had a great influence on the development of the entire modern intellectual culture. Until 1937, Popper was engaged in teaching activities in Vienna, in 1937
From the author's bookBAKHNOV, Vladlen Efimovich (1924-1994); KOSTIUKOVSKY, Yakov Aronovich (b. 1921) 119 And deer are better! "The Song of the Reindeer Breeder" (1950), music. M. TabachnikovaThe song gained wide popularity in the late 1960s. performed by the Nanai singer Cola Beldy. 120 You and I, and we are with you. Refrain of the song "You are
From the author's bookPOPPER, Karl (1902–1994), Austrian-British philosopher 417 Conspiracy theory of society. // The conspiracy theory of society. The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1945), ch. 14 ? Popper K. R. The open society and its enemies. - London, 1945, v. 2, p. 92 See also: “conspiracy theory”. This expression
From the author's bookRADEK, Karl (1885-1939), leader of the international social democracy, publicist, in 1919-1924. member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) 16 National Bolshevism. "The Foreign Policy of German Communism and Hamburg National Bolshevism" ("Die Internationale", 1919, No. 1), an article on it. lang. meant
From the author's bookFeyerabend, Paul (1924–1994), Austro-American philosopher, science scholar 46 Anything goes. // Anything goes. "Against the Method" (1975) This slogan of "epistemological anarchism" goes back to the name. musical (1934; poems and music by Cola Porter). ? John, S.
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KAZAKH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY NAMED AFTER N. AL-FARABI
on the topic: "Feyerabend P. Selected works on the methodology of science"
Completed by: 1st year undergraduate
Anuarbek Ergesh
Checked by: Ph.D., Associate Professor, G.Kh.
Almaty 2015
Introduction
Paul (Paul) Karl Feyerabend - scientist, philosopher, methodologist of science. Born in Vienna, Austria in 1924, at different times he lived in England, USA, New Zealand, Italy, Switzerland. From 1958 to 1989 he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berkeley, California.
Feyerabend became known for his anarchist views on the trial. scientific knowledge, and assertions that there are no universal methodological rules in science. Based on these ideas, he created the concept of epistemological anarchism. He was an influential figure in the philosophy of science and in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Feyerabend's criticism had a significant impact on the development of the theories of science by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and others.
P. Feyerabend also attracted attention by the fact that he soon combined his epistemological premises and consequences with ultra-left social phraseology, which merges either with “ecological socialism”, or with the position of part of the Green Party in Germany. Hence the interest in Feyerabend on the part of representatives of these currents, an interest that is not very stable, since Feyerabend, due to his general skepticism, did not quite clearly and definitely occupy the same socio-political positions. But he stubbornly asserts that it is high time to "liberate" the peoples from the "oppression" of science and scientists, who allegedly turn state power in developed countries into an instrument of their domination over the masses of people (so that one should also "liberate" from scientistic oppression states).
The main works of the scientist:
"Science in a free society" (1978);
Goodbye Prudence (1987).
In his books Against Method and Science in a Free Society, Feyerabend defended the idea that there are no methodological rules that scientists always use. He opposed a single, tradition-based scientific method, arguing that any such method puts some limits on the activities of scientists, and thus limits progress. According to his point of view, science would benefit most from some "dose" of anarchism in scientific theory. He also believed that anarchism in theory was desirable because it was more humanistic than others. scientific systems because it does not impose rigid rules on scientists.
Feyerabend's position is considered quite radical in the philosophical community, since it suggests that philosophy cannot successfully describe science as a whole, nor can it develop a method of separating scientific works from non-scientific entities such as myths. It also suggests that the "general course" developed and recommended by philosophers for the development of science should be rejected by scientists if this is necessary for further progress.
To support his contention that adherence to methodological rules does not lead to success in science, Feyerabend provides examples to refute claims that (correct) science operates according to certain fixed rules. He examines some episodes in the history of science that are considered undoubted examples of progress in science (such as the scientific revolution of Copernicus), and shows that in these cases all the rules accepted in science are violated. Moreover, he argues that if these rules were observed, then in the historical situations under consideration, the scientific revolution could not have taken place.
One of the criteria for evaluating scientific theories, which is actively criticized by Feyerabend, is the criterion of consistency. He points out that insisting that new theories consistently continue old theories gives unreasonable advantages to old theories, and that consistency with respect to old theories does not lead to a new theory describing reality better than another new theory, which is such sequence is not followed. That is, if one has to choose between two equally convincing theories, then choosing the one that is compatible with the old, no longer valid theory will be an aesthetic choice rather than a rational one. The "familiarity" of such a theory to scientists can also be harmful, since they will not discard many old prejudices in the transition to a new theory.
1. Feyerabend's understanding of science
American philosopher and methodologist of science Paul Feyerabend is one of the major representatives postpositivism. In his concept of science, he proceeds from the fact that in society there are various ideological currents (historical in nature), one of which is science. The latter cannot replace other currents, and even more so is not "the only possible way to solve problems" - along with such methods as religion, myth, various irrational approaches, magic, witchcraft, etc. Any other approach, according to Feyerabend, distorts the essence of science and its place in society. That is why he is convinced that "science, which claims to have the only correct method and the only acceptable results, is an ideology and should be separated from the state, and in particular from the learning process."
The philosopher sharply criticizes the so-called "scientific chauvinism", according to which everything that is incompatible with science and its results must be eliminated (for example, the ancient Eastern medicine of acupuncture, cauterization, etc.). Without denying the need for extra-scientific control over science, the American philosopher believes that such control cannot be imposed from outside by violent, political means. The best way to silence the scientific conscience of a scientist, he considers "after all, the dollar."
Feyerabend in no way belittles the role of science, but, on the contrary, emphasizes in every possible way its importance for the life of society as a whole and for each person. At the same time, he constantly reminds that science is only one of the main tools that man has invented in order to "master his environment", one of the ways to study the world. Moreover, this is by no means the only and by no means infallible "tool". Respecting "great science" and its colossal possibilities, Feyerabend nevertheless recommends "putting science in its place as an interesting, but by no means the only form of knowledge that has great advantages, but is not without many shortcomings." Precisely because science has become too influential in our time, it is very dangerous to leave it in a "state of infallibility", to absolutize its role in society.
Science as such in its integrity is the subject of theoretical study of the philosophy of science, the state of which does not satisfy Feyerabend. He sees its main weakness in the fact that it still remains unhistorical. In addition, it is characterized by abstractness, scholasticism, emasculation, underestimation (and even ignoring) of the social factors in the development of knowledge, and in general - "unscientific". The philosopher is in solidarity with those methodologists who consider it necessary "to create a theory of science that will take history into account. This is the path that must be followed if we want to overcome the scholasticism of modern philosophy of science."
2. "Epistemological anarchism"
science fyerabend pluralism concept
Lakatos and Kuhn expressed the position of internalism regarding the dynamics of scientific knowledge on the basis of its inherent factors. Feyerabend expressed the position of externalism. The main focus of his concept is the denial of the norms and rules of scientific activity. The idea of the method is difficult to compare with historical results. The study of the material of the scientific revolution of the 17th century. He convincingly shows that no rigid, unchanging principles were observed during the revolutionary moments of the change of scientific ideas. Feyerabend, as a person of a free Western society, is an adherent of the idea of pluralism, Western liberalism. Terms: conceptual totalitarianism. Totalitarian imposition of concepts, rigid methodology, etc. Describing a cardinal upheaval, he says: “everything starts with a reverse movement - uncertainty, and verification and falsification procedures do not work.” The need for a new understanding is recognized. In this critical period, the victory of a new scientific worldview is possible when, contrary to the rational spirit of science, reliance occurs on irrational means - the scientist appeals to people's emotions. An example is the discovery of Galileo Galilei. - Newton's predecessor Galileo won thanks to the style and technique of persuasion, thanks to the fact that he wrote in Italian and not Latin. The reliance was on socio-psychological factors. He wrote in the vernacular. Addressed a lot of people. Galileo - telescope. Galileo, justifying the new conclusions of mechanics, said that this was observed by a telescope, but Feyerabend said that the development of optics then could not allow Galileo to see, and he relied on propaganda technologies. Feyerabend approved. that the cumulative model does not acc. single history.
Its principles are: incommensurability - there are no standards for comparing theories. In science, you need to invent and multiply and develop theories and concepts that are not compatible with creatures. And recognized theories.
Plurasylation of scientific knowledge - the strongest theory must survive. Only one variant of the development of science is possible - everything is permitted, or the world in many ways. Science has no more authority than any other form of life. Feyerabend criticizes the image of science that has developed on the basis of mathematized nature. Ideology must be separated from the state. Feyerabend's work was published in 1975 - it was associated with the general spirit of the liberalization of Western society. He has a romantic view of the development of science - science has ceased to be an adventure and has become a business. The process of development is very connected with the socio-cultural development of society. What he says is new - there is a certain conglomerate - science is not at all doomed to a leading role. and Myth and astrology, religion can compete with scientific programs, and the program that shows effectiveness should be stimulated by the state. example: in the 50s, when doctors in hospitals in China were guided by the fact that they would not study official works, but according to a different textbook. Western doctors predicted the decline of medicine in China. But it turned out the other way around: acupuncture, cauterization, diagnostics of pulse measurements led to new methods of treatment in medicine in principle. F.'s examples from his point of view show that the growth of scientific knowledge is fundamentally unregulated. In the activities of scientists, it is important to develop individual development scientists. absolutely free behavior. "Farewell to the mind" is one of his works. Abstract - rational approach, he considers insufficient. Its essence is that science is withdrawn from the socio-cultural context.
Feyerabend is not a consistent externalist - he considered the development of science in periods where the logical apparatus of science itself plays an active role, but other periods manifest themselves through the influence of social factors. His position was critically received by his contemporaries.
3. Theoretical and methodological pluralism
In his discussions about the method, Feyerabend repeatedly repeats the idea that, for all the importance of the method for science, it cannot be reduced to a set of rigid, unchanging and absolutely mandatory principles of scientific activity. It is all the more unacceptable when any method is declared "only true" and universal.
Feyerabend considers the notion that any methodological rules, norms reliably guarantee the effectiveness of scientific research an illusion. His position on this issue is quite clear: "Faith in the only set of standards that always lead and will lead to success is nothing but a chimera." The philosopher also points out the source of the "chimera" about the "uniqueness" of the method and its rigidity. This , in his opinion, is too naive an idea of a person and his social environment.
However, Feyerabend believes that it is possible to create a tradition that will be maintained with the help of strict rules and become successful to some extent. But to questions about whether it is desirable to maintain such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else, and whether it is necessary to immediately discard any result obtained within the framework of other traditions and by other methods, the American philosopher replies firmly and resolutely "no."
Denying any universal standards and inert traditions, he develops his own concept of theoretical and methodological pluralism. Its main points, following its creator, can be expressed as follows:
1. The ontological basis of this concept is that "there are many ways of being in the world, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages, and that all of them are needed in order to make us human in the full sense of the word and solve the problems of our joint existence in this world." This fundamental idea, according to Feyerabend, cannot be based only on rational understanding, but must also be a worldview, a religion, so that all people's aspirations can be directed towards some kind of "harmonious development". He believes that such an approach arises within the framework of science itself, bearing in mind, in particular, the "new, strong philosophy" of N. Bohr.
2. The most important argument in favor of a pluralistic methodology, according to Feyerabend, is the coincidence of a part (individual) with the whole (with the world), the purely subjective and arbitrary with the objective and regular. For those who wish to know in detail about this, he recommends the "magnificent work" of J.S. Mill "On Freedom". The philosopher sees the merit of the latter in the fact that he tries to show how scientific method can be interpreted as an integral part of the theory of man. Feyerabend is rather sharply opposed to taking the rules of the scientific method out of the scope of science, making them universal, and even more so - turning them into a part of the whole society.
3. Feyerabend repeatedly emphasizes the close connection between the pluralistic approach and humanism. A scientist, in his opinion, will only preserve the concepts of man and the cosmos when he applies a pluralistic methodology - various (including alternative) concepts, theories, principles, standards, norms, etc. That is why, speaking out against any method that maintains uniformity, the philosopher considers such a method a "method of deception", because the latter, in his opinion, actually supports conformism, leads to deterioration of spiritual abilities, to a weakening of the power of imagination, although it speaks of truth, of deep understanding, etc.
Feyerabend's own credo on this issue consists in two main theses: "For objective knowledge, a variety of opinions is necessary. And the method that encourages such diversity is the only one compatible with the humanistic position." It is in this - and only in this sense - that one can speak of the "only true" method. The scientist should not extol the scientific method as something special, suitable everywhere and everywhere. He must use all the methods and ideas, not just some arbitrarily chosen part of them.
Consequently, the pluralism of theories, concepts, hypotheses, philosophical views is important, according to Feyerabend, not only for methodology. It is also "an essential part of humanism." Only pluralism, aimed at man in the fullness of his manifestations, is able to ensure the freedom of creativity in any sphere of human activity, and not only in cognition. At the same time, this freedom should be understood "not as a way of escaping from reality, but as a necessary property of discovering and, perhaps, even changing the world in which we live."
4. Pointing out that a variety of opinions is methodologically necessary for science, philosophy, epistemology and other areas of human activity, Feyerabend emphasizes three important moments. First, it is by no means self-evident that the correct method must lead to truth, that there is only one truth, and that therefore the correct method must ultimately lead to the elimination of all its alternatives. Secondly, the analysis of the history of science and the history of philosophy shows that the use of many mutually incompatible and partially overlapping theories is of fundamental importance for methodology. Thirdly, it follows from what has been said above that a method is needed that does not fetter - in the name of "universal principles", "revelation" or "experience" - the imagination of the scientist, but allows him to use alternatives to the generally accepted concept. A method is needed that will enable him to take a critical position in relation to any element of this concept, whether it be a law or a so-called empirical fact.
5. The history of science, as Feyerabend tried to show, testifies that it did not develop according to strictly fixed, rigid and universal rules, but for the most part - precisely contrary to them. The claims of any methodological rules to their universal validity have always proved to be unjustified. Hence the fundamental conclusion: "All methodological prescriptions have their limits, and the only rule that remains is the rule "everything is permitted"".
This rule expresses the essence of what the American philosopher calls "epistemological anarchism", distinguishing it from both skepticism and political (religious) anarchism. In his opinion, the epistemological anarchist is capable of defending the most provocative statements, he does not hate (or love) any views, he is against any programs, he uses the most diverse means in his activities, etc. "There is no concept, however 'absurd' or 'immoral' it may seem, that he refuses to consider or use, and there is no method which he finds unacceptable."
The American philosopher notes that the only thing that the epistemological anarchist openly opposes is everything "universal" (standards, laws, concepts, etc.), including such ideas as "Truth", "Reason", "Justice", "Love". Feyerabend seeks to substantiate the idea that scientists (especially eminent ones) - each in their own field - are involuntarily guided by anarchist philosophy. Large scientific achievements, in his opinion, would be impossible if the great creators of science were not able to step over the most fundamental categories and beliefs, if they did not break the methodological and other "fetters" imposed on them - including the "laws of nature".
6. Summing up his discussion of epistemological anarchism, Feyerabend gives the following short and very incomplete "outline of its ideology" and some of its possible applications:
the anarchist anti-method is far more likely to succeed than any rigidly formulated set of standards, rules and regulations;
special rules can only be justified and have a chance of success in the structure of a comprehensive worldview; argumentation is capable of delaying the development of science, while cunning is necessary for its progress; There are many various ways understanding of nature and society and many different ways to evaluate the results of one or another approach.
So, in the clash of two sides, namely, methodological concepts based on law and order, and anarchism in science (with its key principle "everything is permitted"), the American philosopher gives a clear and unambiguous preference to the latter.
7. Feyerabend considers that serious evidence in favor of anarchist epistemology is that salient feature a science according to which, even in this realm, reason cannot be universal and unreasonableness cannot be ruled out. Science is by no means sacred. It is neither worse nor better than many other ways of constructing a worldview - such as myths, magic, dogmas of theology, metaphysical (philosophical) systems, etc. Hence, for Feyerabend, it is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such "unscientific" worldviews needs anarchism even more so than science itself. Thus, anarchism is not only possible, but necessary both for the internal progress of science and for the development of culture as a whole.
Conclusion
Among the numerous representatives of the Western philosophy of science, Feyerabend stands out for the breadth of his horizons. He knows how to embrace philosophy and science, religion and art, modernity and the distant past with a single glance, and everywhere to see and trace the manifestations of certain ideas, trends, methods. The reader will find in his works not only a detailed analysis of the history of astronomy, optics, and mechanics of the 16th-17th centuries, but also a deep understanding of the problems of modern physics.
Finally, one more, perhaps the most valuable feature of Feyerabend as a methodologist, should be noted, specialization, which locks the scientist into the framework of a separate discipline, theory, or even problem, also penetrated philosophy in the 20th century. At present, the discussion of social, ethical, epistemological problems has become a specialty; and in philosophical works devoted to the analysis of methodological problems of scientific knowledge, the authors, as a rule, do not go beyond a limited range of problems.
The structure of scientific theories, explanation, empirical basis, law, confirmation, and so on - Feyerabend boldly breaks this circle, connecting the discussion of methodological problems with reflections on the place of science in society, on its connection with the state, on the freedom of the individual in modern society and about which methodological concept is more consistent with the free development of the individual. The ability to see the main, main, humanistic goal of philosophy behind private methodological problems and to rise above scholastic disputes about insignificant trifles makes Feyerabend, with all his contradictions, mistakes and illusions, one of the most striking and interesting philosophers of the West.
References
1. Feyerabend P. Selected works on the methodology of science. M., 1986.
2. Feyerabend P. "Farewell, mind."
3. Feyerabend P. Science in a free society. M., 1978.
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Science is essentially an anarchist enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humane and progressive than its law and order alternatives. This essay is written in the conviction that, although anarchism may not be the most attractive political philosophy, it is certainly necessary for both epistemology and the philosophy of science.< ... >
This is proved both by an analysis of concrete historical events and by an abstract analysis of the relationship between idea and action. The only principle that does not hinder progress is the principle of anything goes. The idea of a method containing rigid, immutable and absolutely binding principles of scientific activity faces considerable difficulties when compared with the results of historical research. It turns out that there is no rule - no matter how plausible and epistemologically justified it may seem - that at one time or another would not be violated. It becomes obvious that such violations are not accidental and are not the result of insufficient knowledge or inattention that could have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for the progress of science. Indeed, one of the most remarkable achievements of recent discussions in the field of the history and philosophy of science is the realization of the fact that such events and achievements as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican revolution, the development of modern atomism (kinetic theory, dispersion theory, stereochemistry, quantum theory) , the gradual construction of a wave theory of light, turned out to be possible only because some thinkers either consciously decided to break the fetters of "obvious" methodological rules, or involuntarily violated them.
I repeat once again: such a liberal practice. is not just a fact of history. science - it is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the development of knowledge. for any given rule, no matter how "fundamental" or "necessary" for science it may be, there will always be circumstances in which it is advisable not only to ignore this rule, but even to act contrary to it.< ... >
The idea of a hard method or a hard theory of rationality rests on a too naive notion of man and his social environment. If we keep in mind the extensive historical material and do not strive<<очистить» его в угоду своим низшим инстинктам или в силу стремления к интеллектyальной безопасности до степени ясности, точности, «объективности», «истинности», то выясняется, что существует лишь один принцип, который можно защищать при всех обстоятельствах и на всех этапах человеческого развития, - допустимо все. < ... >
There is one more dogma that needs to be considered before we return to the main topic. This is the belief that all people and all objects are automatically subject to the laws of logic and should be subject to these laws. If so, then anthropological research work is redundant. "What is true in logic is true in psychology ... in the scientific method and in the history of science," writes Popper.
this dogmatic statement is neither clear nor true (in one of its common interpretations). to begin with, let us agree that such expressions as "psychology", "history of science", "anthropology" designate certain areas of facts and regularities (nature, perception, human thinking, society). In this case, this statement is not clear, since there is no such single subject - logic - that is capable of revealing the logical structure of these areas. There is Hegel, there is Brouwer, there are representatives of formalism. They offer not at all different interpretations of the same set of logical "facts", but completely different "facts". And this statement is not true, since there are quite legitimate scientific statements that violate even simple logical rules.< ... >
"Science in a free society" // Ibid. pp. 473, 498-499,516.
Some very simple and trustworthy rules and standards, which philosophers and scientists regard as essential elements of rationality, have been violated in situations (the Copernican revolution, the triumph of kinetic theory, the emergence of quantum theory, etc.) that are considered equally important. More specifically, I tried to show that: a) the rules (standards) were indeed violated and the most sensitive scientists were aware of this; b) they must have been violated. Strict observance of the rules would not improve matters, but would retard the progress of science.< ... >
One way to criticize standards is to examine what violates them... In evaluating such a study, we may engage in some practice not yet refined and expressed (this was explained in the section "Reason and Practice", thesis 5). Bottom line: interesting research in specific sciences (and, in general, in any field) often leads to unpredictable revision of standards without premeditated intention. Therefore, if our assessment is based on recognized standards, then the only thing we can say about such a study is: "Anything is permitted."
I pay attention to the context of this statement. “Everything is permitted” is not some “principle of the new methodology proposed by me. This is the only way in which a staunch universalist who wishes to understand history in his own terms can express my understanding of tradition and research practice as outlined in the Mind and Practice section. If this understanding is correct, then everything a rationalist can say about science (and any other interesting activity), is expressed in two words: "Everything is permitted."
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Nor do we deny that advocates of change may have excellent arguments for each of their actions. But their arguments will be dialectical, that is, they will rely on a changing rationality rather than a fixed set of standards, and often these arguments will be the first step towards introducing such rationality. Incidentally, this is precisely the way rational common sense carries out reasoning: it can start with some rules and meanings of terms, and end up with completely different ones. It is not surprising that most of the revolutionaries developed unusually and were often treated as amateurs. Another thing is strange: the philosophers who once were the inventors of new worldviews and taught us to be critical of the status quo have now become its most devoted servants - truly philosophia ancilla scientiae (<<философия - служанка науки»). < ... >
It would be ridiculous to insist that the discoveries of the people of the ancient stone age are due to the instinctive use of the correct scientific method. If this were the case, and if the results obtained were correct, then why did later scientists so often come to completely different conclusions? And besides, as we have seen, the "scientific method" simply does not exist. Thus, if science is valued for its achievements, then we must value myth hundreds of times more, since its achievements are incomparably more significant. The inventors of myth laid the foundation for culture, while rationalists and scientists only changed it, and not always for the better.
It is just as easy to refute the assumption: b) there is not a single important scientific idea that has not been borrowed from somewhere. An excellent example is the Copernican revolution. Where did Copernicus get his ideas from? As he himself admits, from the ancient authorities. What authorities influenced his thinking? Among the others is also Philolaus, who was a stupid Pythagorean. How did Copernicus act when he tried to introduce the ideas of Philolaus into the astronomy of his time? Violating the most reasonable methodological rules.< ... >
M: Progress, 1986.- 542 p.
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Are you fed up with the philosophy and methodology of science? Significant nods to "reason", "scientific" and "rationality" become too intrusive? It seems to you that lecturers and authors of textbooks are not saying something? - Then you will like this book. Paul Feyerabend, himself a cohort of science methodologists, criticizes this school "from within". He shows that ideas about science, scientificity and rational discourse are not indisputable axioms, and the assessment of something as "scientific" is not the last irrefutable argument that unambiguously characterizes the phenomenon under consideration.
The very idea of rationality is culturally and historically conditioned. They arise in Western European civilization, and then begin to claim universal, universal significance. "Scientific" becomes an evaluative, axiological category. P. Feyerabend shows that, despite this arrogance of science, scientific knowledge is by no means always able to explain the phenomena that mankind successfully coped with in mythologically, magically oriented cultures. Moreover, he argues that in many of its postulates science itself contains "irrational" elements. One of the important conclusions of Feyerabed is that a more careful and balanced assessment of the various manifestations of human culture is needed; the main guide should be the freedom of development of the human personality.
Feyerabend is sometimes called a "methodological anarchist". It is difficult to say how fair such an assessment is, however, he is quite close to the ideology of the left movement. For modern methodologists of science, this author is rather "inconvenient": he is not very often referred to. However, these are understandable. In order to argue with him, you need a broader education in various fields: history, art history, religion.
Annotation from MIM
Paul Feyerabend is a well-known methodologist of science, whose writings are widely and actively discussed in modern discussions of logic scientific research. In the works of P. Feyerabend, the place and role of science in modern bourgeois society is considered, the methodological scientific standards put forward by Western positivist philosophers are criticized, and an original concept of the theory of knowledge is developed. They touch upon almost all problems of modern methodology of science. The author connects the discussion of methodological issues with a broad social context. The book, in addition to the main work of P. Feyerabend "Against Methodological Coercion", includes his articles: "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism", "Consolation for the Specialist" and chapters from the book "Science in a Free Society".
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