Systemic history of international relations volume 1. Systemic history of international relations

The purpose of the publication is to provide systematic coverage of the development process international relations. Our approach is called systematic because it is based not just on a chronologically verified and reliable presentation of the facts of diplomatic history, but on showing the logic and driving forces of the most important events in world politics in their not always obvious and often not direct relationship with each other. In other words, international relations for us is not just a sum, a collection of some individual components (world political processes, foreign policies of individual states, etc.), but a complex, but single organism, the properties of which as a whole are not exhausted by the sum of the properties inherent in each of its components separately. Bearing in mind precisely this understanding to denote the whole variety of processes of interaction and mutual influence of the foreign policies of individual states among themselves and with the most important global processes, we use in this book the concept of a system of international relations. This is the key concept of our presentation.

Section I. FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD STRUCTURE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

Chapter 1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS (1917 - 1918).

The final stage of the world war was characterized by three fundamental features.

First, there were clear signs of economic exhaustion on both sides of the front line. The material, technical, financial and human resources of the warring parties were at their limit. This primarily concerned Russia and Germany as the countries that most intensively spent their vital resources during the fighting.

Secondly, both in the Entente and in the Austro-German bloc there were quite serious sentiments in favor of ending the war. This created a real possibility of attempts to conclude a separate peace in one configuration or another. The problem of the destruction of the united allied front was so acute that on August 23 (September 5), 1914, France, Great Britain and Russia signed in London a special Agreement on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which was supplemented there on November 17 (30), 1915 by a separate Declaration of the Allied Powers, including Italy and Japan, on the non-conclusion of a separate peace. But even after this, keeping the Romanov Empire in the war remained the most important international political task of the bloc of opponents of Germany, since - it was obvious - without Russian support, the Western European participants in the anti-German alliance alone were unable to provide themselves with the necessary military-power advantage over the Quadruple Alliance.

Thirdly, in Russia, and partly in Germany and Austria-Hungary, during the World War there was a sharp aggravation of the socio-political situation. Under the influence of military difficulties, the working classes, national minorities, as well as a significant part of the elite strata opposed both the war in general and their own governments, which demonstrated their inability to achieve military victory. The growth of anti-government sentiment in these countries had a significant impact on their foreign policy and the general international situation. The war turned out to be an unbearable burden for the economies and socio-political systems of the warring parties. Their ruling circles clearly underestimated the danger of social explosions.

Preface
Introduction. SYSTEMIC BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY
Section I. FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD STRUCTURE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Chapter 1. International relations at the final stage of hostilities (1917 - 1918)
Chapter 2. Main components of the Versailles order and their formation
Chapter 3. The emergence of a global political-ideological split in the international system (1918 - 1922)
Chapter 4. International relations in the near perimeter zone of the Russian borders (1918 - 1922)
Chapter 5. Post-war settlement in East Asia and the formation of the foundations of the Washington order
Section II. PERIOD OF STABILIZATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1921 - 1932)
Chapter 6. The struggle to strengthen the Versailles order and restore European balance (1921 - 1926)
Chapter 7. “Small détente” in Europe and its extinction (1926 - 1932)
Chapter 8. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 20s
Section III. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE POST-WAR GLOBAL REGULATION SYSTEM
Chapter 9. The “Great Depression” of 1929-1933 and the collapse of the international order in Pacific Asia
Chapter 10. The crisis of the Versailles order (1933 - 1937)
Chapter 11. Elimination of the Versailles order and the establishment of German hegemony in Europe (1938 - 1939)
Chapter 12. Aggravation of the situation in East Asia. Dependent countries and the threat of world conflict (1937 - 1939)
Chapter 13. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 30s and during the Second World War
Section IV. SECOND WORLD WAR (1939 - 1945)
Chapter 14. Beginning of World War II (September 1939 - June 1941)
Chapter 15. Entry of the USSR and the USA into World War II and the initial stage of anti-fascist cooperation (June 1941 - 1942)
Chapter 16. Issues of coordinated regulation of international relations in the anti-fascist coalition (1943 - 1945)
Chapter 17. International relations in the zone Pacific Ocean and the end of World War II
Conclusion. COMPLETION OF THE FORMATION OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF WORLD POLITICAL RELATIONS
Chronology
Name index
About the authors

Center for Convertible Education of the Moscow Public Science Foundation Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences Faculty of World Politics of the State University of Humanities SYSTEMIC HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN FOUR VOLUMES. 1918-1991 Volume one. Events of 1918-1945 Edited by Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor A.D. Bogaturov “Moscow Worker” Moscow 2000 Editorial Board Academician G.A. Arbatov, Doctor of Historical Sciences Z.S.Belousova, Doctor of Pol.Sc. A.D.Bogaturov, Doctor of Pol.Sc. A.D. Voskresensky, Ph.D. A.V.Kortunov, Doctor of History V.A. Kremenyuk, Doctor of History S.M.Rogov, Doctor of History Ar.A. Ulunyan, Doctor of Political Sciences M.A. Khrustalev Team of authors Z.S. Belousov (chap. 6, 7), A.D. Bogaturov (introduction, ch. 9, 10, 14, 17, conclusion), A.D. Voskresensky (chap. 5 ), Ph.D. E.G.Kapustyan (chapter 8, 13), Ph.D. V.G. Korgun (chapter 8, 13), doctor of historical sciences D.G. Najafov (chap. 6, 7), Ph.D. A.I. Ostapenko (chapter 1, 4), doctor of political sciences K.V. Pleshakov (chap. 11, 15, 16), Ph.D. V.P. Safronov (chap. 9, 12), Ph.D. E.Yu.Sergeev (Ch. 1, 9), Ar.A. Ulunyan (Ch. 3), Doctor of Historical Sciences. A.S. Khodnev (chapter 2), M.A. Khrustalev (chapters 2, 8, 13) Chronology compiled by Yu.V. Borovsky and A.V. Shchipin The four-volume book represents the first attempt at a comprehensive study of the history of international relations after the collapse of the USSR the last eight decades of the twentieth century. The odd-numbered volumes of the publication are devoted to the analysis of events in world political history, and the even-numbered volumes contain the main documents and materials necessary to obtain a more complete understanding of the events and facts described. The first volume covers the period from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second. Particular attention is paid to the subjects of the Versailles settlement, international relations in the near perimeter zone Soviet Russia, the eve and first stage of the Second World War before the entry of the USSR and the USA into it, as well as the development of the situation in East Asia and the situation in the peripheral zones international system . The publication is addressed to researchers and teachers, students, graduate students of humanitarian universities and everyone who is interested in the history of international relations, diplomacy and external affairs; th politics of Russia. The publication was supported by the MacArthur Foundation ISBN 5-89554-138-0 © A.D. Bogaturov, 2000 © S.I. Dudin, emblem, 1997 CONTENTS           Preface Introduction. SYSTEMIC BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY Section I. FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD STRUCTURE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR Chapter 1. International relations at the final stage of hostilities (1917 - 1918) Chapter 2. The main components of the Versailles order and their formation Chapter 3. The emergence of a global political-ideological split in the international system (1918 - 1922) Chapter 4. International relations in the zone of the near perimeter of the Russian borders (1918 - 1922) Chapter 5. Post-war settlement in East Asia and the formation of the foundations of the Washington order Section II. PERIOD OF STABILIZATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1921 1932) Chapter 6. The struggle to strengthen the Versailles order and restore European balance (1921 - 1926) Chapter 7. “Little détente” in Europe and its extinction (1926 - 1932) Chapter 8. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 20s Section III. DESTRUCTION OF THE POST-WAR SYSTEM OF WORLD REGULATION Chapter 9. The “Great Depression” of 1929-1933 and the collapse of the international order in Pacific Asia Chapter 10. The crisis of the Versailles order (1933 - 1937) Chapter 11. The liquidation of the Versailles order and the establishment of German hegemony in Europe (1938 - 1939) ) Chapter 12. Aggravation of the situation in East Asia. Dependent countries and the threat of world conflict (1937 - 1939) Chapter 13. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 30s and during the Second World War Section IV. THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1939 - 1945) Chapter 14. The beginning of the Second World War (September 1939 - June 1941) Chapter 15. The entry into the Second World War of the USSR and the USA and the initial stage of anti-fascist cooperation (June 1941 - 1942) Chapter 16. Questions coordinated regulation of international relations in the anti-fascist coalition (1943 - 1945) Chapter 17. International relations in the Pacific Ocean zone and the end of World War II Conclusion. COMPLETION OF THE FORMATION OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF WORLD POLITICAL RELATIONS Chronology Name index About the authors Anatoly Andreevich Zlobin teacher, pioneer-researcher and enthusiast of the systemic-structural school of MGIMO Colleagues, friends, like-minded people who began teaching international relations in other cities of Russia PREFACE Four-volume book "Systemic history of international relations" - the first for fifteen years in Russian historiography an attempt to build a complete picture of the entire period of world political history from the end of the First World War to the destruction Soviet Union and the collapse of bipolarity. From the main works of its predecessors - the fundamental three-volume "History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union", published in 1967 under the editorship of Academician V.G. Trukhanovsky and in 1987 under the editorship of Professor G.V. Fokeev1, the proposed work differs at least three features. Firstly, it was written in conditions of relative ideological looseness and pluralism of opinions. It takes into account many of the major substantive and conceptual innovations recent years development of domestic and world historical and political science. Secondly, analysis of the foreign policy of the USSR was not the most important thing for the authors. The work is, in principle, based on the rejection of a view of international relations primarily through the prism of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and/or the Comintern. It was not at all about writing another version of a critical analysis of Soviet foreign policy, especially since this task is already being successfully developed by several scientific teams2. The four-volume volume is primarily a history of international relations, and only then an analysis of the foreign policies of individual countries, including the Soviet Union. The authors did not try to deduce all significant events in world history either from the victory of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in November 1917 and the policies of Soviet Russia, or from the world revolutionary experiments of the Comintern. The focus is on problems of international stability, war and peace, and the creation of a world order. This does not mean that little attention is paid to “Soviet” subjects. On the contrary, the influence of Soviet Russia and the USSR on international affairs is monitored extremely carefully. But its display does not become an end in itself. For presentation, it is important mainly because it helps to more clearly understand the reasons for the growth of some and the decline of others, trends that were objectively developing in the international system. In other words, the task was not so much to show the significance and insignificance of the Bolshevik foreign policy, but to identify how much it corresponded to or, on the contrary, deviated from the logic of the objective processes of development of the international system. Thirdly, the four-volume work, being neither a textbook itself nor a typical monograph, is still focused on teaching goals. This is due to its dual event-documentary nature. A summary of the events of each of the two main periods in the history of international relations, 1918-1945 and 1945-1991. accompanied by detailed illustrations in the form of separate volumes of documents and materials in such a way that the reader can independently clarify his own understanding of historical events. The first volume of the publication was completed in 1999, in the year of the 85th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918) - an event in world history, unique in the tragedy of its consequences. It's not about the number of victims and the brutality of the battle - the Second World War (1939-1945) far surpassed the First in both respects. The tragic uniqueness of the mutual extermination of 1914-1918 was that the resulting depletion of the resources of the warring parties, unprecedented by the standards of previous eras, dealt such a blow to the foundations of society in Russia that it lost the ability to restrain internal indignation. This outrage resulted in a chain of revolutionary cataclysms that handed Russia over to the Bolsheviks and doomed the world to decades of ideological division. The book begins with questions concerning the preparation of the Versailles peace settlement, with necessary excursions into the events of the last 12 months of the First World War. Next, the issues of political and diplomatic struggle around the creation of a new international order and the results of this struggle, which resulted in a slide towards the Second World War, are considered, at the final stages of which, in turn, the prerequisites for global regulation and renewed attempts to ensure world stability on the basis of collective effort. Since the mid-80s, teaching the history of international relations in our country has encountered difficulties. They were partly caused by the lack of a systematic course in the history of international relations, adequate to the current state of historical and political knowledge. The problem of creating such a course was all the more acute since the capital's monopoly on teaching international relations, security issues and diplomacy was eliminated. During the 90s, in addition to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, these subjects began to be taught in at least three dozen universities both in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Tomsk, Vladivostok, Kazan, Volgograd, Tver, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Krasnodar, Barnaul. In 1999, a second educational institution for training international relations specialists opened in Moscow, where a new faculty of world politics was created at the State University of Humanities (based on the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences). New teaching centers were provided with less educational and methodological materials. Attempts to overcome difficulties were made primarily through the efforts of the Institute of General History and the Institute national history RAS, Moscow Public Science Foundation and MGIMO Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Of the regional centers, the University of Nizhny Novgorod showed the greatest activity, publishing a whole series of interesting documentary publications on the history of international relations and a number of textbooks. In this work, the authors sought to use the developments of predecessors3. To the older generation of specialists, much in the four-volume book may seem unusual - the concept, interpretations, structure, assessments, and finally, the approach itself - an attempt to give the reader a vision of the development of international relations through a systemic prism. Like every innovative work, this one is also not free from omissions. Realizing this, the authors treat their work as an option for interpreting events - not the only possible option, but one that stimulates scientific research and encourages the reader to independently think about the logic and patterns of international relations. The publication became possible thanks to the cooperation of the Research Forum on International Relations with the Moscow Public Science Foundation, the Institute of the USA and Canada, the Institute of World History, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as teachers of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Moscow State University named after. M.V. Lomonosov and Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University named after. K.D. Ushinsky. The team of authors was formed during the scientific and educational events of the Methodological University of Convertible Education of the Moscow Public Science Foundation in 1996-1999. and the project "New Agenda for International Security", which was implemented in 1998-1999. with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Neither the team of authors, nor the project, nor the publication would have been possible without the benevolent understanding of T.D. Zhdanova, director of the Moscow representative office of this foundation. A. Bogaturov October 10, 1999 INTRODUCTION. SYSTEMIC BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY The purpose of the publication is to provide systematic coverage of the process of development of international relations. Our approach is called systematic because it is based not just on a chronologically verified and reliable presentation of the facts of diplomatic history, but on showing the logic and driving forces of the most important events in world politics in their not always obvious and often not direct relationship with each other. In other words, international relations for us is not just a sum, a collection of some individual components (world political processes, foreign policies of individual states, etc. ), but a complex but unified organism, the properties of which as a whole are not exhausted by the sum of the properties inherent in each of its components separately. Bearing in mind precisely this understanding to denote the whole variety of processes of interaction and mutual influence of the foreign policies of individual states among themselves and with the most important global processes, we use in this book the concept of a system of international relations. This is the key concept of our presentation. Understanding that the properties of the whole are irreducible only to the sum of the properties of the parts is the most important feature of a systemic worldview. This logic explains why, say, taken individually, the diplomatic steps of the USSR, the two Atlantic powers (France and Britain) and Germany in the period of preparation and during the Genoa Conference of 1922, seemingly aimed at restoring Europe as a whole, led to consolidation of its split, which sharply reduced the chances of pan-European cooperation in the interests of maintaining stability. Another is the emphasis on the connections and relationships between the individual components of the international system. In other words, we will be interested not only in how Nazi Germany moved along the path of aggression in the late 1930s, but also in how Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States influenced the formation of the driving forces of its foreign policy in the previous decade. who themselves were the object of active German policy. Likewise, the Second World War will be considered by us not just as a milestone event in world history, but primarily as an extreme result of the inevitable breakdown of that particular model of international relations that developed after the end of the First World War (1914-1918). In principle, interstate relations acquired a complexly interconnected, mutually determining character quite early, but not immediately. In order to acquire the features of systematicity, systemic interconnection, certain relationships and groups of relationships had to mature - that is, acquire stability (1) and achieve a sufficiently high level of development (2). For example, we can talk about the formation of a global, worldwide system of international economic relations not immediately after the discovery of America, but only after regular and more or less reliable communication between the Old and New Worlds was established, and the economic life of Eurasia was firmly linked with American sources of raw materials and markets. The global world political system, the system of international political relations, developed much more slowly. Until the final stage of the First World War, when for the first time in history American soldiers took part in hostilities in Europe, the New World remained politically, if not isolated, then clearly separate. There was no understanding of world political unity yet, although it was undoubtedly already in the formative stage, a process that began in the last quarter of the 19th century, when there were no longer “no man’s” territories left in the world and the political aspirations of individual powers were no longer only in the center, but also in the geographical periphery of the world turned out to be closely “ground in” with each other. The Spanish-American, Anglo-Boer, Japanese-Chinese, Russian-Japanese and, finally, the First World War became bloody milestones along the path of the formation of a global world political system. However, the process of its formation by the beginning of the period described below had not ended. A unified global, worldwide system of political relations between states was just taking shape. The world basically continued to consist of several subsystems. These subsystems first developed in Europe, where relations between states due to natural-geographical and economic factors (relatively compact territory, fairly large population, extensive network of relatively safe roads) were most developed. Since the beginning of the 19th century, the most important subsystem of international relations was the European one, the Vienna one. Along with it, a special subsystem gradually began to form in North America . In the east of the Eurasian continent around China, one of the most archaic subsystems, the East Asian one, existed in a chronically stagnant state. At that time, we can only talk about other subsystems, say, in Africa, with a very large degree of conditionality. Later, however, they began to gradually develop and evolve. By the end of the First World War, the first signs of a tendency toward the development of the North American subsystem into the Euro-Atlantic, on the one hand, and the Asia-Pacific, on the other, were emerging. The outlines of the Middle Eastern and Latin American subsystems began to be discerned. All these subsystems developed in a tendency as future parts of the whole - the global system, although this whole itself, as noted above, in the political and diplomatic sense was just beginning to take shape; Only in economic terms were its contours already visible more or less clearly. There was a gradation between the subsystems - a hierarchy. One of the subsystems was central, the rest were peripheral. Historically, until the end of the Second World War, the central place was invariably occupied by the European subsystem of international relations. It remained central both in terms of the importance of the states that formed it and in terms of its geographical location in the interweaving of the main axes of economic, political and military-conflict tensions in the world. In addition, the European subsystem was far ahead of others in terms of the level of organization, that is, the degree of maturity, complexity, development of the connections embodied in it, so to speak, in terms of their inherent proportion of systematicity. Compared to the central level, the level of organization of peripheral subsystems was much lower. Although the peripheral subsystems could differ greatly from each other on this basis. For example, after the First World War, the central position of the European subsystem (the Versailles order) remained undisputed. In comparison, the Asia-Pacific (Washington) was peripheral. However, it was disproportionately more organized and mature than, for example, Latin American or Middle Eastern. Occupying a dominant position among the peripheral ones, the Asia-Pacific subsystem was, as it were, “the most central among the peripheral ones” and second in its world-political significance after the European one. The European subsystem in different periods in historical literature, and partly in diplomatic usage, was called differently - as a rule, depending on the name of international treaties, which, due to certain circumstances, were recognized by the majority of European countries as fundamental for interstate relations in Europe. So, let's say, it is customary to call the European subsystem from 1815 to the middle of the 19th century - Vienna (according to the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815); then Paris (Paris Congress of 1856), etc. It should be borne in mind that in the literature the names “Vienna System”, “Paris System”, etc. are traditionally common. The word “system” in all such cases is used to emphasize the interconnected, complexly intertwined nature of obligations and the relations between states determined by them. In addition, this usage also reflects the opinion that has been rooted for centuries in the minds of scientists, diplomats and politicians: “Europe is the world.” Whereas from the standpoint of the modern worldview and the current stage of development of the science of international relations, strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to say “Vienna subsystem”, “Paris subsystem”, etc. In order to avoid terminological overlaps and based on the need to emphasize the vision of specific events in international life against the background of the evolution of the global structure of the world and its individual parts, in this publication the terms “subsystem” and “system” will, as a rule, be used when necessary to highlight the interrelationships of events in individual countries and regions with the state of global political processes and relations. In other cases, when we are talking about complexes of specific agreements and the relations that arose on their basis, we will strive to use the word “order” - the Versailles order, the Washington order, etc. At the same time, in a number of cases, taking into account the tradition of use, expressions like “Versailles (Washington) subsystem” are retained in the text. To understand the logic of the international political process in 1918-1945. The key is the concept of multipolarity. Strictly speaking, the entire history of international relations proceeded under the sign of the struggle for hegemony, that is, the undeniably dominant position in the world, more precisely, in that part of it that at a particular moment in historical time was considered the world-universe or ecumene, as the ancient Greeks called it. Let's say, from the position of Herodotus, a historian of the times of Alexander the Great, the Macedonian state after the conquest of the Persian kingdom was undoubtedly a world state, a hegemonic empire, so to speak, the only pole of the world. However, only the world that was known to Herodotus and was limited, in fact, to the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East and Central Asia. Already the image of India seemed so vague to the Hellenistic consciousness that this land was not perceived in terms of its possible intervention in the affairs of the Hellenistic world, which for the latter was the only world. There is no need to talk about China in this sense at all. In the same way, Rome in its heyday was perceived as a world-state, the only world pole and source of power and influence; its monopoly position in international relations was such only to the extent that the ancient Roman consciousness sought to identify the really existing universe with its ideas about it. From the standpoint of the Hellenistic and Roman consciousness, respectively, the contemporary world or, as we would say, the international system, was unipolar, that is, in their world there was one single state that practically undividedly dominated the entire territory, which was of real or even potential interest for the then “political consciousness,” or, as we would say in modern language, in the “civilizational space” accessible to the corresponding society. From the standpoint of today, the relativity of “ancient unipolarity” is obvious. But that's not important. It is significant that the sense of reality of a unipolar world - albeit false - passed on to the political and cultural heirs of antiquity, becoming even more distorted during transmission. As a result, the longing for universal domination, infused with historical information and legends about the great ancient empires, if not completely prevailed in the political consciousness of subsequent eras, nevertheless strongly influenced the minds of statesmen in many countries, starting from the early Middle Ages. It was never possible to repeat the unique and in all respects limited experience of the empire of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire. But the majority of any powerful states tried to do this in one way or another - Byzantium, the Empire of Charlemagne, the Habsburg monarchy, Napoleonic France, united Germany - these are only the most obvious and striking examples of attempts and failures of this kind. We can say that most of the history of international relations from a systemic perspective can be explained as the history of attempts by one or another power to construct a unipolar world of attempts, we note, largely inspired by the misunderstood or deliberately distorted interpreted experience of antiquity. But with the same success we can state something else: in fact, since the collapse of the “ancient unipolarity”, real multipolarity has developed in interstate relations, understood as the existence in the world of at least several leading states, comparable in the totality of their military, political, economic capabilities and cultural-ideological influence. Perhaps it initially arose more or less by accident - due to a combination of unfavorable circumstances, a power claiming hegemony, say Sweden during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), was unable to mobilize necessary resources to realize your goals. But very soon other countries began to view the preservation of multipolarity as a kind of guarantee of their own security. The logic of behavior of a number of states began to be determined by the desire to prevent too obvious strengthening of the geopolitical capabilities of their potential rivals. Geopolitical is understood as a set of capabilities of the state, determined by natural-geographical factors in the broad sense of the word (geographical location, territory, population, configuration of borders, climatic conditions, the level of economic development of individual territories and the associated infrastructure), which initially determine the position of a particular country in the system of international relations. The traditional way to strengthen geopolitical capabilities was to annex new territories - either through direct seizure military force , or - in the dynastic tradition of the Middle Ages - by acquisition through marriage or inheritance. Accordingly, diplomacy paid more and more attention to preventing situations that could result in an “excessive” increase in the potential of some already fairly large state. In connection with these considerations, the concept of the balance of power was firmly established in the political lexicon for a long time, which began to be used almost indefinitely by both Western authors and researchers of various schools in Russia and the USSR. The abuse of this catchy term has led to the blurring of its boundaries and even partial meaninglessness. Some authors used the term “balance of power” as a synonym for the concept of “balance of opportunity.” The other, not seeing a strict semantic connection between “balance” and “equilibrium,” considered the “balance of power” simply as the ratio of the capabilities of individual world powers in a particular historical period. The first movement was guided by the linguistic meaning that the word "ballance" has in Western languages; the second was based on the understanding of the word “balance” inherent in Russian. In this book, the authors will use the phrase “balance of power” in the second sense, that is, in the sense of “balance of capabilities.” Thus, it will be clear that the “balance of power” is a certain objective state, always inherent in the international system, while the balance of power, even an approximate one, did not always develop in it and, as a rule, was unstable. The balance of power, therefore, is a special case of the balance of power as an objectively existing relationship between individual states depending on the totality of military, political, economic and other capabilities that each of them possesses. According to this logic, international relations in Europe were built on the basis of the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1715), which crowned the Thirty Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, respectively. The attempt of revolutionary and then Napoleonic France to radically change the balance of forces in Europe provoked a response from Western European diplomacy, which, starting with the Vienna Principles of 1815, made the concern for maintaining the “European balance” perhaps the main task of the foreign policy of the Habsburg Empire and then Great Britain . The preservation of the multipolar equilibrium model was put under serious threat by the emergence in 1871 of the German Empire based on the unification of the German lands into a powerful continuous geopolitical array, which included mainly French Alsace and Lorraine. German control over the resources of these two provinces (coal and iron ore) at a time when metal-intensive industries began to play a decisive role for the military-technical capabilities of states, contributed to the emergence of a situation where containing a united Germany within the framework of the traditional “European balance” by methods of diplomacy and politics turned out to be impossible. These were the structural prerequisites of the First World War - a war that can be described as an attempt to strengthen the structure of multipolarity through the forcible integration of “out of line” Germany in its new, united quality into the archaic structure of multipolarity in the form that was the ideal from the position of many European politicians At the beginning of the 20th century, the Viennese order of the early 19th century was still seen. Looking ahead and appealing to the geopolitical lessons of the First and Second World Wars, we can say that by the beginning of the twentieth century, in principle, theoretically, there were at least two ways to stabilize the international system by political and economic methods - that is, without resorting to large-scale use of military force . The first assumed a much more active and widespread involvement of Russia in European politics, which in this case could effectively restrain Germany from the east by projecting its power rather than directly using it. But to implement this scenario, such an important additional condition as a significant acceleration of Russia’s economic and political development, which would make its non-military presence in Europe more convincing and tangible. However, all Western European states, including Germany itself and its rivals France and Britain, although for different reasons, were afraid of strengthening Russian influence in Europe, suspecting Russia as a new European hegemon. They preferred to see Russia as capable of shackling and limiting the ambitions of Germany, but not strong and influential enough to acquire a voice in the “European concert” that would more fully correspond to its potential, but not realized, gigantic by European standards. The tragedy was that, due to both internal circumstances (the inertia of the Russian monarchy) and external reasons (the hesitation and inconsistency of the Entente in supporting the modernization of Russia), by the beginning of the First World War the country was unable to effectively implement the adopted ones (we do not touch upon the issue about the justification of her decision) by her taking on functions. The result was an unprecedentedly protracted nature of the war by the standards of the 19th century, terrible exhaustion and the accompanying inevitable political collapse of Russia, as well as a sharp, almost instantaneous breakdown of the existing world structure - a breakdown that caused a shock and a deep crisis in European political thinking, which it - as will be shown in pages of this work - was never completely overcome until the outbreak of World War II. The second way to stabilize international relations could be to go beyond Eurocentric thinking. Let's say, if Russia, despite its importance as a potential counterweight to Germany, still instilled - not without reason - fears in Britain and France with its potential, then Russia itself could look for a counterweight - for example, in the person of a non-European power - the United States. However, for this it was necessary to think in “intercontinental” categories. The Europeans were not ready for this. The United States itself was not ready for this either; until almost the end of the 10s of the 20th century, it was clearly focused on non-participation in European conflicts. Moreover, let us not forget that at the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain was considered in the United States as the only power in the world capable, thanks to its naval power, of posing a threat to the security of the United States itself. London's orientation toward an alliance with Japan, in which Washington already saw an important Pacific rival, did not at all contribute to the growth of the United States' readiness to act on the side of the British Empire in the brewing European conflict. Only at the final stage of the First World War did the United States overcome its traditional isolationism and, by throwing part of its military power to the aid of the Entente powers, provided it with the necessary advantage over Germany and, ultimately, victory over the Austro-German bloc. Thus, the “breakthrough” of Europeans beyond the “Eurocentric” vision did occur. However, this happened too late, when it was not a question of political containment of Germany, but of its military defeat. In addition, and this will also be discussed in the chapters of this work, this “breakthrough” turned out to be only a short-term intuitive insight, and not a radical reassessment of the priorities that European diplomacy of the period between the two world wars inherited from the classics, as we would say today , political science of the 19th century, brought up in the traditions of K. Metternich, G. Palmerston, O. Bismarck and A. M. Gorchakov. This dominance of the school of political thinking of the 19th century, which was late in understanding the new geopolitical realities and the new state of global political relations, determined the fact that the main task of streamlining international relations after the First World War was essentially understood not so much as a radical restructuring of the world structure, but rather in particular, overcoming the relative self-sufficiency, political isolation of the European subsystem from the United States, on the one hand, and the area of ​​Eastern Eurasia, on the other, and more narrowly: as the restoration of the classic “European balance” or, as we would prefer to say, a multipolar model of the international system on the traditional , predominantly European based. This narrow approach no longer corresponded to the logic of the globalization of world political processes and the ever-growing political interdependence of the subsystems of world politics. This contradiction between the European, and often even only the Euro-Atlantic, vision of the international situation and the emergence of new centers of power and influence outside Western and Central Europe - in Russia and the USA - left a decisive imprint on the entire world politics of the period 1918-1945. The Second World War dealt a crushing blow to multipolarity. Even in its depths, the prerequisites began to mature for the transformation of the multipolar structure of the world into a bipolar one. By the end of the war, a colossal gap emerged between the two powers - the USSR and the USA - from all other states in terms of the totality of military, political, economic capabilities and ideological influence. This separation defined the essence of bipolarity, in much the same way as the meaning of multipolarity historically consisted in the approximate equality or comparability of capabilities of a relatively large group of countries in the absence of a clearly expressed and recognized superiority of any one leader. Immediately after the end of World War II, bipolarity did not yet exist as a stable model of international relations. It took about 10 years for its structural design. The period of formation ended in 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) - the eastern counterweight to the NATO bloc formed 6 years earlier, in 1949, in the West. Moreover, bipolarity, before it began to take shape structurally, did not in itself imply confrontation. Initially, the “Yalta-Potsdam order” that symbolized it was associated more with a “conspiracy of the powerful” than with their confrontation. But, naturally, the idea of ​​two-power governance of the world caused the desire of “less equal” states (a role that was especially difficult for Britain) to divide their strong partners in order to give the missing weight to themselves. “Jealousy” for the Soviet-American dialogue has become a feature of the policy not only of Britain, but also of France and the governments of Central European countries semi-formally recognized by Moscow. The actions of all of them together fueled the mutual distrust of the USSR and the USA. Against this background, the “counter-escalation” of Soviet and American geopolitical claims that soon began led to the displacement of the cooperative principle in Soviet-American relations by confrontation. In less than three years - from the second half of 1945 to approximately 1947 - a vector of mutual repulsion between both powers was formed. Its milestones were American attempts to politically beat its nuclear monopoly, Soviet ambitions in the Southern Black Sea region and Iran, and the rejection of the Marshall Plan by Eastern European countries, which clearly outlined the outlines of the future “Iron Curtain.” Confrontation began to become a reality, although the Cold War had not yet begun. Its first fact, the Berlin crisis, one way or another provoked by financial reform in the western sectors of Germany, dates back to the summer of 1948. This was preceded by “pressure” actions of the USSR in the “Soviet zone of influence” - elections to the Legislative Sejm of Poland in Poland, questionable in terms of freedom of expression. January 1947 and the political crisis provoked by the Communists in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. It was no longer necessary to talk about coordinated governance of the world in the interests of the USSR and the USA, first of all, and in the interests of other countries - to the extent that they were represented by these two . The idea of ​​an order based on collusion was replaced by the presumption of the ability to maintain the achieved balance of positions and at the same time ensure freedom of action. Moreover, in fact, there was no freedom of action and there could not be: the USSR and the USA were afraid of each other. The self-induction of fear determined their natural interest in improving offensive weapons, on the one hand, and “positional defense” and finding allies, on the other. The turn to relying on allies predetermined the split of the world. The United States became the head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The USSR did not immediately see its Eastern European satellites as full-fledged allies and spent a lot of time on political preparations for the creation of the Warsaw bloc. But until the failure of the Big Four Paris conference in May 1960, the USSR did not give up hope of returning to the idea of ​​Soviet-American co-government. Be that as it may, since 1955, with the creation of two blocs, bipolarity in the confrontational version was structurally consolidated. The bifurcation of the world was emphasized not only by the emergence of “divided states” - Germany, Vietnam, China and Korea - but also by the fact that most of the world’s states were forced to orient themselves relative to the axis of the central confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Warsaw. The weak had to either ensure a satisfactory level of representation of their interests in the chain of great power regulation, or try to act at their own peril and risk, defending national interests independently or in alliance with political outsiders like them. This is the structural and political basis of the idea of ​​non-alignment, which began to be implemented in the mid-50s almost simultaneously with the emergence of schemes among the theoreticians of Chinese communism, which later resulted in the theory of three worlds based on distancing from the “superpowers”. The “spirit of confrontation” seemed to be an expression of the essence of world politics also because from 1956 to 1962, military-political methods of resolving crises especially clearly prevailed in the international system. It was a special stage of evolution post-war world. Its most striking feature was ultimatums, threatening statements, force and para-force demonstrations. Typical in this sense are N.S. Khrushchev’s threatening messages to the governments of Great Britain and France regarding their joint aggression with Israel against Egypt in 1956, American actions in Syria in 1957 and Lebanon in 1958, demonstrative Soviet underground nuclear tests in 1961 after American threats, which in turn followed the construction of the Berlin Wall. Finally, a global nuclear conflict almost broke out due to the USSR’s attempt to secretly place its missiles in Cuba, the very idea of ​​which, however, was also drawn by Moscow from the American practice of installing missiles aimed at the USSR in Turkey and Italy. The predominance of military-force methods in relations between the opposing powers did not exclude elements of their mutual understanding and partnership. The parallelism of the steps of the USSR and the USA during the mentioned French-British-Israeli aggression in Egypt is striking - especially curious against the backdrop of the ongoing intervention of the USSR in Hungary. A renewed bid for global partnership was also in mind during the 1959 dialogue between Khrushchev and Eisenhower in Washington. Due to unfavorable circumstances in 1960 (a scandal caused by the flight of an American spy plane over Soviet territory), these negotiations were unable to make détente a fact of international life. But they served as a prototype for détente, implemented 10 years later. In general, in the 50s and early 60s, political-power regulation clearly dominated international relations. Elements of constructiveness existed, as it were, semi-legally, preparing changes, but for the time being showing little effect on top level. And only the Caribbean crisis decisively pushed the USSR and the USA beyond the framework of thinking in terms of brute force pressure. After it, direct armed confrontation began to be replaced by indirect power projection at the regional level. A new type of two-power interaction gradually crystallized during the Vietnam War (1963-1973) and against its background. Undoubtedly, the USSR indirectly opposed the United States in this war, although not even a shadow of the possibility of a direct clash was visible. And not only because, while providing assistance to North Vietnam, the USSR did not participate in hostilities. But also because, against the backdrop of the Vietnam War in the mid-60s, a Soviet-American dialogue on global problems unfolded with unprecedented intensity. Its peak was the signing in 1968 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Diplomacy has replaced force and turned out to be the dominant instrument of international politics. This situation persisted from approximately 1963 until the end of 1973 - these were the boundaries of the period of predominantly political regulation of the world system. One of key concepts This stage is “strategic parity,” understood not as a total mathematical equality in the number of combat units of Soviet and American strategic forces, but rather as a mutually recognized excess by both sides of the qualitative threshold beyond which their nuclear conflict under all circumstances would guarantee to each side damage that would obviously exceed all conceivable and planned benefits from the use of nuclear weapons. It is significant that parity began to determine the essence of the Soviet-American diplomatic dialogue from the time President R. Nixon, who came to power in 1968, officially announced its existence in his message to the American Congress in February 1972. It would hardly be legitimate to say that that throughout this entire period the superpowers focused only on constructive interaction. But if in the 50s the highest positive of Soviet-American relations were limited parallel actions and isolated attempts at dialogue, then in the 60s real cooperation took place. An essential shift occurred: without ceasing mutual criticism, the USSR and the USA in practice began to be guided by geopolitical considerations, and not by ideological postulates. This circumstance has not remained unchanged. The administration of R. Nixon and then J. Ford received criticism from both Democrats and far-right Republicans for “neglecting American ideals.” The Chinese leadership also inscribed criticism of social-imperialism represented by the Soviet Union on its banner. The weakening of the positions of A.N. Kosygin, who stood behind the new Soviet pragmatism, indicated the presence of strong purist opposition to his flexible course in the USSR itself. However, all this did not prevent Moscow and Washington from fine-tuning the political dialogue, fine-tuning the mechanism for interpreting political signals and clarifying the intentions of the parties. The direct communication line was improved, a network of shock-absorbing devices was created, similar to the one that, at a critical moment in the Caribbean crisis, made it possible to organize a meeting in Washington between Soviet Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin and the president’s brother Robert Kennedy. In May 1972, summarizing the accumulated experience, the parties signed a fundamentally important document in this sense, “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA.” The growth of mutual tolerance and trust made it possible in the same year to conclude in Moscow the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1). Both treaties paved the way for a series of agreements that followed. The result of these disparate efforts was a common Soviet-American understanding regarding the lack of aggressive intentions on both sides, at least towards each other. This did not directly apply to others. But the desire of Moscow and Washington to avoid a head-on collision in itself had a restraining effect on their policies in third countries, narrowing the scope of international conflict, although, of course, not completely blocking its growth. In any case, Moscow’s position in the Soviet-Chinese confrontation in the summer-autumn of 1969 was not without taking into account Washington’s reaction, the peak of which was persistent reports in the West, not refuted in the USSR, about the possibility of preventive strikes by Soviet aviation from airfields on the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic against nuclear facilities in China. Another crisis was averted not only thanks to the flexibility of Soviet diplomacy, but also under the influence of the United States, which, without exaltation, but firmly declared the unacceptability of the unpredictable growth of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. This, by the way, is one of the global strategic prerequisites for the “sudden” Sino-American normalization of 1972, and, in a broader sense, détente on its entire Asian flank, which is still omitted in Russian studies. Despite the fact that in the United States the easing of tensions in the 70s is generally perceived primarily through the prism of ending the Vietnam War and establishing new relations with China, while in Russia it is mainly focused on the recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders in Europe. By the mid-70s, from the decade of the “era of negotiations,” both superpowers made a very significant conclusion: there is no threat of attempts to sharply, forcefully break the basic relationships of their positions. In fact, mutual agreement was reached on the “conservation of stagnation,” the very idea of ​​which fit so well into the internal political situation of the Soviet Union, which was losing momentum under the leadership of its decrepit leader. This, of course, did not exclude a mutual desire to achieve dominance gradually. The compromise in the “conservation of stagnation” could not be particularly strong because the underlying idea of ​​dividing the interests of the USSR and the USA, which assumed greater or lesser stability of “zones of preferential interests,” contradicted the logic of development. After the pan-European settlement established in Helsinki in 1975, the challenges associated with the unpredictable awakening of the developing world came to the fore in international relations. The more impulsive the shifts that arose there, the tighter the framework of Soviet-American mutual understanding seemed. Moreover, both the main and implied meaning of this mutual understanding were interpreted in both the East and the West differently. In the USSR it is restrictive. Maintaining the “basic” relations was considered compatible with the expansion of positions on the regional periphery, especially neutral, not included in the zone of traditional American dominance. It is no coincidence that in the mid-70s there was an increase in the interest of Soviet ideologists in issues of proletarian, socialist internationalism and peaceful coexistence, which was still combined with the thesis of an intensification of the ideological struggle. No one was going to give up solidarity with like-minded people in the “third world” (real or perceived). For its part, the United States valued its agreement with the USSR largely because of what it seemed to the administration to be a commitment to restraint in relation to the “undivided territories,” that is, countries that had not yet committed themselves to a pro-American or pro-Soviet orientation. The matter was complicated by the ideological situation in the United States, where after the end of the Vietnam War and in the wake of the syndrome inherited from it, there was a powerful surge of political moralism with its characteristic painful attention to the ethical basis of American foreign policy and the protection of human rights throughout the world. Against the backdrop of Moscow's tough measures against dissidents and its intransigence on the issue of increasing Jewish emigration, these trends inevitably acquired an anti-Soviet orientation. Attempts by the administration, first of J. Ford (1974-1977) and then of J. Carter (1977-1981), to moderate the onslaught of human rights activists were unsuccessful. In the latter case, the presidential assistant for national security Z. Brzezinski, in whom, even while holding an official post, the wounded national feeling of a descendant of Polish emigrants cast a shadow on the professional impeccability of the “expert on communism.” Events, as if on purpose, favored America's heightened perception of Soviet policy. After the Paris Agreements on Vietnam (1973), the United States sharply reduced the size of the army and abolished the universal conscription that had been introduced during the war. The general mood in Washington was against any intervention in the Third World. In focus public opinion The United States turned out to have recipes for treating the internal ailments of American society. Moscow noticed the US's focus on itself and drew conclusions. It was decided that détente created favorable conditions for launching an ideological offensive and providing assistance to like-minded people. In 1974, the military overthrew the monarchy in Ethiopia. The “carnation revolution” that was victorious in Lisbon that same year caused the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the formation in 1975 of the next authoritarian-nationalist regimes in Angola and Mozambique, without further ado, proclaiming a pro-communist orientation. The USSR did not overcome the temptation and rushed into the opened gaps, “half a corps” ahead of Cuba. But that was not all. In 1975, the weak and unpopular South Vietnamese regime in Saigon collapsed under communist pressure, and Vietnam was united under the leadership of the North on the basis of loyalty to the socialist choice. In the same year, with the active participation of the “people's revolutionary” factor, a change of regimes occurred in Laos and Cambodia. True, in the latter case, the predominant influence was not Vietnam or the USSR, but China. But be that as it may, both Cambodia and Laos declared loyalty to the socialist perspective. The unambiguous role that Vietnam began to claim in Indochina could give grounds to accuse the USSR of spreading communist expansion and exporting the revolution. Events did not allow the fire of suspicion to die out, even for a short time. In 1978, through the machinations of certain “progressive” forces, the monarchy in Afghanistan, which was quite friendly towards the USSR, was overthrown, which turned out to be a prologue to a future ten-year tragedy. And in the summer of 1979, the communists took power in Nicaragua by armed force. By this time, the USSR military had already achieved the adoption of a new naval program. The distant world periphery occupied the minds of Soviet politicians - more densely than could be justified by the real geopolitical interests of the country. The predominance of their broad interpretations was significantly influenced by the aspirations of the military-industrial complex, the capabilities of which in the early 70s made the export of arms to partner states a powerful political-forming factor. The United States, of course, did not remain indifferent. True, they still did not think about a clash with the USSR. American political science proposed an option for “asymmetrical” containment of Soviet advance. Measures were taken to increase indirect pressure on the Soviet Union from its long and vulnerable East Asian borders. Building on the success of US-Chinese normalization, the Carter administration began to work to consolidate China in a position of opposition to the USSR, maintaining a consistently high level of their mutual hostility. At the same time, American diplomacy helped to “strengthen the rear” of the PRC, helping to improve Sino-Japanese relations, which were developing sharply in an upward direction with the rapid cooling of Japan’s ties with the Soviet Union. Things got to the point that by the end of the 70s, in some of the Soviet political-forming spheres, there was an opinion that the Chinese, or rather the combined Chinese-American, threat had become the main challenge to the security of the Soviet Union. Theoretically, this danger far outweighed all conceivable and unimaginable threats to US security from Soviet activity in the Third World. Closed archives do not allow us to judge how seriously American leaders might have considered the possibility of a conflict of this configuration. J. Carter's clear attempt to distance himself from China at the time of its military conflict with Vietnam in 1979 does not incline one to overestimate the prospects for the then US-China strategic partnership. Another thing is indisputable: tension on the eastern border did not allow the Soviet Union to suspend its arms buildup, despite the improving situation in Europe and the presence of strategic parity with the United States. At the same time, Moscow’s high defense spending was taken into account by the American side, which formulated the concept of economic exhaustion of the USSR. This idea was also prompted by the shocks that gripped international relations in the mid-70s, the “oil shock” of 1973-1974, which was repeated in 1979-1980. It was this that turned out to be the pressure that prompted part of the international community, which relied on the import of cheap oil, to switch, through enormous effort, to energy- and resource-saving models of economic growth in 6-7 years, abandoning the long-term practice of wasting natural reserves. Against the backdrop of relatively high global stability, issues of reducing the economic vulnerability of states, ensuring their industrial growth and production efficiency have shifted to the center of world politics. These parameters began to more clearly define the role and status of states. Japan and West Germany began to move into the ranks of the first figures in world politics. Qualitative changes showed that since 1974 the world system entered a period of preferential economic regulation. The drama of the situation was that the USSR, relying on self-sufficiency in energy resources, missed the opportunity to restart research programs aimed at a new stage of the production and technological revolution. This predetermined the decline of Moscow's role in governing the world - a decline proportional to the weakening of its economic and technical and economic capabilities. The 1975 meeting in Helsinki, which formally crowned the first détente, took place at a time when the trend towards improving Soviet-American understanding was already running out of steam. The inertia lasted for several more years. Anti-Shah revolution in Iran and the beginning Afghan war They outlined only the formal outline of events that had already become a fact of failure of détente. Since the beginning of the 80s, international tensions have sharply increased, under which the West was able to realize its technological advantages accumulated in the wave of developments in the second half of the 70s. The struggle for the economic exhaustion of the USSR through its scientific and technological isolation has entered a decisive stage. The severe crisis of governance within the Soviet Union, which from 1982 to 1985 took on the cartoonish form of “leapfrog of the general secretaries,” combined with the end of the era of expensive oil, which turned into budget ruin for the USSR due to a sharp reduction in revenues, completed the matter. Having come to power in the spring of 1985, M.S. Gorbachev had no other rational alternative in foreign policy except the transition to global negotiations on a coordinated revision of the “Yalta-Potsdam order.” The discussion was about transforming the confrontational version of bipolarity into a cooperative one, since the Soviet Union was unable to continue the confrontation with the United States and other powers. But it was clear that the United States would not agree so easily to the “perestroika on a global scale” scenario proposed by Moscow. It was necessary to agree on the conditions under which the West, the United States first of all, would agree to guarantee the USSR, albeit somewhat less than before, but a paramountly important and honorable place in the international hierarchy. In fact, five or six years were devoted to the search for a mutually acceptable price before M.S. Gorbachev was deprived of presidential power at the end of 1991. This price, as far as can be judged by the unprecedentedly increased political authority of the Soviet Union - against the backdrop of the obvious weakening of its capabilities - in was basically found. He actually achieved the right to non-discriminatory cooperation with the West while maintaining his privileged global status. Despite the fact that the reasons for this were not indisputable, for example, against the background of the artificial exclusion of new economic giants, primarily Japan, from the decisive world-political role. Perestroika diplomacy won its round of the struggle for a place in the world, even if the price for winning was the unification of Germany and the refusal in 1989 to support communist regimes in the countries of the former of Eastern Europe . The position of the USSR, taken at the beginning of 1991, regarding the suppression of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by the armed forces of the United States and a number of other Western states, acting under UN sanctions, was a kind of testing of the new Soviet-American understanding on participation in international governance with the asymmetry of the functions of each from the powers. This new role of the USSR was obviously very different from its position in pre-perestroika times, when a ceremonial, more than once failing, almost ritualized and lengthy coordination of opinions was considered the standard. But even in the new conditions, the Soviet Union retained a fairly influential role as a key partner of the United States, without which world governance was impossible. However, this model was not given the opportunity to earn its full potential. As a result of the radicalization of internal processes in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Yalta-Potsdam order fell apart, and the international system began to slide towards deregulation. Section I. FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR Chapter 1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS (1917 - 1918) The final stage of the world war was characterized by three fundamental features. First, there were clear signs of economic exhaustion on both sides of the front line. The logistical, financial and human resources of the warring parties were at their limit. This primarily concerned Russia and Germany as the countries that most intensively spent their vital resources during the fighting. Secondly, both in the Entente and in the Austro-German bloc there were quite serious sentiments in favor of ending the war. This created a real possibility of attempts to conclude a separate peace in one configuration or another. The problem of the destruction of the united allied front was so acute that on August 23 (September 5), 1914, France, Great Britain and Russia signed a special Agreement in London on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which was supplemented there on November 17 (30), 1915 by a separate Declaration of the Allied Powers, including Italy and Japan, on the non-conclusion of a separate peace. But even after this, keeping the Romanov Empire in the war remained the most important international political task of the bloc of opponents of Germany, since - it was obvious - without Russian support, the Western European participants in the anti-German alliance alone were unable to provide themselves with the necessary military-power advantage over the Quadruple Alliance. Thirdly, in Russia, and partly in Germany and Austria-Hungary, during the World War there was a sharp aggravation of the socio-political situation. Under the influence of military difficulties, the working classes, national minorities, as well as a significant part of the elite strata opposed both the war in general and their own governments, which demonstrated their inability to achieve military victory. The growth of anti-government sentiment in these countries had a significant impact on their foreign policy and the general international situation. The war turned out to be an unbearable burden for the economies and socio-political systems of the warring parties. Their ruling circles clearly underestimated the danger of social explosions. 1. The strategic situation and balance of forces in the world by the beginning of 1917. Despite the enormous efforts and sacrifices that, during two and a half years of bloody battles on the fronts of Europe, Asia and Africa, were sacrificed on the altar of victory by the peoples of the two opposing coalitions, in the winter of 1916- 1917 The prospects for ending the war seemed still quite unclear to contemporaries. The Entente, which was based on a military alliance of five leading powers - Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, undoubtedly surpassed the bloc of the Central Powers consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria in manpower and logistics. But this superiority was, to a certain extent, compensated by the extensive territorial gains of the Austro-German bloc, the uninterrupted functioning of the transport communications system and better coordination of joint actions within the Quadruple Alliance. A series of inter-allied conferences held by members of the Entente coalition in 1915-1916 made it possible to qualitatively improve the interaction of Petrograd, Paris and London for the complete defeat of the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his allies. However, the contradictions between the leading participants in the anti-German bloc, which emerged in the initial period of the World War and were associated with the foreign policy programs of each of the allied countries, continued to have a negative impact on strengthening the ranks of the Entente. 2. Contradictions in the ranks of the Entente These contradictions were caused by the clash of demands of each of the Entente powers to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance in the form of territorial acquisitions (annexations) for themselves and patronized small European states (Belgium, Denmark, Serbia), providing various trade and economic benefits and receiving compensation for damage caused (indemnities) from the defeated enemy. For example, the maximum foreign policy program of the Russian imperial government provided for the “correction” of the Russian borders in East Prussia and Galicia, the establishment of control over the Black Sea straits, the unification of all Polish lands, including their German and Austro-Hungarian parts, under the scepter of the Romanov dynasty, the annexation of Armenian-populated and partly by the Kurds of the regions of Asian Turkey, as well as a significant expansion of the territory of Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and Schleswig and Holstein to Denmark. This essentially implied the fragmentation of the Hohenzollern Empire, the reduction of Germany to the scale of the former Prussia and a return to the map of Europe in the mid-19th century. Relying on the support of Paris in the matter of radically weakening Germany, Russian diplomacy, however, faced in this matter the more than cautious position of London, which primarily sought to eliminate the naval power of the Kaiser's Reich and, consequently, to destroy the German fleet and divide the German colonies in Africa and Asia. As for Europe, the British intended to annex the Rhine regions of Germany to Belgium or Luxembourg, and not to their ally France. At the same time, the cool attitude of Paris towards Russia’s plans to seize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which became an unpleasant surprise for tsarist diplomacy at the initial stage of the war, was balanced by London’s agreement in principle to the implementation of this “Russian historical task”, which the Russian Foreign Minister unexpectedly easily obtained from the British government S.D. Sazonov in March 1915. The disagreements between London and Paris on the issue of the left bank of the Rhine were obvious. France demanded at a minimum the creation of a buffer zone there under its unlimited influence, and Great Britain believed that such a decision would lead to an unjustifiably excessive weakening of Germany and allow Paris to claim hegemony on the mainland. In this situation, by the end of the war, an informal bloc had formed between Russia and France, sealed on February 1 (14) and February 26 (March 11), 1917, by an exchange of letters between Petrograd and Paris. In accordance with a confidential agreement, both powers promised each other mutual support in establishing their future borders with Germany, without informing London. The disagreements between Great Britain, France and Russia regarding the post-war settlement in the Middle and Middle East turned out to be quite significant. Far East . The discussion was about the principles of dividing the “Turkish inheritance” and the fate of the German possessions in China that fell into the hands of Japan. Regarding the first problem, Russia and Great Britain were concerned about the excessive territorial claims of the French in Syria, and the second - about the Japanese in China. In addition, the London cabinet, unlike the Paris one, was suspicious of the formalization of the Russian-Japanese military-political alliance on June 20 (July 3), 1916, rightly seeing it as a means of belittling the importance of the Japanese-British alliance of 1902, which was one of the pillars British policy in East Asia. On the issue of the territories of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Arabs, London and Paris hardly reached an agreement on the delimitation of interests only in May 1916 (the Sykes-Picot agreement, named after the British delegate at the negotiations, Mark Sykes, and the French delegate, Georges Picot). At the same time, both powers recognized Russia’s right to Turkish Armenia as compensation for its agreement with the terms of the French-British partition. Italy and Romania also counted on territorial acquisitions from fragments of Austro-Hungarian possessions, which after long calculations considered it more profitable for themselves to join the Entente. And yet, at the conferences of representatives of the Allied armies, first in Chantilly (November 1916), and then in Petrograd (January-February 1917), a spirit of optimism reigned. Neither the growing fatigue of the broad masses from the sacrifices and hardships of the war, nor the expanding activities of pacifists and extreme left organizations, which in 1916 gave rise to the first anti-government protests on the territory of the powers of the "Cardiac Accord", nor the rise of the national liberation struggle in the colonies could "spoil the mood" leaders of the Entente, who decided to launch a general offensive on all fronts in the spring of 1917, having 425 divisions against 331 enemy divisions. The statement of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II, made in a conversation with one of the governors just a month before the February Revolution, is typical: “Militarily, we are stronger than ever. Soon, in the spring, there will be an offensive, and I believe that God will give us victory ..." 3. Attempts to turn towards a peaceful settlement Certain hopes of Petrograd, Paris and London for achieving a decisive turning point in the war were also associated with received information about the economic exhaustion of Germany and Austria-Hungary, whose ruling circles in December 1916 made a proposal for peace negotiations. At the same time, they took into account the real state of affairs at the fronts by this time. Berlin and Vienna intended to conduct a dialogue with their opponents on the basis of recognition of the territorial seizures of the Central Powers, which could mark the beginning of the practical implementation of the pan-German plans to create a Central European political and economic union under the auspices of Germany. To this were added demands for the establishment of a new border with Russia, German guardianship over Belgium and the provision of new colonies to Germany. It must be said that all the years of the war were marked by mutual diplomatic probes and demarches by members of the opposing blocs. At the same time, successes or failures on the fronts, as a rule, intensified the efforts of the “creators of armchair diplomacy” on both sides, who sought to attract “fresh” states to their camp. Thus, it was as a result of complex behind-the-scenes bargaining that Italy (in 1915) and Romania (in 1916) joined the Entente, and Turkey (in October 1914) and Bulgaria (in 1915) joined the bloc of the Central Powers. In December 1916, the situation seemed to favor the maneuver of the Kaiser's diplomacy. After the defeat of Serbia and Romania, the Balkan Peninsula came under the control of the Quadruple Alliance, which opened the way for the German armies to the Middle East. In the Entente countries, the food crisis worsened, caused by crop failure and interruptions in the supply of colonial raw materials to the metropolises. On the other hand, the restrained attitude of Great Britain and France towards US attempts to impose on Europeans their own vision of the goals and objectives of the war, based on the rejection of the concept of “balance of power” and recognition of democracy as criteria for the international order, collective security and self-determination of nations (a note from US President Woodrow Wilson dated December 18, 1916), allowed Berlin to use the stalemate on the French and Russian fronts for its own, albeit propaganda, purposes. Thus, in December 1916, the Entente members, who had just agreed on broad offensive plans, were faced with the need to give an adequate response to the peace initiatives of not only Germany, but also the United States. If in relation to Berlin the allies focused on exposing the hypocrisy of the Kaiser's diplomacy, then in their address to the US President they emphasized the unanimous desire of the anti-German coalition to reorganize Europe on the principle of national self-determination and the right of peoples to free economic development, the basis for which was to be the defeat of the Central Powers. “Peace cannot be durable unless it is based on the victory of the Allies,” summed up the position of the Entente members, Lord Arthur Balfour, who at that time replaced Edward Gray as head of the British Foreign Office. 4. The February Revolution in Russia and changes in the international situation Two of the most important events of this year were, perhaps, the decisive factors in the radical transformation of the world order, which received its legal justification in the documents of the Paris Conference of 1919-1920: revolutionary events in Russia and the entry into the war of the United States of America on the side of anti-German forces. Initially, the news of the February Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd caused a wary reaction on the banks of the Seine and Thames, although it seemed that after the overthrow of the monarchical regime, the Entente propaganda machine received an additional argument, since from now on this bloc acted in the eyes of the world community as an alliance democracies who fight for the freedom of peoples oppressed by the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires, Sultan Turkey and Tsarist Bulgaria. In addition, Paris and London could finally breathe a sigh of relief regarding rumors about secret contacts between the court camarilla of Nicholas II and German emissaries in attempts to conclude a Russian-German separate peace. The Entente leaders were given some hope for Russia's continuation of the war by the declaration of the Provisional Government outlining the foreign policy program of March 27 (April 9), and especially the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. N. Milyukov, sent on April 18 (May 1) to all Entente powers. True, already in these documents there was a certain shift in emphasis towards the transition from the classical logic of territorial reorganization based on the policy of “balance of power” and “European equilibrium” to “revolutionary defencism” and the rejection of the “forcible seizure of foreign territories,” although the “confidence in the victorious end of this war in full agreement with the allies." At the same time, at this stage the Provisional Government refused to accept the demand of the Petrograd Council to proclaim the goal of the new Russia to be peace without annexations and indemnities while respecting the right of peoples to self-determination. The government crisis that followed led to the resignation of Miliukov himself and Minister of War A.I. Guchkov. The reorganized cabinet, which included representatives of the socialist parties, accepted the peace formula of the Petrograd Soviet. This change in priorities was noticeable in the message of the Provisional Government (in which the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs had already been transferred to M.I. Tereshchenko) dated April 22 (May 5), 1917, with an explanation of Miliukov’s note. New accents in the Russian position, combined with signs of a crisis in the Russian military-industrial complex with the progressive weakening of the central government in the country, seriously worried France and Great Britain. Perhaps only in Washington until the fall of 1917 did they continue to harbor illusions about the possibility of “reanimating” Russian military power through new financial injections, reorganization of transport and the activities of numerous charitable organizations sent from overseas to Russia. The beginning of the decline in trust in the Russian ally was observed already in March - April 1917, when at meetings of Entente leaders without the participation of representatives of the Provisional Government, the issue of taking measures to prevent Russia from leaving the war was discussed. A clear symptom of her diminishing weight in the ranks of “Cardent Accord” was the decision to detail, without agreeing with her, the map of the division of Turkey in order to provide Italy with territories lying in the previously agreed upon zone of Russian interests off the Aegean coast of Asia Minor (Dodecanese Islands). The failure of A.F. Kerensky's summer offensive and the crushing counterattack of the German-Austrian troops near Tarnopol finally buried the Entente's plans to achieve a speedy victory. The situation could not be saved by China's declaration of war on Germany in August 1917, especially since the anti-government uprising in Turin and the preparation of the Austrian offensive against Italy (which took place in October of the same year) threatened to remove another Entente member from the game, as happened with Romania, which in January 1918, after a crushing military defeat, withdrew from the war and later signed a separate Bucharest Peace Treaty with Germany on May 7, 1918. Thus, the only way out of this situation for the Entente was to involve the United States of America in the war on its side. 5. US entry into the war The United States entered the conflict on March 24 (April 6), 1917, citing the unacceptability of the policy of unlimited submarine warfare proclaimed by Germany on January 31, 1917. This was preceded by dramatic collisions and behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvers. The point was not only that by the spring of 1917 Washington realized the impossibility of further maintaining a neutral status. US President William Wilson also hoped to take advantage of the situation to deliver a decisive blow to the old, pre-war world order, which doomed the overseas republic to a peripheral, secondary role in the system of international relations. Entering the war, the United States did not formally join the Entente alliance, but only declared itself an associate member. Thanks to this, the American leadership remained legally free from any inter-allied mutual wartime obligations, including those related to territorial reorganization, annexations, etc. The Entente experienced an increasing need for American assistance not only in finance and military materials, but also in manpower. However, Wilson's declared US goals in the war contradicted the traditional European concept of the "balance of power" even at the cost of violating the rights of peoples to self-determination. Indeed, according to the Washington administration, the reason for the instability of the pre-war world order was not precisely the difficulties on the way to achieving balance, but the constant violation by the great powers of the principle of self-determination of nations, the observance of which, according to Wilson, could in itself ensure the stability of the world order. That is why the United States proposed the creation of a new permanent international collective security body that would ensure the fair resolution of international disputes on the basis of a certain set of agreed upon principles, including the principle of self-determination of nations. First, in confidential diplomatic correspondence, and then in public speeches of the American president, the projected institution was called the League of Nations. From Wilson's point of view, this organization, the first of its kind in history, was supposed to represent "a universal association of nations for the maintenance of the unimpaired security of the sea routes, the general, unrestricted use of them by all states of the world, and for the prevention of all wars, started either in violation of treaty obligations, or without warning, with the complete subordination of all issues under consideration to world public opinion..." It is quite clear that Washington’s declaration of such, in the opinion of Paris and London, abstract tasks of the post-war world order, far from the real situation on the fronts, is not aroused enthusiasm among Western European leaders - French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who sought to “replace” Russia with the United States as quickly as possible in building up joint military efforts. Paris and London were prompted to this by the deteriorating situation in the rear, the growth of the strike movement and the activation of pacifist organizations, partly under the influence of the Vatican’s initiative on August 1, 1917 for mediation between the warring powers. At the same time, faced with attempts by the Allies to renegotiate the specific terms of a future peace treaty with the Central Powers at the expense of Russian interests in Europe and the Middle East, the Provisional Government took a series of diplomatic steps towards rapprochement with the United States, seeking to rely on its military-economic assistance and enlist the assistance of the Wilson administration in achieving foreign policy goals. This was evidenced by the exchange between the two countries of emergency missions led by special representatives Elihu Ruth and B.A. Bakhmetev, which took place in the summer of 1917. The rapid deterioration of the internal political situation and the acute economic crisis in Russia against the backdrop of the collapse of the Eastern Front and the Russian army in the fall of the same years forced the Entente and the United States to develop an agreement on coordinating their activities to preserve within the bloc an ally that had become unreliable. Thus, Great Britain was tasked with “supervising” maritime transportation for Russia, France with maintaining the combat capability of the army, and the United States with rail transport. The Provisional Government itself was intensively preparing for the next inter-allied conference in Paris (November 1917). ), active participation in which was supposed to once again demonstrate the desire of republican Russia for a common struggle to a victorious end. 6. October Revolution in Russia and the Bolshevik peace program (Peace Decree) The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks on October 25 (November 7), 1917 and the proclamation of the Peace Decree by the Second Congress of Soviets made significant adjustments to the development of international relations. For the first time since the Great French Revolution, a new government of one of the European great powers openly proclaimed the goal of overthrowing the existing social order on a worldwide scale. Adopted October 26 (November 8) II All-Russian Congress Soviets Lenin's Decree, which contained a proposal to cease hostilities and immediately begin negotiations on a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities based on the unconditional implementation of the principle of self-determination of nations, regardless of in which part of the world it will be implemented. Although this document made a reservation about the possibility of considering other conditions for ending the global conflict, the Bolshevik leadership as a whole was strictly oriented in the first months after the October coup, as follows from the speeches of its leaders and their practical steps in the international arena, towards inciting a world revolution and a revolutionary exit from the war of all nations. Under these conditions, the ranks of adherents of the old European social democracy and supporters of traditional liberal values ​​were split. A certain part of the public opinion of the warring states, neutral and dependent countries, was undoubtedly impressed by the call from Petrograd for an immediate end to the bloodbath and the Bolsheviks’ shift of attention to ensuring the rights of both large and small nations, not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. However, the radicalism of the Peace Decree program, the propaganda campaign launched on the pages of the Entente press against the Soviet government and the fear of general chaos and anarchy that would await Europe in the event of a victory of pro-communist forces along the “Russian model”, along with the patriotic, anti-German sentiments of the French and British contributed to much greater popularity of another program for exiting the war, proclaimed on December 26, 1917 (January 8, 1918) by US President William Wilson. 7. US Peace Program (Wilson’s 14 Points) This American “peace charter”, consisting of 14 points, should be considered as a kind of compromise between the annexationist projects of the participants of the opposing blocs and the Soviet Peace Decree (which was issued two months earlier), although there was It would be a mistake to believe that Wilson simply borrowed certain provisions from various sources without introducing anything new into them. The strength and appeal of Wilson's program lay in its relative moderation compared to the Bolshevik peace program. Wilson proposed a new international order and mechanisms for maintaining it. But he did not attempt to disrupt the socio-political structure of states in the process of creating some kind of global supranational community. The US leader's program was the fruit of many years of thought by the president, an analysis of the current situation by his closest aides and the recommendations of numerous experts. The first eight points that Wilson called "must-haves" included the principles of open diplomacy, freedom of navigation, general disarmament, the removal of barriers to trade, a fair settlement of colonial disputes, the re-establishment of Belgium, the withdrawal of troops from Russian territory and, most importantly, the establishment of a body for coordination of world politics - the League of Nations. The remaining six more specific provisions provided for the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, the granting of autonomy by the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the revision of the borders of Italy at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Balkans, the internationalization of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the creation of an independent Poland with access to Baltic Sea. As applied to Russia, Wilson's program contained a requirement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied Russian lands. In addition, she was guaranteed non-interference in internal affairs and full and unhindered opportunity to make an independent decision regarding her own political development and her national policy. Such a platform did not at all exclude a dialogue between the West and the Bolsheviks and the return of Russia to the international community. Thus, the post-war American-style world order was to be maintained not at the expense of the previous “balance of power” of the great European powers, which divided the world into spheres of influence, and not by creating a “world proletarian republic” without governments and borders, as the Bolsheviks proposed, but based on principles of democratic law and Christian morality that would ensure collective security and social progress. It is quite clear that such a vision new system international relations was disharmonious with the line of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who advocated that the Central Powers, and especially Germany, “pay in full all the bills presented.” Therefore, while verbally supporting Wilson's ideas, the ruling circles of Great Britain and France viewed the 14 points rather as a utopia designed to veil Washington's true goal - to acquire the position of global leader after the end of the war. 8. The factor of national self-determination in international relations and the politics of great powers The question of self-determination of the European and Asian peoples, who were primarily part of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires, occupied a very important place in international politics throughout the war. Even at the beginning of the war, Russia came up with the idea of ​​​​creating Czechs and Hungarians on the territories separated from Austria-Hungary (plan of Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov), transferring lands inhabited by South Slavic peoples to Serbia, as well as annexing Polish and Ukrainian possessions the Habsburg monarchy to Russia itself. In fact, this was the first attempt to base the territorial reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe on the limitedly interpreted, selectively applied principle of national self-determination in the spirit of 19th-century diplomacy and the classical understanding of the balance of power as the basis for the stability of international relations. This plan frightened France and Great Britain, since its implementation would lead to the complete destruction of Austria-Hungary and, more importantly, to a very significant strengthening of Russia’s geopolitical position in Europe. However, the Western allies were forced to agree to the future unification of Polish lands within Russia, subject to the provision of autonomy rights. Russia's allies, as well as its opponents in the person of Germany and Austria-Hungary, grasped the national liberation expectations of the peoples of Eastern Europe better than the Russian government. They sought to gain influence on the political organizations of nationalists and, if possible, attract to their side any national-patriotic forces and organizations and subjugate the national-revolutionary impulse, the potential of which became more and more impressive by the end of the war. Germany and Austria-Hungary actively used slogans of self-determination of Poles against Russia in the territories of the Kingdom of Poland seized during the occupation, as well as other lands inhabited by Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Latvians. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments provided measured support to Polish and Ukrainian nationalists, and the Austro-German troops sought to act as liberators of peoples from Russian domination. For its part, France also actively participated in the game with national-patriotic forces, whose capital by the end of the war became the de facto center of the Polish and Czech national movements. Both blocs competed intensely for the sympathy of nationalists. The national revolutionary factor would have been fully taken into account in the Bolshevik Peace Decree. However, the Bolsheviks rejected the selective implementation of the principle of self-determination of nations in the spirit of 19th century European politics. They declared it universal, applicable to all ethnic groups and all international political situations. In the Bolshevik interpretation, the principle of self-determination acquired an unlimited and extremely militant, combative character. Following the Decree, on November 15, 1917, the Bolsheviks issued the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which proclaimed (in accordance with the Bolshevik party program) the right of all peoples of the Romanov Empire to self-determination, up to and including secession. On December 3, 1917, the Bolsheviks also announced an Appeal to all working Muslims of Russia and the East, imbued with the revolutionary liberation spirit, which certainly indicated the desire of the Soviet government to lead the national liberation processes in both the West and the East, directing them in a revolutionary direction. Occupying by no means a primary place among the advocates of self-determination, US President William Wilson in his program, wittingly or unwittingly, synthesized the initiatives of his predecessors and interpreted the self-determination of nations in his own compromise (in relation to the Sazonov plan and the Bolshevik Decree). Wilson's interpretation downplayed the destructive charge inherent in the principle of self-determination and made it possible to count on the compatibility of the practice of self-determination with the specific interests of the most powerful world powers, including the United States itself and the “old imperial” powers represented by Great Britain and France. Therefore, the Wilsonian interpretation of self-determination eventually became the most famous and authoritative in the world. It became decisive for the construction of most nation-building programs until the 90s of the twentieth century. The entry into the war by the United States, which entailed the popularization of Wilson's program, contributed to increasing the role of the ethno-national and national-psychological components of international relations and all international negotiations regarding a new interstate order. Despite their wary attitude towards the principle of self-determination, Great Britain and France began to take it into account, pursuing their own interests whenever possible. 9. Peace initiatives of Soviet Russia and the reaction to them of the Entente countries and the Quadruple Alliance The Entente states, not without reason, saw in the Decree on Peace a threat of violation of the Agreement and Declaration of 1914 and 1915 on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, especially since already on November 6 (19), 1917 The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General N.N. Dukhonin, received an order from the Bolshevik government to immediately offer a truce to all states participating in the world war. Almost simultaneously, a note with proposals of similar content was presented to the ambassadors of the Entente countries in Russia on November 9 (22). After Dukhonin refused to obey the order, he was removed, and the Soviet government began negotiations with Germany on its own, relying on support from the masses of soldiers who, at the call of the Bolsheviks, began to take power in their places of deployment. The Allied Powers watched in confusion. The Central Powers, on the contrary, immediately appreciated the prospects of a separate peace with the Bolsheviks, and on November 14 (27), 1917, Germany agreed to enter into peace negotiations. On the same day, the Council of People's Commissars again sent its proposals to the Entente countries to take part in the peace conference. There was no response to this appeal, as well as to the previous and subsequent ones. Under these conditions, the Bolsheviks decided to agree to a truce with Germany. Brest-Litovsk, where the command of German troops on the Eastern Front was located, was chosen as the venue for armistice negotiations. The Soviet delegation was headed by A.A. Ioffe (a longtime ally of L.D. Trotsky). The German delegation was headed by General M. Hoffmann. The Bolsheviks' intention to negotiate on the basis of the principles set out in the Peace Decree was formally taken into account by the opposing side. But in reality, the German side preferred to consider only military and territorial problems. The work of the delegations continued with a break from November 20 (December 3) to December 2 (15), 1917. The parties reached a temporary agreement on the cessation of hostilities for a period of 28 days. 10. Separate negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Austro-German bloc in Brest-Litovsk Negotiations directly on a peace treaty between Russia and Germany with its allies in Brest-Litovsk opened on December 9 (22), 1917. Germany played the leading role at the peace conference. Its delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann, and the Austro-Hungarian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin. The head of the delegation of Soviet Russia was still A.A. Ioffe. Based on the principles set out in the Peace Decree, the Russian delegation put forward a program for peace negotiations consisting of the following six points. "1) No forcible annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed. Troops occupying these territories are withdrawn from there as soon as possible. 2) The political independence of those peoples who were deprived of this independence during the present war is restored in full. 3) National groups that did not enjoy political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide on their belonging to one or another state or on their state independence through a referendum... 4) In relation to territories inhabited by several nationalities, the right of a minority is protected by special laws ensuring it is given cultural and national independence and, if it is actually possible, administrative autonomy. 5) None of the warring countries is obliged to pay so-called “military costs” to other countries... 6) Colonial issues are resolved in compliance with the principles set forth in points 1, 2, 3 and 4". The Soviet program was based on the ideas of peace without annexations and indemnities and the right of nations to self-determination. It was addressed, rather, to the working people of European states and peoples seeking to gain independence, and was supposed to stimulate the development of revolutionary and national liberation movements. Russia wanted to avoid accusations of a separate deal with Germany, and it tried to at least formally and indirectly involve the Entente countries in the negotiations. The powers of the Quadruple Alliance accepted the rules of the game and also decided to use them for propaganda purposes. On December 12 (25), they stated that the conditions of the Russian delegation could be implemented if all powers participating in the war undertake to comply with them. This reservation was made with the understanding that the Entente countries, which negatively regard separate negotiations between Russia and Germany, would not discuss Russian program , as it happened. Territorial issues were the main ones at the conference. Each side interpreted the peace formula without annexations and indemnities from the point of view of its interests. Soviet - proposed to withdraw Russian troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia they occupied, and the troops of the Quadruple Alliance - from Poland, Lithuania and Courland and other regions of Russia. Promising to let the population of Poland and the Baltic states independently decide on the issue of state structure, the Bolshevik leadership counted on the establishment of Soviet power there in the near future. The preservation of these lands in the orbit of German influence would exclude such a possibility. The German delegates refused to withdraw troops from Poland and the Baltic provinces, citing the declarations of the Bolsheviks themselves and their recognition of the principle of self-determination of the peoples of the former Tsarist Russia. In Germany's interpretation, the principle of self-determination in relation to Poland and the Baltic peoples had already been put into practice on lands occupied by German troops, with the agreement of the German military authorities and the local population. In response, the Russian side objected, pointing out the need for an open expression of the will of the population of the occupied territories regarding their self-determination with the mandatory preliminary withdrawal of occupation forces. Due to the seriousness of the differences, issues of territorial structure were even excluded from the preliminary draft of the treaty. On December 15 (28), 1917, at the proposal of the Bolsheviks, a ten-day break was announced in the negotiations in order to allow other states to join them. The delegations left Brest-Litovsk for consultations. The Bolsheviks delayed the negotiation process, believing that a revolution was about to occur in Germany, and this would significantly weaken its negotiating position. 11. The Ukrainian question at the Brest-Litovsk Conference Work resumed on December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918). The Russian delegation was headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. At the first meeting, R. von Kühlmann stated that since over the past time the Entente countries have not accepted the peace formula proposed by Russia without annexations and indemnities, the Quadruple Alliance will not negotiate on its basis. The separate nature of the settlement in Brest-Litovsk was finally revealed. To put pressure on the Russian delegation, Germany and Austria-Hungary began to use the claims of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the formation of an independent Ukraine. This body, representing the interests of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties in Ukraine, was created back in March 1917. , immediately after the February revolution in Petrograd, but in reality had no power. However, in the wake of the events after the October Bolshevik coup on November 3 (16), 1917, the General Secretariat of the Rada proclaimed it the body of state power throughout Ukraine. On November 7 (20), 1917, the Central Rada, headed by M.S. Grushevsky, V.K. Vinnychenko and S.V. Petlyura, published the III Universal, which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). On November 11 (24), 1917, Petlyura, who headed the armed forces of the new regime, stated that the Central Rada did not recognize the powers of the Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd and was taking the initiative to form a new central government for all of Russia from “representatives of nationalities and centers of revolutionary democracy.” Provoking rivalry between the Bolshevik government in Petrograd and the Central Rada in Kyiv, the Austro-German bloc blackmailed the Council of People's Commissars with the threat of involving the Kyiv delegation in the negotiations. Meanwhile, in Ukraine there was a struggle between the nationalist movements of supporters of the Rada (based in Kyiv) and supporters of the Soviet regime (whose forces were concentrated in the Kharkov region). Moreover, the leaders of the Rada tried to find support simultaneously from both the Entente and the Quadruple Alliance. Heading to Brest-Litovsk, they hoped that the German army would help them establish themselves in power. At the same time, the leaders of the Rada claimed to annex to Ukraine part of the Kholm province of the former Kingdom of Poland that was part of Russia (Kholm Rus or Zabuzhye, where a significant Ukrainian population lived) and the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. The latest demands inevitably pitted the Ukrainian delegation against Austria-Hungary. If its demands were met, the Rada was ready to provide the Central Powers with food, ore and agree to the establishment of foreign control over the railways passing through Ukraine. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), even before the resumption of negotiations, the delegation of the Central Rada arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where its confidential consultations began with representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The latter did not have a common position on the Ukrainian issue. Austria-Hungary did not agree either to the transfer of Bukovina and Galicia, or to the separation of the Kholm region. Meanwhile, the Rada’s claims to Polish-Ukrainian lands were skillfully used by the German delegation to put pressure on the Austrian delegation, which, due to the internal instability of the situation in Austria-Hungary, was much more interested in concluding a speedy peace with Russia than Germany. The difficulties in the “Polish-Ukrainian” issue were partly due to the fact that the German high command objected to the transfer of Polish lands to anyone and insisted on their complete annexation to Germany. The position of the head of the German delegation to Germany, von Kühlmann, was more cautious; he objected to open annexation and preferred to talk about some version of an “amicable” agreement, which, without formally including Polish territories in Germany, would allow for unlimited German influence on them. On the eve of the discussion of the most complex territorial problems on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Central Powers put the Ukrainian question on the agenda. It concerned the status of the Rada. The head of its delegation, V. Golubovich, made a statement on this matter. He emphasized that Ukraine is entering into international relations as an independent state, and therefore at the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic is completely independent. At the same time, trying to soften the severity of his statement, Golubovich emphasized that the independence of Ukraine he declared does not exclude any form of state unification of Russia and Ukraine in the future. The note read by him from the General Secretariat of the UPR to all warring and neutral powers said: “Striving to create a federal union of all the republics that have arisen at the moment on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Ukrainian People’s Republic, represented by the General Secretariat, is taking the path of independent international relations before time until a nationwide federal connection is created in Russia and international representation is divided between the government of the Ukrainian Republic and the federal government of the future Federation." Golubovich's reservations were explained by the fact that the territory actually controlled by the Rada was steadily shrinking under the blows of the Kharkov Soviet government, which was supported by Petrograd. The Kyiv leaders were afraid to make a complete break with the Bolsheviks, but at the same time the weakness of the Rada’s internal political positions forced it to seek international recognition at any cost in order to quickly obtain official status and seek help from foreign states. The Soviet delegation found itself in a difficult position. If the independent status of the Central Rada delegation was not recognized by the government in Petrograd, Germany would receive formal grounds to conduct separate negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation, which would actually mean the formation of an anti-Russian Ukrainian-German bloc. But if the Rada’s claims were supported, then the Council of People’s Commissars would actually agree not only with the idea of ​​Ukrainian independence, but also with the fact that this new independent Ukraine would be represented by the Central Rada government hostile to the Bolsheviks, and not by the friendly Soviet leadership of Ukraine in Kharkov. Trotsky chose the middle option - to agree to the participation of Rada delegates in the negotiations, but not to recognize the Rada as the government of Ukraine. Kühlmann, who chaired the meeting that day, tried to get from the Soviet delegation a more complete explanation of the official position of the Russian side, but Trotsky evaded him. However, on December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918), Count Chernin made a general statement on behalf of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. Defining the status of the delegation of the Central Rada and its government, he stated: “We recognize the Ukrainian delegation as an independent delegation and as an authorized representative of the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. Formally, recognition by the Quadruple Alliance of the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent state will be expressed in a peace treaty." 12. Problems of Poland and the Baltic states. "Hoffmann Line" Along with Ukraine great importance The Soviet delegation attached importance to the future of the outlying provinces of the former Russian Empire. In the very first days after the resumption of the conference, it was proposed to discuss territorial issues. The main disagreements concerned Poland, Lithuania and Courland. On December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918), the Bolsheviks formulated their demands on controversial issues. They insisted that Germany and Austria-Hungary confirm that they had no intentions to seize any territories of the former Russian Empire from Soviet Russia.

M.: 2010. - 520 p.

This textbook is a development of the second volume of the two-volume “Systemic History of International Relations” edited by A.D. Bogaturov. Corrected and supplemented, restructured presentation of the material is given in accordance with the needs of the teacher and student experience educational process at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. The book is reinforced with methodological appendices (chronology, index), and the text provides definitions of key concepts.

The textbook maintains a systematic approach to the study of the history of international relations, focusing on the development and gradual degradation of the Yalta-Potsdam order, the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of a new world order. The development of the situation in regional subsystems is also considered - in Europe, East Asia, the Near and Middle East, and Latin America. In the period after 1991, priority attention is paid to Russian foreign policy.

The publication is addressed to a wide range of readers, primarily students, undergraduates and graduate students who are preparing to take an exam in the history of international relations, as well as everyone who is interested in the history of Russian foreign policy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 7
Introduction 12
Section I FORMATION OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM (1945-1953)
Chapter 1. Main features of the Yalta-Potsdam order (Yalta-Potsdam system) 15
Chapter 2. Formation of the foundations of global economic and political regulation after the Second World War 19
Chapter 3. Decisions of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition on the German question in 1945 24
Chapter 4. Foreign policy strategy of the USSR after the war. Ideology and reality 28
Chapter 5. The first crises " cold war» (Greece, Türkiye, Iran) 30
Chapter 6. The emergence of the concept of “containing the USSR” and its official formalization in the “Truman Doctrine” 35
Chapter 7. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War 38
Chapter 8. The Fall of the Colonial System in Southeast Asia 47
Chapter 9. The German question in 1946-1947. and peace treaties with Germany's former allies in Europe 50
Chapter 10. The emergence of India and Pakistan. First Indo-Pakistani War 53
Chapter 11. The Palestinian problem after World War II and the formation of the State of Israel 57
Chapter 12. “The Marshall Plan” and its international political significance 61
Chapter 13. Communization of Central and Eastern Europe by the end of the 1940s 66
Chapter 14. The formation of security structures in the West (1947-1949) (Western European Union, NATO) 74
Chapter 15. “The First Berlin Crisis” and its International Significance 78
Chapter 16. Formation of the PRC and the split of China: 82
Chapter 17. Consolidation of the split in Germany: the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR 87
Chapter 18. The beginning of European integration: the ECSC and the “Pleven plan”. The problem of including Germany in Western security structures 88
Chapter 19. Prospects for the national communist revolution in Asia. The Korean War and its International Consequences 93
Chapter 20. Preparation for the San Francisco Conference and its results 100
Section II CONTRADICTIONS OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM: OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (1953-1962)
Chapter 21. Development of new approaches of the USSR in foreign policy after the change of power. Anti-communist protests in the GDR 107
Chapter 22. The concept of “throwing away communism.” Its political and military components 112
Chapter 23. Creation of the Department of Internal Affairs and Germany’s entry into NATO (1955) 116
Chapter 24. Bandung and Belgrade conferences. Asian and African Solidarity Movement and Non-Aligned Movement 120
Chapter 25. The concept of “peaceful coexistence” and the crisis in the socialist community 123
Chapter 26. The Suez crisis and its international consequences 132
Chapter 27. The Treaty of Rome and the creation of the EEC. Integration processes in Western Europe 135
Chapter 28. The Second Berlin Crisis. Soviet-American relations... 138
Chapter 29. The Agile Framework 145
Chapter 30. The Cuban Missile Crisis and its International Consequences 149
Section III FIRST STAGE OF CONFRONTATIONAL STABILITY: DETENTE AND STABILIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1962-1975)
Chapter 31. The emergence of confrontational stability in the 1960s. Negotiations on arms control in 1963-1968. 155
Chapter 32. Turn of France and Germany to the East. France's exit from military organization NATO and the “new Ostpolitik” of Germany.... 162
Chapter 33. Contradictions of Western European integration and the first expansion of the EEC 170
Chapter 34. The Middle East conflict in 1967-1973. and the first “oil shock” 174
Chapter 35. The situation within the socialist community in the 1960s. Events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the “doctrine of socialist internationalism” 185
Chapter 36. Soviet-American agreements of 1969-1974 191
Chapter 37. The Soviet-Chinese conflict in the 1960s. China's place in the world in the 1960s and early 1970s 197
Chapter 38. Normalization of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan and the position of the USSR on the issue of the Joint Declaration of 1956.. 204
Chapter 39. Pan-European process and main provisions of the Helsinki Act 208
Chapter 40. The US War in Vietnam and its international consequences (1965-1973) 216
Section IV SECOND STAGE OF CONFRONTATIONAL STABILITY: CRISIS OF DETENTE AND RESUME OF BIPOLAR CONFRONTATION (1975-1985)
Chapter 41. Formation of mechanisms of world political regulation in conditions of the “energy crisis” (1973-1974). World petrodollar cycle 225
Chapter 42. Creation of a network of partnership relations between the USSR and African countries. Expansion of the military-political presence of the USSR in the world 230
Chapter 43. Human rights issues and its impact on Soviet-American relations and the pan-European process... 236
Chapter 44. The role of Vietnam in Indochina. Conflicts between China and Vietnam, Cambodian conflict 243
Chapter 45. The formation of “triangular” relations between the USSR-USA-PRC and the situation in East Asia in the late 1970s 247
Chapter 46. The emergence of a special foreign policy line for the countries of Southeast Asia: neutralism and economic regionalism 250
Chapter 47. Conflicts around Palestine and Lebanon 256
Chapter 48. Escalation of conflicts in the Middle East: Iran and Afghanistan in 1977-1980. The problem of foreign interference 263
Chapter 49. The collapse of détente and NATO’s “dual solution” 271
Chapter 50. Conflicts within zones of influence of superpowers: the Polish crisis and the Central American conflict 275
Chapter 51. US foreign policy approaches in the first half of the 1980s. Foreign policy strategy of the USSR 280
Chapter 52. A new round of the arms race and the economic and ideological exhaustion of the USSR 287
Section V THE COLLAPSE OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM (1985-1996)
Chapter 53. New political thinking and international relations of the Soviet Union 294
Chapter 54. The pan-European process and the changing attitude of the USSR to human rights issues 298
Chapter 55. Curtailment of Soviet foreign policy activity: settlement of Central American, Afghan and African conflicts 302
Chapter 56. The new policy of the USSR in East Asia 308
Chapter 57. “Doctrine of non-intervention” by M. S. Gorbachev and anti-communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe 313
Chapter 58. Complex of international disarmament agreements (INF Treaty, CFE Treaty, START-1) 321
Chapter 59. International consequences of the self-destruction of the USSR and the emergence of the CIS 325
Chapter 60. Middle East peace settlement in the late 1980s - first half of the 1990s 335
Chapter 61. Accelerating European integration: Maastricht Treaty 341
Chapter 62. Conflicts in the post-socialist space: the collapse of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Afghanistan 344
Chapter 63. Formation of the CIS. The problem of the nuclear legacy of the USSR 352
Chapter 64. Conflicts in Tajikistan, Transcaucasia and Moldova 357
Chapter 65. The concept of “expanding democracy.” The UN crisis and mechanisms of informal regulation of international relations 371
Chapter 66. Russian-American relations in the 1990s. The Bosnian conflict and the first NATO intervention in the Balkans 375
Section VI THE FORMATION OF A UNIPOLAR WORLD (1996-2008)
Chapter 67. Globalization and humanitarian interventions 385
Chapter 68. Changes in Russia’s international positions in connection with the first NATO expansion 392
Chapter 69. Freezing conflicts in the CIS 396
Chapter 70. Conflict in the Serbian region of Kosovo and the second NATO intervention in the Balkans, interethnic conflict in Macedonia 404
Chapter 71. Problems around the CFE Treaty, Russia-NATO relations and growing disagreements on the problem of creating a missile defense system in Europe 410
Chapter 72. Caucasian conflict node: Chechnya, Russian-Georgian relations and the “five-day war” of August 2008 419
Chapter 73. Deepening Russian-Chinese cooperation and development of the SCO 427
Chapter 74. Development of conflict in the Middle East and South Asia 430
Chapter 75. Religious extremism and transnational terrorism. September 2001 events in the USA 440
Chapter 76. Integration trends in Northern and South America 445
Chapter 77. The third and fourth enlargements of the EU and the development of European integration in the 2000s 457
Chapter 78. The situation on the Korean Peninsula 464
Chapter 79. The American strategy of “regime change” and the change in the situation in the Persian Gulf as a result of the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime 470
Application. Chronology 478
Name index 510
Recommended sites 519

Academic Educational Forum on International Relations

Moscow Public Science Foundation

Institute of the USA and Canada Russian Academy of Sciences

School of Woffd Politics State University of Humanities

Scientific and educational forum

On international relations

Moscow Public Science Foundation Institute of USA and Canada RAS

Faculty of World Politics, State University of Humanities

SYSTEMIC HISTORY

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IN FOUR VOLUME

SYSTEM

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IN FOUR VOLUME 1918-2000

Volume two

DOCUMENTATION

1910-1940s

Edited by Prof. Dr. Alexei D. Bogaturov

Edited by

the doctors political* sciences, professorsA. D. Bogatyreva

"Moskovsky rabochy" 2000

"Moscow Worker" 2000

Systematic history of international relations in four volumes. Events and documents. 1918-2000. Rep. ed. A.D. Bogaturov. Volume two. Documents from the 1910s to the 1940s. Comp. A.V. Malgin. M.: Moskovsky Rabochiy, 2000. 243 p.

SECTION I. COMPLETION OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Compiled by

A.V.MALYIN

The four-volume volume represents the first attempt after the collapse of the USSR to comprehensively study the history of international relations of the last eight decades of the 20th century. The odd-numbered volumes of the publication are devoted to the analysis of events in world political history, while the even-numbered volumes contain the main documents and materials necessary to obtain a more complete understanding of the events and facts described.

The second volume is compiled as a documentary illustration of the history of international relations and foreign policy of Russia and the USSR from the final stage of the First World War to the victory of the United Nations over Germany and Japan in 1945. The collection includes documents including different years published in the Soviet Union in open editions and collections of limited distribution, as well as materials from foreign publications. In the latter case, the cited texts are given in a translation into Russian made by A.V. Malgin (documents 87, 94-97).

The publication is addressed to researchers and teachers, students, graduate students of humanitarian universities and anyone interested in the history of international relations, diplomacy and foreign policy of Russia.

Published with the support of the MacArthur Foundation

Scientific and auxiliary work on the manuscript was carried out by E.N. Orlova Computer layout by N.V. Sokolova

1. Declaration of Russia, France and Great Britain on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, signed in London * August 23 (September 5), 1914

[Authorities; Russia- Benckendorf, FranceP. Cambon, UK- Gray.]

The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, make the following declaration:

The Governments of Russia, France and Great Britain mutually undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the present war.

The three Governments agree that when the time comes to discuss the terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers will impose any terms of peace without the prior consent of each of the other Allies.

2. Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Temporary Russian government P.N.Milyukova

Delivered through Russian representatives

Allied powers

On March 27 of this year, the provisional government published an appeal to citizens, which contained a statement of the views of the government of free Russia on the tasks of this war. The Minister of Foreign Affairs instructs me to inform you of the said document and make the following comments.

Our enemies have recently tried to create discord amongunion relations, spreading absurd rumors that RosThis country is ready to conclude a separate peace with the middle monarchies. The text of the attached document best refutes such fabrications. You will see from it that those expressed by the temporarygovernment general provisions quite consistent with those highideas that were constantly expressed right up to the very last of his time by many outstanding statesmen

ISBN 5-89554-139-9

© A.V.Malgn, ADBogaturov. compilation, 1996, 2000

© S.I. Dudin, emblem, 1997

Japan acceded to this agreement by a note signed by London Inoue on October 6/19, 1914; Italy - November 8/21, 1915

Section I, End of the First World War

Allied countries and which found especially vivid expression on the part of our new ally, the great trans-Atlantic republic, in the speeches of its president. The government of the old regime, of course, was not able to assimilate and share these thoughts about the liberating nature of the war, about creating solid foundations for the peaceful coexistence of peoples, about self-determination of oppressed nationalities, etc.

But liberated Russia can now speak in a language understandable to the advanced democracies of modern humanity, and it is in a hurry to add its voice to the voices of its allies. Imbued with this new spirit of liberated democracy, the statements of the provisional government, of course, cannot give the slightest reason to think that the coup that took place entailed a weakening of Russia's role in the common allied struggle. Quite the opposite - the national desire to bring the world war to a decisive victory only intensified, thanks to the awareness of the common responsibility of everyone. This desire became more effective, being focused on a task that was close to everyone and obvious - to poison the enemy who had invaded the very borders of our homeland. It goes without saying, as stated in the reported document, the provisional government, while protecting the rights of our homeland, will fully comply with the obligations assumed in relation to our allies. While it continues to have full confidence in the victorious end of the present war, in full agreement with the allies, it is also absolutely confident that the issues raised by this war will be resolved in the spirit of creating a solid basis for lasting peace and that advanced democracies, imbued with the same aspirations, will find a way to achieve those guarantees and sanctions that are necessary to prevent new bloody clashes in the future.

3. Message from the Provisional Russian Government

Delivered to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers

In view of doubts that have arisen regarding the interpretation of the note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs accompanying the transfer to the Allied governments of the declaration of the provisional government on the tasks of the war [dated March 27 (April 9)], the provisional government considers it necessary to clarify:

1. 
   The Foreign Minister's note was the subject of careful
   a long and lengthy discussion of the provisional government,
   and its text was adopted unanimously.
2. 
   It goes without saying that this note, speaking of decisive
   victory over the enemy, means achieving those tasks that

set by the declaration of March 27 and expressed in the following words: “The Provisional Government considers it its right and duty to declare now that the goal of free Russia is not domination over other peoples, not depriving them of their national property, not the violent seizure of foreign territories, but the establishment of lasting peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples. The Russian people do not seek to strengthen their external power at the expense of other peoples; he does not set as his goal the enslavement and humiliation of anyone. In the name of the highest principles of justice, he removed the shackles that lay on the Polish people. But the Russian people will not allow their homeland to emerge from the great struggle humiliated and undermined in its vitality."

3. By the “sanctions and” guarantees” of lasting peace mentioned in the note, the provisional government meant arms limitation, international tribunals, etc.

4. Appeal of the Petrograd Soviet

Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies *

Comrades! The Russian revolution was born in the fire of world war. This war is a monstrous crime of the imperialists of all countries, whose greed for conquests, their mad rush to armaments are preparing and making a world fire inevitable. Whatever the vicissitudes of military fortune, the imperialists of all countries are equally the victors in this war: the war has given and continues to give them monstrous profits, accumulates colossal capital in their hands, and gives them unheard-of power over the personality, labor and very life of the working people. But this is precisely why the working people of all countries are equally defeated in this war.

On the altar of imperialism they make countless sacrifices with their lives, their health, their fortune, their freedom; Unspeakable hardships fall on their shoulders. Russian Revolution,

• 
  revolution of the working people, workers and soldiers, is not an uprising
  only against the crimes of international imperialism. This
• 
  not only a national revolution, this is the first stage of revolution
  international mission that will put an end to the shame of war and
  will return peace to humanity. Russian Revolution from the very moment
  birth, she was clearly aware of the international
  native task. Its authorized body is the Petrograd Soviet
  R. and S.D. - in his appeal dated March 14/27, he called on the peoples

This document reflects the balance of forces in the Petrograd Soviet, where the Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties had the majority.

8 Systemic history of international relations. 1910-1940s. Documentation

The whole world unite to fight for peace. The revolutionary democracy of Russia does not want a separate peace, which would give a free hand to the Austro-German alliance. She knows that such a world would be a betrayal of the cause of workers' democracy in all countries, which would find itself tied hand and foot before the world of triumphant imperialism. She knows that such a peace could lead to the military defeat of other countries and thereby strengthen the triumph of the ideas of chauvinism and revenge in Europe for many years, leaving it in the position of an armed camp, as it was after the Frank-Prussian War of 18/0, and thus inevitably preparing for a new bloody battle in the near future. The revolutionary democracy of Russia wants universal peace on a basis acceptable to the working people of all countries, who do not seek conquest, do not strive for robbery, who are equally interested in the free expression of the waves of all peoples and in crushing the power of international imperialism. A world without annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples - this formula, accepted without second thoughts by the proletarian mind and heart, provides a platform on which the working people of all countries, warring and neutral, can and must come together in order to establish lasting peace and heal their wounds with common efforts caused by the bloody war. The provisional government of revolutionary Russia adopted this platform. And the revolutionary democracy of Russia turns first of all to you, the socialists of the allied powers. You must not allow the voice of the Russian provisional government to remain alone in the alliance of the powers of the Agreement. You must force your governments to declare decisively and definitely that a platform for peace without annexation and indemnities based on the self-determination of peoples is also their platform. By doing this you will give due weight and strength to the speech of the Russian government. You will give our revolutionary army, which wrote “peace among nations” on its banner, the confidence that its bloody sacrifices will not be used for evil. You will give her the opportunity, with all the fervor of revolutionary enthusiasm, to carry out the combat missions that fall to her lot. You will strengthen her belief that, while defending the gains of the revolution and our freedom, she is at the same time fighting for the interests of all international democracy and will thereby contribute to the speedy onset of the desired peace. You will present the governments of hostile countries with the necessity of either resolutely and irrevocably abandoning the policy of seizure, robbery and violence, or openly admitting their crimes and thereby bringing down the just wrath of their peoples on their heads. The revolutionary democracy of Russia also addresses you, socialists of the Austro-German alliance. You cannot allow the troops of your governments to become the executioners of Russian freedom. You cannot allow that, taking advantage of the joyful mood of freedom and brotherhood that has gripped the revolutionary Russian army, your governments will transfer

Section I. End of the First World War

Troops to the Western Front to first destroy France, then rush to Russia and, in the end, to strangle yourself and the entire international proletariat in the world embrace of imperialism. The revolutionary democracy of Russia appeals to the socialists of the warring and neutral countries to prevent the triumph of the imperialists. Let the cause of peace, begun by the Russian revolution, be brought to completion through the efforts of the international proletariat. To combine these efforts, the Petrograd Council of R. and S.D. decided to take the initiative to convene international conference all socialist parties and factions of all countries; whatever the differences that have torn socialism apart during three years of war, not a single faction of the proletariat should refuse to participate in the common struggle for peace, which is in line before the Russian revolution. We are confident, comrades, that we will see representatives of all socialist groups at the conference we are convening.

The unanimous decision of the proletarian International will be the first victory of the working people over the capitalist International.

Workers of all countries, unite!

5. From the declaration of the Provisional Russian Government of May 5/18, 1917.

In its foreign policy, the provisional government, in full agreement with all the people, rejects a separate peace, openly sets as its goal the speedy conclusion of a universal peace, which has as its goal neither domination over other peoples, nor the deprivation of their national property, nor the forcible seizure of foreign territories, - peace without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples. In the firm belief that with the fall of the tsarist regime in Russia and the establishment of democratic principles in domestic and foreign policy, a new factor in the desire for lasting peace and brotherhood of peoples was created for the allied democracies, the provisional government is taking preparatory steps towards an agreement with the allies on the basis of the declaration of the provisional government of 27 March (April 9).

2. In the conviction that the defeat of Russia and her allies would not only be the source of the greatest disasters for the peoples, but would also delay or make impossible the conclusion of a general peace on the above basis, the provisional government firmly believes that the revolutionary army of Russia will not allow the German the troops defeated our allies and fell upon us with the full force of their weapons. Strengthening the beginnings of democratization of the army, organizing and strengthening its combat strength both in defensive and offensive actions will be the most important task of the provisional government.

Systemic hysteria international relationships. 1910-1940s. Documentation

ChapterI. End of the First World War wars

6. Peace Decree adopted II All-Russian * Congress of Soviets October 26 (November 8), 1917

Peace Decree

The Workers' and Peasants' Government, created by the revolution of October 24-25 and based on the advice of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, invites all warring peoples and their governments to immediately begin negotiations on a just democratic peace.

The just or democratic peace that the overwhelming majority of the exhausted, exhausted and war-torn workers and laboring classes of all the warring countries yearn for - the peace that the Russian workers and peasants most definitely and persistently demanded after the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy - is such a peace that the government considers immediate peace without annexations (i.e. without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forced annexation of foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.

The Russian government proposes to conclude such a peace to all warring peoples immediately, expressing its readiness to immediately take all decisive steps without the slightest delay, pending the final approval of all the conditions of such a peace by authorized assemblies of people's representatives of all countries and all nations.

By annexation or seizure of foreign lands, the government understands, accordingly legal consciousness democracy in general and the working classes in particular."any annexation to a large or strong state of a small or weak nationality without the precisely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, regardless of when this forced annexation is complete, regardless of how developed or backward is a nation forcibly annexed or forcibly retained within the borders of a given state.Finally, regardless of whether this nation lives in Europe or in distant overseas countries.

If any nation is kept within the borders of a given state by force, if, contrary to its expressed desire, it does not matter whether this desire is expressed in the press, in popular assemblies, in party decisions or indignations and uprisings against national oppression - If the right to freely vote, with the complete withdrawal of the troops of the annexing or generally stronger nation, is not given the right to decide without the slightest coercion the question of the forms of state existence of this nation, then its annexation is annexation, i.e. capture and violence.

To continue this war over how to divide among the strong and rich nations the weak nations they have captured,

Written by V.I. Lenin.

The government considers it the greatest crime against humanity and solemnly declares its determination to immediately sign peace terms ending this war on the specified conditions, equally fair for all nationalities without exception.

At the same time, the government declares that it does not at all consider the above peace conditions to be ultimatum, i.e. agrees to consider all other conditions of peace, insisting only on their proposal as quickly as possible by any belligerent country and on complete clarity, on the unconditional exclusion of all ambiguity and all secrecy when proposing conditions."

Viy peace.

The government abolishes secret diplomacy, for its part expressing its firm intention to conduct all negotiations completely openly before all the people, immediately proceeding to the full publication of secret agreements confirmed or concluded by the government of landowners and capitalists from February to October 25, 1917. The entire content of these secret agreements, since it is aimed, as in most cases, at delivering benefits and privileges to Russian landowners and capitalists, at maintaining or increasing the annexations of the Great Russians, the government declares unconditionally and immediately cancelled.

Addressing the proposal to the governments and peoples of all countries to immediately begin open negotiations on concluding peace, the government expresses its readiness to conduct these negotiations both through written communications, by telegraph, and through negotiations between representatives of different countries or at a conference of such representatives. To facilitate such negotiations, the government appoints its plenipotentiary representative to neutral countries.

The government invites all governments and peoples of all warring countries to immediately conclude a truce, and for its part considers it desirable that this truce be concluded for no less than 3 months, i.e. for such a period during which it is quite possible to complete peace negotiations with the participation of representatives of all nationalities without exception, or nations drawn into the war or forced to participate in it,

Transcript

1 Scientific and educational forum on international relations Systematic history of international relations in two volumes Volume two. Events of the years Edited by Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor A.D. Bogaturov 2nd edition Moscow 2009

2 BBK 66.4(0)-6*63.3 C34 Editorial Board Academician G.A. Arbatov, Corresponding Member of the RAS V.G. Baranovsky, Doctor of Pol. A.D. Bogaturov, Corresponding Member of the RAS A.A. Dynkin, Doctor of Philology A.Yu.Melville, Doctor of History M.G. Nosov, Academician N.A. Simonia, Corresponding Member of the RAS A.V. Torkunov, Doctor of Political Sciences I.G. Tyulin, Doctor of Pol.Sc. T.A. Shakleina, Doctor of Political Sciences M.A. Khrustalev, Academician A.O. Chubaryan Team of authors Ph.D. Batyuk (chap. 1, 10, 11), A.D. Bogaturov (introduction, ch. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, final), Ph.D. T.V. Bordachev (chap. 10,11), doctor of historical sciences V.G. Korgun (chapter 3, 9, 11), Doctor of Historical Sciences V.B. Knyazhinsky (chapter 1), doctor of historical sciences S.I. Lunev (chapter 3, 7), doctor of political sciences B.F. Martynov (chapter 7, 10), Ph.D. D.V. Polikanov (Ch. 7, 9), P.E. Smirnov (Ch. 1, 2, 5, 10), Doctor of Pol. T.A. Shakleina (chap. 10, 11), Doctor of Political Sciences M.A. Khrustalev (chap. 3, 6, 7, 8), Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Yazkova (chapter 9) The chronology was compiled by Ph.D. Yu.V. Ustinova and Ph.D. A.A. Sokolov The name index was compiled by A.A. Sokolov C34 Systematic history of international relations in two volumes / Edited by A.D. Bogaturov. Volume two. Events of the years. Ed. 2nd. M.: Cultural Revolution, p. ISBN This publication is a two-volume version of the four-volume book of the same name, published several years ago and has long won the recognition of readers. This is the first attempt since 1991 to comprehensively study the history of international relations of the last eight decades of the twentieth century. The second volume examines the period from the end of World War II to the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. Particular attention is paid to the formation and evolution of the Yalta-Potsdam order, the emergence of “confrontational stability” in the years, the international consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of a new world order. The book examines issues of international relations in regional subsystems in Europe, East Asia, the Near and Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The publication is addressed to specialists and a wide range of readers: teachers, researchers, students, undergraduates and graduate students of humanitarian universities and anyone interested in the history of diplomacy and foreign policy of Russia. A.D. Bogaturov, 2000, 2006 Cultural revolution, 2009

3 Contents with Preface Introduction. Change of orders in the international system Section I. An attempt to create a global order and its failure Chapter 1. Contradictions of the post-war settlement () Creation of the foundations of world economic regulation at the final stage of the Second World War. Bretton Woods system (25). The position of the Soviet Union regarding the Bretton Woods system (27). Treaty-legal foundations of relations between great powers (29). San Francisco Conference of 1945 and the creation of the UN (30). Features of the functioning of the UN (30). Correlation of capabilities of the USA and the USSR (31). Features of the post-war situation in Western Europe (32). Soviet and American perceptions of potential military threats (37). Features of international decisions on the German issue in 1945 (38). Growing contradictions regarding settlement issues regarding Germany (40). The situation around Austria (42). Question about former Italian colonies (42). Dispute over Trieste (43). The emergence of the concept of “containing” the USSR. Kennan's "Long Telegram" (45). Aggravation of the issue of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran (47). Attempts to limit the role of the nuclear factor in international relations (48). “Baruch Plan” and disruption of the work of the UN Atomic Energy Commission (49). The Greek question in relations between the great powers (51). Diplomatic conflict between the USSR and Turkey (52). Question of diplomatic recognition of Eastern European countries (54). The situation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (55). The situation in the Soviet Baltic states (61). Disagreements in connection with the development of peace treaties with Germany's European allies. Paris Conference 1946 (62). The question of the Italian-Yugoslav border and the completion of work on draft peace treaties with the German allies (64). Exacerbation of disagreements on the German question (66). Differences among Western countries on German policy issues (66). Chapter 2. The initial stage of the formation of bipolarity () Prerequisites for the transformation of political regimes in Eastern European countries (69). Defeat of non-communist forces at all

4 4 Contents of the general elections in Poland on January 19, 1947 and its consequences (71). Signing peace treaties with former German allies (72). Territorial changes in Europe based on the decisions of the (73). Pact of Dunkirk between France and Great Britain (79). Announcement of the “Truman Doctrine” and activation of US international policy (80). Marshall Plan (81). Creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (84). The meaning of the Marshall Plan (84). The turning point in the situation in Eastern Europe and the formation of Cominform (85). Formation of the Free Greece government in Thessaloniki (87). The German question at the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947 (88). Coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia (88). The emergence of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (90). Preparation and conclusion of the Brussels Pact (92). The European idea in international relations of the 40s (94). Separate meeting of the six Western powers on Germany in London (94). The aggravation of the German question and the first Berlin crisis (96). Signing of the Danube Convention (98). Formation of a system of cross-contracts between Eastern European countries (99). The internal political situation in the USSR and Eastern European countries in the late 40s and its impact on international relations (100). Creation of CMEA (104). The Washington Conference of 1949 and the formation of NATO (104). Foreign policy views of the American elite and the ideologization of the Soviet-American confrontation (106). Activation of international social movements of an anti-war orientation (107). Creation of the Council of Europe (108). Preparations for the creation of a separate West German state and the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany (108). International situation by the fall of 1949 and the transformation of the USSR into a nuclear power (109). The formation of the GDR and the completion of the political split in Germany (110). Yugoslavia's emergence from diplomatic isolation and the emergence of the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment (110). Chapter 3. The spread of bipolar confrontation to East Asia and the periphery of the international system () The situation in East Asia after the end of World War II (113). Approaches of the USSR and the USA to the regional situation (114). The policy of the leading powers in matters of a peaceful settlement with Japan (115). Civil War in China and destabilization of the East Asian subsystem (117). The conflict surrounding the declaration of Indonesian independence (120). The emergence of a communist enclave in French Indochina and the beginning of the revolutionary war of liberation against France in North Vietnam (122). The United States granting independence to the Philippines (123). Situation in Malaya (124). Split of Korea (124). Formation of the PRC and the split of China (126). 2. International situation India at the end of the World War (130). British Indian Independence Act and state demarcation in South Asia (131). First India-Pakistan

5th Sky War (132). Formation and features of India's foreign policy orientation (133). Sino-Indian contradictions in Tibet (134). 3. The situation in the Middle East (135). Foreign policy orientation of Iran after the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country (136). The emergence of the Iranian policy of “positive nationalism” (138). Features of Afghan neutrality after World War II (140). 4. Shifts in the Middle Eastern subsystem and the consolidation of Arab countries on a national-state basis (141). The Palestinian problem after the Second World War (143). First Arab-Israeli War (145). The aggravation of relations between Egypt and Great Britain and the coup of the Free Officers (147). 5. Inter-American relations in the late 40s. Signing of the Rio Pact and creation of the OAS (148). Features of relations between Latin American countries and the United States (149). 6. The Korean issue in relations between the leading powers (150). Start Korean War(151). The entry of the PRC into the war and the “MacArthur ultimatum” (153). Extra-regional aspects of the Korean War (154). 7. Intensification of the American policy of a peace settlement with Japan (156). Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty (157). Preparation and holding of the San Francisco Peace Conference (158). Conclusion of an alliance treaty between Japan and the United States (160). Completion of the formation of a network of guarantee agreements against Japan (160). The formation of the San Francisco order and its features (161). Chapter 4. Structural design of the two-bloc system () International political situation in Western Europe during the Korean War (164). The problem of Germany’s “return” to Europe (166). Tightening US approaches to international politics (168). Changing NATO policy towards Spain and the American policy of “strengthening the flanks” (171). The emergence of Western European integration and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (173). The project for creating a unified European army (“Pleven Plan”) (174). Signing of the Bonn Treaty ending Germany's occupation status and the Paris Treaty on the European Defense Community (176). Change of political leadership in the USSR (178). The adoption by the US Republican administration of the concept of “throwing away communism” (178). The beginning of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe and the anti-government protests of 1953 in the GDR (181). The beginning of the peaceful diplomatic offensive of the USSR (183). Activation of national liberation processes on the periphery of the international system (185). American Domino Doctrine (185). The fall of the monarchy in Egypt (186). Sino-Indian compromise in Tibet (187). Escalation of the Vietnam conflict (188). Geneva Conference on Indochina and Korea and its results (189). US intervention in Guatemala (191). The failure of the European Defense Co-5 project

6 6 Table of contents of the society (192). Preparation and conclusion of the Manila Pact (194). Preparations for the admission of Germany into the military-political structures of the West (196). Signing of the Paris Protocols of 1954 on the entry of Germany into the Western Union and NATO (197). The concept of “dual containment” (197). The beginning of the war in Algeria (198). Creation of the Baghdad Pact (199). Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries (200). Signing of the Warsaw Pact (202). Resolution of the Austrian problem (203). Normalization of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia (204). ECSC Conference in Messina (205). Geneva Summit (206). Normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Germany (207) Section II. Balancing on the brink of war Chapter 5. Contradictions of “competitive coexistence” () Foreign policy program of “peaceful coexistence” (210). De-Stalinization and “crises of hope” in the “socialist community” (212). Dissolution of the Cominform and disagreements in the “socialist camp” on the issue of criticism of I.V. Stalin (214). Conflict in Poland (214). Soviet intervention in Hungary (216). Modernization of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe (219). Restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan (220). “Suez crisis” in the Middle East (221). Positions of the USSR and the USA regarding the situation around the Suez Canal (222). "Eisenhower Doctrine" (224). The aggravation of Afghan-Pakistani contradictions and the strengthening of the influence of the USSR in Afghanistan (225). Strengthening integration trends in Western Europe and the formation of the EEC (227). Testing of ICBMs in the Soviet Union and changes in the global military-strategic situation (230). Deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe (232). Exacerbation of the German problem (233). Education of the UAR and the Lebanese crisis (234). Taiwan crisis (236). An attempt to reorganize the colonial empire of France (239). Toughening of the USSR's position on West Berlin (240). The situation in Southeast Asia in the second half of the 50s (241). Chapter 6. Shift of conflict to the international periphery zone () Revolution in Cuba (245). Attempts at compromise on the German issue (246). Increasing disagreements between the USSR and the PRC (248). Preparation and holding of the first Soviet-American summit meeting (248). New conflict between China and India in Tibet (250). Exacerbation of Soviet-Japanese relations (251). Preparations for the Paris Summit Conference and its disruption (252). The spread of the anti-colonial wave to Africa (253). The emergence of conflict in the Congo (254). Issues of decolonization in the activities of the UN (258). Formation of a conflict node in the Middle East around Iraq (258). Development in

7 US concept of “flexible response” (260). Differences between the United States and Western European countries on military-political issues (262). Soviet-American meeting in Vienna and the “second Berlin crisis” (264). The emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (266). Soviet-Albanian political conflict (267). The emergence of two approaches to European integration (267). Resolution of the conflict in Algeria (267). Attempts to normalize the situation in Indochina and the signing of the Geneva Agreements on Laos (269). Conflict in Yemen (270). Cuban Missile Crisis (271). Discussion on “multilateral nuclear forces” and the “Nassau Pact” (274) Section III. Confrontational stability Chapter 7. The formation of the policy of détente () An attempt to form a Franco-West German “axis” and its failure (279). Modernization of foreign policy attitudes of the USSR and the USA (281). Doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (282). Conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons Tests (283). Aggravation of the conflict in Cyprus (286). Education UNCTAD (287). Growing tensions around Vietnam and the beginning of the Vietnamese-American conflict (288). The transition of Soviet-Chinese differences into open confrontation (289). The beginning of the US war in Vietnam (292). Stabilization of the situation in the Congo (293). Indo-Pakistani War (294). Events in Indonesia (296). Contradictions in the process of deepening Western European integration and the “Luxembourg compromise” (298). France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization (300). Soviet-French rapprochement (302). Treaty on Principles for the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (303). “Authoritarian wave” in Latin America and the conclusion of the “Treaty of Tlatelolco” (304). The struggle against apartheid in southern Africa (307). Conflict in Nigeria (309). Aggravation of the situation in the Middle East. "Six Day War" (311). The problem of the Arab people of Palestine (314). Soviet-American meeting in Glassboro (315). The approach of the ATS and NATO countries to the situation in Europe (316). ASEAN Education (318). An attempt at a settlement in Vietnam and the growth of anti-war protests in the USA (318). Worldwide wave of leftist protest sentiments (“ world revolution 1968") and its impact on international relations (321). Conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (323). Attempts at internal reforms in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and their consequences (324). The doctrine of “socialist internationalism” (326). Disruption of the Soviet-American summit (328). Chapter 8. Stabilization of the international system () Exacerbation of Soviet-Chinese relations (330). The emergence of a pan-European process (332). “Guam Doctrine” by R. Nixon (333). Culmina-

8 8 Contents tion of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation (335). The formation of the “new Eastern policy” of Germany (336). The crisis of the Bretton Woods system (338). The human rights movement in the USSR and its influence on the international relations of the Soviet Union (339). The second stage of Western European integration (341). International legal consolidation of the post-war borders of Germany (343). Conflict around the PLO in Jordan (345). Legalization of the policy of détente at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU (347). Formation of a system of consultative pacts between the USSR and non-socialist countries (348). Education of Bangladesh and the Indo-Pakistani War (349). Normalization of US-China relations (351). A new balance of power capabilities of the USSR and the USA and the formation of the concept of “strategic parity” (352). Soviet-American rapprochement (353). Normalization of relations between China and Japan (358). Signing of the Paris Agreements on Vietnam (358). Development of the Helsinki Process (361). The situation with ensuring human rights in the USSR (362). The formation of the ideological and political trend of “trilateralism” (363). The situation in Latin America (364). Overthrow of the Popular Unity government in Chile (364). Soviet-Japanese summit (366). "October War" in the Middle East (366). The first “oil shock” (371). Chapter 9. Contradictions of détente and its crisis () Coordination of foreign policies of industrial states in the conditions of the “energy crisis” (374). Aggravation of the situation in Cyprus (375). Promotion of the idea of ​​a “new international economic order” by the UN General Assembly (377). The emergence of a “pause” in Soviet-American relations and growing disagreements on human rights issues (378). The emergence of a network of partnerships between the USSR and African countries (380). Signing of the Helsinki Act (384). Fall of the dictatorship in Spain (387). The Rise of Neutrality in Southeast Asia (387). The unification of Vietnam and a new aggravation of the situation in Indochina (389). Exacerbation of Soviet-American geopolitical contradictions (391). The formation of “Eurocommunism” and its international political role (392). Problems of human rights in international relations (393). Belgrade CSCE meeting and the adoption of new constitutions in the “socialist countries” (395). The deepening of Soviet-American contradictions in Africa and the war in the Horn of Africa (397). The Rhodesia Problem (398). Conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship (399). The emergence of the Cambodia problem and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (400). The formation of “triangular” relations between the USSR, the USA and the PRC (402). The Iran-American conflict and the second “oil shock” (403). The problem of petrodollar circulation in international relations (405). Soviet-American SALT-2 negotiations (407). The situation in Latin America (409). The emergence of new centers of instability in the Middle East (411). The problem of “Euromissiles” and NATO’s “dual solution” (414). The outbreak of the USSR war in Afghanistan and the breakdown of the policy of détente (416).

9 Chapter 10. Renewal of bipolar confrontation () Foreign policy strategies of the USSR and the USA (420). The Afghan issue in international relations (423). Global debt crisis (424). Polish crisis (425). “Sanctions Strategy” (428). An attempt to create a US-Chinese quasi-alliance (429). The emergence of the Central American conflict and its internationalization (430). Iran-Iraq War (421). Beginning of the Madrid CSCE Meeting (433). Soviet-American relations after the change of administration in the United States and the creation of a bloc of negotiating systems on arms control issues (434). Falklands Crisis (436). Aggravation of conflicts around the PLO in Lebanon and Syria (438). The formation of the “equidistance” policy in the PRC (441). Deployment of American missiles medium range in Europe and the culmination of the Soviet-American confrontation (442). Completion of the Madrid CSCE Meeting and convening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures (444). Expanding conflict in Afghanistan (445). Economic exhaustion and undermining of the foreign policy resources of the Soviet Union (446). The doctrine of “new globalism” in the USA (448). Change of leadership in the USSR and resumption of dialogue with the West (450). Anti-nuclear trends in the South Pacific and the signing of the “Treaty of Rarotonga” (452). The formation of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia (453). Development of Western European integration and signing of the Single European Act (455). Chapter 11. The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order () Doctrinal foundations of the new foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union (458). Exacerbation environmental problems international security (460). Political and psychological situation in the world in the second half of the 80s (461). Completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures and convening of the Vienna OSCE Meeting (462). Resolution of the Central American conflict (463). Soviet-American relations in the military-political field and the signing of the Washington Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (466). International legal settlement of the situation around Afghanistan (468). Ending foreign interference in Angola (470). Completion of the Vienna CSCE meeting and changes in USSR policy regarding human rights (472). The USSR's new policy in East Asia and the end of Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (474). Normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC (476). Easing tension in Korea (478). “Doctrine of non-interference” by M.S. Gorbachev (479). Anti-communist “revolutions” in Eastern European countries (480). US intervention in Panama (484). Strengthening regionalist tendencies in Latin America and the restoration of democracy in Chile (485). The emergence of centrifugal tendencies and the threat of collapse in the USSR (488). Unification of Germany (492). Signing of the Limitation Treaty 9

10 10 Table of contents of conventional armed forces in Europe (495). Charter of Paris for a New Europe (496). Transformation of the apartheid regime in South Africa (497). The evolution of the Middle East conflict and the Gulf War (497). Beginning of the Madrid Conference on the Middle East (501). The deepening of the political crisis in the USSR (501). Disintegration of the Department of Internal Affairs (503). Conclusion of the Schengen Convention (503). Signing of the Moscow Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) (504). Attempted coup in the USSR (505). Self-destruction of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (506). Collapse of Yugoslavia (507) Section IV. Globalization Chapter 12. The collapse of the bipolar structure () Crisis and reforms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (514). The beginning of the war in Yugoslavia (517). Transformation of Russian-American relations and the signing of the START-2 treaty (519). The problem of the nuclear legacy of the USSR (522). The formation of the CIS and the issue of ensuring security in its space (523). Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh (527). International aspects of the confrontation in Afghanistan (529). Tajik conflict (531). War in Transnistria (534). Ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia (538). The problem of the rights of the non-indigenous population of the Baltic countries (545). Conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty and creation of the European Union (548). Strengthening integration groups in East Asia, North and Latin America (551). American concept of “expanding democracy” (556). The crisis of the UN system and the strengthening of mechanisms for informal regulation of international relations (558). Humanitarian intervention in Somalia (560). Normalization of the situation in Cambodia (561). The situation in the Middle East and attempts at reconciliation between Israel and Jordan and the PLO (561). The situation on the Korean Peninsula and the “nuclear alarm” of 1994 (563). Formation of the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative (565). Third EU enlargement (566). The conflict in Bosnia and the first NATO intervention in the Balkans (568). Signing of an agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Africa (570). Taiwan "missile crisis" and China's turn towards rapprochement with Russia (571). Development of relations in the CIS and the formation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus (574). Preparations for NATO expansion (575). Chapter 13. “Pluralistic unipolarity” () Globalization and the development of international relations between states into a system of world-political relations (580). The first stage of NATO expansion (562). Changing Iran's foreign policy priorities (584). Normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations (585). National reconciliation in Tajikistan (586). Carry out

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