Peace with Japan. Washington Post (USA): Russia seeks peace with Japan (wait a second, are they still at war?)

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 (briefly)

The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26 (or, according to the new style, February 8) 1904. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, before the official declaration of war, attacked ships located in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this attack, the most powerful ships of the Russian squadron were disabled. The declaration of war took place only on February 10.

The most important reason for the Russo-Japanese War was Russia's expansion to the east. However, the immediate cause was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, previously captured by Japan. This prompted military reform and the militarization of Japan.

The reaction of Russian society to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War can be briefly said as follows: Japan’s actions outraged Russian society. The world community reacted differently. England and the USA took a pro-Japanese position. And the tone of press reports was clearly anti-Russian. France, an ally of Russia at that time, declared neutrality - it needed an alliance with Russia in order to prevent the strengthening of Germany. But already on April 12, France concluded an agreement with England, which caused a cooling of Russian-French relations. Germany declared friendly neutrality towards Russia.

Despite active actions at the beginning of the war, the Japanese failed to capture Port Arthur. But already on August 6 they made another attempt. A 45-strong army under the command of Oyama was sent to storm the fortress. Having encountered strong resistance and having lost more than half of the soldiers, the Japanese were forced to retreat on August 11. The fortress was surrendered only after the death of General Kondratenko on December 2, 1904. Despite the fact that Port Arthur could have held out for at least 2 more months, Stessel and Reis signed the act of surrendering the fortress, as a result of which the Russian fleet was destroyed, and 32 thousand. people were captured.

The most significant events of 1905 were:

The Battle of Mukden (February 5 – 24), which remained the largest land battle in human history until the outbreak of the First World War. It ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, which lost 59 thousand killed. Japanese losses amounted to 80 thousand.

The Battle of Tsushima (May 27 - 28), in which the Japanese fleet, 6 times larger than the Russian fleet, almost completely destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron.

The course of the war was clearly in Japan's favor. However, its economy was depleted by the war. This forced Japan to enter into peace negotiations. In Portsmouth, on August 9, participants in the Russo-Japanese War began a peace conference. It should be noted that these negotiations were a serious success for the Russian diplomatic delegation, headed by Witte. The concluded peace treaty sparked protests in Tokyo. But, nevertheless, the consequences of the Russian-Japanese War were very noticeable for the country. During the conflict, the Russian Pacific Fleet was practically destroyed. The war claimed more than 100 thousand lives of soldiers who heroically defended their country. Russia's expansion to the East was stopped. Also, the defeat showed the weakness of the tsarist policy, which to a certain extent contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiments and ultimately led to the revolution of 1904–1905. Among the reasons for Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. the most important are the following:

diplomatic isolation of the Russian Empire;

the unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations in difficult conditions;

outright betrayal of the interests of the fatherland or the mediocrity of many tsarist generals;

Japan's serious superiority in the military and economic spheres.

Portsmouth World

The Treaty of Portsmouth (Peace of Portsmouth) is a peace treaty between Japan and the Russian Empire that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The peace treaty was concluded in the city of Portsmouth (USA), which is how it got its name, on August 23, 1905. S.Yu. Witte and R.R. participated in the signing of the agreement on the Russian side. Rosen, and from the Japanese side - K. Jutaro and T. Kogoro. The initiator of the negotiations was American President T. Roosevelt, which is why the signing of the agreement took place on US territory.

The agreement canceled the previous agreements between Russia and China regarding Japan and concluded new ones, this time with Japan itself.

Russo-Japanese War. Background and reasons

Japan did not pose any threat to the Russian Empire until the mid-19th century. However, in the 60s, the country opened its borders to foreign citizens and began to develop rapidly. Thanks to the frequent trips of Japanese diplomats to Europe, the country adopted Foreign experience and was able to create a powerful and modern army and navy in half a century.

It was no coincidence that Japan began to increase its military power. The country experienced an acute shortage of territory, so already at the end of the 19th century the first Japanese military campaigns began in neighboring territories. The first victim was China, which gave Japan a number of islands. The next items on the list were supposed to be Korea and Manchuria, but Japan faced Russia, which also had its own interests in these territories. Throughout the year, negotiations were held between diplomats in order to divide spheres of influence, but they did not achieve success.

In 1904, Japan, which did not want any more negotiations, attacked Russia. The Russo-Japanese War began, which lasted two years.

Reasons for signing the Treaty of Portsmouth

Despite the fact that Russia was losing the war, Japan was the first to think about the need to make peace. The Japanese government, which had already managed to achieve most of its goals in the war, understood that the continuation of hostilities could greatly hit the Japanese economy, which was already not in the best condition.

The first attempt to make peace took place in 1904, when the Japanese envoy to Great Britain approached Russia with his version of the treaty. However, the peace provided for the condition that Russia agrees to be listed in the documents as the initiator of the negotiations. Russia refused and the war continued.

The next attempt was made by France, which provided assistance to Japan in the war and was also severely depleted economically. In 1905, France, on the verge of a crisis, offered Japan its mediation. A new version of the contract was drawn up, which provided for indemnity (farm-out). Russia refused to pay money to Japan and the agreement was again not signed.

The last attempt to make peace took place with the participation of US President T. Roosevelt. Japan turned to the states that provided it with financial assistance and asked to mediate in the negotiations. This time Russia agreed, as discontent was growing within the country.

Terms of the Portsmouth Peace

Japan, having secured the support of the United States and agreed in advance with the states on the division of influence on Far East, was determined to sign a quick and beneficial peace. In particular, Japan planned to take away the island of Sakhalin, as well as a number of territories in Korea, and impose a ban on navigation in the country’s waters. However, peace was not signed, since Russia refused such conditions. At the insistence of S. Yu Witte, negotiations continued.

Russia managed to defend the right not to pay indemnity. Despite the fact that Japan was in dire need of money and hoped to receive a payoff from Russia, Witte's persistence forced the Japanese government to refuse the money, since otherwise the war could continue, which would have hit Japan's finances even harder.

Also, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia managed to defend the right to own the larger territory of Sakhalin, and Japan only received the southern part on the condition that the Japanese would not build military fortifications there.

In general, despite the fact that Russia lost the war, it managed to significantly soften the terms of the peace treaty and exit the war with fewer losses. Spheres of influence in the territories of Korea and Manchuria were divided, and agreements were signed on movement in Japanese waters and trade on its territories. A peace treaty was signed by both sides.

57 years ago, Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations were restored.

IN Russian media You can often come across the statement that Moscow and Tokyo are supposedly still at war. The logic of the authors of such statements is simple and unpretentious. Since a peace treaty has not been signed between the two countries, they “reason,” the state of war continues.

Those who undertake to write about this are unaware of asking the simple question of how diplomatic relations at the embassy level can exist between the two countries while maintaining a “state of war.” Let us note that Japanese propagandists, interested in continuing endless “negotiations” on the so-called “territorial issue,” are also in no hurry to dissuade both their own and the Russian population of the contrary, deliberately lamenting the “unnaturalness” of the situation with the absence of a peace treaty for half a century. And this despite the fact that these days are already marking the 55th anniversary of the signing in Moscow of the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan of October 19, 1956, the first article of which declares: “The state of war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan ceases from the date of entry into by virtue of this Declaration, and peace and good neighborly friendly relations are restored between them.”

The next anniversary of the conclusion of this agreement provides an occasion to return to the events of more than half a century ago, to remind the reader under what circumstances and through whose fault the Soviet-Japanese, and now Russian-Japanese peace treaty has not yet been signed.

Separate San Francisco Peace Treaty

After the end of World War II, the creators of American foreign policy set the task of removing Moscow from the process of post-war settlement with Japan. However, the US administration did not dare to completely ignore the USSR when preparing a peace treaty with Japan - even Washington’s closest allies could oppose this, not to mention the countries that were victims of Japanese aggression. However, the American draft peace treaty was handed over to the Soviet representative at the UN only as a matter of familiarization. This project was clearly separate in nature and provided for the retention of American troops on Japanese territory, which caused protests not only from the USSR, but also from China, the DPRK, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and Burma.

The conference to sign the peace treaty was scheduled for September 4, 1951, with San Francisco chosen as the location for the signing ceremony. This was specifically about the ceremony, since any discussion and amendments to the text of the treaty drawn up by Washington and approved by London were not allowed. In order to stamp the Anglo-American bill, the signing participants were selected, mainly from pro-American countries. A “mechanical majority” was created from countries that had not fought with Japan. Representatives of 21 Latin American, 7 European, 7 African states were convened in San Francisco. Countries that fought the Japanese aggressors for many years and suffered the most from them were not allowed to attend the conference. The People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Far Eastern Republic, and the Mongolian People's Republic did not receive invitations. As a sign of protest against ignoring the interests of Asian countries in the post-war settlement, in particular, regarding the problem of payment of reparations by Japan, India and Burma refused to send their delegations to San Francisco. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Holland also made demands for reparations. An absurd situation was created when the majority of the states that were at war with Japan found themselves outside the process of a peaceful settlement with Japan. In essence, it was a boycott of the San Francisco Conference.

A. A. Gromyko. Photo by ITAR-TASS.

However, this did not bother the Americans - they firmly set a course for concluding a separate agreement and hoped that in the current situation the Soviet Union would join the boycott, giving the United States and its allies complete freedom of action. These calculations did not come true. The Soviet government decided to use the platform of the San Francisco Conference to expose the separate nature of the treaty and put forward the demand for “the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan that would truly meet the interests of a peaceful settlement in the Far East and contribute to the strengthening of universal peace.”

The Soviet delegation, headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko, heading to the San Francisco Conference in September 1951, had directive instructions from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to “focus its main attention on the issue of inviting the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the conference." At the same time, the Chinese leadership was informed that without satisfying this demand, the Soviet government would not sign the document drawn up by the Americans.

The directives also provided for seeking amendments on the territorial issue. The USSR opposed the fact that the US government, contrary to the international documents it had signed, primarily the Yalta Agreement, actually refused to recognize in the agreement the sovereignty of the USSR over the territories of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. “The project is in gross contradiction with the obligations regarding these territories assumed by the United States and England under the Yalta Agreement,” Gromyko said at the San Francisco conference.

The head of the Soviet delegation, explaining the negative attitude towards the Anglo-American project, outlined nine points on which the USSR could not agree with him. The position of the USSR was supported not only by allied Poland and Czechoslovakia, but also by a number of Arab countries - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq, whose representatives also demanded that indications that foreign country may maintain its troops and military bases on Japanese soil.

Although there is a chance that the Americans will listen to the opinion Soviet Union and countries in solidarity with it, there were few, at the conference the proposals of the Soviet government were made to the whole world in accordance with the agreements and wartime documents, which basically boiled down to the following:

1. According to Article 2.

Paragraph “c” should be stated as follows:
“Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, title and claims to these territories.”

According to Article 3.

Revise the article as follows:
“The sovereignty of Japan will extend to the territory consisting of the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido, as well as Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Pares Vela, Marcus, Tsushima and other islands that were part of Japan before December 7, 1941, with the exception of those territories and islands specified in Art. 2".

According to Article 6.

Paragraph “a” should be stated as follows:
“All armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers will be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible. short term, and, in any case, not more than 90 days from the date of entry into force of this treaty, after which none of the Allied or Associated Powers, nor any other foreign power, will have its troops or military bases in the territory of Japan "...

9. New article (in Chapter III).

“Japan undertakes not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power that has taken part in its armed forces in the war against Japan...

13.New article (in Chapter III).

1. “The La Perouse (Soya) and Nemuro straits along the entire Japanese coast, as well as the Sangarsky (Tsugaru) and Tsushima straits must be demilitarized. These straits will always be open for the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

2. The straits specified in paragraph 1 of this article shall be open to the passage only of those military vessels belonging to the powers adjacent to the Sea of ​​Japan.”

A proposal was also made to convene a special conference on the issue of Japan paying reparations “with the obligatory participation of countries subject to Japanese occupation, namely the PRC, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, and with an invitation to Japan to this conference.”

The Soviet delegation addressed the conference participants with a request to discuss these proposals of the USSR. However, the United States and its allies refused to make any changes to the draft and put it to a vote on September 8. Under these conditions, the Soviet government was forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty with Japan for American conditions. Representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia also did not sign the agreement.

Having rejected the amendments proposed by the Soviet government on Japan's recognition of the full sovereignty of the USSR and the PRC over the territories transferred to them in accordance with the agreements of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition, the drafters of the text of the treaty could not completely ignore the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The text of the treaty included a provision that “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.” . By including this clause in the text of the agreement, the Americans did not at all seek to “unconditionally satisfy the claims of the Soviet Union,” as stated in the Yalta Agreement. On the contrary, there is a lot of evidence that the United States deliberately ensured that even if the USSR signed the San Francisco Treaty, the contradictions between Japan and the Soviet Union would remain.

It should be noted that the idea of ​​using the USSR's interest in the return of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to create discord between the USSR and Japan existed in the US State Department since the preparation of the Yalta Conference. The materials developed for Roosevelt specifically noted that “the cession of the South Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union would create a situation with which Japan would find it difficult to reconcile... If these islands were turned into an outpost (of Russia), a constant threat would arise for Japan.” Unlike Roosevelt, the Truman administration decided to take advantage of the situation and leave the issue of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in a sort of “suspense.”

Protesting against this, Gromyko stated that “there should be no ambiguities when resolving territorial issues in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty.” The United States, being interested in preventing a final and comprehensive settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations, sought precisely such “ambiguities.” How can one otherwise evaluate the American policy of including in the text of the treaty Japan’s renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, while at the same time preventing Japan from recognizing the sovereignty of the USSR over these territories? As a result, the efforts of the United States created a strange, if not absurd, situation in which Japan renounced these territories as if in general, without determining in whose favor this renunciation was being made. And this happened when Southern Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, in accordance with the Yalta Agreement and other documents, were already officially included in the USSR. Of course, it is no coincidence that the American drafters of the treaty chose not to list in its text by name all the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned, deliberately leaving a loophole for the Japanese government to lay claim to part of them, which was done in the subsequent period. This was so obvious that the British government even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent such a clear departure from the agreement of the Big Three - Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill - at Yalta.

The landing of American troops in the Philippines. In the foreground is General MacArthur. October 1944

A memorandum from the British Embassy to the US State Department dated March 12, 1951 stated: “In accordance with the Livadia (Yalta) Agreement, signed on February 11, 1945, Japan must cede South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.” The American response to the British stated: “The United States believes that the precise definition of the limits of the Kuril Islands should be the subject of a bilateral agreement between the Japanese and Soviet governments or should be legally established by the International Court of Justice.” The position taken by the United States contradicted Memorandum No. 677/1 issued on January 29, 1946 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, to the Japanese Imperial Government. It clearly and definitively stated that all islands north of Hokkaido, including “the Habomai (Hapomanjo) group of islands, including the islands of Sushio, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku, were excluded from the jurisdiction of the state or administrative authorities of Japan , as well as the island of Sikotan (Shikotan)." To consolidate Japan in its pro-American anti-Soviet positions, Washington was ready to consign to oblivion the fundamental documents of the war and post-war period.

On the day of the signing of a separate peace treaty, a Japanese-American “security treaty” was concluded at the American Army NCO Club, which meant maintaining US military-political control over Japan. According to Article I of this treaty, the Japanese government granted the United States "the right to station land, air and sea forces in and near Japan." In other words, the territory of the country, on a contractual basis, turned into a springboard from which American troops could carry out military operations against neighboring Asian states. The situation was aggravated by the fact that, due to Washington’s selfish policy, these states, primarily the USSR and the PRC, formally remained at war with Japan, which could not but affect the international situation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Modern Japanese historians and politicians differ in their assessments of Japan's renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands contained in the text of the peace treaty. Some demand the abolition of this clause of the agreement and the return of all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka. Others are trying to prove that the South Kuril Islands (Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan) are not included in the concept of the “Kuril Islands”, which Japan abandoned in the San Francisco Treaty. Supporters latest version claim: “...There is no doubt that, according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. However, the recipient of these territories was not defined in this agreement... The Soviet Union refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty. Consequently, this state, from a legal point of view, has no right to benefit from this treaty... If the Soviet Union had signed and ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty, this would probably have strengthened the opinion among the states parties to the treaty that the position of the Soviet Union was justified, concluded that the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands belonged to the Soviet Union." In fact, in 1951, having officially recorded its renunciation of these territories in the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan once again confirmed its agreement with the terms of unconditional surrender.

The refusal of the Soviet government to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty is sometimes interpreted in our country as a mistake by Stalin, a manifestation of the inflexibility of his diplomacy, which weakened the position of the USSR in defending the rights to own South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In our opinion, such assessments indicate insufficient consideration of the specifics of the then international situation. The world has entered a long period cold war, which, as the Korean War showed, could turn into a “hot one” at any moment. For the Soviet government at that time, relations with its military ally the People's Republic of China were more important than relations with Japan, which had finally sided with the United States. Moreover, as subsequent events showed, the USSR’s signature under the text of the peace treaty proposed by the Americans did not guarantee Japan’s unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the Kuril Islands and other lost territories. This was to be achieved through direct Soviet-Japanese negotiations.

Dulles' blackmail and Khrushchev's voluntarism

The conclusion of a military alliance between Japan and the United States seriously complicated the post-war Soviet-Japanese settlement. By a unilateral decision of the American government, the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, through which the USSR sought to influence the processes of democratization of the Japanese state, were liquidated. Anti-Soviet propaganda intensified in the country. The Soviet Union again began to be seen as a potential military adversary. However, the Japanese ruling circles were aware that the lack of normal relations with such a large and influential state as the USSR did not allow the country to return to the world community, prevented mutually beneficial trade, doomed Japan to a strict tie to the United States, and seriously limited the independence of foreign policy. Without the normalization of relations with the USSR, it was difficult to count on Japan joining the UN or establishing diplomatic relations with socialist countries, primarily with the PRC.

The unsettled relations with Japan did not meet the interests of the Soviet Union either, because it did not allow establishing trade with its Far Eastern neighbor, which was quickly restoring its economic power, made it difficult to cooperate in such an important sector of the economy for both countries as fishing, prevented contacts with Japanese democratic organizations and, as a result, contributed to Japan's increasing involvement in the anti-Soviet political and military strategy of the United States. The one-sided orientation toward the United States caused discontent among the Japanese people. An increasing number of Japanese from various strata began to demand a more independent foreign policy and normalization of relations with neighboring socialist countries.

At the beginning of 1955, the USSR representative in Japan approached Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu with a proposal to begin negotiations on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. After lengthy debates about the location of the meetings between diplomats of the two countries, a compromise was reached - the plenipotentiary delegations were to arrive in London. On June 3, in the building of the USSR Embassy in the English capital, Soviet-Japanese negotiations began on ending the state of war, concluding a peace treaty and restoring diplomatic and trade relations. The Soviet delegation was headed by the famous diplomat Ya. A. Malik, who during the war years was the USSR Ambassador to Japan, and then, with the rank of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the representative of the Soviet Union to the UN. The Japanese government delegation was led by a Japanese diplomat with the rank of Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto, close to Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama.

In his opening speech at the opening of the negotiations, the head of the Japanese delegation noted that “almost 10 years have passed since the day when, unfortunately, a state of war arose between both states. The Japanese people sincerely wish for the resolution of a number of open issues that have arisen over the years and the normalization of relations between both states.” At the next meeting, Matsumoto read out a memorandum that the Japanese side proposed to serve as the basis for the upcoming negotiations. This memorandum from the Japanese Foreign Ministry put forward the following conditions for restoring relations between both countries: the transfer of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin to Japan, the return to their homeland of Japanese war criminals convicted in the Soviet Union and a positive resolution of issues related to Japanese fishing in the northwestern part of the Pacific Ocean, and also facilitating the admission of Japan to the UN, etc. At the same time, the Japanese side did not hide that the main emphasis during the negotiations would be on “resolving the territorial problem.”

Map of the so-called “disputed territories”.

The position of the Soviet Union was to, having confirmed the already achieved results of the war, create conditions for the comprehensive mutually beneficial development of bilateral relations in all areas. This was evidenced by the draft Soviet-Japanese peace treaty proposed on June 14, 1955 by the Soviet delegation. It provided for the cessation of the state of war between both countries and the restoration of formal relations between them on the basis of equality, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and non-aggression; confirmed and specified the existing international agreements regarding Japan signed by the Allies during World War II.

The Japanese delegation, following a government directive, laid claim to “the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, the Chishima Archipelago (Kuril Islands) and the southern part of Karafuto Island (Sakhalin).” The draft agreement proposed by the Japanese side stated: “1. In the territories of Japan occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the war, on the day this Treaty enters into force, Japanese sovereignty will be fully restored. 2. Troops and civil servants of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently located in the territories specified in paragraph 1 of this article must be withdrawn as soon as possible, and, in any case, no later than 90 days from the date of accession by virtue of this Agreement."

However, Tokyo soon realized that an attempt to radically revise the results of the war was doomed to failure and would only lead to a worsening of bilateral relations with the USSR. This could have disrupted negotiations on the repatriation of convicted Japanese prisoners of war, reaching an agreement on fisheries issues, and blocking the resolution of the issue of Japan's admission to the UN. Therefore, the Japanese government was ready to limit its territorial claims in order to reach an agreement southern part Kuril, stating that she allegedly did not fall under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This was clearly a far-fetched statement, because on Japanese maps of the pre-war and wartime, the South Kuril Islands were included in the geographical and administrative concept of “Chishima”, that is, the Kuril Archipelago.

By putting forward the so-called territorial issue, the Japanese government was aware of the illusory nature of hopes for any serious compromises on the part of the Soviet Union. The secret instruction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry provided for three stages in putting forward territorial demands: “First, demand the transfer of all the Kuril Islands to Japan with the expectation of further discussion; then, retreating somewhat, seek the cession of the southern Kuril Islands to Japan for “historical reasons,” and, finally, insist on at least the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, making this demand an indispensable condition for the successful completion of negotiations.”

The Japanese Prime Minister himself has repeatedly said that the ultimate goal of diplomatic bargaining was Habomai and Shikotan. Thus, during a conversation with a Soviet representative in January 1955, Hatoyama stated that “Japan will insist during negotiations on the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to it.” There was no talk about any other territories. Responding to reproaches from the opposition, Hatoyama emphasized that the issue of Habomai and Shikotan should not be confused with the issue of all the Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin, which was resolved by the Yalta Agreement. The Prime Minister has repeatedly made it clear that Japan, in his opinion, does not have the right to demand the transfer of all the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin to it and that he in no way views this as an indispensable precondition for the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations. Hatoyama also recognized that since Japan renounced the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin under the Treaty of San Francisco, it has no reason to demand the transfer of these territories to it.

US Secretary of State J. Dulles.

Demonstrating its dissatisfaction with this position of Tokyo, the US government refused to receive the Japanese Foreign Minister in Washington in March 1955. Unprecedented pressure began on Hatoyama and his supporters in order to prevent a Japanese-Soviet settlement.

The Americans were invisibly present at the negotiations in London. It got to the point that State Department officials forced the leadership of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to familiarize them with Soviet notes, diplomatic correspondence, delegation reports and Tokyo's instructions on negotiating tactics. The Kremlin knew about this. In a situation where the failure of negotiations would have pushed Japan even further away from the USSR towards the United States, the then leader of the Soviet Union N. S. Khrushchev set out to “organize a breakthrough” by proposing a compromise solution to the territorial dispute. In an effort to break the deadlock in the negotiations, he instructed the head of the Soviet delegation to propose an option in which Moscow agreed to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but only after signing a peace treaty. The announcement of the Soviet government's readiness to transfer to Japan the Habomai and Shikotan islands located near Hokkaido was made on August 9 in an informal setting during a conversation between Malik and Matsumoto in the garden of the Japanese embassy in London.

Such a serious change in the Soviet position greatly surprised the Japanese and even caused confusion. As the head of the Japanese delegation, Matsumoto, later admitted, when he first heard the Soviet side’s offer of readiness to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, he “at first did not believe my ears,” but “was very happy in my heart.” And this is not surprising. After all, as shown above, the return of these islands was the task of the Japanese delegation. Moreover, by receiving Habomai and Shikotan, the Japanese legally expanded their fishing zone, which was a very important goal of normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations. It seemed that after such a generous concession, the negotiations should have quickly ended in success.

However, what was beneficial to the Japanese did not suit the Americans. The United States openly opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR on the terms proposed by the Soviet side. While putting strong pressure on Hatoyama's cabinet, the American government did not hesitate to make direct threats. US Secretary of State J. Dulles warned in a note to the Japanese government in October 1955 that expanding economic ties and normalizing relations with the USSR “could become an obstacle to the implementation of the Japanese assistance program being developed by the US government.” Subsequently, he “severely punished the US Ambassador to Japan Allison and his assistants to prevent the successful completion of the Japanese-Soviet negotiations.”

Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN Ya. A. Malik.

Contrary to Khrushchev’s calculations, it was not possible to bring the negotiations out of the deadlock. His ill-considered and hasty concession led to the opposite result. As had happened before in Russian-Japanese relations, Tokyo perceived the proposed compromise not as a generous gesture of goodwill, but as a signal to tighten its territorial demands on the Soviet Union. A fundamental assessment of Khrushchev’s unauthorized actions was given by one of the members of the Soviet delegation at the London negotiations, later Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinsky: “Ya. A. Malik, acutely experiencing Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the negotiations and without consulting with the other members of the delegation, prematurely expressed in this conversation with Matsumoto the reserve that the delegation had from the very beginning of the negotiations, approved by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (i.e., N.S. Khrushchev himself) position without fully exhausting the defense of the main position in the negotiations. His statement first caused bewilderment, and then joy and further exorbitant demands on the part of the Japanese delegation... N. S. Khrushchev’s decision to renounce sovereignty over part of the Kuril Islands in favor of Japan was a rash, voluntaristic act... The cession to Japan of a part of Soviet territory, which was claimed without permission Khrushchev went to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet people, destroyed the international legal basis of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and contradicted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which recorded Japan’s renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands...”

Evidence that the Japanese decided to wait for additional territorial concessions from the Soviet government was the termination of the London negotiations.

In January 1956, the second stage of London negotiations began, which, due to the obstruction of the US government, also did not lead to any result. On March 20, 1956, the head of the Japanese delegation was recalled to Tokyo, and, to the satisfaction of the Americans, negotiations practically ceased.

Moscow carefully analyzed the situation and through its actions sought to push the Japanese leadership to understand the urgent need for a speedy settlement of relations with the Soviet Union, even despite the position of the United States. Negotiations in Moscow on fisheries in the northwest Pacific helped break the deadlock. On March 21, 1956, a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the protection of stocks and regulation of salmon fishing on the high seas in areas adjacent to the territorial waters of the USSR in the Far East” was published. It was announced that during the salmon spawning period their catch was limited for both Soviet and foreign organizations and citizens. This ruling caused a stir in Japan. In the absence of diplomatic relations with the USSR, it was very difficult to obtain licenses for salmon fishing established by the Soviet side and to coordinate catch volumes. Influential fishing industry circles in the country demanded that the government resolve the problem as quickly as possible, namely before the end of the fishing season.

Fearing the growth of discontent in the country by delaying the issue of restoring diplomatic, trade and economic relations with the USSR, the Japanese government at the end of April urgently sent the Minister of Fisheries, Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono to Moscow, who was to negotiate with the Soviet government to achieve understanding of the difficulties that had arisen for Japan . In Moscow, Kono negotiated with the top officials of the state and took a constructive position, which made it possible to quickly reach an agreement. On May 14, a bilateral Fisheries Convention and an Agreement to provide assistance to people in distress at sea were signed. However, the documents came into force only on the day of restoration of diplomatic relations. This required the Japanese government to decide to quickly resume negotiations on a peace treaty. Kono, on his own initiative, invited the Soviet leaders to return the delegations of the two countries to the negotiating table.

A new round of negotiations took place in Moscow. The Japanese delegation was led by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who again began to convince his interlocutors of the “vital necessity for Japan” of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. However, the Soviet side firmly refused to negotiate over these territories. Since the escalation of tensions in the negotiations could lead to the Soviet government abandoning its previously made promise regarding Habomai and Shikotan, Shigemitsu began to be inclined to end the fruitless discussion and sign a peace treaty on the terms proposed by Khrushchev. On August 12, the minister reported in Tokyo: “The negotiations have already come to an end. The discussions are over. Everything that could be done has been done. It is necessary to determine our line of behavior. Further delay can only hurt our prestige and put us in an uncomfortable position. It is possible that the issue of transferring Habomai and Shikotan to us will be called into question.”

And again the Americans rudely intervened. At the end of August, without hiding his intention to disrupt the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, Dulles threatened the Japanese government that if, under a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan agreed to recognize Kunashir and Iturup as Soviet, the United States would forever retain the occupied island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago. In order to encourage the Japanese government to continue to put forward demands unacceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States committed a direct violation of the Yalta Agreement. On September 7, 1956, the State Department sent a memorandum to the Japanese government stating that the United States would not recognize any decision confirming Soviet sovereignty over territories renounced by Japan in the peace treaty. Playing on the nationalistic feelings of the Japanese and trying to present themselves as almost defenders of the state interests of Japan, US State Department officials invented the following formulation: “The US government has come to the conclusion that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido) will always were part of Japan and should rightly be considered as belonging to Japan." The note further stated: “The United States viewed the Yalta Agreement simply as a declaration of the common goals of the countries participating in the Yalta Conference, and not as having legal force the final decision of these powers on territorial questions." The meaning of this “new” US position was that the San Francisco Treaty allegedly left the territorial issue open, “without determining the ownership of the territories that Japan abandoned.” Thus, the rights of the USSR not only to the South Kuril Islands, but also to South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands were called into question. This was a direct violation of the Yalta Agreement.

Open US interference in the negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, attempts to threaten and blackmail the Japanese government caused strong protests from both the country's opposition forces and leading media mass media. At the same time, criticism was addressed not only to the United States, but also to its own political leadership, which meekly follows Washington’s instructions. However, the dependence, primarily economic, on the United States was so great that it was very difficult for the Japanese government to go against the Americans. Then Prime Minister Hatoyama took full responsibility, who believed that Japanese-Soviet relations could be resolved on the basis of concluding a peace treaty with the subsequent resolution of the territorial issue. Despite his illness, he decided to go to Moscow and sign a document normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations. In order to reassure his political opponents in the ruling party, Hatoyama promised to leave the post of prime minister after completing his mission in the USSR. On September 11, Hatoyama sent a letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which he declared his readiness to continue negotiations on the normalization of relations with the condition that the territorial issue would be discussed later. On October 2, 1956, the Cabinet of Ministers authorized a trip to Moscow for a Japanese government delegation led by Prime Minister Hatoyama. The delegation included Kono and Matsumoto.

And yet, severe pressure from the United States and anti-Soviet circles in Japan did not allow them to achieve their goal - to conclude a full-scale Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. To the satisfaction of the US State Department, the Japanese government, in order to end the state of war and restore diplomatic relations, agreed to sign not a treaty, but a Soviet-Japanese joint declaration. This decision was forced on both sides, because Japanese politicians, looking at the United States, insisted to the last on the transfer to Japan, in addition to Habomai and Shikotan, also Kunashir and Iturup, and the Soviet government resolutely rejected these claims. This is evidenced, in particular, by the intensive negotiations between Khrushchev and Minister Kono, which continued literally until the day the declaration was signed.

In a conversation with Khrushchev on October 18, Kono proposed the following version of the agreement: “Japan and the USSR agreed to continue, after the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR, negotiations on the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, including the territorial issue.

At the same time, the USSR, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agreed to transfer to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the understanding that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will take place after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the USSR.”

Khrushchev stated that the Soviet side generally agreed with the proposed option, but asked to delete the expression “including the territorial issue.” Khrushchev explained the request to remove the mention of the “territorial issue” as follows: “...If you leave this expression, then you might think that between Japan and the Soviet Union, in addition to Habomai and Shikotan, there is some other territorial issue. This may lead to misunderstandings and misunderstandings of the documents that we intend to sign.”

Although Khrushchev called his request a “purely editorial comment,” in reality it was about a fundamental issue, namely, Japan’s de facto agreement that the territorial problem would be limited to the question of ownership of only the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. The next day, Kono reported to Khrushchev: "After consultation with Prime Minister Hatoyama, we have decided to accept Mr. Khrushchev's proposal to delete the words 'including the territorial question'." As a result, on October 19, 1956, a Joint Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan was signed, in paragraph 9 of which the USSR agreed to “the transfer to Japan of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."

On November 27, the Joint Declaration was unanimously ratified by the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet, and on December 2, with three against, by the House of Councilors. On December 8, the Emperor of Japan approved the ratification of the Joint Declaration and other documents. On the same day it was ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Then, on December 12, 1956, a ceremony for the exchange of instruments took place in Tokyo, which meant the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and its annexed protocol.

However, the United States, in the form of an ultimatum, continued to demand that the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty on the terms of the Joint Declaration be abandoned. The new Prime Minister of Japan, Nobusuke Kishi, yielding to US pressure, began to withdraw from negotiations on a peace treaty. To “justify” this position, demands were again put forward to return the four South Kuril Islands to Japan. This was a clear departure from the provisions of the Joint Declaration. The Soviet government acted in strict accordance with the agreements reached. The USSR refused to receive reparations from Japan, agreed to early release of Japanese war criminals serving their sentences, and supported Japan's request for admission to the UN.

Very negative impact Bilateral political relations were influenced by the Kishi cabinet's policy of further involving Japan in the US military strategy in the Far East. The conclusion in 1960 of a new Japanese-American Security Treaty directed against the USSR and the People's Republic of China further complicated the resolution of the issue of the border line between Japan and the USSR, because in the current military-political situation of the Cold War, any territorial concessions to Japan would contribute to the expansion of the territory used by foreign troops. In addition, the strengthening of military cooperation between Japan and the United States was perceived very painfully by Khrushchev personally. He was outraged by Tokyo's actions and regarded them as an insult and disrespect for his efforts aimed at finding a compromise on the territorial issue.

The Soviet leader's reaction was violent. On his instructions, the USSR Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to the Japanese government on January 27, 1960, in which it indicated that “only subject to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory and the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan, the islands of Habomai and Shikotan will be transferred to Japan, as it was.” provided for by the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan of October 19, 1956.” To this Tokyo responded: “The Japanese government cannot approve the position of the Soviet Union, which has put forward new conditions for the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue and thereby trying to change the content of the declaration. Our country will relentlessly strive to return to us not only the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, but also other ancestral Japanese territories.”

The attitude of the Japanese side to the Joint Declaration of 1956 boils down to the following: “During the negotiations on concluding a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union in October 1956, the top leaders of both states signed the Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR, according to which the parties agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty and normalized interstate relations. Despite the fact that as a result of these negotiations, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer the Habomai group of islands and Shikotan Island to Japan, the USSR’s consent was not received for the return of Kunashir Island and Iturup Island.

The 1956 Joint Declaration of Japan and the Soviet Union is an important diplomatic document that was ratified by the parliaments of each of these countries. This document is equal in legal force to a contract. It is not a document whose contents can be changed by just one notice. The Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR clearly stated that the Soviet Union agreed to transfer to Japan the Habomai group of islands and the island of Shikotan, and this transfer was not accompanied by any conditions that would constitute a reservation ... "

One could agree with such an interpretation of the meaning of the Joint Declaration, if not for one important “but”. The Japanese side does not want to admit the obvious - these islands, according to the agreement, could become the object of transfer only after the conclusion of a peace treaty. And this was the main and indispensable condition. In Japan, for some reason, they decided that the issue of Habomai and Shikotan had already been resolved, and in order to sign a peace treaty, it was supposedly necessary to also resolve the issue of Kunashir and Iturup, the transfer of which the Soviet government never agreed to. This position was invented in the 50s and 60s by those forces who set out to block the process of concluding a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty for many years by putting forward conditions that were obviously unacceptable for Moscow.

In an effort to get out of the "Kuril impasse", the leaders modern Russia attempts were made to “reanimate” the provisions of the 1956 Joint Declaration. On November 14, 2004, Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov, expressing the point of view of the Russian leadership, stated: “We have always fulfilled and will fulfill our obligations, especially ratified documents, but, of course, to the extent that ours partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements. So far, as we know, we have not been able to come to an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as we saw in 1956.”

However, this gesture was not appreciated in Japan. On November 16, 2004, the then Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi arrogantly remarked: “Until Japan’s ownership of all four islands is clearly determined, a peace treaty will not be concluded...” Apparently, realizing the futility of further negotiations in order to find a compromise, Russian President V. V. Putin on September 27, 2005 stated with certainty that the Kuril Islands “are under the sovereignty of Russia, and in this part it does not intend to discuss anything with Japan... This is enshrined in international law, this is the result of the Second World War.”

This position is shared by the majority of the people of our country. According to repeated opinion polls, about 90 percent of Russians are against any territorial concessions to Japan. At the same time, about 80 percent believe that it is time to stop discussing this issue.

Boris Ivanovich Tkachenko - leading researcher at the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Far Eastern Branch Russian Academy Sciences, professor-consultant of the Maritime State University named after. Admiral G.I. Nevelskoy (Vladivostok).
He is engaged in research of international relations, economics and organization of science and political science in modern Russia. Has more than 400 scientific publications.

More than 67 years have passed since the victory of the united coalition of allies - the USSR,USA and Great Britain - over Japan and, respectively, the end of the Second World War. However, since the mid-50s of the last century, the problem of the Southern Kuril Islands, painful for Japanese-Russian relations, has surfaced from time to time. Japan is currently demanding the return of Iturup from Russia,Kunashir and Shikotan,Yuri Islands, Green, Tanfilyeva, Polonsky and Anuchin, called in Japan« northern territories», which were allegedly captured by the Soviet Union in 1945. However« Kuril problem» did not arise at all as a result of the Second World War. To make sure of this, it is enough to analyze its legal aspects not for the post-war period, and no less than 150 years of Russian-Japanese relations, since it is completely unacceptable to isolate only separate periods of time from previous history and at the same time arbitrarily manipulate norms international law.

Background to the emergence of the “Kuril problem”

T from the fact that the state border between Russia and Japan was established in 1855, Art. 2 of the Treaty of Shimoda and passed between the islands of Urup and Iturup, does not prove anything at all in Japan’s claims to the South Kuril Islands. Moreover, it was subsequently changed twice more in favor of Japan, naturally reflecting the successes of the territorial expansion of the Land of the Rising Sun in the Far East, including as a result of military operations. In 1875, after peace negotiations, according to Art. 1 and 2 of the St. Petersburg Treaty, the remaining 18 islands located north of Iturup were ceded to Japan in exchange for Japan’s official renunciation of its claims to Sakhalin. In 1905, according to the results of the Russo-Japanese War and in accordance with Art. 9 of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Russia also lost Southern Sakhalin, which Japan began to own.

Why, in its claims to the southern part of the Kuril Islands, does Japan refer specifically to the 1855 treaty, because it could just as easily take the international legal framework of the 1875 St. Petersburg and 1905 Portsmouth treaties as a starting point, laying claim to all the Kuril Islands and even to South Sakhalin? Yes, the fact is that, according to the Shimoda Treaty, Sakhalin Island was “left undivided” between the two countries, that is, it was located jointly owned(condominium), which clearly allows Japan, based on this agreement, to demand from Russia not only the Southern Kuril Islands, but also the entire Sakhalin on the terms of joint ownership. This historical and legal logic is flawed, since it does not allow a final solution to this territorial problem, but retains the possibility of expanding Japan’s territorial claims in the future.

It is possible to resolve such a territorial dispute within the framework of, first of all, a political and legal approach.

The evolution of the Russian-Japanese border is recorded in the above-mentioned bilateral interstate documents of the 19th - early 20th centuries: the Shimoda, St. Petersburg and Portsmouth treaties. They, of course, have important historical and legal significance, but do not determine the status of the modern Russian-Japanese border. The key to this issue are the political and legal decisions and agreements during the Second World War and the first post-war years, adopted by the participants of the united coalition of allies in the war against Japan. They are the basic documents for discussing the issue of the line of the “disputed” border.

The ownership of the Kuril Islands by Russia is the result of World War II

WITH According to the decisions of the Yalta February 1945 and Potsdam August 1945 conferences, signed by the top leaders of the USA and Great Britain (F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, G. Truman and C. Attlee, respectively), the conditions for the USSR's participation in the war against militaristic Japan were the return of South Sakhalin to him and the transfer of the Kuril Islands. At the conference of the heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in Yalta, the three great powers, among others, also concluded an agreement on issues of the Far East 1, in which this was stated completely unambiguously. The United States and Great Britain guaranteed that if the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, then after defeating it its right to these territories would be realized. Subsequently, this agreement was also confirmed by the documents of the Potsdam Conference.

The Yalta Agreement, in its essence and form of presentation, is a multilateral binding international pact with specific deadlines and procedures. It undoubtedly represents an international legal document that corresponded to the historical realities of that time, signed in extreme conditions and with special secrecy, and therefore, naturally, was not subject to multilateral ratification, much less disclosure.

The agreement contained specific mutual obligations of the three allied powers, including the restoration of Russia's historical rights to South Sakhalin and the adjacent islands, as well as to the Kuril Islands, which it lost in the 19th century. By signing the agreement, the Allies recognized these historical rights as justified and confirmed.

Following the results of World War II in the Far East, the victorious powers changed the territory of the defeated country. Consent to these future territorial changes was recorded in the rescript of the Emperor of Japan accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 2 and in the provisions of the Japanese Surrender Act of September 2, 1945 3 . The latter imposed legal obligations on Japan, which also accepted the terms of the Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943, 4 on its top leadership and its successors, including on territorial issues. This means that, from a legal point of view, no subsequent approval (by ratification) of these territorial changes by any legislative body (parliament) of Japan was required. The Japanese side fully and unconditionally accepted the ultimatum terms of surrender, from which it automatically follows that any disagreement with the territorial changes outlined in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations is unacceptable.

Thus, according to the norms of international law, the territorial claims of modern Japan not only to Russia, but also to other countries have no legal basis: in accordance with the provisions of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, this issue was finally resolved by the conclusion of the Act of Surrender of Imperial Japan.

Memorandum No. 677 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers to the Japanese Imperial Government dated January 29, 1946 5 excluded all islands located north of the coast of Hokkaido, including the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, from the jurisdiction of the state and administrative authorities of Japan.

According to Art. 2c of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, signed and ratified by Japan, it “renounced all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5 1905" 6. However, the agreement did not indicate that these territories would be returned to the Soviet Union, as was recorded in the documents of the Yalta Conference.

After the defeat and occupation of Japan, the United States, in the context of the Cold War they unleashed against the Soviet Union, began to hinder the final international legal settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations. As a result of the opposition of the Americans, who were one of the main participants in the negotiations with Japan and the actual author of the San Francisco Treaty, the final legal point in relations between the USSR and Japan was never reached when summing up the results of World War II. For a number of reasons, a peace treaty was not concluded between them; the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on Far Eastern problems and the corresponding articles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty were not brought together.

However, it should be borne in mind that, according to Art. 8 of the said treaty, Japan recognized " full force all treaties concluded by the Allied Powers, now or hereafter, for the termination of the state of war begun on September 1, 1939, as well as any other agreements of the Allied Powers concluded for the restoration of peace or in connection with the restoration of peace,” without any reservation. in relation to the Yalta Agreement, published on February 11, 1946, which provided for “the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all adjacent islands” (clause 2a) and “the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union” (clause 3). In the list of these “treaties concluded by the Allied Powers,” in addition to the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the Act of Surrender of Japan, the Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers to the Japanese Imperial Government, the Soviet-American Agreement on the Repatriation of the Japanese Population of 1946 and San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan.

In 1951, at parliamentary hearings on the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, representatives of the Japanese government - the head of the treaty department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. Nishimura and Prime Minister S. Yoshida 7 - announced the renunciation of the sovereignty and legal foundations of Japan to all Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin. Thus, the country's highest legislative body recognized that since 1946 these territories were legally and actually under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union in accordance with the well-known decisions taken in Yalta and Potsdam.

Thus, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands went to the Soviet Union (and Russia, as its legal successor), which is confirmed by a set of relevant international legal documents listed above.

Present-day Russia owns the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island on the same international legal grounds as Kaliningrad region(East Prussia). These territories were ceded to the USSR as a result of World War II, and Southern Sakhalin was returned to it as a territory seized as a result of the war of 1904–1905, and East Prussia and the Kuril Islands were seized from Germany and Japan as punishment for aggression and to strengthen border security USSR in the West and East.

And here it is necessary to emphasize that the transition of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the sovereignty of the Soviet Union did not require mandatory enshrinement in a peace treaty. In a similar way (that is, without a peace treaty and in accordance with the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences) the following were transferred to the possession of the USSR - Königsberg with the adjacent region of East Prussia; in the possession of Poland - part of the territory of East Prussia and Danzig (Gdansk), Silesia and other areas on the right bank of the Oder and Western Neuss rivers; and the Sudetenland belongs to Czechoslovakia. All these territories belonged to Germany before the Second World War.

Consequently, Japan’s claims to the Russian Far Eastern territories are legally unlawful, and the bargaining around the Kuril Islands, which Soviet diplomacy got involved in in the mid-50s during negotiations to conclude a peace treaty with Japan (to cede two or four islands), became a significant miscalculation.

Later, after the entry into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and especially since the mid-50s of the last century, certain circles in Japan, with the support of Washington, began a discussion around the so-called northern territories. It was stated that Japan's renunciation of the Kuril Islands did not include the renunciation of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands. At the same time, the initiators of the artificially inflated problem referred to the San Francisco Treaty, in which the geographical concept of the “Kuril Islands” was not deciphered in detail. Washington actively supported the idea of ​​“peaceful revenge” for Japan, since Tokyo intended to follow in the footsteps of American foreign policy in Asia and sought to strengthen the military alliance with the United States.

Thus, the “territorial problem” in the interstate relations between Japan and the USSR arose under strong pressure from the United States, which thus sought to prevent Japan from rapprochement with the Soviet Union. For almost 10 years after the end of World War II, it was taken for granted in Japan (in accordance with the principle of tacit recognition in international law) that the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin belonged to the Soviet Union, although this was not properly legally formalized as bilateral agreement. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, as is known, could not replace it, since it was of a separate nature and did not take into account the interests of the Soviet Union, China and many countries of East, Southeast and South Asia, and therefore contained many “blank spots”. The Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco refused to sign it on US terms and, in particular, due to the fact that its text did not indicate the Soviet Union as the copyright holder of the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island with its adjacent islands, from which Japan refused.

In the post-war period, Soviet-Japanese relations turned out to be “frozen”; there were no official interstate, including diplomatic, relations, which was contrary to the interests of both the USSR and Japan.

IN The opportunity to conclude a peace treaty appeared in the mid-50s. In 1955–1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations were held to resolve problems arising from the end of World War II. The United States actively prevented the normalization of bilateral Soviet-Japanese relations, not stopping in the face of direct threats. Thus, on August 19, 1956, US Secretary of State J. Dulles informed Japanese Foreign Minister S. Shigemitsu that “if Japan recognizes the Soviet Union as full sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, we will conclude that we also have the right to full sovereignty over Ryukyu Islands" and "The United States may remain in Okinawa forever, and no Japanese government will remain in power." By inducing Japan to put forward revanchist demands on the USSR, the United States, in a State Department note sent to the Japanese government on September 7, 1956, actually violated the terms of the Yalta Agreement, stating that “the US government has concluded that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan and should rightly be considered as belonging to Japan." 8 And the US Ambassador to Japan G. Allison received instructions from the State Department “to prevent the successful completion of Japanese-Soviet negotiations” 9 .

It can be reasonably argued that the "territorial problem" between Japan and the USSR (Russia) was initiated by the United States and is a by-product of the Cold War. Moreover, it was the United States that created the necessary “theoretical basis” for Tokyo’s territorial claims. Subsequently, a movement for the return of the “northern territories,” directed by Japanese revanchist circles and the country’s government, developed in Japan.

Due to US pressure, the negotiations did not end with the signing of a peace treaty. Based on their results, the above-mentioned joint declaration was signed in Moscow on October 19, 1956 (Prime Minister I. Hatoyama put his signature on it on the Japanese side). The Declaration, which entered into force on December 12, 1956, contains 10 articles. It officially ended the state of war between the USSR and Japan; restored peace and good neighborly, friendly relations (Article 1); diplomatic and consular relations (Article 2); confirmed that both parties in relations with each other will be guided by the principles of the UN Charter, security and justice (Article 3); obligated the USSR to support Japan's request to become a member of the UN (Article 4); all Japanese citizens convicted in the USSR as war criminals were released and repatriated to their homeland (Article 5). In accordance with this declaration, the USSR renounced all reparation claims against Japan (Article 6). The parties committed themselves to holding negotiations with a view to concluding a trade agreement on the principles of equality and mutual benefit (Article 7). In addition, the Fisheries Convention (beneficial for Japan) and the Agreement on Cooperation in the Rescue of Persons at Sea (Article 8) were put into effect.

Regarding the international legal problem we are analyzing, Art. 6 and 9 of the declaration.

In accordance with Art. 6 “USSR and Japan mutually refuse(emphasis mine. - B.T.) from all claims, respectively, on the part of one’s own state, its organizations and citizens against another state, its organizations and citizens arising as a result of the war since August 9, 1945.” It clearly follows from this that Japan has officially recognized that, as a state, it refuses any claims against the USSR as a state, including territorial claims, since the declaration was ratified by the Japanese parliament and came into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification (according to Article 10), which took place in Tokyo on December 12, 1956.

The 1956 Declaration can actually be considered as a preliminary (preliminary) peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. According to Art. 9 “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of Habomai Islands and Shikotan Islands to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be carried out after the conclusion of the peace treaty(emphasis mine. - B.T.) between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."

From the contents of Art. 9 of the 1956 declaration makes it absolutely clear that the parties consider the indicated islands - Habomai and Shikotan - to be territories belonging to the USSR, which the Soviet Union, “meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state” (that is, as a gesture of goodwill), promises hand over Japan after meeting pre-agreed conditions. As you know, you can only transfer (that is, donate) what rightfully belongs to the owner. The 1956 Declaration bears the signature of the Prime Minister of Japan and other members of the Japanese delegation, who thereby with this provision of Art. 9 agreed. Subsequently, this received legal confirmation and was secured by the ratification of the document by the Japanese Parliament. Thus, it is not about return islands,owned by Japan, and about transmission her islands,belonging to the Soviet Union.

Legally, the act of donation is considered completed at the moment of transfer of property. In the case of Habomai and Shikotan, this could only happen after the conclusion of a peace treaty, which means obligations under Part 2 of Art. 9 of the 1956 declaration are among those legally binding.

However, then, in 1957–1959, Japan did not take advantage of the opportunity. The United States, in an ultimatum, demanded that the Japanese government refuse to conclude a peace treaty with the USSR on the terms of this declaration. As a result, the Japanese side disrupted the negotiation process, thereby violating the conditions for the transfer of part of the Kuril Islands.

Moreover, on January 19, 1960, Japan concluded a Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, directed against the USSR, China and other states of Asia and the Far East. This treaty secured for a long time the right of the United States to maintain military bases on Japanese territory. Moreover, the Japanese side provided the American ground, air and naval forces with additional services, facilities and territories; gave the right to import into Japan and use any types of weapons, including nuclear ones; agreed to the conduct of offensive military operations by the American armed forces from Japanese territory and took upon itself the obligation to jointly defend American military bases on its territory. At the same time, the scope of the treaty extended to the territories of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Thus, this treaty effectively perpetuated the occupation of Japan by placing its territory at the disposal of a foreign power with aggressive intentions in Asia. This, of course, infringed on Japan's sovereignty and could have drawn it into hostilities against its will, especially since, in accordance with the new treaty, the country had committed itself to increasing its military potential.

The American-Japanese Treaty of 1960 radically changed the geopolitical situation in the Far East and caused tension in Soviet-Japanese relations, since it contradicted Art. 1 of the Soviet-Japanese joint declaration of October 19, 1956.

In response to this, on January 27, 1960, the Soviet government published memorandum 10 on the impossibility of fulfilling the obligations associated with the transfer of the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge. During January–April 1960, the governments of the Soviet Union and Japan exchanged memos, which were in the nature of lengthy statements. The Soviet government handed over three memos to the Japanese government (January 27, February 24, and April 22), and the Japanese government gave two to the Soviet government (February 5 and March 1).

The Soviet side insisted that in connection with the conclusion of the US-Japanese treaty, which provided for the creation of foreign (American) military bases on Japanese territory intended for war with the USSR, paragraph 9 of the 1956 declaration in its previous edition could not be executed. The clarifying clause that Moscow introduced read: “Only subject to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory ( that is, the liquidation of all foreign military bases on Japanese territory. - B.T.) the islands of Habomai and Shikotan will be transferred to Japan."

Thus, the USSR did not unilaterally terminate the intergovernmental agreement signed with Japan, but only made an official statement about additional condition its implementation. Such official statements explaining and clarifying the positions of the parties, which they make when signing important intergovernmental or interstate documents or after it, are a generally accepted norm of diplomatic practice.

The 1956 Joint Declaration in its content (Articles 1–6) is similar to both the preliminary and final peace treaty, since after its ratification not only the state of war between the USSR and Japan ceased, but peace and good neighborly relations were to be restored. In addition, other issues that are usually resolved by peace treaties were resolved. The nature of the 1956 declaration as a preliminary peace treaty is indicated by Part 1 of Art. 9, which provided for “the continuation of negotiations on concluding a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan.”

Pitfalls of the “Kuril problem”

N It is necessary to note one important international legal circumstance of the possible transfer of the Southern Kuril Islands to Japan. According to Art. 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, “with any State which has signed or acceded to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942... and is not a signatory to the present treaty, Japan will be willing to conclude a bilateral peace treaty on the same or under substantially the same conditions as those provided for in this treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first entry into force of this treaty. In the event that Japan agrees to a peace settlement or a settlement of military claims with any State conferring upon that State greater advantages than those provided for in this Treaty, the same advantages shall be extended to the parties to this Treaty."

As you know, the Soviet Union is not a party (participant) to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which means, according to Art. 2 of this agreement, Japan actually renounced the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin with adjacent islands, but not for anyone's specific benefit. We need to keep this international legal conflict in mind when negotiating with Japan on the “territorial problem.”

The international legal status of that part of the Kuril Islands in the south of the archipelago, which Russia will agree to transfer to Japan under the Russian-Japanese peace treaty and which in this case will cease to be Russian de facto, will be the subject of consideration by a special international conference participants in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But it will take place without Russia’s participation, since the USSR did not sign this agreement at one time (and after it came into force, it was closed for signing).

If the discussion turns out not in favor of Russia, then the “disputed” territories will be considered “ownerless” and their fate will be decided by the 48 countries that signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty (with the exception of Japan, which, according to Article 2, renounced “all rights, legal grounds and claims” against them). Subsequently, according to Art. 22 of this treaty, “if, in the opinion of any party to this treaty, a dispute has arisen relating to the interpretation or performance of this treaty and which is not settled by referral to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, that dispute shall, at the request of any party to the it has been referred to the International Court of Justice for decision.” Moreover, Japan, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution of October 15, 1946 and by virtue of Art. 22 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, agreed to accept jurisdiction without special agreement International Court of Justice in a relationship all disputes of the nature specified in this article. Apparently, we will talk about the international legal regime of a condominium. Consequently, Japan will receive nothing in this case either. After all, the current San Francisco Peace Treaty is indefinite and cannot be changed. And Japan, under this agreement, renounced the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin with the adjacent islands completely and completely, although it did not name the country that was the copyright holder of these territories.

As is known, in the West they do not keep bad lawyers, politicians and diplomats in their service and do not play giveaways in foreign policy. It is not surprising that under the “Kuril problem”, through the efforts of the American “allies,” many mines and pitfalls were laid that could work today. In an effort to make it difficult for Moscow to resolve the territorial issue, the United States ensured that the article on the transfer of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the USSR was not included in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Thus, Washington actually violated the agreements reached in Yalta.

In the current situation, it is noteworthy that Japan, according to Art. 2c and 26 of the San Francisco Treaty, not only does not have any rights to either South Sakhalin or the Kuril Islands, but is generally not competent to negotiate the final registration of anyone’s legal title to these territories. As for Russia, even if it somehow fantastically managed to join the treaty, this would not mean for it legal registration of rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, since this is not provided for in the treaty itself. At the same time, although Russia is the same “any state that has signed the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942 ... and is not a signatory to this treaty,” Japan has the right and obligation to sign a peace treaty with this “party” , as noted in the document, “will expire three years after the first entry into force of this treaty.” In other words, Japan lost such rights and obligations already in 1955, and the state of war between the USSR and Japan was ended only by the 1956 declaration. Consequently, this option for solving the “territorial problem” also disappears.

There is a kind of stalemate, a legal impasse that cannot be overcome within the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This problem could be solved by changing the relevant articles of this agreement, which is hardly possible, since such a procedure is not provided for in it, and the agreement itself is valid and unlimited.

However, it must be borne in mind that Russia, as a part and successor of the USSR, already owns South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, while exercising real and effective control over these territories, which actually belong to it and are practically used. Japan, according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, abandoned them completely and completely.

Do we need a peace treaty with Japan?

P The problem of concluding a bilateral peace treaty between Russia and Japan 67 years after the end of the war does not make any sense for Moscow if Japan continues to talk about the “territorial problem” and “disputed islands.” Tokyo insists on the need to sign a peace treaty precisely because the 1956 declaration provided for the transfer of part of the Southern Kuril Islands to Japan precisely after his conclusion. And if Japan needs such a treaty, then Russia certainly does not need it, just as it does not need a peace treaty with modern Germany, since the state of war with it was ended by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On ending the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany” dated January 25, 1955. This precedent gives grounds to recognize that the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended in 1956, with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which means that there is no longer a need to conclude a Russian-Japanese peace treaty.

Territorial and border disputes are one of the most serious sources of instability in the Far East and the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, recently the ruling circles of Japan have sharply increased their activity around the “problem” of statehood of the “northern territories” and are increasingly asserting their claims to the Southern Kuril Islands. This dispute leaves its mark on the entire spectrum of Russian-Japanese relations, especially since the positions of our states on this issue are too different.

Tokyo, for example, strictly makes the development of trade and economic relations with Russia dependent on the existence of a peace treaty between our countries. However, according to the Russian side, such an agreement should not be an end in itself. Russia does not have such an agreement, for example, with Germany, but this does not prevent the two countries from developing trade and economic relations where it brings mutual benefit. According to the laws of business, cooperation must be economically beneficial for both parties, and its development depends primarily on the general economic and legal climate in the country, in this case in Russia. If this does not happen in Russian-Japanese relations, it means that the Japanese are not satisfied with these very positions, which in no way depend on the presence or absence of a peace treaty. And his signing will not change anything in this sense. Moreover, if it is important for Tokyo to reinforce trade and economic cooperation with Russia with some kind of interstate agreement, then such an agreement could well be a comprehensive treaty on good neighborliness and cooperation.

Analysis of the “Kuril problem” allows us to draw some practical conclusions.

The lost rights of the USSR (Russia) to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were restored (in fact, restitution took place) in accordance with a whole complex of international legal documents of the allied powers during the Second World War and the first post-war period (Cairo Declaration, Yalta Agreement, Potsdam Declaration and the Act of Surrender of Japan, the Treaty of San Francisco, etc.), which is consistent with modern norms of international law (UN Charter, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

It is pointless for the Russian side to continue negotiations with Japan, which have been dragging on for more than 20 years (1991–2012), on concluding a peace treaty and resolving the “Kuril problem,” since Tokyo clearly seeks only to satisfy its territorial claims. Reaching an agreement on concluding a peace treaty outside the context of the transfer of the mentioned Russian territories is unrealistic, which means that further continuation of these negotiations is counterproductive for Russia.

The transfer of the Southern Kuril Islands to Japan will give rise to problems, primarily in Russia itself, associated with a sharp deterioration in the moral and psychological situation in society due to the national humiliation of Russians. It should be recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan through territorial concessions does not meet the long-term national geopolitical, economic and defense interests of Russia, both now (for fishing and seafood production) and in the future (for the exploitation of the resources of the seabed and its subsoil , as well as sushi).

To determine Russia’s attitude to the “Kuril problem,” one should proceed from the fact that the territorial issue has already been resolved following the Second World War on a legal and fair basis and is secured by relevant international agreements of the war and post-war periods, which correspond to modern norms of international law. All further discussions on the “Kuril problem”, which will be conducted in the interests of “international peace and harmony” in the hope of winning the favor of the Japanese side through territorial concessions, in our opinion, are harmful Russian Federation.

In the interests of ensuring national security and the territorial integrity of Russia, it is advisable to supplement the country’s constitution with a provision on the inalienability of the territory of the Russian Federation and the inadmissibility of seizing the territory of a subject of the Federation without the consent of this subject. Article 4 of the current Constitution of the Russian Federation is overly declarative (“The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory”), whereas it should be of a clear imperative nature. In the previously effective Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1978, this provision was recorded much more clearly: “The territory of the Russian Federation is integral and inalienable” (Article 70), “Territories of the region, region, city federal significance cannot be changed without the consent of the relevant territory, region, city of federal significance" (Article 84 as amended by the Law of the Russian Federation of December 9, 1992 No. 4061-I, Law of the Russian Federation of April 21, 1992 No. 2708-I).

Unfortunately, it must be admitted that in Russia itself some representatives of the scientific and journalistic communities are trying to form public opinion, favoring a phased solution to the “territorial problem” in favor of Japan. It seems that it would be reasonable to provide for the necessary legal and organizational measures to prevent propaganda and practical actions, aimed at violating the territorial integrity and national interests of Russia by any officials, individual citizens, government bodies, political parties, public and religious organizations.

Notes

1 Crimean (Yalta) Agreement of the three Great Powers on issues of the Far East of February 11, 1945 // Foreign policy Soviet Union during Patriotic War. M.: Gospolitizdat, 1947.T. 3: January 1 - September 3, 1945 pp. 111–112.

2 Notice from the imperial government of August 14, sent to the governments of four states - America, England, the USSR and China // Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. T. 3. P. 380.

3 The act of surrender of Japan of September 2, 1945 // Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. T. 3. pp. 480–481.

4 The Cairo Declaration, signed by representatives of the United States, China and Great Britain on November 27, 1943, provided for “to deprive Japan of all islands on Pacific Ocean which it had captured or occupied since the outbreak of World War I in 1914", return to the Republic of China "all territories which Japan had seized from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands", and expel Japan "from all other territories which she seized by force and as a result of her greed” (see: Joint collection of documents on the history of territorial demarcation between Russia and Japan. M.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992. P. 18).

5 Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers to the Japanese Imperial Government No. 677 dated January 29, 1946 // Joint collection of documents on the history of territorial delimitation... P. 30. The full text of the memorandum was published in the “Collection of the most important documents relating to the occupation and control of the Allied Powers in Japan” in English. language ( Gaimushō Tokubetsu Shiryōka. Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan. Japan: Foreign Office, Division of Special Records, 1949. Vol. 2. 349 p.), and also provided to the author by the US Consulate General in Vladivostok as a copy of the original.

6 Quoted. from: San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan of September 8, 1951 // History of the War in the Pacific: In 5 volumes: Transl. from Japanese M.: Foreign publishing house. lit., 1958. T. 5. pp. 338–339 .

7 Response to a request dated October 17, 1951 (see: Russian Pacific Epic. Khabarovsk: Khabar. kn. publishing house, 1979. P. 585–586).

8 International relations in the Far East in post-war years: In 2 volumes. M.: Mysl, 1978. T. 1: . P. 226.

9 Ibid. P. 230.

10 The American-Japanese military treaty is a threat to peace: Memorandum of the Soviet government to the government of Japan // Pravda. 1960. January 29. No. 29. P. 2.