T 90 in the Chechen war. T-80 was a complete disaster

In the 1990s, the Russian army found itself involved in an endless series of new Caucasian wars, in which tanks played, although not a decisive, but still quite noticeable role, although most often they had to operate in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks - in street battles .

We will not go into the political background of the conflict, but will immediately move on to a description of military actions. The first significant event was the attempt to storm Grozny, undertaken on November 26, 1994 by the forces of the anti-Dudaev opposition. The decisive role in this operation was played by tanks - 35 T-72A, transferred to the opposition from the warehouses of the North Caucasus Military District. If not for these tanks, the assault could not have taken place at all, so we can say that they became the key factor, although not in the sense that tank forces play in general army operations. This operation failed miserably, because Dudayev and his entourage turned out to be well informed about all the plans of the oppositionists. The attacking groups were met with concentrated fire, and only 4 tanks managed to escape from the city; the rest were either destroyed or abandoned by their crews.

T-72B1 of the 2nd tank company of the 276th motorized rifle regiment before going out to support the assault groups fighting on Noya Bauchidze Street (in the foreground is tank 441 of Sergeant E. Lyapustin). During all the fighting in Grozny, the tank was never hit by an RPG. January 1995

The failure of this attempt to fight with “little bloodshed on foreign soil” pushed Russian leadership to more active actions, and on November 29, the Russian Security Council approved a plan for a military operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. At the beginning of December, several military groups were created, which were to enter the territory of Chechnya and, if the Dudayevites refused to fold, take Grozny by storm. In the Mozdok direction, a group of 15 battalions was formed, which had about 230 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 40 tanks. A group of 11 battalions with 160 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and 30 tanks advanced from the Vladikavkaz direction. The strongest group of 34 battalions, which had about 700 armored vehicles, including more than 100 tanks, was advancing from the Kizlyar direction. The mere enumeration of the forces involved shows that a corps-scale operation was being carried out.

However, from the very beginning, everything did not go as planned, only it took the troops 16 days to advance to Grozny instead of 3 according to plan. As a result, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev only on December 27 gave the order to begin the assault on Grozny on December 31 with a mandatory report to the Russian President about capture of the city on January 1 at 00.01. As we see, the rotten tradition of the Russian-Soviet-Russian army to take cities on the red dates of the calendar over the past two centuries has not wavered at all. Now they take Plevna from us for the Tsar’s birthday, then Kiev - for November 7, Berlin - for May 1, and now a New Year’s gift... “A birthday cake from the filling is prepared by a human brother for the sovereign brother...” These lines were written in 1877 year, but I'm afraid they are still relevant today.

Combat positions of 324 MRR near the breeding farm at the time of blocking the road to Grozny. The command of the federal troops at the third stage of the assault on the Chechen capital provided for complete control over the city from the south. February 1995

About 15,000 federal soldiers were concentrated against approximately 10,000 militants defending Grozny. They were supported by 230 tanks and 879 light armored vehicles, several hundred guns. However, street battles lay ahead, where this superiority in technology was largely offset by the positional advantages of the defenders. At the same time, the West continues to be in the unshakable confidence that the Russians have concentrated enormous forces to storm Grozny. For example, a study by the Danish Royal Military College categorically states that more than 38,000 soldiers took part in the assault. Of course, you can see everything much better from Copenhagen.

Before the attack on the city, after a heavy battle, Khankala airport was occupied, but, unfortunately, the command did not draw the proper conclusions based on the results of this battle. It seems, for unknown reasons, the generals were counting only on symbolic resistance from the Dudayevites. The assault on the city was carried out according to an insufficiently developed plan; once again the command did not have reliable communication with its troops, which cost the attackers dearly. In general, among the troops, the plan for a rapid rush of mechanized columns to the city center was regarded as an adventure. Subsequent events showed the validity of this assessment.

Spare parts boxes saved the T-72B1 tank from a cumulative jet entering the engine compartment. Grozny. January 1995

The assault troops were divided into 4 groups according to directions. At 06.00 the North group began its offensive. It included the 131st Maikop Motorized Rifle Brigade. Having lost several tanks and armored personnel carriers, the column nevertheless broke through to railway station, where the brigade took up a perimeter defense. The Northeast group, using a successful diversionary maneuver, broke into the city relatively freely, where it also took up defensive positions. The “East” and “West” groups did not complete the tasks assigned to them. Moreover, if the “North-East” group set up checkpoints along the route, which provided, albeit difficult, but still communication with the rear, then the “North” and “West” groups found themselves surrounded.

The worst thing about all this was that it was the Soviet troops who at one time gained extensive experience in fighting in the city. Koenigsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed exactly how to act in such cases. But this experience was completely forgotten. And another grave mistake was made - the Russian troops completely unforcedly gave the initiative to the enemy. Instead of systematically clearing the city using superior firepower, the assault groups went on the defensive. At one time, one famous British admiral, who himself fought a fair amount of war, said: “Moderation in war is the greatest idiocy. Ruthlessness, tirelessness, persistence - these are the keys to success.” All these principles were violated.

An RPG grenade hitting the T-72B1 commander's cupola from the top floor of the building pierced the armor and hit the tank commander. Grozny. January 1995

As a result, Dudayev was able to pull his most combat-ready units to the city center and begin to eliminate the encircled groups. The 131st Brigade found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which on January 1 at approximately 16:00 lost all its armored vehicles. At the same time, it should be said that the new generation tanks (T-72 and T-80) showed noticeably better survivability than the tanks that fought in the Middle East in 1973. One hit by an RPG or ATGM shell was no longer enough to disable it. As a rule, at least 6-7 hits were required, and a record case was recorded when a tank withstood hits from almost 20 shells. The dynamic protection systems worked exceptionally well. But the armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles turned out to be completely defenseless. The important role played by self-propelled artillery in such battles was again confirmed, since the weight of the 152-mm projectile of the 2SZM Akatsiya self-propelled gun was noticeably greater than that of tank guns, and had a noticeably greater destructive effect when firing at buildings.

After regrouping and the arrival of reinforcements, the assault continued. There was no longer talk of any anniversary dates. In general, the organized resistance of the militants in Grozny was finally broken only by March 26. This assault cost Russian army approximately 6,000 people killed and wounded. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles, according to the Main Armored Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, amounted to 49 tanks, 132 infantry fighting vehicles, 98 armored personnel carriers. The number of damaged but repaired tanks remains unknown.

One should not think that the battles in Grozny went on continuously for 3 months; they fall into several stages, separated by breaks of official truces and temporary respites. The first phase ended on January 18 after the capture of the presidential palace, when the northern and central parts of the city came under the control of the Russian army. Only after this did the attack on the southern part of Grozny begin, which was carried out with powerful artillery support. There were days when our artillery fired up to 30,000 shells at enemy positions. This is how it should have been done from the very beginning.

In August 1996, fighting broke out again in Grozny, although this time it lasted relatively short. On August 6, militants broke into the city. They did not attempt to storm the federal strongholds, but simply isolated them and subjected them to mortar fire, awaiting the surrender of the defenders. However, the energetic actions of the command of the federal troops managed to prevent the worst scenario. Although the fighting was still stubborn, on August 11 the corridor to the Government House was broken, lifting the siege from this important point. And by August 13, a decisive turning point was reached. Federal troops began to push back the enemy in all directions, and the militants began to retreat from the city. By the time the armistice was signed on August 14, the city was under the control of federal troops. Losses in this case amounted to only 5 tanks, 22 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 armored personnel carriers. We will not even comment on the chatter of some Western newspapers about hundreds of burned tanks.

A captured T-72A tank captured by federal troops from illegal armed groups during the fighting in Grozny. For their characteristic towers, painted with white lime, these vehicles were nicknamed “white crows” by the federals. After repairs, the tank was used by the Sever group in the battles on Minutka Square. January 1995

During the Second Chechen War, Grozny had to be stormed once again, but now armored vehicles were used in the minimum required quantities. The assault began on December 11, 1999. This time the main emphasis was placed on artillery and air support for infantry assault groups. As a result, the anti-tank defense system carefully prepared by the militants turned out to be simply useless. The advance of the federal troops was slow, but they suffered only light losses. Installations played a significant role in this operation volley fire TOS-1. Realizing that they could not oppose anything to such a gradual advance, on January 31, 2000, the militants tried to escape from Grozny under the cover of a snowstorm. They suffered heavy losses, but part of their forces still managed to escape.

T-72B (M) 74th Guards. an armored infantry brigade hit by an RPG shot into the unprotected gap between the turret shoulder strap and the fender fuel tank (apparently, they tried to hit the tank with a second grenade into the turret ring, which was already unprotected by the fuel tank). The tank crew died. January 1995

Broken sniper shot panoramic sight. January 1995

The T-90 tank is the latest modification of the legendary T-72 tank family - Soviet tanks second post-war generation. Without undergoing significant layout changes, it embodied almost all the best that was created in domestic tank building by the mid-90s of the last century.

The T-72 tank itself was developed by the Uralvagonzavod design bureau and was created as one of the options for improving the T-64A tank produced by the Kharkov plant named after. Malysheva. The T-72 tank differed from the T-64A mainly in minor changes to the hull associated with the installation of a four-stroke diesel engine of the V-2 family (the one that originated for the legendary T-34 tank and developed for the T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks ) instead of the 5TDF opposed two-stroke diesel engine and a new chassis, using a simpler and more reliable electromechanical automatic loader (A3) of a tank gun instead of an electro-hydraulic loading mechanism (MH).

The creation of the T-64 and T-72 tanks in the late 60s and early 70s was a big step forward. At that time, there were no vehicles in the world equal to them in terms of basic combat characteristics, and the possibility of eliminating the fourth crew member (loader) by installing the MZ (A3) on a tank with a classic layout on foreign tanks was realized only in the late 80s ( on the French tank of the third generation "Leclerc").

From the time it was put into service (1973) to the present, the T-72 tank has been repeatedly modernized and improved in all main areas ( firepower, security, mobility). The improvements were aimed at ensuring to the required extent the ability of the T-72 tank to withstand tanks of a later design than the T-72 that are being adopted in the armies of the strongest foreign countries, as well as new anti-tank weapons (PTS) being created.

For example, the improvement of tank protection was carried out in 5 stages, and if we compare the protection of the frontal projection of the T-72 tank produced in 1973, when its mass production began, and the T-90 tank - the last of the tanks of this family, put into service 20 years later , then it increased three times. To the constantly improved multi-layer combined armor protection, first mounted, and then built-in dynamic protection (in the Western press - “reactive armor”) and the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex were added, providing the tank with individual protection from those in service with most armies of the world anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) with command semi-automatic guidance systems such as “TOW”, “Hot”, “Milan”, “Dragon” and laser homing heads such as “Maverick”, “Hellfiree”, “Copper head” by creating active jamming guidance The use of unconventional methods of protection provided a slight increase in the weight of the T-90 tank, which combined with an increase in engine power from 740 to 840 hp. allowed to save acceptable level mobility.

During its existence, tanks of the T-72 family were purchased for the armies of many countries, and also began to be produced under license abroad (for example, in Yugoslavia). The tank has proven itself with positive side when used in various climatic conditions- from the harsh Arctic to Asian deserts and subtropics. The vast majority of domestic tank crews who served on other domestic tanks (T-64 and T-80 families), as well as foreign specialists and tank crews who had the opportunity to fight on these vehicles, speak positively about the vehicle. As for the complaints about the T-72 family of tanks, which appeared from the media during the US-Iraq conflict and during the military conflicts in Transcaucasia, the analysis of the reasons causing such complaints mainly reveals the shortcomings of the system for operating tanks in the troops. Indeed, an analysis of the nature of combat damage to tanks reveals an insufficient level of support for their combat use, and in some cases, incorrect tactics use of tanks(for example, the majority of tank defeats during urban battles occurred as a result of PTS hits when firing from above into the insufficiently protected upper hemisphere of the tank), and by analyzing the complaints against tanks coming from the troops, we can conclude that the overwhelming number of failures and malfunctions occur due to insufficient knowledge of the material part and poor level of technical maintenance.

Without a doubt, we can say that the T-72 family of tanks has a solid level of survivability in combat conditions. Thus, during a demonstration shelling of the T-90 tank, which took place during a period of euphoria “based on the results of the combat use” of our tanks in Chechnya, 6 shots were fired from another tank from a distance of 200 m, reproducing the conditions of real shelling in combat conditions. After this, the tank under fire arrived at the display site under its own power and from the outside resembled a pile of twisted metal. Naturally, there was damage to the materiel, but their analysis shows that with proper organization of the combat use of tanks and adequate support for their actions, a significant share of losses in personnel and technology in Chechnya.

To a large extent, the reasons for such survivability and reliability lie in the painstaking accounting in the Uralvagonzavod Design Bureau, of which the General Designer long time there was a talented engineer and leader V. Potkin, experience in domestic and foreign tank building, a correctly established system in the design bureau for monitoring and collecting information over the operation of tanks in the army, as well as the tests carried out, especially at the stage of accepting the tank for service with the army. After the death of the General Designer, the T-90 tank received the name “Vladimir”. Here is our story about some episodes of state tests of the T-90 tank, which one of the authors had to participate in.

“COCKROACH RACE” - LIFE MAKES THE BET

Conventionally, the position of the test participants can be characterized as follows. During testing various levels and type (from research to state acceptance), those military specialists who represent the interests of the customer of the tested model and who will subsequently operate the vehicle, and perhaps even fight on it, try to identify all its shortcomings in order to eliminate them before putting them into service and check , how the machine meets the requirements that were presented during its design. Representatives of the design bureau try to advantageously demonstrate all the advantages of the sample, and if any inconsistencies are identified, they try to justify them with the capabilities of existing technologies, violation of the test program, rules of operation of the prototype, etc. In general, this is a normal situation of struggle for the customer’s machine and its developer, in which compromise solutions are sought on the design and characteristics of a wide variety of component parts of the sample. Sometimes quite funny things happen. Thus, during the most difficult tests of a tank for cross-country ability on a section of road swollen from bad weather, consisting of a mixture of clay, sand and crushed stone, the rubber tires of the road wheels were partially destroyed by crushed stone mixed in clay, which, naturally, caused irritation among representatives of the design bureau, who were indignant on this occasion they said that there were no other conditions such as those at this test site on the entire continent. Or another case when a metal fragment accidentally caught by the caterpillar lugs pierced the fuel tank on the fender and a dispute arose whether this was considered a design defect.

The T-90 test program was structured in such a way that from the very beginning the vehicles arriving from the factory faced perhaps the most difficult tests - running along a highway with a hard asphalt concrete surface until the fuel was completely exhausted (in common parlance - “cockroach races”). On a concrete track, the range at one gas station was determined. The tank was filled to capacity, including two barrels at the rear of the vehicle, which are included in the engine fuel supply system (1700 liters in total). Early in the morning the tank went out onto the highway, stopping once every 4 hours to change the crew, for 1.5-2 minutes, without turning off the engine. When the second one was already on one o'clock in the morning, all the test participants were just waiting for it to stop. And finally the booming rumbling stops. At the gas station we look for a tank on the highway, look at the speedometer - 728 km (600 km was stated). Of course, in addition to the skill of the driver mechanics, this is the merit of the designers and manufacturers of the prototype, who achieved the optimal combination of parameters and adjustments of the engine-transmission unit and the tank's motion control system. Similar results in foreign tank building are unknown.

The life of the tank before major repairs is 14 thousand km, and the T-90 tanks had to “run” along a concrete track for 3500 km, and how to run: the average speed was 48-50 km/h. It should be noted that tests on concrete are the most difficult for a tank of all test vehicles, because hard coating in combination with high speeds has the most destructive effect on the components and assemblies of the tank.

In general, the task of the tester in any conditions is to “squeeze” everything that it is capable of from the car, test it at extreme conditions, try to put it in extreme conditions, of course, observing all the rules and regulations of operation. Sometimes we, the testers, felt sorry for the car. But the realization that if it survives in such difficult conditions, it will certainly not let you down in battle, still encouraged further “rape” of the machine.

Once, during a 250-kilometer night run, the operating conditions of a tank were simulated with partial damage to the power plant (coolant leak). This situation is quite real both in everyday operation and in a combat situation, where it is especially important to have a margin of tank reliability (for helicopters, for example, there is a certain requirement for the duration of “dry”, i.e. without oil, engine operation to allow crew to select a place and land the vehicle in case of damage to the engine lubrication system). The testing was entrusted to the driver mechanic, experienced tester A. Shopov. The tank's engine cooling system was filled with 35 liters of antifreeze instead of the required 90 liters. During the tests, the main operating parameters of the power plant were carefully monitored when performing the task. And it should be noted that the engine of the T-90 tank successfully passed this difficult test, working out the resource specified by the program at the temperature limit.

This fact made us look at the car a little differently; we gained even deeper respect for its developers, who created this reliable and extremely unpretentious car.

What is the value of an eight-hour non-stop run with the fire control system on? Be sure to choose a difficult route with endless holes and potholes, on which the stabilized gun of the tank from overloads every now and then becomes on the hydraulic stop, you can hear the loaded squeal of the hydraulics of the stabilizer of the gun, the mass of which reaches several tons. In addition, the gunner is required to make a horizontal turn of the tank turret every 2-3 minutes in the “transfer speed” mode by 360.

In a desert Central Asia there was such a case. Tank driver, soldier conscript service, one day suddenly, unexpectedly, “carefully” began to drive the tank along a well-known route. He did not respond to repeated requests to increase speed. I had to stop, turn off the engine and carry out explanatory work about the need to test the tank in extreme conditions. As it turned out, industry representatives sympathized with the soldier in his “ordeal” on the uneven Turkmen road and convinced him that the soldier did not need any possible repairs to the tank due to overload. Surprisingly, after the words that now we will quietly roll back without checking anything, and in two years a “good” tank that was put into service, but in the hands of a younger brother-soldier, will fail somewhere in a combat situation, they produced he was impressed that until the end of the tests we never returned to this issue with this soldier. And the speed performance of this driver was one of the best, even among more experienced testers.

A comprehensive check of the tank’s numerous properties, of course, required a lot of time, and it was even necessary to replace the driver, a conscript soldier, who was being discharged from the army. An average driver, who did not have sufficient experience, was sent from the troops to replace him. It was in Siberia, in the midst of a bitter winter. The new driver was eager to start testing and quickly demonstrate his knowledge and skills. After two days of studying the forty-kilometer route as a passenger in the tank's turret, we finally entrusted him with a place behind the levers of the machine. The route was quite difficult, combining high-speed sections with bumpy, almost bare, snow-free sections with a meter-long layer of snow. But, nevertheless, the testers always kept within the average speed of 35-41 km/h. Imagine our surprise when the newcomer covered the test route in almost 2 hours at an average speed of 23 km/h. And this despite the fact that before driving, he asked if it was possible to drive the car “all the way.” Mastery is an acquired skill, and if you want, of course, you can achieve anything. Within a week, the newcomer had almost completely adapted to the harsh winter conditions and the peculiarities of the complex test track.

When testing snow cross-country ability, we were extremely surprised when the T-90 confidently traversed long snow sections with snow depths ranging from 1.1 to 1.3 m.

IT'S NOT EASY IN THE DESERT EVEN FOR A CAMEL

All stages of testing were difficult for the tank, but what awaited it in the desert of Central Asia cannot be compared with the others.

Ambient temperature 45-50°C in the shade. Along the entire length of the hundred-kilometer running route, there was a layer of forest dust of 10-20 cm. During movement, the column of dust behind the tank rose several hundred meters, and from the tank itself only the cannon and the mud flaps of the tracks were visible. But its trace in the desert was visible for tens of kilometers. We determined where the tank was by the dust tail, but it could be seen 40 km away. However, as we joked, it was probably visible to American satellites from space, there’s no getting around it.

Dust was almost everywhere. When cleaning the internal volume of the tank with a vacuum cleaner from dust that entered through open hatches during marches, 5-6 buckets of dust were collected, and this was for every 4-5 marches. We remembered about it even a few months later in the winter in Siberia, when on one of the highways after the tank flew into a huge hole so that the Turkmen dust that had long settled in the hull rose up.

Trying to somehow get rid of the dust, the testers moved away from the field road to the side where there was less of it, but, a couple of times, at high speed, they fell into holes with steep walls, washed out by spring floods, which are not visible among the faded yellow and dried vegetation , returned to the “channel”. We called this monstrous road that way because when you cross it on foot, you get the impression that you are walking on water. Moreover, you can cross such a “channel” only in boots, which, of course, no one wore in the heat; it is impossible in sneakers.

During the day, the tanks covered from 350 to 480 km, and also worked, as on concrete, on all types of fuel. Moreover, in the military district where the tests were carried out, there was no kerosene for the engine of the T-90 tank. There was only RT kerosene (jet fuel), the use of which was not permitted by the tank’s operating instructions. After discussion together with representatives of the design bureau, we made the decision to run on RT kerosene at our own risk. We were fulfilling the point of the test program, but the representatives of the design bureau clearly took risks, but, obviously, were confident in their brainchild. The risk was also that very heavy loads were placed on the tank engine in conditions of dust and high temperature ambient air, even when operating on “native” diesel fuel, and here is aviation kerosene.

That time everything went extremely well and calmly. By the way, during the entire testing of T-90 tanks in the desert, the average speed ranged from 35 km/h on gasoline to 43 km/h on kerosene and diesel fuel. And to put all the dots on this issue, we add that the average operating speed of tanks (an indicator obtained by dividing the mileage meter readings by the engine hour meter readings under load) in combat units is 8-11 km/h, and for all state tests it is was 28 km/h.

And yet there were some incidents. One day at the end of the work week we were completing tank runs along the circular route. The test manager was informed by radio that we were going out for the last lap, then we were heading to the park on our own, after which we lost contact. While passing a checkpoint on the highway at high speed, we saw one of the testers of the backup group, who was waving his hand at us. We took this gesture as a greeting and, responding in kind, continued moving. After many kilometers of grueling running, we were looking forward to the events of the weekend and were in a wonderful mood.

The section of road from the ring road to the park was a hilly road with steep ascents and descents for 6 km. One climb with a steepness of about 300 and a length of 80-100 m was especially impressive. When the car climbed this climb, and we really sympathized with it, the speed dropped sharply, the dust at the stern cleared a little and a rather tricky situation was revealed. The tank was burning, burning very strongly, and from the outside. After all, in the event of a fire from the inside, the fire protection system would have worked and the crew would have known about it immediately. We, the commander and gunner on the turret, tried via intercom to convince the driver to stop immediately, in the heat of the moment, without bothering to tell the reason for such a stop. Naturally, the driver did not understand why he should stop in such an inconvenient place and continued to climb to the top of the hill.

Only after the tank stopped did the source of the fire become clear. This was a burning tank with a supply of oil for the engine, installed on the exhaust manifold of the power plant (so that in winter this oil would be heated and always ready for use). Apparently, during a long drive over rough terrain, the fastening of the tank became loose, it was destroyed and the oil spilled onto the exhaust manifold, where it instantly ignited. During our movement, almost 40 liters of oil spilled onto the left side and chassis, as a result of which the rubber bulwarks and rubber tires of the rear road wheels caught fire. This is exactly what they tried to tell us at checkpoint. It took a painfully long time to put out the fire. The OU-2 fire extinguisher available in the spare parts kit was not enough, and the abundance of forest dust at hand also did not help much. They dealt with the fire only when, having burned themselves, they managed to tear the tank itself, which was about to explode, from the bulwark fastenings.

Naturally, we arrived at the park in an “unsightly” condition and with great delay, which caused the test manager and his colleagues to worry. But we must give them their due - they showed restraint and loyalty to us, considering what happened not as an emergency, but as one of the equipment failures, to eliminate which it is necessary to make adjustments to the tank operating instructions.

SHOOTING WELL IS NOT JUST SHOOTING WELL

During firing tests at one of the firing ranges in Siberia, such an incident occurred. While firing from two T-90 tanks was being carried out, a break for lunch was announced and after that the firing director set the task for the crews for the next round. The tanks were already ready to carry out the task, the leader was ready to give the command “forward”, when at that moment a moving object appeared ahead in the target area. As it turned out, the watchman from the other end of the range, considering the shooting finished, rode on a horse in a sleigh to the village for food and decided to shorten his route through the range. He still watched the shooting from the tanks from the command tower, with horror imagining himself and his horse there, at the level of real targets.

It should be added that learning to shoot well from this tank is much easier, in our opinion, than to drive it well. In principle, those simple operations that a gunner performs can be mastered in a few training sessions, and almost everything that is considered to be the art of a gunner was taken over by the fire control system installed on the tank, which automatically takes into account all the necessary data for firing, including including corrections caused by deviations of shooting conditions from normal (such as direction and wind speed, barometric pressure and air temperature, charge temperature, wear of the gun barrel, lateral roll of the tank, etc.) The gunner’s entire task comes down to using the guidance remote control (jokingly called a “joystick” by soldiers) to bring the aiming point to the target, and press the electric trigger button to fire a shot .

During tests to determine the fire capabilities of a tank, sometimes the fire control system forces you to treat yourself very, very correctly. During the shooting, one of the T-90 tanks began to make unjustified mistakes. Checking the serviceability of the control system did not reveal any defects; everything functioned normally. Everyone was at a loss. Only a casual glance by the tank commander at the new capacitive wind sensor made it possible to explain the unsatisfactory performance of the control system. It turned out that everything was very simple - the crew was inattentive and did not remove the small cover from the wind sensor, and it, naturally, being “in calm”, did not work out the required correction for the control system.

This episode is not given by chance, because technology, no matter how “smart” it is, still requires a professional, qualified attitude, which allows for a much wider use of its capabilities.

The fire capabilities of the T-90 have expanded significantly with the installation of a guided weapon system to ensure confident superiority over all existing foreign tanks in terms of target engagement range. The T-90 tank hits heavily armored targets at a range of up to 5 km on the move (up to 30 km/h) with a high probability of hitting with the first shot. During state tests, 24 missile launches were carried out at ranges of 4-5 km and all of them hit the target. Again, we must say thank you to the designers who created this “long arm”. It’s one thing when, at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi, from a T-80U tank (which has the same guided weapon system), an experienced gunner made 52 guided missile launches at a range of 5 km and all the missiles hit the target, and another thing when, during state tests of the tank T-90 all missile launches were carried out by young guys who had undergone preliminary training and had absolutely no prior experience in firing a guided missile.

Well, what a professional can do was demonstrated at the demonstration of the T-90 tank by one of the foreign delegations. A fairly experienced gunner, performing a firing exercise, first hit a target with a guided missile at a distance of 4 km from a standstill, and then, in 54 seconds of movement at a speed of 25 km/h, hit 7 real armored targets located at ranges of 1500-2500 m, and returning to the starting point position, transferred fire control to the tank commander, who, in duplicate mode, fired from the rear of the tank and shot 4 more targets.

Shooting from a tank always impresses with its power, it is especially impressive and visual in mountainous conditions, where targets appear in full view, seem very close, and the rocks located literally behind them are probably 3 km, no more. However, when measuring the range with a laser rangefinder, it turns out that these rocks are at least 6-7 km away, and the targets are at least 2.5 km away. In such conditions, the trajectory of the projectiles is very clearly visible.

A TANK IS NOT A SUBMARINE OR A HANG GLIDER, BUT STILL...

It also turned out that, in addition to the bitter frosts of Siberia, the unbearable (for humans) heat and dust of Central Asia, the tank had to pass through water obstacles 5 m deep and rise twice to a height of 8000 m on board transport aircraft IL-76MD and AN-124 "Ruslan".

The underwater tests were difficult. The tank entered the reservoir to a depth of 5 m, the engine was turned off, and for 1 hour the crew listened in complete silence through the air supply pipe to what was happening above the water column. Such a long stay under water was necessary to check the quality of sealing of the elements of the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex, which are located on the tank’s armor. Although in principle there was nothing to be afraid of under water (in case of an emergency abandonment of the tank, the crew was equipped with IP-5 insulating gas masks), we were looking forward to the time of starting the engine and the tank returning to the surface of the water.

A SWAN SONG...

One of the most critical stages of testing prototypes of T-90 tanks - testing for resistance to anti-tank weapons, is usually carried out at the end of the entire test program, since after this stage the sample, as a rule, is not subject to further use.

To test the security characteristics, the program included tests by shelling and mine detonation of one of the prototypes. The start was terrible for the car. A landmine was placed under one of the tracks, the TNT equivalent of which corresponded to the most powerful mines of foreign countries. The car passed this test, i.e. was brought into working condition by the crew within the time established by the requirements. Then the tank was subjected to brutal shelling, with the “enemy” hitting its “weak” spots. With each new hit, it became more and more gloomy, and after a fairly decent number of hits, systems and components began to fail; the last one, like a person’s, was the “heart” of the tank, its engine.

We felt humanly sorry for the tank, which had become our fighting friend over the past year and a half. But his “suffering” will not be in vain, as it has provided new food for designers and specialists.

The second T-90 tank had a completely different fate. He walked 14,000 km, shot a mountain of ammunition, replacing two barrels for a tank gun during testing, and was sent to his birthplace - the city of Nizhny Tagil, where new components and assemblies were installed on him for further research and testing.

Many are interested in the question of the combat effectiveness of the latest Russian tanks in comparison with foreign analogues. In particular, what are the capabilities of the tank? T-90 vs American?

It should be understood that the situation when two tanks meet on the battlefield, like two knights clad in armor, in a fair duel, is becoming less and less common in modern combat. Today, to survive, a tank must be ready to fight a variety of opponents - from infantry armed with anti-tank missiles to combat aircraft and helicopters. However, some tanks are constantly compared to others.

Some experts believe that a general theoretical comparison of tanks is impossible, and even real fighting do not give a definitive answer. It is necessary to take into account application tactics, crew training, equipment maintenance, interaction between units - all this often has higher value than the technical properties of the tank itself.

As for, there is no reliable data on their participation in hostilities. Despite the statements of some authors, most likely no T-90s during both the First and Second Chechen campaign there were none on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. It is believed that in August 2008, T-90 tanks took part in hostilities in South Ossetia as part of units of the 58th Army during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In particular, T-90s were seen during the withdrawal of Russian troops from Gori (Georgia). But in the absence of documentary evidence, this cannot be stated categorically, because externally, the T-90 is very similar to the T-72B with the Kontakt dynamic protection, which may cause an error in their “identification”.

Not long ago, the NTV television company aired a program that compared the T-90S and the main tank of the US armed forces, the M1 Abrams. After analyzing the main characteristics of the two combat vehicles, the authors of the program came to the conclusion that the T-90S is clearly superior to the Abrams. Naturally, Western analysts have a completely opposite opinion. For example, Dean Lockwood, a weapons systems analyst at Forecast International, notes: “When we talk about the T-90 family, we are actually talking about the chassis from the T-72 and the updated turret and artillery system from the T-80. The T-72 tank was produced in large quantities, the results of its combat use are not particularly impressive, and the T-80 has very limited combat experience. Calling the T-90S the best tank in the world is a clear exaggeration. The T-72 was used by Iraqi troops in 1991 and 2003, then it was also considered one of the best examples of armored vehicles. But the war showed that it cannot stand comparison with the American M1 Abrams and the British Challenger. The Abrams and Challenger could destroy the T-72 while remaining out of its reach. The T-90 has a number of improvements, but it is definitely not a technological breakthrough.”

Let's try to make some generalizations based on the known characteristics of the Russian T-90 and the American Abrams.

T-90 VS ABRAMS: COMPARISON OF DESIGN AND PROTECTION

First of all, you need to take into account that the T-90 tank, developed by UKBTM more than 20 years ago and essentially being a deep modernization of the T-72, itself has many modifications: T-90 (1992 model), T-90 “Bhishma”, T-90SA , T-90A (2004 model), T-90AM, T-90SM, which differ significantly from each other both structurally and in combat effectiveness.

The same applies to the American Abrams, which entered service in 1980. There were its modifications: M1 (with a 105-mm cannon), M1A1, M1A1NE (with “heavy armor”), M1A2, M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program), M1A1/A2 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit). Moreover, for example, the innovations introduced on the modification of the M1A2 tank increased its combat effectiveness compared to the modification M1A1 in the offensive by 54%, in defense - by 100%.

For this reason, meticulously comparing millimeters and kilograms makes at least some sense only for very specific modifications released in the same period of time. Therefore, we immediately “out of brackets” the frankly weaker M1 with a 105-mm cannon and so far existing only in prototypes of the T-90AM/SM.

First of all, it should be noted that the USA and the USSR, and subsequently Russia, chose two different approaches to the design of their tanks. The naked eye can see that the T-90 is significantly smaller than the M1. This was achieved thanks to the T-90’s abandonment of the loader, which requires about 1.7 m of fighting compartment height to operate. As a result, restrictions on reducing the height of the tank were lifted, and the use of a dense layout made it possible to create a highly protected vehicle with a low silhouette and a small longitudinal and cross-sectional area with a relatively low weight. As a result, the reserved volume of the T-90 is only 12 cubic meters, and the Abrams - 21. True, you have to pay for everything - and reverse side The dense layout made the crew members cramped, as well as the difficulty of replacing crew members with each other if necessary.

Many will say that since the Abrams is heavier, it means it is better protected. But not everything is so simple. Reducing the internal reserved volume on the T-90 called for reducing the weight of the armor to ensure the required level of protection. Due to its smaller dimensions, the frontal projection, which is most likely to be damaged, is only 5 sq.m for the T-90, and 6 sq.m for the Abrams. This alone makes the T-90 potentially less vulnerable.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the real security of the T-90 and Abrams due to high level secrecy of this issue. However, it is known that the armor of the front part of the turrets is made according to a similar principle - packages of “reflective sheets” are installed in the pockets of the frontal armor. They provide increased anti-cumulative resistance, while resistance against kinetic ammunition deteriorates due to a decrease in the density of the barrier (air gaps between packages).

The T-90's "reflective sheets" are made of steel, while the Abrams's, starting with the M1A1NA modification, were made of depleted uranium. Due to the high density of uranium (19.03 g/cm3), these plates, with an extremely small thickness, ensured the “explosive” nature of the destruction of the cumulative jet.

In addition to the usual armor, the T-90 also uses a complex of built-in dynamic protection, which most modifications of the Abrams do not have, with the exception of the M1 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) with increased security, designed for operations in urban environments.

The Kontakt-5 dynamic protection installed on the T-90 works both against cumulative weapons and against armor-piercing finned sabot projectiles. The complex provides a powerful lateral impulse, allowing to destabilize or destroy the BPOS core before it begins to interact with the main armor.

Now, according to the manufacturer, the frontal armor of T-90A tanks can withstand hits from the most popular Western BOPS-M829A1, MS29A2, DM-33, DM-43. In 1995, as part of a special display in Kubinka, the T-90 was fired at by 6 shells from another tank from a distance of 150-200 m. They fired with modern Russian cumulative shells. Frontal armor was not penetrated; moreover, after the shelling, the vehicle was able to return to the observation deck under its own power.

On the other hand, according to statements by American officials, the frontal armor of the M1A1 also withstood fire from the 125-mm guns of Iraqi T-72 tanks, although they fired outdated ZBM9 and ZBM12 BOPS, which were withdrawn from service in the USSR back in 1973.

WEAPON COMPARISONAND AMMUNITION

As for the main armament - the tank gun, the Russian T-90 is armed with a 125-mm 2A46M/2A46M5 smoothbore tank gun, and the American Abrams is armed with a 120-mm (NATO standard) M256 smoothbore tank gun. Despite the difference in caliber, they are similar in their characteristics, and the effectiveness of their fire depends significantly on the ammunition used. The T-90 is capable of firing four types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation shells, as well as guided missiles. The standard Abrams ammunition includes only two types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber and cumulative.

BOPS are mainly used to combat tanks. Since the 90s, Russian tanks have been armed with aging Soviet BOPS ZBM-32 and ZBM-44 with a core made of uranium and tungsten alloy, respectively. True, more powerful Russian BOPS have recently been developed, which have better characteristics and can combat the frontal armor of almost any Western tanks. These include ZBM-44M and ZBM-48 “Lead”. However, to use them on the T-90, it is necessary to replace the automatic loader, since the existing rotating conveyor trays are not designed for the use of projectiles with a length of 740 mm.

The main ammunition of the Abrams is the 120-mm M829A3 round with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile, which was put into service at the beginning of 2003 and has high performance.

It is very significant that the T-90 has a “long arm” - the 9K199 Reflex-M guided weapon system with an effective firing range of up to 5000 m. This is 2-2.5 times greater than the return fire range of the BPS of any modern tanks, to Moreover, unlike BOPS, guided missiles retain unchanged armor penetration indicators at any distance. As a result, the T-90 receives fundamentally new combat capabilities - winning the battle before entering the effective fire zone of enemy tanks. Simulation of an oncoming battle of tank companies (10 T-90 tanks against 10 M1A1 tanks) showed that, starting firing guided missiles from a range of 5000 m, the T-90s manage to hit up to 50-60% of enemy tanks at a range of 2000-2500 m. True, opponents note that this advantage cannot be realized in every terrain - for example, in the European theater, the average probable detection range of a “tank” type target is only 2.5 km.

In some publications there is a statement that the T-90 guided weapon system can at the same time perform air defense functions for a tank. However, this is an exaggeration. The developer declared only the technical capability of hitting non-maneuvering low-speed (up to 70 km/h) air targets. Agree, it would be strange to expect an enemy combat helicopter to obligingly hover in one place, waiting for the T-90 to hit it with a guided missile.

The Abrams does not have a guided weapons system at all.

The Abrams' disadvantages also include the fact that its standard ammunition does not contain a high-explosive fragmentation projectile (and this reduces its ability to destroy area targets), while the T-90's ammunition package contains a HE projectile with the Ainet remote detonation system. But if necessary, the Abrams can use the M83DA1 grapeshot projectile or its concrete-piercing version, the M908. Also, to combat helicopters, an M830A1 shot with an air blast is provided.

The gun on the T-90 works with an automatic loader. This allows you to shoot at a constant high rate of 6-8 shots. per minute (minimum loading cycle - 6.5-7 s) under any driving conditions, while on the Abrams a high rate of fire with a loading cycle of up to 7 seconds (8 rounds per minute) is ensured only from a standstill or when moving on flat terrain and largely depends on physical condition loader

The disadvantages of the A3 scheme include the fact that the ammunition is located directly in the fighting compartment next to the crew, which is not separated from it in any way. On the T-90, the ammunition load of 42 rounds is partially placed in the A3 rotating conveyor under the fighting compartment floor - 22 rounds, and the remaining 20 are located throughout almost the entire habitable volume of the tank, including the turret. Therefore, when the ammunition detonates, the crew dies, and the tank breaks down and cannot be restored.

The ammunition load of the Abram tank is also 42 rounds, but in accordance with modern Western fashion, it is placed in a fundamentally different way - in separate compartments equipped with special ejector panels, which, in the event of shell detonation, are knocked out and the explosion energy goes up. In the aft niche of the turret, separated from the fighting compartments by an armored partition, there are 36 rounds. Another six shots are located in the armored enclosure, between the fighting compartment and the logistics compartment. If the ammunition rack is damaged, the Abrams remains mobile and, according to instructions, must immediately leave the danger zone and then move to the rear for repairs.

COMPARISON OF POWER UNITS

The T-90 and Abrams are equipped with fundamentally different power plants. T-90A, T-90CA - a 1000-horsepower diesel engine, and the Abrams - a 1500-horsepower gas turbine, made in one unit with an automatic hydromechanical transmission. The engines provide the T-90 and Abrams with a specific power of 21 hp/t and 24 hp/t, respectively. Due to the higher efficiency of the diesel engine compared to the voracious gas turbine, the T-90 has a significantly greater range - 550 km, versus 350 km for the Abrams.

The production T-90s are equipped with a mechanical transmission with an outdated steering mechanism (the role of which is played by onboard stepped gearboxes). The Abrams is equipped with a hydrostatic transmission and turning mechanisms with digital automatic control systems. Accordingly, the maneuverability of the Russian T-90 is lower than that of the Abrams. The disadvantages of the transmission of the T-90 tank include the low reverse speed - 4.8 km/h, while on the Abrams, due to the hydrostatic transmission, reverse movement is ensured up to 30 km/h.

The undoubted advantage of the T-90 power plant is its unpretentiousness and high reliability. In any case, during tests in the Indian Thar Desert there was no failure of T-90 engines, while, for example, a brigade of M1A1 tanks (58 units) lost 16 tanks in three days of movement across the sands during Operation Desert Storm. due to engine breakdowns.

When replacing an engine, the T-90 is characterized by a lot of labor-intensive work; a team of qualified technicians needs 6 hours to do this, but on the American Abrams it takes only 2 hours.

T-90 VS. "ABRAMS" - OVERALL SCORE

So, we can conclude that the undoubted advantages of the T-90 compared to the Abrams include: the ability to fire guided missiles at a range of up to 5 km; a wide range of ammunition, including HE shells (including those with remote detonation and ready-made submunitions); excellent protection, including dynamic protection “Kontakt-5” and KOEP “Shtora-1”; high rate of fire throughout the battle thanks to the use of A3; good mobility, high range, great depth of water obstacles to be overcome; small dimensions; exceptional unpretentiousness and reliability in operation; good price-quality combination.

The Abrams also has its own advantages: it provides complete isolation of the crew from the ammunition; there is an automated battle management system that provides information in real time; reliable protection; high power density; good maneuverability (including reverse speed up to 30 km/h).

In conclusion, we present the data from the article by the General Director of JSC VNIItransmash, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member Russian Academy rocket and artillery sciences by V. Stepanov, which was published in 2012 and is devoted to the analysis of methods for the comparative assessment of tanks. It assesses the MTU (military technical level) indicator of the best modern tanks, including T-90A, T-90MS, M1A2 and M1A2 SEP. The calculation of VTU is carried out according to indicators of firepower, security, mobility and operational capabilities and represents a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of a given tank relative to a certain reference tank. The T-90A was chosen as the standard (i.e. its VTU = 1.0). VTU indicators American tanks M1A2 and M1A2 SEP were 1.0 and 1.32, respectively. For the new T-90MS, the VTU indicator was determined as 1.42. Thus, in the author’s opinion, the comparative assessment, taking into account a possible calculation error of 10%, indicates the similarity of the levels of the best modern foreign tanks and the T-90A.

Tanks T-90 and T-80. Photo from the press service of Uralvagonzavod

Complete contradictions

On export sales of Russian tanks

In the future, Russia will lose its leading position in
world market for heavy armored vehicles, if it cannot offer
customers a wide range of modern and competitive products. IN
At present, the positions occupied by the country can be assessed as
contradictory. On the one hand, Russia is the world leader in
sales volumes of tank equipment, but on the other hand, over the past few years
lost a number of tenders for the supply of tanks, and these defeats were different
no matter how annoying you can call them.

This opinion was expressed on April 14, 2011 by the Deputy Director of the Center
analysis of strategies and technologies Konstantin Makienko. According to him, among
reasons for Russia's possible decline from first place in terms of supply volumes
tanks can be called such as “narrowness of Russian proposals”,
obsolescence of technology and “lack of flexibility in responding to requests
market". Growth in sales volumes of T-90S main battle tanks in recent years
for several years was provided mainly by India and Algeria, at that time
how outside of these countries Russian cars did not show significant
breakthroughs.

What and how

Today, export sales of Russian tanks look very
impressive. In 2006-2009, the volume of exports of Russian tanks, according to
according to the Center for Analysis of the Global Arms Trade, amounted to 482 units per
a total of $1.57 billion. According to this indicator, Russia ranked
first place. In second place were Germany with 292 tanks at 3.03
billion dollars and the USA with 209 tanks worth 1.5 billion dollars. From
The statistics above show that the first and obvious advantage
The advantage of Russian technology is its low cost.

According to the preliminary forecast, in 2010-2013 the supply volume
Russian tanks on the world market will increase and amount to 859 units per
a total of $2.75 billion. This assessment includes
future deliveries under already concluded military contracts, as well as
stated intentions of some states to purchase and license
production of Russian tanks. Mainly, growth in supply volumes
armored vehicles will be provided by India.

Indian ground forces plan to increase the total number of Russian tanks
T-90S is in service with up to two thousand units. India received 310 of these vehicles
under a contract concluded in 2001. In 2007, India acquired more
347 tanks. India is expected to buy another 600 units between 2014 and 2019.
T-90S. In 2006-2009, Russia, in addition to India, entered into contracts for
supply of tanks to Algeria, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Uganda and
Turkmenistan. These states must receive a total of 413
tanks T-55, T-72M1M, T-80U and T-90S. Some of the vehicles already handed over
to the customer, were supplied from the reserves of the Russian Armed Forces.

After the contracts with India and Algeria are exhausted, Russia will have no
major buyers of tank equipment, and sales volumes may begin
decline. In addition, Russian industry has been developing for a long time
not only new samples military equipment, but also modernized
variants of the old one. At the same time, other countries have stepped up efforts to
improvement of Soviet developments and began to compete
modern Russian technology.

According to Makienko, “stagnation of the technical level of the T-90” with
simultaneous increase in its cost led to the fact that the Chinese
VT1A managed to beat the T-90S in the Moroccan tender for the supply of main
battle tanks. In total, based on the results of the tender, the ministry
Defense Morocco purchased 150 VT1A tanks from China. Russia's defeat in
This competition can only be called annoying. The point is that the T-90S,
although based structurally on the T-72, it is positioned as new car.
At the same time, the Chinese VT1A is a modified T-72, in its own way
characteristics close to T-80UM2.

At the same time, China is beginning to increasingly offer cheaper products for export.
tanks Type 96 and in the future may bring to the market Type 99 (revision
Type 98G, based on VT1A/MBT 2000). Thus, China is actually
will be able to satisfy customer requests in different price and technical
segments. And this, obviously, will be the country’s advantage in the future
when participating in international tenders: if you want it cheaper, here’s VT1A or
Type 96; you need a convenient price-quality ratio - Type 98; required
“advanced and more expensive” - that’s Type 99. In a word, everything is according to the rules
market.

Probably referring specifically to the loss of the T-90S in Morocco and the appearance
a large number of samples of Chinese armored vehicles, commander-in-chief
On March 15, 2011, Colonel General of the Russian Ground Forces stated: “Those types of weapons that the (Russian - Note from Lenta.Ru)
industry, including armored weapons, artillery and
small arms, their parameters do not correspond to NATO models and even
China."

In fact, Russian armored vehicles still comply
modern requirements, but over the years there will be obsolescence
becoming more and more noticeable. Especially due to the lack of large-scale new
developments and general stagnation of the military-industrial complex, with which
the Russian government intends to fight with the help of targeted
state program modernization of the defense industry. This program will
is expected to be presented in the next few months.

However, the first alarming signals are already coming. Until they
may cause serious damage to Russia’s position in the market, but without accepting
appropriate measures may lead to loss of leadership. Except for losing
China, Russia failed to win in the Malaysian tank
tender This competition, which took place in 2002, was won by
Polish tank PT-91M. Malaysian Ministry of Defense, first good
buying Russian military equipment (though mainly air defense systems and
aircraft), ordered 48 Polish tanks, which are several
a modified version of the same Soviet T-72.

And now from latest news. At the end of March 2011, the command
ground forces Thailand has decided to purchase 200 Ukrainian
main battle tanks T-84U "Oplot" for a total of seven billion
baht ($231.1 million). The decision to purchase tanks was made
based on the results of a tender in which the Russian T-90S also took part.

Not so simple

Speaking about Russia's victories and defeats in the foreign armored market, and
any other technique should still be taken into account and political factor,
which often plays an even greater role than cost and technical
characteristics of the offered products. The most striking example of this
is just a Thai tender. Although the T-90S, according to some technical
the characteristics are objectively superior to the T-84U, competition to the “Ukrainian”,
however, he lost.

The point is obviously that Thailand has been buying military products for a long time
Ukrainian production. In 2007, in particular, Thailand acquired from
Ukraine has 96 BTR-3E1 armored personnel carriers worth four billion baht, and in
At the end of 2010, he announced his intention to buy another 121 armored personnel carriers. Here
It should be clarified that, as a rule, the Ministry of Defense of certain
countries, once choosing a country as a military supplier
technicians try to stick to purchasing from this supplier.
Naturally, if he is able to offer the required equipment.

However, the Thai newspaper
with reference to one of the servicemen, she wrote that the soldiers preferred
Korean K1 tanks, also participating in the tender. The point is that on
T-84U is equipped with an automatic loader, which requires a complete stop
machines for reloading guns after ammunition
spent. In combat conditions, such a stop makes the vehicle vulnerable. By
according to an unnamed military man, from this point of view, manual loading on the K1
much more convenient and better than automatic.

At the beginning of 2011, Rosoboronexport announced that in Saudi Arabia
comparative tests of the T-90 and the French Leclerc took place,
American M1A1 Abrams and German Leopard 2A6. Within ten days
the tanks covered 1,300 kilometers in difficult climatic conditions and drove
shooting various types ammunition. Won the test
T-90, while foreign tanks cannot cope with a number of tasks
succeeded. True, the fact that the contract for the supply of T-90S to Saudi
Arabia was never concluded, the Russian state-owned company explained
succinctly: “Politics.”

But the rule of political decision works mainly in cases where
when one state or another already bought military equipment from
any supplier in the past or has very specific
strategic interests. In new markets, especially in countries where
troops are armed with equipment from different manufacturers different countries, Not
the last role is played by the ratio of price and quality of military
products. From this point of view, Russian technology still has
high competitiveness. People speak in favor of Russian weapons
their reliability, ability to work in difficult climatic conditions and
relatively low cost.

For comparison, the cost of the T-90S (export version of the T-90A) is
an average of 2-2.5 million dollars per piece. Only Chinese ones are cheaper
derivatives of the T-72. According to various sources, the Chinese VT1A is on the external
market 1.4-1.8 million dollars. In turn, the Polish PT-91M can be
buy for 2.7-3 million dollars, and the Ukrainian T-84U, according to various sources,
for 2.5-4 million dollars (the cost of one tank for Thailand, according to
preliminary data, will be 1.2 million dollars). True, speaking of
prices for military products, we should not forget about the principle
“discounts for regular and wholesale customers.”

In any case, no matter what caused the loss of Russian tanks in
tenders, manufacturers should think about it and take action. At least
because other countries are modernizing the products offered for export
samples significantly faster than Russia. And if we talk about China, then this
Every year the state increases the range of products offered
sale of military equipment.

Possible way out

The restoration of Russia's position in the world market, according to Makienko,
Only a qualitative breakthrough can contribute. In particular, several
The situation can be corrected by bringing it into line with modern
standards of existing tank platforms. For example, it is required as
it is possible to quickly bring the modernized T-90A - T-90AM to the foreign market.
This machine, created by the Ural Transport Design Bureau
mechanical engineering, equipped with new automatic loader, devices
surveillance, protection and gun.

The technical characteristics of the T-90AM are not yet fully known. In 2010, First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia
stated that the new vehicle will receive increased combat power,
improved night vision devices and armor. Besides, in
the modernized T-90 fighting compartment will be moved to a separate
compartment. However, the prospects for the T-90AM are still vague. According to Makienko,
The Russian Ministry of Defense has not yet decided on plans for this vehicle.

For a long time, the “Object 195” (T-95) tank also inspired some hope
fundamentally new design. This MBT had a crew position in
isolated compartment, new surveillance and fire control systems,
information management system, active protection system and new
engines. The Russian Ministry of Defense has stopped funding the project
creation of "Object 195" in 2010. The reason for this decision
the cost of the machine and its technical
complexity.

According to the General Director of Uralvagonzavod Oleg Sienko,
despite the closure of the Object 195 program, the enterprise continues
modernization of this machine to own funds because he sees in
tank “there is still more positive than negative.” In 2010
it was reported that as a replacement for the T-95 in the state weapons program for
2011-2020 envisages the creation of a “unified heavy platform”,
which will be developed under the code "Armata". It is assumed that
this machine will be simpler and cheaper than the T-95, but will inherit a number of its technologies.

At the same time, one cannot help but note a certain “tiedness” between Russian
enterprises for state defense orders. This means the following: for export
Only equipment that was adopted by the USSR is supplied
or Russia. At the same time, there is a practice of supplying for export abroad.
simplified versions of military equipment, which for some reason
The local Ministry of Defense refused to accept it for service. More
the practice of creating joint ventures with
foreign companies to develop new military equipment for
domestic use and for export.

Russia, as it seems, is just beginning to follow this path. From existing
Today, the only products that come to mind for such joint ventures are cruise missiles
"BrahMos" and FGFA fighters jointly developed by Russia and India,
and Hashim grenade launchers, the production of which is being created in Jordan.
Theoretically, this practice can be transferred to joint development
infantry fighting vehicles, anti-aircraft missile systems, tanks,
armored personnel carriers and helicopters. The main thing in modern world- keep up with
market.

It has been said more than once about the methods used to push the “tank analogue” of the T-72 into service. These were methods of armchair adventures and... Even bribery. Now these traditions continue in the form of lies and articles.
Embellishing and misleading the country's leadership regarding the work being carried out has long been the case. Major General Yu. M. Potapov, head of comparative tests of T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks:

“Over 16 years of working with Comrade Venediktov, I became convinced that he was constantly embellishing and misleading the leadership of GBTU about the state of affairs in the work he was carrying out. He also taught his subordinates at the design bureau to do this. Such phenomena were not observed among the chief designers of the T-80, Comrade Nikolai Sergeevich Popov, and Comrade Morozov, the chief designer of the T-64. These designers were always truthful and did not embellish the state of work on the creation and modernization of tanks.”

“In 1995, several T-90 tanks took part in combat operations in Chechnya and turned out to be practically invulnerable to separatist anti-tank weapons.
Gunner Sergei Gorbunov recalls: “The shells got stuck in the built-in protection and did not enter the armor. The active protection system reacts with lightning speed: the T-90 turns the gun towards the danger and covers itself with a smoke and aerosol cloud.”

Another portion of false propaganda and cheap show-off.
T-90 never in action on the territory of Chechnya was not used (the T-72B with the Kontakt-5 remote sensing system was used, which are like two drops of water similar to the T-90).

It is not surprising that even the developers themselves confuse the T-72B with the T-72B; this is essentially the same tank, which simply changed the name thanks to.
Mention of " Active protection system"Once again shows the essence of the incompetent authors of the article. This system (we are talking about the KOEP “Shtora”) can only work when the tank is illuminated with laser aiming and surveillance devices, which were not part of the Chechen illegal gangs during the war. At the same time, the question of the real effectiveness of this flawed product of the military-industrial complex of the late USSR period deserves separate discussion ( photodetectors of detector heads do not provide sufficient sensitivity).

And once and for all it is worth remembering that there are great creators, such as Morozov, Koshkin, Kucherenko, and there are their imitators, such as the designers of the T-72. Their only achievements are renaming the tank after minor changes (T-72, T-72A, T-72B,